What does Christ mediate to non-elect covenant members?

The title question is sometimes asked of those who hold to Calvin/Turretin's view of Covenant Theology. I respond that the question seems to contain two flawed premises.

First, a mediator is a person who reconciles two parties. Christ does not serve as a mediator for the non-elect, only for the elect.

On the other hand, the non-elect members of the church should expect to receive something from Christ. It is written, "the Lord will judge his people." (Deuteronomy 32:36; Psalm 135:14; Hebrews 10:30) So, those who are merely outwardly part of the covenant should expect Christ to serve not as mediator, but as judge.

But Christ does not "mediate wrath" to those people, because that is not a mediatorial role. In his role as judge of all the Earth, Christ does not stand between God and man, but simply stands as God against man.

My emphasis on "outwardly," above, brings me to the second flawed premise. There are no non-elect members of the covenant of grace, under either the Mosaic administration or the NT administration. Those non-elect people who are part of the assembly/congregation/ekklesia but never believe are only outwardly members. Thus, they may bear the signs of the covenant (i.e. circumcision and/or baptism) but they lack the cleansing, forgiveness, and regeneration that those symbols represent.

The true Jew or true Christian is one who is one inwardly. Circumcision is of the heart.

-TurretinFan

Pope Francis on June 1, 2015 and the Failure of the Cross (with Bonus)

When you read the Pope's comments about the "failure of the cross" in light of this homily from earlier this year, I think it sheds some light on the subject. Just as Scripture interprets Scripture, so also Francis interprets Francis:

Reflecting on the Gospel reading of the day during morning Mass at the Casa Santa Marta, the Pope said the stone that the builders rejected became the cornerstone; the scandalous executioner’s block that appeared to put an end to the story of hope, marked the beginning of man’s salvation.

And highlighting how the Scriptures speak to us today, the Pope said God builds upon weakness and waste; he said God’s love for mankind is manifested in the apparent “failure” of the Cross.

...

But above all - the Pope said - the story tells us of how Jesus’s death led to his ultimate triumph.

Let us not forget the cross – he said – because it is here that the logic of “failure” is turned upside down.

Jesus – Pope Francis said – reminds the chief priests, the scribes and the elders that although we can expect trials and rejection, in the end we will see triumph and he quotes the Scriptures: “The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone”.

“The prophets, the men of God who spoke to the people, who were not listened to, who were rejected, will be His glory. The Son, His last envoy, was seized, killed and thrown out. He became the cornerstone” he said.

“This story that begins with a dream of love, that seems to be a love story, but ends up looking like a story of failures, ends with the great love of God who offers Salvation through the rejection of his Son who saves us all”.

...

(source)

Bonus Update:

Here's what Francis said back on May 29, 2013:

“Triumphalism in the Church halts the Church. The triumphalism of us Christians halts Christians. A triumphalist Church is a half-way Church”. A Church content with being “well organized and with... everything lovely and efficient”, but which denied the martyrs would be “a Church which thought only of triumphs and successes; which did not have Jesus’ rule of triumph through failure. Human failure, the failure of the cross. And this is a temptation to us all”.

(source)

-TurretinFan

More Thorough Exegesis of Francis' "Failure of the Cross" Phrase

In response to Pastor Hall quadrupling down on his misinterpretation of Francis' words, let me explain how I know (with certainty) that Pope Francis was contrasting the divine perspective with the human perspective, when he said:

The cross shows us a different way of measuring success. Ours is to plant the seeds. God sees to the fruits of our labors. And if at times our efforts and works seem to fail and not produce fruit, we need to remember that we are followers of Jesus Christ and his life, humanly speaking, ended in failure, the failure of the cross.

a) Notice that the point of the paragraph is to explain the right way of measuring success. It's not a discourse on the atonement or on redemption, but instead of metrics of success. The cross is an example of how to measure success.

b) Not only is this confirmed by the thesis sentence of the paragraph, but also by the way that the paragraph fits within the section of the speech:

And it diminishes the wonder of our first encounter with Christ. We can get caught up in measuring the value of our apostolic works by the standards of efficiency, good management and outward success, which govern the business world.

Not that these things are unimportant, of course. But we have been entrusted with a great responsibility, and this is why god's people rightly expect accountability from us but the true worth of our apostolate is measured by the value it has in god's eyes, to see and evaluate things from god's perspective, calls for constant conversion in the first days and years of our vocation and, need I say, it demands great humility.

The cross shows us a different way of measuring success. Ours is to plant the seeds. God sees to the fruits of our labors. And if at times our efforts and works seem to fail and not produce fruit, we need to remember that we are followers of Jesus Christ and his life, humanly speaking, ended in failure, the failure of the cross.

b) Thus, the point of the Pope's statement is to contrast outward success, success as perceived by men, with true success.

c) The pope is drawing a distinction between measuring worldly endeavors (like businesses) with "our apostolic works" or "apostolate."

d) So, in context the pope is saying that measured by business standards, i.e. "humanly speaking" the cross was a failure.

e) The pope is saying that this is the wrong way to measure spiritual endeavors. It's an argument from the greater to the lesser. If measuring the cross by business standards would make it look like a failure, we shouldn't worry that our apostolate/apostolic works look like a failure by that standard.

f) That the pope was talking about failure that shouldn't count as failure can be seen from the fact that he refers to "seem to fail" when describing our efforts and works.

g) The alternative understanding, that Francis meant that the cross really did fail, would undermine the point of using the cross as an illustration. If the cross actually failed, then business method of measuring success is right, and we're not dealing with a "different way of measuring success," but with a same way of measuring success.

h) Finally, we see the same thing confirmed in the way that the pope wraps up his discussion in a subsequent paragraph:

I know that many of you are on the front lines in meeting the challenges of adapting to an evolving pastoral landscape, like Saint Peter, I ask you, that regardless of the difficulties and trials that you face, be at peace and respond to them as Christ did. He gave thanks to the father, took up his cross and looked forward.

