Authorized Version - Why not?

Authorized Version - Why not?

This post is a challenge and a commentary.

Why not use the Authorized Version of the Bible, i.e. the King James Version?

Is the Language too hard?
The usual response that the language is too difficult is bogus. Thousands of children read and understand KJV Bibles, and virtually all Christian children in America for the first 200 years of its settlement by Chrstians. The entire 18th century of English-speaking children grew up on the King James Version, as did most of the 19th century. Only in the 20th and 21st centuries did alternative versions provide any serious encroachment on the Authorized Version.

Is the Greek source weak?
Another response is that the KJV relies on the Textus Receptus, and that the Textus Receptus is inferior to modern critical texts, because the Textus Receptus did not take into account a handful of earlier manuscripts that have been discovered subsequent to the finalization of the Textus Receptus.

Nevertheless, while there are differences between the Textus Receptus and earlier manuscripts, it is an open question about whether the earlier manuscripts are more reliable. Indeed, it is well known that they differ as much among themselves as between themselves and the Textus Receptus.

Is the translation quality suboptimal?
Perhaps the most interesting critique is the one that asserts that there are translation inaccuraces or suboptimalities in the KJV. The KJV was an improvement on earlier English translations, and the presently accepted version reflects about 250 years of Greek and Hebrew scholarship. Nevertheless, there may be room for improvement.

Here's the challenge: Identify categories of translation inaccuracies in the KJV.

I'll start: I think the biggest areas where the KJV may contain inaccuracies are:

1. The use of the article. Article usage is very difficult to tranfer between languages: Greek does not use articles the same way English does. A number of critics, particularly Granville Sharp have asserted that they have identified either unnecessary ambiguity in the A.V., or inaccuracies in the A.V. when it comes to the translation of the article. This issue will be dealt with in a separate post or posts. Suffice to say that there are at least some reasons to disagree with Sharp in at least some instances, but there may be other instances where Sharp was as clever as his family name suggests.
2. The use of prepositions. Like articles, prepositions can be difficult to translate between languages. One of the particularly difficult prepositions in Greek to translate into English may be the Greek preposition en, which is often rendered "in" in the KJV. In the 20th century, and perhaps earlier, questions have been raised about whether "by" would be a better translation of many of those instances.
3. Italicization. In certain places, words are placed in italics. The choices of which words to italicize and the sense conveyed by italicization, in some cases could be improved.
4. Specific examples. There are certain words for which the KJV translators seem to have made a mistake. These include, most notably, the translation of Pascha in Acts 12:4 as "Easter." The translation appears to be based on showing deference to the Bishop's Bible translation.

I challenge the readers of this blog to identify other errors and alleged errors in the A.V. Let's review them and see what can be improved.

-Turretinfan

Sovereignty as applied to Land

Sovereignty as applied to Land

On another blog where I sometimes comment, one of the authors posted an entry regarding immigration that I found interesting.



The conclusion of the article was:

A law regarding illegal immigration has to be something that applies to us—what we can do, should not do, or ought to do. It can’t deal directly with this abstracted person that is not even subject to our law.
So, I suppose we have reached rock bottom finally. The question, “who is an illegal alien?” is answered by, “someone that does not have papers, whom we therefore have the right to put on a train.”

I respond:



This comment is obviously wrong. An illegal alien is a person who is in our country without permission. It's much the same as tresspass on land. A trespasser is (generally speaking) anyone who is on one's land without permission. Of course, even if the harm of illegally being on the land is remedied, the guilt remains.



Scenario



Let's imagine we have farmer. We'll call him Tim. He lives an a country, which we'll call TS (Tim's State).



Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Tim lives on the border between TS and adjacent country, which we'll call NTT (Next to Tim).



If a person (we'll call him Mike) is standing in NTT and thinking about walking across Tim's land, that person is an inchoate trespasser. Mike has not done Tim wrong yet, he's just thinking about. Maybe Mike has even put on boots and a rucksack and is headed for Tim's land. He is still an inchoate trespasser. Finally, when Mike's boot first touches Tim's dirt (or, more likely, enters the airspace above Tim's land), he becomes a trespasser, because Tim has not given him permission. Likewise, if TS has not given Mike permission to enter TS, then Mike has simultaneously become an illegal alien.



Suppose instead, that Tim had invited Mike. Well, in that case at touchdown, Mike would not be trespasser, but only an illegal alien. Similarly, if Mike had been granted visa by TS, then Mike would be only a trespasser and not an illegal alien.



