tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post5814870871852030376..comments2024-03-17T08:25:33.806+00:00Comments on Thoughts of Francis Turretin: Simple Argument Against Libertarian Free Will from ForesightTurretinfanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comBlogger139125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-8131769369601528112011-09-06T17:04:08.932+01:002011-09-06T17:04:08.932+01:00WM,
BTW, if you are really interested in Edwards,...WM,<br /><br />BTW, if you are really interested in Edwards, here's my review of his book on the will:<br /><br />http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2008/11/index-for-critique-of-jonathan-edwards.html<br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttp://www.arminianchronicles.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-48022931791589629642011-09-06T17:00:41.034+01:002011-09-06T17:00:41.034+01:00WM, I am not sure what to make of your second poi...WM, I am not sure what to make of your second point (i.e. it refers to a specific explanation of how the will might operate in accordance with the laws of causation), so I will just comment on your first. <br /><br />What you are describing what philosophers call semi-compatiblism (i.e. responsibility and determinism) rather than compatiblism (freedom and determinism). John Martin Fisher is Godismyjudgehttp://www.arminianchronicles.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-34782804012695372182011-09-04T20:47:05.337+01:002011-09-04T20:47:05.337+01:00My response is: I don't think you're free ...My response is: I don't think you're free to simply take Edwards out of context and claim to "understand" him -- but OK, let's set that aside.<br /><br />My understanding of compatibilism is twofold. First, it refers to the claim that moral responsibility is compatible with the obedience of the will to causation; and second, it refers to a specific explanation of how the wtanksleyjrnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-58628128806760537852011-09-04T20:38:34.607+01:002011-09-04T20:38:34.607+01:00OK, here was your lost post (it shows in the RSS f...OK, here was your lost post (it shows in the RSS feed, but I don't see it on this page:<br /><br />Thursday, September 01, 2011 1:56 PMWM,<br /><br />That's not how I understand Edwards, but maybe it's best if we set Edwards asside. What do you mean by compatiblism?<br /><br />God be with you,<br />Danwtanksleyjrnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-52175857333516323762011-09-03T16:44:19.902+01:002011-09-03T16:44:19.902+01:00Dan, I think you made a comment that got lost due ...Dan, I think you made a comment that got lost due to the switchover to the new system. You might want to repost. (This comment is also a test -- my previous two were apparently lost, but the loss may have been due to my system's network unreliability.)wtanksleyjrnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-90496093400241405322011-09-01T21:56:08.055+01:002011-09-01T21:56:08.055+01:00WM,
That's not how I understand Edwards, but ...WM,<br /><br />That's not how I understand Edwards, but maybe it's best if we set Edwards asside. What do you mean by compatiblism?<br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-1311078383348826582011-08-31T19:50:18.771+01:002011-08-31T19:50:18.771+01:00Edwards wasn't attempting to define the freedo...Edwards wasn't attempting to define the freedom of the will in that sentence; he was attempting to explain the common perception of freedom <i>per se</i>. If the will were to be described as having freedom, one would expect to show that the will is free from compulsion or constraint on itself, just as if we talk about ourselves being free we are talking about our own freedom from compulsion wtanksleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03283393679440645366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-18139025862267554982011-08-31T19:17:56.854+01:002011-08-31T19:17:56.854+01:00Dan, what am I failing so badly to understand abou...Dan, what am I failing so badly to understand about your statements regarding hypotheticals and counterfactuals? My answer seems like a perfect rebuttal, but your answer to it is simply "no", and then you repeat your original point.<br /><br />I agree that you've expressed counterfactuals, but those counterfactuals are not inherent to the definition of compatibilism; rather, they&#wtanksleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03283393679440645366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-81598955740619058222011-08-31T02:26:43.496+01:002011-08-31T02:26:43.496+01:00WM,
TF's contention is that this sentence is ...WM,<br /><br /><i>TF's contention is that this sentence is ultimately only _trivially_ true -- that ultimately speaking, man must somehow not be able to cause nonX.</i><br /><br />Sure. But the question, in my mind, is if that view is based on some belief we share, or not? I would be unsupprized to find that ultimatly, we don't have the same underling presuppositions.<br /><br />God be Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-37709570087384851922011-08-31T02:19:25.032+01:002011-08-31T02:19:25.032+01:00WM,
It's very interesting that you say that c...WM,<br /><br /><i>It's very interesting that you say that compatibilism "changes the past". Do you mean that it requires that in order for the present to be changed to demonstrate contrary choice, the past must be changed as well?</i><br /><br />No. In the expressions you could choose X <i>if it were your stongest desire</i> or you could do X <i>if you chose to</i> the ability to Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-52472309040047365402011-08-31T02:13:50.330+01:002011-08-31T02:13:50.330+01:00WM,
Regarding Edwards, he said:
There are two ...WM, <br /><br />Regarding Edwards, he said:<br /><br />There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint; otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-27129885254936028802011-08-27T00:25:38.076+01:002011-08-27T00:25:38.076+01:00It's very interesting that you say that compat...It's very interesting that you say that compatibilism "changes the past". Do you mean that it requires that in order for the present to be changed to demonstrate contrary choice, the past must be changed as well? If so, I'd have to agree; but this doesn't mean compatibilism is a "hypothetical" freedom, but rather that the concept of a contrary choice is an wtanksleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03283393679440645366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-57290641788005322532011-08-26T22:26:48.794+01:002011-08-26T22:26:48.794+01:00Dan, thank you for your considered answer.