Notice that he encourages people to imitate Christ in their "front lines" of "an evolving pastoral landscape." That makes sense if the cross was a success spiritually, though not "humanly speaking," but makes no sense if the cross was truly a failure.

Now, I certainly agree that the RC views of the atonement and of the mass treat the cross as being at least partly a failure - but that's an external critique of their position - not something they themselves admit. Acting like Francis was admitting it here is inappropriate "gotcha" apologetics at best. We need to be honest in our criticisms, even of the Man of Sin whom God will destroy with his Spirit.

-TurretinFan

On Founders and Fathers

People like me appeal to the Founders of the American republic as authorities on what the Constitution meant when it was written. We do that because we believe in a grammatical-historical method of interpretation of any written document. In a similar way, many people like to appeal to the Church Fathers to understand the Scriptures. There are some similarities and some differences in these approaches.

Some Differences:

Unlike the Founders, the Church Fathers did not themselves write the Scriptures. The Scriptures were inspired by the Holy Spirit and written by those with a prophetic gift. Even the earliest of the Early Church Fathers we have were probably pretty young when the Scriptures were written. Furthermore, the writings of the earliest of the Early Church Fathers never explicitly purport to provide any insight into what was meant by the text as written. There is not a body of literature contemporary to the writing of the New Testament, parallel to the Federalist Papers (for example), to which we can appeal for documentation regarding why things in Scripture were probably written the way they were written.

In fact, most of the church fathers were separated as far as we are (or farther than we are) from the Founders. Thus, their value in a grammatical-historical model of interpretation is quite dilute. They may be useful in helping us confirm that we're still reading Greek in about the same way as they did, but folks like Augustine and his contemporaries didn't have any first hand, or even second or third hand knowledge of the apostles and evangelists, much less of Moses, David, and the prophets.

Additionally, the Bible is perfect. It is a complete document that will accomplish exactly what God intended it to do. Those tasks include communicating the way of salvation and thoroughly furnishing the man of God for every good work. The US Constitution is an impressive document, but it is far from perfect. We don't even have a reason to think it would be perfect. It's a merely human work, and humans make mistakes. There is no guarantee that it will accomplish all its authors intended.

Similarly, the Bible is perspicuous. By contrast, there is no doctrine of the perspicuity of the US Constitution. Even on important points, it is possible for the US Constitution to be vague. Just as their is not guarantee that the Constitution will work as intended, there is no guarantee that a fair-minded reader trying his best will correctly understand even the most important points.

Thus, the need to rely on external authorities becomes important when dealing with the Constitution in ways that it is not when dealing with the Bible.

Some Similarities:

Like the Fathers, the Founders were not always of one mind. In one interaction I had with a Roman Catholic, I recall the following interchange (I'm paraphrasing):

RC: Are you saying that church went off the rails from the very beginning? Because we know what Clement of Rome taught about ecclesiology.
TF: You're referring to the book of 1 Clement, which is usually attributed to Clement of Rome. But note that the author of that work was arguing with the Corinthians. He was saying that they went off the rails. So, did someone go off the rails right at the beginning? Apparently so - the very evidence you cite is proof of that, whether Clement was right or wrong.

A similar issue was recently raised by my brother, Jordan Hall, in a post about the Constitution. There he raised a comment by Thomas Jefferson in a letter written around 1819. My brother wanted to argue that Jefferson's position reflected what "the Founders" thought about the Constitution. The problem is this - Jefferson's letter is one that is arguing against his contemporaries (link to letter). In other words, while my brother may want to side with Jefferson, Jefferson is arguing with another of his contemporaries. "The Founders" were not of one mind on the subject, but of two (or more) competing minds.

That leads us to another similarity. It's not always easy to identify a "Founder" just as it is sometimes difficult to identify a "Father." Should we count Origen and Tertullian as Fathers? They are certainly highly influential early Christian authors, but their full orthodoxy is sometimes questioned. Similarly, who do we count as a Founder? One Constitution-focused website explains the problem:

Other U.S. Founding Fathers were not there [TF insertion: at the Constitutional Convention], but made significant contributions in other ways. Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the Declaration of Independence, was serving as ambassador to France at the time of the Convention. He kept abreast of the proceedings in Philadelphia by carrying on correspondence with James Madison. John Adams, as ambassador to Great Britain, wrote "Defense of the Constitution of the Government of the United States of America." Thomas Paine wrote the influential pamphlet "Common Sense," which immeasurably influenced the philosophy reflected in the Declaration of Independence. One of the U.S. Founding Fathers, Patrick Henry, was initially opposed to the very idea of the Constitution! He wanted to keep the Articles of Confederation, the predecessor to the Constitution. However, when an agreement was made to add a "bill of rights" to the Constitution, Henry fought hard for its ratification.

(link to site)

We see similar divisions amongst the fathers. There were various theological battles over which those in the early church fought - sometimes on central issues (like Jesus' divinity) and sometimes over relatively trivial issues (like when Easter should be celebrated). While I certainly wouldn't treat an Arian as a "father of the church," it's important to realize that this identification involves me using the Scripture as my standard for deciding who to label a "father." Thus, my list of "fathers" is going to include generally orthodox men. I can't then turn around and say that their opinion proves that my doctrine is orthodox, as Roman Catholics sometimes erroneously attempt to do.