There is only parcel of land! How is this possible?



The answer is that there a bundle of rights associated with the land. There are the rights that belong to Tim as landowner and there are rights that belong to TS as sovereign of the state.



If Tim were an absolute monarch, all those rights would be bundled in the possession of a single person.



If Tim were a tenant, renting the land, his rights would be distinct from those of the landowner. If Tim were a joint tenant, renting the land with a partner, his rights would still be a lesser part of the bundle. Finally, if Tim were just a guest, visiting the property, his rights would be practically zero.



In America, no one has all the rights bundled like an absolute monarch would. The "every man's home is his castle" maxim, is a pleasantry, not a reality. In a typical scenario, (leaving aside tenants and guests) a landowner has a big chunk of rights in the land, the local government (such as the city, township, county, or the like) has another set of rights in the land (think zoning rules, the right to tax the land, and so on), the state government has another set of rights in the land (think, for example, of the right to enter to enforce the laws of the state), and the federal government has another set of rights (think, for example, in this case - the right to decide who is present within the country).



The right of a state to determine who is within her borders is ancient. It was already firmly rooted in the Middle East in the time of Moses. Recall how Moses sent spies into the promised land, and how some countries refused to let the Israelites pass through their land, even along the public highway.



Given that background, I cannot see how the commenter described above can possibly presume that immigration laws cannot relate to a person being welcome or unwelcome but only with our right to remove the person.



Perhaps the commenter will explain ... who knows.



-Turretinfan

A Quick Look at a Simple Definition of LFW

(This post may get deleted, in order to harmonize the discussion on free will.)

Godismyjudge has provided a new simple definition of LFW:

An agent has free will if and only if the agent is able to do otherwise than what he will do.

This definition is not harmonious.

Let's break it down.

1) An agent has (present tense) free will This line is understandable. It is an assertion about a present state of the agent.

2) if and only if This line is also understandable. A definition is about to follow.

3) the agent is able (present tense) to do otherwise This line is mostly understandable. It is a statement about a present ability to do something, where the something is defined negatively, and we are waiting for that something. So we continue to the last line

4) than what he will do (future tense) This line by itself is understandable. What is being described is a future action of the agent.

The lack of harmony appears when we combine 3 and 4 in view of 1. That is to say, when we speak of a present quality that depends on a comparison between the present and the future.

This lack of harmony is evidenced several ways:

First: the lack of harmony is evidenced by the fact that in order for the statement to have meaning, there must be (present tense) something that the agent will do (future tense). That would suggest that the future already exists, in some sense. Such a suggestion unravels the entire sweater of LFW, as has previously been seen.

Second: the lack of harmony is evidenced by the fact that my being able to eat steak today, and my actually not eating steak tomorrow would fully qualify under the definition. In other words, if I eat steak on Friday, and not on Saturday, I have proven that I had free will on Friday, under this definition. This would suggest that a completely deterministic (even a mechanically deterministic) world would include agents with free will, because they had the ability to do otherwise than what they did do.

I call these a lack of harmony, not because the definition itself is incoherent, but because these results do not harmonize with a non-compatibilist mentality.

In other words, if the simple definition above defines LFW, then Calvinists all agree that man has LFW, because we all agree that we can do something different today than we will do tomorrow.

-Turretinfan

Murder Update - Progress with Caveat in Oklahoma

Apparently, in Oklahoma, now public money cannot be used to fund the murder of unborn children, although they can be executed for the sins of their fathers.

Here's the link.

Specifically, unborn children can be executed if their fathers committed rape or incest (with their mothers and they were the result of the crime).

This may seem strange to Americans who live in states where neither rape nor incest is a capital offense for the principals, and where federal headship is not the basis of criminal guilt for any other crimes, or even for these crimes once the child is born.

Apparently, though, such children - in the view of Oklahoma - deserve to die for the sins of their fathers.

Truly it is written: "I the Lord thy God am a Jealous God, visiting the inquity of the fathers upon the children ... of them that hate me." Therefore let us instead seize the accompanying promise: "And showing mercy unto thousands [of generations] of them that love me and keep my commandments."

-Turretinfan

A Final (hopefully) Example to Round Things Out

A Final (hopefully) Example to Round Things Out

Here's a final example of the Presuppositional Blindness and its Impact on Epistemology, for the gentle reader (from the same thread of comments:

The commenter writes:

Yes, I misquoted. Nothing rides on this, though. Besides, Silverstein gives the impression that he was involved in the decision. “Maybe the smartest thing to do is pull it.”

