So far, we've discussed about seven (give or take) types of LFW. Their various definitions are provided below for a convenient single reference list below. Recall that the simple, ordinary speech, Calvinistic definitions of necessity were discussed above in the Inventokos post. Here is the link. So far, this author has not clearly identified a definition of Libertarian Free Will that satisfies Godismyjudge as being the correct definition of Libertarian Free Will.
LFW-N: There is no, i.e. zero, ability for things to be otherwise than they are.
LFW-F: There is an ability for things to be otherwise than they are.
Summary of Analysis: LFW-N is simply a species of Logical Necessity. Logical Necessity is universal, because it is based in the nature of God. Thus, the idea of freedom from Logical Necessity is absurd.
LFW-P-F: Man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
LFW-P-N: Man is not able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
Summary of Analysis: LFW-P is (a) not particularly germane because it deals only with antecedent freedom, and (b) nonsensical if construed otherwise.
LFW-2-F: Free from someone or something external to us controlling what we want.
LFW-2-N: Someone or something external to us controlling what we want
Summary of Analysis: LFW-2-F is not freedom in common speech or the Bible, and while the Bible does not speak speak of LFW-2-F, it is does describe things that arguably fall within LFW-2-N.
LFW-3-F: Man is able at T=1, to choose or not choose A.
LFW-3-N: Man is not able at T=1, to choose or not choose A.
Summary of Analysis: As it stands, this was rejected as not intended by GIMJ. This definition seems to me, however, to be the most promising as a springboard for further refinement. Nevertheless, since I am not the Arminian, I will not insist on this one being the Arminian's position.
LFW-3A-N: Man is not able at T=1, to choose or not choose A at T=2.
Summary of Analysis: Man is timebound, and consequently can not act at T=2 at T=1, because it creates a temporal contradiction.
LFW-4-F: Man is Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause.
LFW-4-N: Man is not able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause.
Summary of Analysis: Same problem as in LFW-3 above, in that man can only act in the present.
LFW-5-N: Man is unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.
LFW-5-F: Man is able at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.
Summary of Analysis: Clearly no one thinks that LFW-5-F exists. LFW-5-N is a species of Logical Necessity.
LFW-P2-F: Man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.
LFW-P2-N: Man is not able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.
Summary of Analysis: This has the same problem identified for LFW-3 and LFW-4 above, in that man is time-bound.
LFW-6-N = Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise.
LFW-6-F = Given preceding causes, A can be otherwise.
Summary of Analysis: This definition has two weakness: (1) "causes" probably is intended to have a technical definition, but that definition is not stated, and (2) without the technical definition it reduces freedom to the random.
LFW-7 (Courtesy Hijodedios)
LFW-7-F = The innate capacity of a human being to willingly select to follow, obey and love God...or not...at any given moment.
LFW-7-N = A lack of innate capacity of a human being to willingly select to follow, obey and love God...or not...at any given moment.
Summary of Analysis: The greatest weakness of this definition is that it is not clear what "innate capacity" refers to. As such, a Calvinist, an Arminian, and even a Pelagian could probably both affirm this definition of LFW, while each would probably assign a different sense to the term "innate capacity." The sense that Hijodedios intended, was that fallen man has this ability, which is clearly Pelagian.
LFW-A
LFW-A-N: There is no, i.e. zero, ability for things to be otherwise than they will be.
LFW-A-F: There is an ability for things to be otherwise than they will be.
Summary of Analysis: Things already are different than they will be. Thus, this definition is necessarily true, and is meaningless for the purpurpose of debate.
LFW-8 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)
LFW-8-F: the human will is autonomous.
LFW-8-N: the human will is not autonomous.
Summary of Analysis: The only sticky issue with this definition is determing what "autonomous" means. On its face, we would assert that this definition ascribes a divine attribute to man, and thus that LFW-8-N is the constant state of man.
LFW-9 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)
LFW-9-F: the human will is not in bondage to what is perceived.
LFW-9-N: the human will is bondage to what is perceived.
Summary of Analysis: There is a little bit of stickiness in terms of what "in bondage" means. Nevertheless, it should be clear that perceptions play a huge role in the ability of the will, and, thus, we would assert that LFW-9-N is the constant state of man.
LFW-10 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)
LFW-10-F: the human will cannot be worked by outside powers.
LFW-10-N: the human will can be worked by outside powers.
Summary of Analysis: It is obvious that, at least to a degree, the human will can be worked by outside powers. Thus, we would assert that LFW-10-N is the constant state of man.