People who are trying to round up opinions of the Founders to support their views need to be similarly careful. Jefferson's view on the judiciary (as interpreted by my brother) would seem to place him at odds with John Marshall's views on the judiciary. Nevertheless John Marshall, like Thomas Jefferson, was a founding father (link to relevant information on Marshall). Although Jefferson is more famous, both men were founders and arguably represent (on some issues) competing views found amongst the Founders even in the early days of the republic. If you only count the Founders who agree with you as being Founders, your appeal to them is no longer grammatical-historical analysis but simply partisan politics or propaganda.

So be careful when applying external sources. The Constitution may need them to be understood-- Scripture doesn't need them, even if they are helpful. Moreover, when you are looking at them, look more for the points on which those debating found common ground. In the case of the Fathers, that was that Scripture is the highest and most ultimate authority, aka Sola Scriptura. Look for the things that they took for granted that their opponents would agree with, not those points on which they wanted their opponents to submit. Those points provide much stronger evidence for "the opinion" of the Fathers or the Founders.

-TurretinFan

Humanly Speaking the Cross was a Failure

The pope wasn't saying that Christ's death was a failure. He was saying the same thing that both Roman Catholics and Protestants affirm, namely that the disciples were expecting a Messiah that would give military victory over the Romans. Instead, the Romans killed him. He looked like a failure to those who had only a human perspective on things. The pope was contrasting the divine perspective with the human perspective, when he said:

The cross shows us a different way of measuring success. Ours is to plant the seeds. God sees to the fruits of our labors. And if at times our efforts and works seem to fail and not produce fruit, we need to remember that we are followers of Jesus Christ and his life, humanly speaking, ended in failure, the failure of the cross.

This shouldn't be any surprise, since others have said the same thing.

Roman Catholic expressions of this:
"It is love and loyalty which persist even where humanly speaking there seems to be no reason for it — just as the cross of Jesus was humanly speaking hopeless, but brought salvation and goodness." A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults, with Supplement

"Humanly speaking, a failure: a colossal, blatant failure. Yet when all seemed to be lost, all was in fact saved. " Federico Suarez

Non-RC expressions of this:
"5. He was rejected and despised by the people among whom He labored. "He came to His own, and His own received Him not." His work was, humanly speaking, a complete failure, and when He left the world He had but a handful of followers who had remained true to His teachings and person." Albert Simpson

"With all reverence, let me say to you, humanly speaking, the day the Master died on the Cross it seemed a colossal failure." D. L. Ferris

"That beautiful Iife promised so much, but the Cross shows how those promises, humanly speaking, ended in failure. The nation He came to teach rejected Him; the people He came to save crucified Him; a few Disciples only remained faithful to Him; and yet out of that " failure" came the greatest success the world has ever known, the success which has regenerated mankind!" Alfred Mortimer

"Humanly speaking, his work had failed. " Warren W. Wiersbe

"What enabled the disciples of Jesus to understand this enigmatic "message of the cross"? At first sight, we see in the cross the sign of a failure, humanly speaking. " Taize

There are good reasons to be opposed to the papacy, but this isn't one of them.

-TurretinFan

Judicial Precedent as Law - Summary

In America, judicial precedent is law. This is true even if it is true that:
a) Some of that law is bad law;
b) Some of that law is unconstitutional law;
c) Some of that law would be "honored in the breach";
d) Some of that law outrages us;
e) Some of that law could be overturned tomorrow;
f) Some of that law is contrary to God's law;
and we could probably think of many more to go with those.

The fact that judicial precedent is law in America can be seen in a variety of ways:
1) Look at dictionary definitions (I was told that this approach is un-American, but let the reader judge) http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2015/09/taking-un-american-stance.html
2) Look up what it means that America is a "Common Law" jurisdiction as distinction from a "Civil Code" jurisdiction.
https://onlinelaw.wustl.edu/blog/common-law-vs-civil-law/
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law
3) Look up what the expression "case law" means (not in reference to the Torah, but in reference to the American legal system)
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=148

Now, Jordan Hall​, Marcus Pittman​, and Joel McDurmon​ have all expressed disagreement with my thesis - and they are all talented brothers in Christ. But on this point they are wrong, and not just white shoes after Labor Day wrong - they are as wrong as putting a "Tribble" caption on a photo of an Ewok, as wrong as thinking that "RC" in RC Sproul stands for "Roman Catholic", and as wrong as Bruce Jenner's current restroom choices.

There are lots of good reasons to oppose the new precedent set by the Supreme Court, but they don't include the absurd notion that, because the decision is not legislation it is not law (the errant opinion expressed by Jordan and Marcus and defended by Joel).

So please, brothers. Stop it. Just stop it. The media get lots of things wrong all the time, but this is not one of those things. This is actually one of those rare cases where they've made an accurate statement.

-TurretinFan

Taking an Un-American Stance

In English the word law includes both statutes and judicial precedent.

"The judgment of a competent, court, until reversed or otherwise superseded, is law, as much as any statute." (Black's Law Dictionary, 1910)

American Heritage Dictionary

4.
a. A statute, ordinance, or other rule enacted by a legislature.
b. A judicially established legal requirement; a precedent.

Webster's (1828)

11. Unwritten or common law, a rule of action which derives its authority from long usage, or established custom, which has been immemorially received and recognized by judicial tribunals. As this law can be traced to no positive statutes, its rules or principles are to be found only in the records of courts, and in the reports of judicial decisions.

One will find similar entries in other dictionaries as well. Some will simply have general statements about binding rules, but where you find mention of statutes, look and see whether judicial precedent or "common law" is mentioned. I don't think you'll be disappointed. I've been told that this is an un-American approach, but I can live with that. Words have meaning after all, and as general rule, the dictionaries are great sources for those meanings.