What should the critical reader see? Accuracy is not that important to this commenter. If the commenter gets an impression - that's enough.

The commenter continues:

This is the scenario you weave. Silverstein gets a call from the chief who wants to consult with him about the situation. (This implies that Silverstein was no on hand.) The chief and Silverstein presumably come the conclusion that the building is going to collapse. Silverstein then advises the chief to pull out all of the firemen from the general area. The building then falls down.

Note the unnecessary pejorative "weave." Nevertheless, the general storyline rings true, and we can verify that Silverstein was not downtown at the time of the crisis.

The commenter continues:

Questions:
1) How did they know the building was going to collapse? Oh, yes. Everybody could just tell. But then why does the NIST report:
“The global collapse occurred with few external signs and is postulated to have occurred with the failure of core columns.”
Let me save you some time and reply for you. “The NIST said the global collapse occurred with few external signs. But they were not expecting a global collapse; they were expecting a local one.”

Note how the commenter is not willing to wait for a response. The question was not serious. It was not an inquiry to obtain information. It was a rhetorical device. Furthermore, the commenter does not understand the NIST report. The NIST report is stating that, as the global collapse occurred, there were not external signs of why it was occurring, therefore, it must have been the result of the failure of internal columns. This is a true report, and is true regardless of whether the failure was the result of explosives, thermite, thermate, or fire and impact.

2) Since there were all kinds of people in the (police, officials, reporters), why did Silverstein only make reference to the firemen? Why not say, “hey, lets move everybody back since this thing can go at any time.”

Note how bizarre this question/comment is. Why only the firemen? Because he was talking to the fire chief. Besides, I think any normal person would recognize that if the firemen are pulling back away from a building, they're not going to leave other people behind on purpose.

The commenter continued:

3) Silverstein’s quote gives the impression that these things happened in a short sequence. Phone call, “pull it,” the building falls. On your scenario it should be, phone call, “pull it,” Larry gets a cup of coffee, he calls his insurance agent and asks him how much loot he will collect if Bldg 7 falls, he leisurely goes over the figures in his head and imagines the new Silverstein Tower that he will build on the site one day, he strolls over to the chief and they chew the fat while they wait for the building to come down.

Notice how the pretense of the question format has been abandoned. Also, notice how again the commenter's impression is more important than what is actually said. The commenter is not altogether to blame. The video clip shows Mr. Silverstein making the comment and *boom* down falls the building. More imporantly, what is the underlying theory here? The fire chief "pulled" the building with some kind of special issue detonation tools?

The commenter continues:

As to your claim that the collapse was not symmetrical, watch the many videos of. But I guess on TurretinFan’s worldview gov’t reports trump empirical experience.

And there, at the end, we start to see rationality itself fraying. If you watch the videos more closely you will notice two things. The left side core (all of the videos are from the north or northwest side of the building), i.e. the part of the building under the east side mechanical penthouse, collapses first, but the building is still standing. About five seconds go by. Then the remainder of the building collapses, apparently from the bottom (the location that the collapse is initiated is below the 20th floor or so, but the lower floors cannot be seen in the currently available videos, because of the buildings in between). That staggered collapse alone is a remarkable asymmetry. Furthermore, as already noticed, and as thoroughly documented, the collapse footprint is asymmetrical, somewhat favoring the north east side of the building. Finally, at the initiation of the collapse, a noticable fault line or kink appears asymmetrically in the building. Yet, inexplicably, the commenter's impression upon watching the video trump a more detailed analysis of the data.

Of course, there was a great deal of symmetry, and the reason why is that the building was built symmetrically with respect to the exterior of the building. On what earthly principle would one expect the building to collapse differently? On the other hand, the reason the eastern penthouse collapsed first, is that in the interior structure, there was a significant asymmetry, with greater reinforcement over the Con-Ed substation beneath the building.

I say above that the commenter's personal impressions trump a more detailed analysis "inexplicably." As I pointed out in the last two posts, that's not quite true. The explanation is presuppositions. If you presuppose a conspiracy, you will find a way to give weight to the intangible impressions you get over the facts.