LFW-11 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)
LFW-11-F: the equal ability under the same given circumstances, to choose either of two or more courses of action, wherein no other power could determine the choice, wherein choice is defined as the mental act that consciously initiates and determines a further action, and wherein choice is the same as deliberate volition.
LFW-11-N: a lack of equal ability under the same given circumstances, to choose either of two or more courses of action, wherein no other power could determine the choice, wherein choice is defined as the mental act that consciously initiates and determines a further action, and wherein choice is the same as deliberate volition.
Summary of Analysis: One downside of this definition is that it is so detailed that may be objectionable to for any number of potential ambiguities. Nevertheless, this definition does have a certain elegance in terms of trying to close loopholes and stave off ambiguity. It may provide an even better way forward thaN LFW-3 above.
Other
Although this list is supposed to capture all of the definitions in the discussion so far, this list is not intended to be exhaustive. I encourage Godismyjudge (and any other LFW advocate who may be interested) to consider which definition of the above, or any other definition, best fits his view of what human freedom in contrast to necessity is, if it is something more than the simple, Scriptural definition provided in the Inventokos post provided previously.-Turretinfan
Dear Turretinfan,
ReplyDeleteLFW-P-F: Man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
LFW-P-N: Man is not able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
Summary of Analysis: LFW-P is (a) not particularly germane because it deals only with antecedent freedom, and (b) nonsensical if construed otherwise.
I am not so concerned about what the choice is, but rather where it came from. That’s why prior to A is germane.
As for LFW-P-N, I had raised a few objections.
But your definition does not define what man has to do. It could be read as:
Man can’t do both A & nonA
Man can’t do one of A or nonA (but which is unspecified)
It also could be read as leaving open the possibility that at the time of the deed, man is able to do either A or NonA.
As for LFW, I note that you added the phrase “than they are” as opposed to my suggestion “than they will be” provided in my article.
“A simple and common definition given by libertarians is the ability to do otherwise. Another common definition is power over alternative possibilities. But otherwise than what and alternative to what? The answer is what we will do.”
http://www.geocities.com/freewilltheology/foreknowledge.html
As for the rest (LFW 2-6), I think they stem from LFW-P and are simply looking at the same issue from different angles. But no need to labor on this point.
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteA) As to the relevance of "prior to A," I will address that issue in a new post.
B) While I appreciate the additional objections to LFW, I'm not sure why you provide them. I recognize that there is some ambiguity in the definition of LFW-P-N. Nevertheless, LFW-P-N can be generically defined as the absence of LFW-P-F, which should - one would think - address your concern. Furthermore, ambiguity in the definition of terms that define your position (if in fact they do define your position) are really my objection, rather than yours.
C) I can see why you say that LFW, as I first listed it, is not what you consider to be LFW in your article. In recognition of this, I have added LFW-A, and a brief critique thereof in the post above. (I've also added LFW-7 based on the comments of another internet poster.)
What I propose to do going forward, is
1) to allow you a little more time to think up any more precise definitions, so that you do not feel I pushed you into a definition that is inaccurate, add any such definition in the post above;
2) at the same time as (1), to discuss your comment regarding your lack of interest in choice itself, iteratively returning to (1), above, if necessary to more clearly and precisely define Libertarian Free Will;
3) once we have identified the definition of LFW, and debated its relevance, I will provide my detailed critique of that definition, and you can defend that definition against the critique, and we'll see if it stands up.
-Turretinfan
Ok, what happened to the free-will thread over at the forums?
ReplyDeleteI am going to try and read through here to see what is being said.
It might take me a while.
I am supposing it all boils down to the specific cause of how people are saved?
(God chooses to bring people Himself by His own will, verses we choose to come by our own will.)
I dont think choosing all sorts of things (like ice cream, mayo, mustard, blue, black) pertain to the fact that all people are unable to come to Jesus Christ without divine intervention.
We were brought forth by His will.
In the exercise of His will He brought us forth by the word of truth.........
Take care everybody
KJB
Excellent topic ,Turretin!
ReplyDeleteVery interesting read, of enormous learning value.
Looking forward to further debate and comments. You are really digging deep into the issue.
Also allow me to compliment you on the blog. You have quite an ability to present tough theology in understandable terms.
I ought to say this is the only one that I always read with great interest!! (while there are a billion of personal blogs around, most are just a psychiatrist’s dream)
Also.. TF is loved and greatly missed on C/A ;)…
You never used the highly illegal and unfair practice of resorting to mere preaching instead of addressing the topic in question when you were there ;) While preaching is lovely, it defeats the purpose of theological discussion.
Sorry your FW thread got cancelled.
To end with something else then lamentations - great topic on Catholic issues.I fully agree with you - sorry Fred :)
All the best and God bless you richly,
~Odeliya~
Dear Odeliya,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your compliments!