-TurretinFan

Distinguishing Reality from Fantasy

No matter how good of an argument for Departmentalism my exceedingly brilliant friend and brother, Steve Hays offers (here, for example), Departmentalism is a pipe dream. It's not the way America actually works.

In practice, in America, the Supreme Court has a final say. Knowledgeable advocates of the position Steve Hays mentions continually rue this. For example, Ed Whelan, as quoted by Steve Hays in an earlier post, states: "We live in a legal culture besotted by the myth of judicial supremacy." And again: "Although there are some scholars, both on the right and on the left, who challenge it, most lawyers across the ideological spectrum, having suffered the detriment of a modern legal miseducation, embrace it." In other words, Whelan's position is a minority position that reflects the way he thinks the system should be not the way the system actually is.

That said, I don't think any of the arguments for Departmentalism are very compelling. For example, Whelan argues (quoted by Hays):

It is one thing for the Supreme Court to decline to apply a law that it deems to be unconstitutional; it is quite another for it to maintain that presidents, members of Congress, and state officials must likewise regard the law as unconstitutional and, further, must accept and follow the rationale of the Court’s decision.

Whelan is whiffing. There are at least three strikes there.

1) Although in some cases the Supreme Court decides whether something is unconstitutional as applied, the Supreme Court often decides whether something is unconstitutional on its face, and consequently void. Whelan tips his hat to this point, but doesn't seem to realize its far-reaching implications.

2) Not all of the Court's decisions relate to the Constitution. Sometimes the question requires interpreting a piece of legislation and deciding what the legislation means. We'll come back to this issue shortly.

3) In America, no one has to "regard the law as unconstitutional" (in the sense of agreeing that the Court decided rightly) nor must they "accept and follow the rationale" that the Court offered. They are free to think the Court decided wrongly. However, even if they disagree with the ruling, they have to obey the ruling until it is overturned. That's true whether it's a really controversial Constitutional issue or a less controversial legislative issue. And that is how the system works. It's easier to overturn decisions about the meaning of statutes and much harder to overturn interpretations of the constitution. But the same rule applies.

According to Whelan, the Court didn't come up with judicial supremacy until 1958. That kind of claim runs face-first into a more complete history of the situation (see here, for example). Famous cases along the way include the Court striking down the original income tax law, leading to a Constitutional Amendment to overturn the court's decision.

The most bizarre part of Whelan's argument is this: "But none of this speaks with clarity or force to the judicial-supremacist claim that other governmental actors must abide by a federal judge’s view that a law is unconstitutional." What would be the point of having a judiciary that no one had to obey? The idea that the Supreme Court's decisions on constitutional matters are just advisory is just nuts. One doesn't have to agree with the Court, but one does have to obey the Court.

-TurretinFan

Judicial Supremacy

In a number of great posts at Triablogue, Steve Hays has raised the question of the legitimacy of what he terms Judicial Supremacy. His question is not totally illegitimate, even though it in no way rebuts (in fact, it presupposes) my argument that Obergefell is law. So, let's briefly consider the question of so-called Judicial Supremacy.

The US Constitution is a great document, but it has certain gaps that have been noticed over the last two centuries of use. One of those gaps is the question of whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution should be treated as better than the President's interpretation of the Constitution or the Congress's interpretation. When the branches of government disagree about what the Constitution means, who wins?

In practice, i.e. the way things are, the Supreme Court's interpretation wins. That's the way it has been, almost without interruption since the time of the founders. There are some rare situations that have challenged that status quo, such as when around 1832, President Jackson supposedly said "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" Nevertheless, if someone wants to know how the American system actually works, the answer is that the Supreme Court's interpretation wins.

In theory, the answer is not quite so clear. After all, each branch swears allegiance to the Constitution. If the Supreme Court's decision is not just wrong, but actually contrary to the U.S. Constitution, then the Congress should not make laws consistent with the Court's decision and the President should not enforce either the Court's decision or any other unconstitutional laws. In other words, each branch seems to have an independent duty to make sure that the Constitution is obeyed.

Of course, a lot of the controversial Supreme Court decisions don't fall into that theoretical category where the President would have to choose between contradicting the Constitution and following the Court or contradicting the Court and following the Constitution. For example, while the recent Obergefell decision may not be an objectively correct interpretation of the Constitution, it's much harder to argue that obeying the rule in Obergefell would violate some other part of the Constitution.

If one wished to argue that it does violate it, one would presumably rely on the "reservation of powers" clause or something like that, and suggest that obeying the Supreme Court would require usurping rights reserved to the states. On the other hand, that argument does not seem to have a lot of teeth. The real problem with Obergefell is its objective immorality and/or its objectively unreasonable interpretation of the Constitution.

It seems to be much less compelling that the President or Congress could simply disregard a Supreme Court decision because they don't think it was justified, even if they don't think it would violate the Constitution. After all, what if the Court did that? In other words, what if the Court didn't say laws were unconstitutional, but simply refused to treat as valid laws it didn't think were justified? That would seemingly potentially cause chaos.

Thus, in cases where there is not a clear inherent conflict between following the Court and following the Constitution, it seems that even on a theoretical level there is a legal (though not moral) obligation to follow the Court.

That's still not actual Judicial Supremacy (just so-called supremacy) because - as I've previously pointed out - there are checks and balances against a runaway judiciary. One check is that judges can be removed. Another check is that Constitution can be amended. The former option can provide new judicial precedent that overrules prior precedent. The latter can simply directly overrule the precedent.