I am quite sure that the commenter, in preparing a lecture or sermon would never try to determine the meaning of a text simply based on the impression he got. I seriously doubt that he would give the time of day to someone who based their Constitutional argument on the impression that they felt from reading the Second Amendment.

No, in most areas, the commenter is a completely reasonable person, but because of presuppositions, this particular commenter has headed down a path that is difficult to remedy. Next thing you know, like Dr. Steven Jones, this commenter may begin to invent non-existent substances ("super-thermate" comes to mind) when it turns out that there is no explanation that relies on actually existent substances to fit the presupposition.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, this issue is essentially trivial. If there was a government conspiracy, they did an awesome job covering it up. The vast bulk of the evidence strongly favors the official story, and while there are some loose ends to be tied, it is only someone who presupposes government complicity that would grab that loose end in the hope that it would cause the rest of the tapestry to unravel.

-Turretinfan

Epistemelogical Impacts of Presuppositions

Epistemelogical Impacts of Presuppositions

In the previous post (link here), I explored how people can be blind to their own presuppositions and blinded by their presuppositions.

Nevertheless, there is an additional effect that presuppositions can have. This effect is illustrated by some recent comments I received in the course of the same dialogue I mention above.

Here's the windup:

Let me repeat my statement ... in the form of a challenge. For, if nothing short of a full and public confession by govt insiders would make TF sceptical about the govt’s conspiracy theory, then there is no point in trading little factoids.

As a preliminary note, what the author of the quotation means by "govt's conspiract theory" is the view that radical Muslims smashed hijacked planes into both the twin towers, and that the towers fell down and took out the neighborhood.

The author of the comments seems to believe that I presuppose that the Muslim hijacking story is true. I do not. I have considered the evidence, and it is the posistion that is better supported by the evidence. I was initially skeptical regarding some things. I made the mistake of watching all the conspiracy theorist materials first. I wasted a lot of time thinking that the criticisms presented had some kind of merit.

Now, I'm persuaded that the vast bulk of the evidence supports the "official story" as most skeptics seem to prefer to phrase it. I'm not a big fan of using the term "conspiracy theory" in a non-standard way, because it muddies the waters.

In any event, the point to notice is that the commenter is right about one thing: if one holds a presupposition so tightly that no facts could shake it, then there is no point in presenting the evidence.

The challenge presented was:

So, TurretinFan, please outline an example of the kind of evidence that would change you into being a sceptic of the govt story.

At this point it is not so much the kind of evidence that is important, but the amount of good evidence. There is such an enormous weight of evidence supporting the official story that it would be hard to contradict it with only a little data. As to kinds, I find scientific and engineering data to be more persuasive than testimony by random individuals.

The trick would be finding evidence that cannot reasonably be explained consistent with the official story. This is what many of the conspiracy theorists have attempted to do. Among the most interesting of the allegedly inconsistent evidence is a newspaper report that claims that a passport of one of the hijackers was recovered from the street.

One major problem with that datum and at least most of the others that have been set forth is that they do not fit as part of a consistent whole.

The Quid Pro Quo was:

In return, I will do the same in reverse– I will give a brief outline of the kind of evidence that would remove my scepticism. Why don’t we stay with Bldg 7 on this.

Notice that this is not really "the reverse." It takes far less to create skepticism than to remove it, particularly when the skepticism is based on a presupposition. To put it another way, removing skepticism takes a lot more than removing confidence. One can raise a doubt easily, but placing things beyond a reasonable doubt is more difficult.

When one has adopted a presupposition, one has a foundation for knowledge. That foundation can be built upon, and the house of knowledge on top can be torn down or modified as necessary. Going after a foundation is much more difficult than going after the house. That's one reason why, in the American legal system there is supposed to be a presupposition of innocence.

In this case, there is enough evidence to convict the fanatical Muslims involved, but not enough evidence to convict the government. For me, it is really that simple.

If you start with an unbiased mind and analyze the official story critically, you will find that (at least on most points) it stands up to the various criticisms presented. If you consider any of the alternative hypotheses, you will immediately find an enormous number of inconsistences that do not stand up to the criticisms presented.

WTC7 may be an exception, but not all of the evidence has been released to the public yet. Although there is reason to confirm the official story, and though there are many gaping holes in the conspiracy theories, it would be nice to see the bulk of the evidence presnted before coming to a final conclusion.

So, answering the commenters challenge, I'm open to any kind of evidence, and it is not some much the kind but the quality, quantity, and consistency of the evidence that will persuade me that the facts are different than the official report.