I miss the C/A thread a bit as well. Nevertheless, by God's grace, expanding to other venues has been a unexpected blessing.
I'm glad you enjoy the blog, and you are welcome any time.
Best regards,
-Turretinfan
Dear KJB,
ReplyDeleteLine-by-lining your comments:
KJB wrote: Ok, what happened to the free-will thread over at the forums?
I reply: The site administration deleted it. In case you didn't notice, it is not a Calvinist-friendly forum.
KJB wrote: I am going to try and read through here to see what is being said.
I reply: Enjoy! And feel free to comment as you see fit.
KJB wrote: It might take me a while.
I reply: Take your time.
KJB wrote: I am supposing it all boils down to the specific cause of how people are saved?
I reply: I think it may boil down to that, but this particular post, and a big vein of this discussion is examining and then critiquing the Arminian concept of "free will."
KJB wrote: (God chooses to bring people Himself by His own will, verses we choose to come by our own will.)
I reply: I'm not quite sure that's the distinction. God does choose to bring people to Himself by His own will, AND we do come to him willingly, because He changes our hearts.
KJB wrote: I dont think choosing all sorts of things (like ice cream, mayo, mustard, blue, black) pertain to the fact that all people are unable to come to Jesus Christ without divine intervention.
I reply: Not just intervention but mechanism. The fact is that we make choices. But if you don't like mayo, you're not going to choose that. Our choices are determined, even though we cannot always see that.
KJB wrote: We were brought forth by His will.
I reply: Amen, and by the strength of His outstretched hand.
KJB wrote: In the exercise of His will He brought us forth by the word of truth.........
I reply: Amen.
KJB wrote: Take care everybody
I reply: You too, dear KJB.
-Turretinfan
Dear Turretinfan,
ReplyDeleteI will give a simple definition of libertarian freewill and then look at it from the angles of causality, accidental necessity (ie historic necessity), power, logical necessity, and temporal transition. These are not alternative definitions. Rather, they are meant to clarify the original definition by addressing adjacent issues. Nevertheless, I will provide a composite definition as well. Again, this is not meant to be an alternative, but rather to clarify.
Simple Definition of Libertarian Freewill: An agent has libertarian freewill if and only if the agent is able to do otherwise that what he will do
Causality
Positively
Choices are a result of agent causation
Agent Causation: Some events are caused, not by events, but rather personnel agents.
Negatively
Choices are not the result of a sufficient cause
Sufficient cause: Given the circumstances a sufficient cause always produces its effect, unless impeded by agent causation. Sufficient causes determine events. An event (E) is causally determined if some other event (E2) beyond the agent’s control has already occurred, where the state of affairs that E has occurred and E2 does not occur is causally impossible. If an event is causally determined, it’s casually necessary.
Accidental necessity
Positively
Given A will occur at T3, prior to T3, nonA is possible at T3
Negatively
Given A will occur at T3, nothing prior to T3 renders nonA impossible
If something prior to T3 renders nonA impossible, A is accidentally necessary
Power
Positively
It is with the agents’ power to perform or refrain from performing an action
Negatively
No other agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed.
If another agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed, then the event is not within the agent’s power.
Logic
Positively
considering everything prior to the event, the event is logically possible
Negatively
nothing prior to the event is logically incompatible with the event
If something prior to the event is logically incompatible with the alternative event, the event is logically necessary.
Temporal transition
Before the event, the agent is able to cause or not cause the event.
At the time of the event (T2) the agent is:
1) able to cease from causing the event at a subsequent time (T>T2)
2) in a divided sense (excuding the event), able to cause the alternative event (T=T2)
3) in a compound sense, unable to cause the alternative event (T=T2)
Why is the relevant sense of freedom temporally before the event? Because causation works forward in time. If an agent at T2 cause an effect which is produced at T3, in effect the event at T3 is necessary in the tautological sense that it is what it is. But it’s not necessary in the relevant sense: it had to be what it is.
Composite Definition
An agent has libertarian freewill if and only if what the agent will do is not, causally, logically, or accidentally necessary, but rather the alternative is within the agent’s power and the agent is able to do otherwise that what he will do.
Is this an alternative to the simple definition? Not really. Taking the position that man's actions are necessary (in any of the three senses) is ultimately inconsistent with affirming simple LFW. But it does take a few more steps to get there.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your comments.
I have responded in three parts:
http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/05/quick-look-at-simple-definition-of-lfw.html
http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/05/no-time-like-present.html
http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/06/quick-look-at-complex-definition-of-lfw.html
-Turretinfan