Steve's biggest challenge to this was:

But since you refuse to challenge judicial supremacy, your appeal to impeachment or the amendment process is preemptively derailed by the very institution you presume to rein in, given the incontrovertible prerogative you ascribe to it. If the Constitution only means whatever judges say it means (a la Chief Justice Hughes), then they can "interpret" the Constitution to immunize judges from impeachment or forbid the abridgment of their authority.

Steve's argument here is wrong. What Steve should say is that if the Supreme Court were consistently given an incontrovertible prerogative, they could avoid impeachment and ignore Constitutional amendments. But the current American system does not give them that level of incontrovertible prerogative. The American system lacks that kind of consistency, and as a result does not have that absurd outcome.

Steve may want to argue that the American system would be better if some changes were made, or Steve may want to argue that the American system is inconsistent. Both of those may even be legitimate criticisms (not of me, but of the American system). But both of those arguments from Steve presuppose the point my original article made, one which my friends need to hear, namely that although Obergefell is a very bad law, in the American system it is law.

Bad Law is Still Law

Steve Hays has a thought-provoking post (link) sparked by my own previous post (link). Since his post doesn't seem to directly dispute the central thesis of my own post, namely that Obergefell is law, no rebuttal is needed. In fact, I find a lot of points in Steve's post with which I agree - or at least I think that there are issues worth considering.

For example, Steve wrote: "Whether executive agency regulations should have the force of law is hardly indisputable." Whether they do have the force of law is different from whether they should have the force of law. In practice, they have a slightly different effect from legislative law, but they are (in general) still laws that people have to abide by. Whether this should or shouldn't be the case is essentially academic.

Moreover, Steve's point about executive agency regulations helps underscore the point of my original post. After all, while agency regulations may have disputable standing on some academic level, judicial precedent is not disputable.

Steve commented (regarding agency regulations): "To my knowledge, that's not something the Founding Fathers envisioned." Whether or not they did, they definitely envisioned judicial precedent as law.

Skipping over other interesting things Steve said, toward the conclusion of the post, Steve raises a question of whether there should be judicial supremacy. If the question here is founder's intent, it's worth noting that Judicial supremacy goes back to 1803 in which the Supreme Court first declared a law void based on the law being unconstitutional. That was in a case brought against President Madison, who was one of the founders. Once again, there is a sort of academic argument to be made that the final determination of constitutionality should lie in the Executive or Legislative branches, but in practice that's not where the American system is today.

Today, even when the Supreme Court makes bad Constitutional decisions, its decisions stand as law until either they are overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions or the U.S. Constitution is amended. That's how the system is, whether or not that's how the system should be. I leave the should be question to the academics and the rich.

As a result, Christians should not go around making foolish claims that Obergefell isn't law. They may oppose it, but they should recognize it for what it is.

Obergefell is Law

Some dear friends have been going around claiming that Obergefell(fn1) isn't the law of the land. These dear friends are wrong.

But the Constitution vests all legislative authority in the Congress!

Yes all federal legislative authority is Congressional, but legislation isn't the only kind of law. There are also laws that come from the executive branch (e.g. regulations) and laws that come from the judicial branch (e.g. judicial precedent). There are even treaties, which the President enters into with the consent of the Senate.

But the Founders never intended for judicial precedent to be law!

Actually, the founders accepted the idea of judicial precedent as law. They all had as their framework the English "common law" system, in which judicial precedent was treated as law. The Constitution doesn't oppose this framework. In the historical context in which the Constitution was written, it was assumed that judicial precedent would be treated as law.

But this is Legislating from the Bench!

What you really mean is, you don't agree with the justices' decision. You think they were wrong to conclude as they did. That doesn't make this legislation from the bench. It's just judicial precedent.

But it's just an Opinion, look it says "Opinion" right on it!

This has to be the most ignorant (or deceptive) objection I've heard. Yes, judicial decision is typically called an "opinion." That doesn't mean it's simply some kind of personal opinion that lacks the force of law. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court is legal precedent that controls - lower courts must follow it.

But Kentucky's law is different

When Federal law and Kentucky state law come into conflict, Federal law wins (US Constitution, Article VI).

But Article VI doesn't mention judicial precedent!

Even if that mattered, it mentions the US Constitution and - according to Obergefell - the US Constitution conflicts with some state laws.

Doctrine of the Lesser Magistrate!

Suffice to say that this doctrine is one that relates to rebellion by the lesser magistrate against the greater magistrate. When or whether such rebellion may be Scripturally warranted is a different topic, but the point is that we are no longer talking about whether Obergefell is law, but whether the lesser magistrate is going to obey that law or rebel against that law. In principle, there are times when lesser magistrates ought to rebel against the law, but it is still rebellion against the law. Those who rebel against the de facto authorities, including an unjust greater magistrate, should fully expect to reap the consequences of death, imprisonment, loss of property, and so on.

But #datnotpostmil!

Just because we know that God's kingdom will continue to advance doesn't mean we know how precisely that will come to be. Perhaps it will be a reformation in this land. Perhaps it will be through God bringing just judgment in this land. I hope it will be the former, but the more bad laws we have, the more we invite the latter.

But then what can we do?

Within the law, we can remove Supreme Court justices for bad behavior and install those who will overturn bad precedent. Alternatively, we can amend the Constitution to overcome bad judicial precedent regarding the Constitution.

More significantly, we can proclaim the truth that is revealed in Scriptures to those around us. The Word of God is more powerful than you think, no matter how powerful you think it is. It's ok for us to use the political process, but that's not the primary way by which #datpostmil will come about.