Hopefully, everyone who is unbiased on the issue can say the same. If, however, one's epistemology is based on a presupposition of governmental guilt, one's skeptiicsm will not be easily removed.

May God give us (including the present author) wisdom both to refrain from presupposing what we ought not, and also to presuppose what we should.

-Turretinfan

Presuppositional Blindness

Presuppositional Blindness

I was recently interacting with a person who stated: "I do not know what the real story of 9-11 is, but I am confident that the official story is bogus. I would be happy to debate the issue, but I am confident that nobody will take up my offer since it would only dignify a “nut-ball” position."

As an aside, I immediately took up his offer. It's an easily winnable debate. How do I know?

I was, like many, initially skeptical that the official reports were generally correct. I watched the "squibs" of dust on the Loose Change video, and reviewed the many analyses of the various data. I read many skeptical reports, and saw the far left and the Libertarian and Anarchist right responses to the official report.

Then, I dug deeper. I spoke with a civil engineer who had the same initial reaction of "How on earth could a building fall down like that," but who was persuaded by the explanation provided. I spoke with a person who actually saw the plane fly into the side of the Pentagon. I reviewed the detractors' articles, and then reviewed the source materials.

You know what I found? Most of the detractors (not all, certainly) were willing to distort the evidence, truncate quotations, change quotations, assert scientific falsehood, and maintain not just unproven but disproven hypotheses.

In speaking with the person whom I've quoted above, one favorite tactic was to take a quotation from Mr. Silverstein (a leaseholder of the WTC complex), alter the quotation and then take it out of context! I was absolutely flabbergasted, because this man is someone who is ordinarily not just rational and cogent, but intelligent and respectable. I've enjoyed, over the years, listening to what this man has explained and reading the articles he has written. I have immense respect for this man.

I could not figure out why he would treat the evidence with such open disregard. After all, his distortions were easily identifiable. The quotation was taken from a documentary that aired on PBS in September 2002, and at least one person legally recorded the quotation and its immediate context and posted it to the Net. All I had to do was provide a link, and Mr. Silverstein could be heard, and - for part of the quotation - seen saying what he actually said.

Then, later in the discussion, a third party asked one of the frequently asked questions that one sees, because of the many deceptive web sites that claim that there are unanswered questions. The person's question related to the mechanics of the collapse, an issue that was dealt with in great depth by the NIST report on the topic, and dealt with in summary form on various web sites.

I had commented that the only way to discard the scientific arguments is essentially to have a severe prejudice against the government.

One part of the commenter's response was striking: "'Severe prejudice' might better read ‘prudent presupposition,’ given the history of our government and most others."

Leaving aside the prudence of the presupposition, I think the commenter hit the nail on the head.

The denial of 9/11 is, for many people, presuppositional. No amount of evidence will dissuade them from their tenacious denial of the facts that a group of Muslim terrorists killed thousands of people and damaged or destroyed several large buildings. There are confessions of the terrorists. There is both documentary and image evidence of the terrorists preparing for the attack and boarding the planes. There are a myriad of witnesses who actually saw the planes hit their targets. And so on, and so forth.

One of the other commenters on this same thread wrote (regarding me): "TF — I get the feeling that nothing short of a full and public confession by the responsible parties would convince you." I was amazed. In fact, we do have a fairly full and reasonably public confession by the responsible party (Al Qaeda). Yet, even THAT is not enough to convince the 9/11 conspiracy theorists.

That's when I realized why the conspiracy theorists rarely agree to debate the topic, normally avoid structured debates when they do debate the topic, and inevitably lose the debates when they do debate the topic in any structured way: their position is based on presupposition.

Presuppositions are important and useful, as long as they are correct. I am a presuppositionalist, and my presuppositions are correct. I presuppose that God exists, that He revealed Himself in His Word, and that He is True to His Word. From those presuppositions I derive my doctrine and worldview. If someone wants to debate the existence of God, I can demolish their arguments against God's existence, but I cannot positively prove my presuppositions. I can explain the usual arguments for the existence of God, including the intuitive "first cause" and "source of meaning" arguments. Nevertheless, these will only be persuasive if the person already shares my presuppositions, or if God opens their eyes to the truth.

The same is somewhat the case here as well. While the presuppositions against the U.S. government may not be as fundamental as religious presuppositions, these men have real presuppositions that should be identified and stated. The masking of these presuppositions is a great evil.