One mi...Dan, thank you for your considered answer.<br /><br />One minor thing first...<br /><br />I'm puzzled by one assertion you attribute to Edwards; I scanned his "Freedom of the Will" to see whether it was any part, but it wasn't. Did you find that definition elsewhere in his writings?<br /><br />In part I section 5, Edwards claimed that the exercise of will occurs when we choose wtanksleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03283393679440645366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-74756825483951510962011-08-24T20:31:35.440+01:002011-08-24T20:31:35.440+01:00TF,
"I think you mean here that it is logica...TF,<br /><br /><i>"I think you mean here that it is logically impossible that both “God foresees that man will do X” and “Man does not do X” are true."<br /><br />Which means it is logically impossible for man not do to X, given that God foresees that man will do X.</i><br /><br />Do you consider your statement here simply a restatement of mine, or do you think you are expressing a Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-2866133295325069082011-08-24T20:27:49.932+01:002011-08-24T20:27:49.932+01:00WM,
Man’s will, which is part of his non-physical...WM,<br /><br />Man’s will, which is part of his non-physical soul, is free. Physical objects, including our bodies, only have a passive potency. In some sense, a car can go 0 to 60 in 6 seconds. But for the car to move, we understand that it must be acted upon. In the same way, the body awaits the will’s commands (at least in volitional actions). Unlike cars, or our physical bodies, agents act Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-22217519544995365812011-08-23T01:35:22.624+01:002011-08-23T01:35:22.624+01:00"If we assume man requires the ability to con..."If we assume man requires the ability to convert the proposition “man does X” from possibly true to actually true in order to have LFW, we will run into problems."<br /><br />If something can't be made actually true, then it isn't possible true, it's just false.<br /><br />-TurretinFanTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-18503256322865061542011-08-23T01:24:20.930+01:002011-08-23T01:24:20.930+01:00"I think you mean here that it is logically i..."I think you mean here that it is logically impossible that both “God foresees that man will do X” and “Man does not do X” are true."<br /><br />Which means it is logically impossible for man not do to X, given that God foresees that man will do X.<br /><br />Which means that it is causally impossible for man not do to X, given that God foresees that man will do X.<br /><br />"Turretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-89036251521499962422011-08-22T05:47:32.611+01:002011-08-22T05:47:32.611+01:00Dan, TF, this dialogue is very interesting. Please...Dan, TF, this dialogue is very interesting. Please continue.<br /><br />Dan, what type of possibility is sufficient for LFW? <br /><br />Longer explanation: I usually hear Arminians saying that compatibilism isn't sufficient for REAL freedom, because there has to be moral possibility and not merely the possibility of performing the physical act. But your argument seems to suggest that the wtanksleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03283393679440645366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-50458723730191285442011-08-21T19:20:38.624+01:002011-08-21T19:20:38.624+01:00TF,
I would not express things that way, but we h...TF,<br /><br />I would not express things that way, but we have already discovered that we have semantic differences and now I am interested in if we have substantive ones or not. I think you mean here that it is logically impossible that both “God foresees that man will do X” and “Man does not do X” are true. This is what I have been calling the compound sense, if that’s what you mean, we can Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-41951953544337820632011-08-12T23:45:39.017+01:002011-08-12T23:45:39.017+01:00Let's call A "God foresees that man will ...Let's call A "God foresees that man will do X" <br /><br />Let's call B "Man does not do X"<br /><br />If A, then B is not possible.<br /><br />If B is not possible (given A) then man cannot do otherwise than X (given A).<br /><br />If you think the question "Can man do otherwise, given God foresees man will do X" is not relevant to the question of MolinisticTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-78360067910493230512011-08-12T15:22:27.364+01:002011-08-12T15:22:27.364+01:00That’s a good illustration of your position, but n...That’s a good illustration of your position, but not necessarily the reasoning supporting your position. At least I took the argument in your blog post to be based on some impossible combination (i.e. doing otherwise than God’s foreknowledge) not a possible one (i.e. man and God’s foreknowledge). If that’s the case, do you mind giving reinterpreting the CO2 analogy in terms of your argument Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-69491434379112107452011-08-11T23:15:21.872+01:002011-08-11T23:15:21.872+01:00The ability to do otherwise is what is necessary i...The ability to do otherwise is what is necessary in order to do otherwise. <br /><br />If you can't do otherwise, you lack the ability to do otherwise. <br /><br />And given God's foresight ... you can't do otherwise. <br /><br />Therefore, given God's foresight, you lack the ability to do otherwise.<br /><br />Thus the O2 is man, C is God's foresight, and breathability is Turretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-67953981703594135192011-08-11T18:34:58.176+01:002011-08-11T18:34:58.176+01:00What does O2 represent? The ability to do otherwi...What does O2 represent? The ability to do otherwise or use of that ability in actually doing otherwise?<br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-18068940879346036112011-08-11T17:52:03.281+01:002011-08-11T17:52:03.281+01:00Yes, I think we are on the same page now. Althoug...Yes, I think we are on the same page now. Although O2 has the quality of being good for breathing, if a planet (Planet X) is covered completely in C02, that quality of O2 isn't relevant to the question of whether the air on Planet X is good for breathing. On Planet X, air is not good for breathing.<br /><br />Even so, if man only "can do otherwise" when God's foresight is not Turretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21597890.post-91592712468981038842011-08-11T03:37:41.161+01:002011-08-11T03:37:41.161+01:00Well I like the CO2 analogy. I take your point th...Well I like the CO2 analogy. I take your point that not that O2 vanishes in the CO2 compound, but rather, be careful about waxing eloquent about the beatitudes of O2 because they no longer apply. In other words, given foreknowledge, it’s the usefulness of the divided sense, that’s in question, not its existence. <br /><br />Is that correct? If so, I suppose it makes sense for me to explain Godismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.com