-TurretinFan

FN1: For those living under a rock, Obergefell held: "The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State."

Calvinism vs. Reformed Molinism Debate

The debate has been posted at the Seeing God Ministries website (link to page)(direct link to mp3). The debate pitted Reformed Molinists Richard Bushey and Zachary Lawson against myself and Josh Sommer.

Unlawful Orders and Options - Some Thoughts on Persecution

Steve Hays has already provided some excellent thoughts on the issue of unlawful orders over at Triablogue (link). In supplement of those thoughts, I wanted to add a couple of additional semi-related points.

1) Distinguishing Permitted Disobedience from Required Disobedience

In some cases, when someone in authority over us commands us to do something, we are required by God's law not to follow those orders. Often, there are two ways in which can "no follow orders."

For example, if a judge ordered a clerk to issue a "gay marriage" certificate, the clerk has a moral obligation under God's law not to follow that order, assuming following that order was sinful. However, there are at least two real alternatives this hypothetical clerk has. The clerk could simply refuse (i.e. disobey the order) or the clerk could resign (i.e. avoid the order). Both of these alternatives are legitimate.

Some people seem to think that a Christian's duty to disobey also entails a duty to do so following the path of least resistance. In other words, some people seem to be arguing that our hypothetical clerk must resign, rather than simply disobeying orders. This view seems to suggest that disobedience can only be a last resort - we can only disobey when our back is to the wall, so to speak.

That rationale seems intuitively wrong. It seems as though the midwives in Egypt could have sought other career options instead of continuing to deliver babies, but their choice to continue delivering babies while disobeying orders seems praiseworthy.

There may be cases where we cannot resign our way out of direct disobedience. For example, I don't think anyone believes that the apostles had the option of resigning their apostolic office in order to avoid directly disobeying the Sanhedrin.

On the other hand, that does not mean that direct disobedience is always mandatory. Remember that sometimes Christians are called to flee persecution. For example,

Matthew 10:23 But when they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another: for verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come.

So, in our hypothetical example, the clerk is permitted to flee persecution, for example by simply resigning.

This is distinct from cases where we may not have any way of fleeing the persecution and disobedience is our only option, as with the Apostles in front of the Sanhedrin. Still, it is important to recognize the distinction and to permit Christians their liberty in Christ to elect between enduring persecution for the name of Christ and fleeing that persecution.

While enduring such persecution is noble and praiseworthy, it is not mandatory in every case. Therefore, while we should praise those who suffer for the sake of the kingdom, we must not condemn those who flee into another city, so to speak.

-TurretinFan

Commentary on the Book of Jonah - Haimo of Auxerre

I'm grateful to translator Deborah Everhart (and in general the consortium for the teaching of the Middle Ages) for providing a very readable translation from the original Latin of Haimo of Auxerre's Commentary on Jonah. Haimo died around A.D. 875. So this is not an "early church" commentary, but it is part of Western church history.

Haimo provides a very fluid set of interpretations of the text - proceeding from the literal to various non-literal interpretations (trological, analogical, spiritual, etc.). Haimo treats Jonah as a type of Christ in a way that would fit extremely well in today's Redemptive-Historical Hermeneutic.

The commentary is quite short, naturally, in view of the short length of the book being discussed. Still, it is a nice addition to any collection of commentaries on the minor prophets.

Here a few quotations that I found interesting, without any suggestion that these are representative of the work as a whole (footnotes omitted):

And the mariners were afraid, and the men cried to their god, and they cast forth the wares that were in the ship into the sea, to lighten it of them (Jonah 1:5). The mariners, not knowing the one and true God, invoked gods, knowing that nothing is done without the providence of God. From this we understand that He is feared and perceived by all men, although they may be seduced by false religions from the one and true God to many gods.

(p. 11 - at Jonah 1:5)

The above quotation fits quite nicely with a presuppositional viewpoint. Haimo is saying that people not only know that God exists, but that He is in control of everything that happens.

Moreover, they sacrificed victims, not animals, which, according to the literal level, they would not have had on the waves, but spiritual victims, that is, thanksgiving and praise. The Psalmist says, "Offer to God the sacrifice of praise" (Psalm 49:14), and the prophet says, "Take away all iniquity and receive the good, and we will render the calves of our lips" (Hosea 14:3).

(p. 17 - at Jonah 1:16)

The importance of recognizing spiritual sacrifice as distinct from animal sacrifice becomes important in understanding a variety of these minor prophet allusions to sacrifice.

"All thy billows, and thy waves have passed over me" (Jonah 2:4). The billows and waves are the temptations and the beatings, which never happen without the permission and will of God.

(pp. 20-21 - at John 2:4)

Once again, note Haimo's seemingly high view of divine sovereignty.

"I went down to the lowest parts of the mountains: the bars of the earth have shut me up for ever" (Jonah 2:7) ... The soul of the Redeemer descended to the abyss, not so that He might be held there, but so that He might snatch away his own men. These bars of the earth, as it were the door bars of the final prison and punishment, wish always to hold these souls once they have accepted them. The Lord is shut up by these bars; but, just as it was predicted in Isaiah, He broke the brass gates and burst the iron bars (Isaiah 45:2).

(pp. 22-23 - at Jonah 2:7)

While Haimo does not seem to make the direct connection, this explanation fits very well with a proper understanding of "the gates of hell shall not prevail."

"But I with the voice of praise will sacrifice to you: I will pay whatsoever I have vowed for my salvation to the Lord" (Jonah 2:10). The prophet is animated with good hope, and now secure about his liberation, he promises that he will sacrifice thanksgiving and that he will fulfill all vows.