Dr. James White, a Reformed Baptist elder, likes to say that the person who denies that he has traditions is the greatest slave to them. It's a bit glib, but it is generally accurate. People who do not recognize what their presuppitions are, are to a large extent blind. The result is that they can deceive themselves, and deceive those around them. They can leave gaping holes in their arguments without even recognize that the hole exists.

This is why you see comments like this one: "I do not know what the real story of 9-11 is, but I am confident that the official story is bogus." Someone does not recognize, or is unwilling to state, his own presupposition that if something really bad happens, wickedness on the part of the government (or a puppeteer behind the government) is behind it. Even though this person recognizes that there is no coherent alternative to the official story, and even though this person cannot disprove the official story, this person is absolutely convinced that the official story cannot be true.

As such, to a limited extent, this otherwise cogent, intelligent, rational, God-fearing man is blind. He cannot see the evidence because he has already decided the issue as a matter or presupposition. He himself made the comparison between his failure to accept the evidence presented in the extensive and detailed government reports and the failure of unbelieving Jews to accept the evidence of the New Testament. I think it may be too harsh a comparison against him, because I - presuppositionally - have some hope that a regenerate man (like himself) could be fully reasonable on such matters.

But I'll tell you what doesn't help: posts like this one that call 9/11 conspiracy theorists "nut-balls," and that ridicule them. I know many intelligent, reasonable people who spin out conspiracy theories. Mocking them is not a serious response, and saying that the ridiculous deserves ridicule is not a kind and merciful remark. It does not show love.

I am happy to discuss the evidence with 9/11 conspiracy theorists, but I think the bigger point that they need to recognize is that they believe what they believe not because of the evidence, but because of their presuppositions.

And its not just a lesson for 9/11 conspiracy theorists but for others as well. If you presuppose that Joseph Smith or Mohammed was a prophet of God, or that Vatican II was a council of the godly you will reach certain conclusions regarding doctrine that are not driven by the Word, but by presupposition. If presuppose that man's destiny is not fixed in stone, you will arrive at a different conclusion from reading Scripture than if you discard that presupposition.

If you cannot identify your own presuppositions, you are - at least to some degree - blind, no matter how wise you are in general. May God enable all of us, this author included, to more clearly see our presuppositions, and to more clearly identify those presuppositions to those with whom we interact.

-Turretinfan

No Time Like the Present

No Time Like the Present

A response to Libertarian Past-Tense Free Will

Introduction

In "Through the Lookingglass," one of the characters is offered a position that provides a certain benefit "every other day." It sounds tempting, but it is then discovered that this condition "every other day" is construed with the utmost literal precision, such that the benefit never enures, because today is never any other day than today.

That kind of hyper-literal analysis is silly in a children's book, but can prove to be essential in philosophical discussions. Many things can turn on the precision of definitions, and thus we should be careful to avoid the "other day" trap.

Some advocates of Libertarian Free Will may perhaps have fallen into such a trap with loose definitions of human freedom. Either they have fallen into the trap by speaking imprecisely, or they mean something that it is totally unacceptable.

By analogy, one could say that man has freedom, under their definitions, every other day.

Freedom in the Past Time Only

One of my respected Arminian colleagues has posited the idea that the relevant sense of freedom is something that only comes before the act (e.g. choice), not something that exists at the time of the act.

Stepping back from the details for a second, this is like saying that you are free with respect to what you do tomorrow, but not today, and saying that every day. It is the "every other day" trap. You don't have freedom with respect to actions that you are doing, but only with respect to actions that you will do.

Under this system of thought, before it is time do something, you have freedom, but when it comes to actually doing it, you do it of necessity. The result of this model is that every single act is an act of necessity. Freedom is ephemeral. It dissipates just when you need it.

The Importance of the Present

The present is important, becuase it is the present that we exist, we act, we do, we think, and we choose. If we act freely, then we do so in the present. If we act of necessity, we do so in the present. If Paul someone says they "are" free, they mean at present.

When Paul speaks, in Romans 7:3 of the freedom of widows, he says that if her husband is dead, she IS free. Paul is speaking here about the Calvinistic De Jure freedom, not a Libertarian Free Will freedom (even if such a thing existed). More important, though, is Paul's explanation regarding that freedom.

While her husband lives, she is not free: if she marries another man she will be called an adulteress. Although she may be free in the future, that future freedom does not give her license to marry whomsoever she will.

The analogy is simple: whatever kind of freedom matters for us to say that we ARE free, is freedom in the present time, not freedom in the future, or freedom in the past.

Objection 1 - I don't care

This is a curious objection. The objection simply states that it makes no difference whether the acts themselves are free. The objector doesn't care whether acts themselves are free. Of course, the minute such an objection is made, one recognizes that whatever this freedom or necessity is, it is not what the Bible is talking about: it is not the freedom described in the Bible, nor is it even the kind of freedom that common sense or intution tells us we have. I "can" is present. I "am" able is present. I "have" free will is present. We could go on and on.

If, with respect to his actions at time X, man is not free, but only was free at some past point, that matter freedom is of only historical significance.

If man is not free with respect to the things he does, man is never free.

Perhaps there are more objections, we will have to see.

-Turretinfan

Response to June 29, 2006, Dividing Line

Response to James White's Argument

Regarding the Symbolism of Circumcision and Baptism

Presented On

The Dividing Line

June 29, 2006

Interacting with a caller to Dr. White's radio program, "The Dividing Line," Dr. White stated that:

That's one of the major differences between us, is that I don't believe you can demonstrate from the New Testament that Baptism is pointing toward something. Circumcision did. Baptism points back. It is a sign unto us of something, not hoping for something. Circumcision was a sign of the Abrahamic covenant. What do you have happening there? You have the promise that the seed would come and the nations would be blessed. Well, folks, once Christ comes, the seed has come. And so, to make baptism something that's looking forward to a hope for fulfilment of faith that's where I go, "Sorry" Again, as I pointed out, there's some real discontinuity in the Presbyterian application regards the objects and things like that. Why can't this be discontinuity? [The (apparently Presbyterian) caller here interjected that circumcision points forward to the gospel, and baptism points backward to the gospel.] Except that circumcision was a promise that the seed would come through that household of faith. The seed has come. The blessing has come. Baptism isn't looking forward to something to where go, "Well, we give it someone in hope that they will have faith." That's one of the major differences between us.

I respond:

Introduction
Dr. White is a notable Reformed scholar, and he should not be dismissed lightly. Furthermore, the comments above were made in response to a call-in to a radio show, and, thus, may not present a fully developed view and are not necessarily the result of a carefully planned response. Nevertheless, Dr. White is experienced at thinking on his feet, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that he conveyed what he generally intended to convey. Of course, though I doubt that Dr. White will find time in his busy schedule to respond to this intramural Reformed response, I leave the door open for Dr. White to revise, clarify, or indicate as outdated the argument he presented above. The original presentation is available in the second half of the program, the entirety of which can be found here.
In contrast, I am just an anonymous man with a Bible and a regenerate (by the monergistic work of God) mind. I have studied the issues, but I would not want anyone to agree with me over Dr. White because of my study, or because I claim to have considered the matter more than he. In fact, it may be that Dr. White would be able to claim greater study of the issue than I can claim. He has a publicly available debate with Rev. Shishko, an OPC minister, on this topic, which anyone who is interested in a more detailed presentation of Dr. White's views should peruse.

The Comparison
The Lord's Supper is to the Passover, what Baptism is to Circumcision. The Lord's Supper and the Passover picture the sacrifice of Christ, and Baptism and Circumcision picture the purification of regeneration.

Baptism is a prerequisite for partaking of the Lord's Supper, just as Circumcision was a prerequisite for partaking of the Passover (Exodus 12:48). The link between baptism and the Lord's Supper is also obliquely expressed in Matthew 20:22-23, paralleled in Mark 10:38-39.

Circumcision was an outward sign of what was supposed to be an inward purification (Deuteronomy 10:16, 30:6, Jeremiah 4:4, Romans 2:28-29, Philippians 3:3, and Colossians 2:11).

For Abraham, circumcision was a believer's circumcision:

Romans 4:11-12
11And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised: that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised; that righteousness might be imputed unto them also: 12And the father of circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he had being yet uncircumcised.

Even so, the early baptisms were believers baptisms (John 4:1-2, Acts 2:41, Acts 8:12).

The aspect of "hope" expressed by circumcision was a hope that the child would believe. The same is true of infant baptism today. We hope for the same thing that Abraham hoped for his children.

Likewise, baptism symbolizes regeneration and the remission of sins (Acts 2:38, Acts 22:16, Romans 6:3-4, Colossians 2:12, 1 Peter 3:21).