(p. 25 - at Jonah 2:10)

Once again, Haimo recognizes the category of spiritual sacrifice.

And the older generation begins, the younger follows, because no one is without sin, not even the infant whose life upon the earth is but one day.

(p. 29 - at Jonah 3:5)

Haimo's acknowledgement of the universal sinfulness of men, infants included, is not tempered with any caveat about certain particularly righteous people.

But in the Church, just as in a great house, there are vessels, and some are for honor and some are for insult; some are carnal and some are spiritual ...

(p. 38 - at John 4:11)

I found this seeming application of Romans 9 to the church itself an interesting observation. It seems as though Haimo is acknowledging the mixed nature of the New Testament assembly.

-TurretinFan

John of Damascus Interpreting James 2:26

It was interesting to read a late patristic-era author (his death is sometimes used as the end of the patristic era) interpreting James 2:26. In An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, vol. 4, chapter 9, "Concerning Faith and Baptism," (PG 94:1121-22) John of Damascus writes (translation available here, emphasis mine):

It behooves us, then, with all our strength to steadfastly keep ourselves pure from filthy works, that we may not, like the dog returning to his vomit [2 Peter 2:22], make ourselves again the slaves of sin. For faith apart from works is dead, and so likewise are works apart from faith. [James 2:26] For the true faith is attested by works.

It's particularly interesting to note that the Damascene correctly ascertains that James' point is that works testify to true faith.

For those who like the original Greek or the Latin translation in Migne:

The key word there is δοϰιμάζεται (comprobatur), which is accurately translated as "is attested by" as in the translation provided.

Pseudo-Augustine "Doubt is an element of Faith"

One of my friends pointed out to me a quotation attributed to Augustine, but which didn't sound Augustinian. My friend's suspicions were correct. The quotation in question was this: "Doubt is an element of faith."

I found this attributed to Augustine in a number of sources:

"Doubt, as Saint Augustine wrote, is actually an element of faith." Immersion Bible Studies: 1 & 2 Corinthians, James L. Evans (2011), Section 4, "Hope Really Does Float" at 1 Corinthians 15-16.

"St. Augustine: 'Doubt is but another element of faith.'" and "Augustine could say, 'Doubt is but another element of faith.'" Faith and Reason, William Hemsworth (2009).

"Saint Augustine, early in the first millennium, wrote that 'doubt is but another element of faith.'" Baseball as a Road to God: Seeing Beyond the Game (2013), John Sexton et al., Third Inning "Doubt".

"St. Augustine: 'Doubt is but another element of faith.'" Doubting Toward Faith: The Journey to Confident Christianity (2015), Bobby Conway, p. 35.

"As St. Augustine said, 'Doubt is but another element of faith,' so for some deeply religious people, the absence of doubt is not the best measure of religious commitment." Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, p. 19

"'I've told you what Saint Augustine said about not taking Bible completely literally—and "doubt is but another element of faith."'" Kurt Andersen, "True Believers: a Novel," (2012) p. 59.

The actual source for this quotation, however, is Paul Tillich. Ironically, the Baseball book above actually noticed the same thought in Tillich but apparently didn't realize that Tillich was the original source. Tillich wrote: "But doubt is not the opposite of faith; it is an element of faith." (Systematic Theology, 1975, vol. 2, p. 116) The quotation falsely attributed to Augustine (never with any actual citation to Augustine's works) is actually just a slight rewording of what Tillich wrote.

I'm not sure exactly how the misquotation began. One possibility is someone misreading Kent Smith's "Faith: reflections on experience, theology, and fiction" where the quotation from Tillich comes shortly after a mention of Augustine (p. 2). Even more probably, the phrase got stuck in someone's mind as a pithy quotation. That person then later couldn't remember who actually said it, and assumed that a pithy quotation like that would have come from a smart guy, and consequently named Augustine as the source.

I'm constantly trying to call folks who write to a higher standard of scholarship, particularly when it comes to use of sources. If you quote something from someone, make the effort to track down your source. If you read something in a book that lacks citations, take it with a grain of salt. It may be right, but a lot of books without citations are poorly researched from other secondary sources, also without source citations. I have no reason to suppose that the original source of this misquotation had any malice. Still, this kind of false attribution can lead to problems that go beyond the original mis-attribution.

Molinism - Responses to a Some Attempted Defenses

Someone posting under the name Richard Bushey has a post attempting to defend Molinism against some of the criticisms offered by my friend, Dr. James White (link). I'd like to rebut a few points.

Is Molinism too heavily reliant on philosophy? Mr. Bushey argues that philosophy is inherent to every kind of theology. However, that misses the point. The problem is not simply that Molinism employs philosophy but that it is (at best) totally speculative, based solely on philosophy, rather than being based on Scripture with philosophy being employed to draw out what is implied by Scripture.

Does Molinism begin with libertarian free will aka the "autonomous will of man"? It certainly does. Mr. Bushey says that Molinist just "recognize that freedom of the will exists." The problem is that Molinists cannot establish this starting principle from Scripture. The Scriptures teach that man has a will and that he makes decisions, but not that man's will is autonomous. On the contrary, the Scriptures have plenty of contrary examples.

Does Molinism compromise God's sovereignty? Yes, though not as much Mr. Bushey seems to be willing to let it. Mr. Bushey thinks that on Molinism, God "does not have to dictate every single movement to have sovereignty." Actually, on Molinism God does decide every single movement in his decree to instantiate a single feasible world. Even so, God's sovereignty is compromised because there is a difference between the set of "possible worlds" that God could create, and the set of "feasible worlds" that humans would cooperate in bringing about. Thus, God's choices are limited by human autonomy. Oddly, they are limited by a human autonomy not even yet in existence and consequently having no actual basis.

Mr. Bushey admits, "the Molinist is saying that with the additive of human freedom, then God’s choices become limited because he wants to persist in allowing humans the luxury and virtue of freedom of the will." Since this imagined freedom supposedly results in the eternal damnation of many, it hardly seems appropriate to call it a luxury, and it quite obviously isn't a virtue when exercised in that way.

Furthermore, the idea that freedom to fall into damnation is somehow a good thing contradicts the idea that heaven is going to be a good place, since we won't have the possibility of falling into damnation. Similarly, God himself necessarily lacks the freedom to sin, which suggests that the freedom to sin is certainly not a virtue and is not truly a luxury.

Finally, the Scriptures do not teach or suggest that God has a desire that humans be autonomous. That's that unbiblical philosophical presupposition creeping back in.

Is predestination still personal on Molinism? In some strains of Molinism, where it is suggested that God tries to save the maximum number of people, it does seem impersonal to that extent. Naturally, there are a variety of Molinistic views, so William Lane Craig's views on that point are not representative of the entire spectrum of Molinists. When God chooses to instantiate a particular world, that inevitably leads to a particular group of individuals certainly being saved and all the others being certainly lost, on Molinism. So, from that perspective, it is personal and individual.

Who dealt God the cards? One of the central problems of Molinism is the grounding objection. I've dealt with at length in a previous post (here), so I won't repeat it all. In short, while human autonomy is supposed to limit God's choices prior to the final decree of creation, the problem is that there is no existing created thing at that logical instant to provide the limitation, and the limitation is not internal to God. It's an insoluable problem that can get glossed over, but which ought to trouble every Molinist. On Molinism, God is not literally dealt cards by a card dealer, but what other than a co-eternal being could limit God before God's decree to create?

Does Molinism retain freedom of the will? On Molinism, a person in a particular situation would always make the same decision. That does not look, walk, or quack like autonomy - it sounds like determinism. IF a die is a fair die, it has an equal probability of coming up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. But the Molinist will would, in a particular situation, always come up the same. That looks more like loaded dice.

Is David's experience in Keliah evidence for Molinism? Some Molinists think that God's answer to David's hypothetical question supports the idea of middle knowledge, because it suggests God knows what a person would do, even in circumstances that don't come to pass. Unfortunately, these Molinists have overlooked that God's answer is exactly the same as it would be if the men of Keliah were purely deterministic. If you don't see why, just substitute a non-human in David's question - "If I stay, will the walls collapse on me?" Obviously, in that case, the answer has nothing to do with middle knowledge. The same is the case with David's actual question. The only reason for thinking it has to do with middle knowledge is the insertion of the idea of an autonomous human will - an insertion that lacks basis in Scripture.

-TurretinFan

I've skipped over the stuff about Dr. White supposedly not knowing various things. Those accusations can hopefully be seen to be false in view of the explanations above.

Calling Discernment Bloggers to Use More Discernment

Chris Bolt did an excellent job of debunking JD Hall's inaccurate criticism of Karen Swallow Prior (link to Chris' post). I was disappointed to see that JD has not repented of his post, but instead has doubled down on it with a new post insinuating the same kinds of things as the original post.

I mentioned my concern about JD's hatchet job on facebook and tagged Karen. Her comments regarding her motivation were refreshing and provide a very different light on her actions:

Karen: "I was invited to the event specifically to represent the "non-affirming" view, which I did."
In response to the question: "Did you get a chance to use the divinely inspired biblical terminology and the hope of the gospel?"
Karen responded: "That's the goal I went with and I pray God used my witness. The event also included folks who have renounced their past homosexual behavior and it was a blessing to support and encourage them."

As I said in my facebook post, I may not agree with Karen Swallow Prior's choice to attend the event she attended. Based on Karen's further comments, I might actually agree with her choice, but that's a moot point.

Even assuming I disagree with her on that point, my disagreement with her on that point does not allow me to stand behind hatchet jobs accusing her of all sorts of worse things. We Christians need to hold ourselves and the "discernment bloggers" to a high standard of honesty, integrity, and accuracy. Thanks to Chris Bolt for demonstrating that. It's not about "choosing sides," or about necessarily agreeing with every last one of Karen's decisions, but it's about basic honesty and carefulness. It's a ninth commandment issue.

-TurretinFan

Two Recent Debates

I recently did two very different debates:

1. Is the Father Alone Almighty God? David Barron vs. TurretinFan (link to debate page)(direct link to mp3)

2. Intercession of the Saints - William Albrecht vs. TurretinFan (link to debate page)(direct link to mp3).

I'd like to provide more comments on the debates, but I lack time at present.

-TurretinFan

Defining "Responsibility" for Leighton Flowers

I was listening to Professor Leighton Flowers talk about "responsibility," (mp3 - around 29 minutes into the debate) and he noticed that he tried to define it as "able to respond," as in being able to respond positively to God's commands and exhortations. That definition is just fanciful.

The term "responsible" actually means "answerable" or "accountable" - in other words, it's about the fact that the person is going to have to answer or respond for what he does. It means that the person will have to face the consequences of his actions. When we say that man is "responsible," we're not talking about some hypothetical philosophical ability to do something, but instead we're talking about the fact that man will have to give an account for all his actions before the Judge of All the Earth on judgment day.

Inability to do what is right is consistent with responsibility for doing what is wrong, because "responsibility" doesn't imply some very specific kind of hypothetical philosophical ability to have done otherwise, but rather it implies that the person will be punished for his sins - unless the person has a penal substitute in the person of Jesus Christ.