And like circumcision, baptism appears to have been applied to the household of faith, not only to believers (Acts 16:33).

Conclusion
I would respectfully disagree with Dr. White's apparent opinion that circumcision only related to the promise of Christ's coming. After all, it was not from a circumcised man that Christ came but from an uncircumcised woman in the miracle of the Virgin birth. The circumcision pointed to the work of Christ just as Baptism points to the work of Christ. Circumcision is purification of the flesh much as Baptism is a purification of the flesh, with both pointing toward a necessary purification of the spirit. There were believer circumcisions, Abraham being the primary example, and there were numerous believer baptisms in the first generation of the apostolic era.

Nevertheless, Dr. White's apparent view that the promises of Deuteronomy 4:40 and 12:28 cannot be seized by New Testament believers in the immutable God are unsupported. We are Abraham's children by faith, and the same general promises that applied to the patriarchs are for us as well. Thus, we have a reason to expect that God will reward our diligent and careful raising of our children in the Word of God, and that God will bless us by saving our children after us. Furthermore, we hold our children as more to be blamed if they turn away from the truth in which they were raised, than we would hold the children of infidels who had never heard the gospel.

-Turretinfan

The Abuse of the Bible Award

With apologies to Dan, Fred, and John (among others to whom post or replies are still owed), a quick nomination for the Abuse of the Bible Award (2007) is:

Greenpeace

Greenpeace should get the award because:

1) They are actually spending the money to build a replica of Noah's ark on the mountain where it came to rest; but

2) It is unquestionable that a huge percent of the membership of Greenpeace does not believe Genesis' account of the Great Flood to be historically true; and

3) They are using the replica to try to warn people of a new Great Flood that they claim will occur if humans do not stop industry; although

4) The very Scriptures that tell us of the Ark, also contain the promise that God will never again destroy the World by a Flood.

Undoubtedly, the effort is aimed to be a public relations piece, and a way to get free advertising from numerous outlets such as this one.

To provide an antidote to that purpose, I provide a link to a web site from which one can order Dr. Beisner's book that debunks the global warming alarmism. It's the book at the bottom of the list, so you may have to scroll down. Link is here.

-Turretinfan

News - Fallwell Dies

Death of an Icon

I am behind on my blogging as John, Dan, and Fred (to name a few) could testify. Nevertheless, the news of this particular demise is worthy of note.

It has been reported here, that Dr. Fallwell has gone to meet his Maker.

Whether Dr. Fallwell trusted in Christ alone for salvation, or whether he was trusting in his own works cooperating with grace, we may never know for sure. Here's a clip of him discussing the general subject, and denying the truth as heresy. Link to clip here.

His theology is wrong, but I will not judge his heart, for men can hold to bad theology out of confusion: something that extraordinarily evident in the clip of Fallwell linked above.

Neverthless, it is important at this point to affirm the substitionary atonement, and to note that those substituted-for will escape because they have the substitute. If Fallwell was one of those, he is now in heaven, and we hope that he is.

-Turretinfan

Lupine Outing Update - "Fred"'s Response Rebutted

An internet poster who identifed himself only as "Fred" wrote (here is a link for confirmation):

Catholics just can't win with some folks. They call us legalists...by which they mean this preposterous fantasy that we think we can earn our way to heaven. And yet Turretinfan (for example) is instantly ready to assume that Dr. Beckwith would act *contrary* to a legalistic gospel by acting in bad faith. So which is it? Are Catholics evil because they're legalists, or evil because they're not? Turretinfan can't have it both ways. Or maybe it's just that he thinks Catholics are evil no matter what they believe or do? Or - and this is by far the most probable - maybe it's just that he has no idea what we really believe, which is the nearly universal condition of all Protestants who hate the Catholic Church.Yet it's quite clear (reading their own comments) that those who actually know Dr. Beckwith have nothing but the highest regard for his personal integrity, even when they strongly disagree with him. So there's absolutely no basis for this malicious idea that he intended to be a Papist mole in the ETS chancery.

I respond line-by-line, as follows:

Fred: "Catholics just can't win with some folks."

I reply: I pointed out both balanced and imbalanced Roman Catholics in my original post. There are reasonable Roman Catholics and there are unreasonable Roman Catholics.

Fred: "They call us legalists...by which they mean this preposterous fantasy that we think we can earn our way to heaven. "

I reply: Consistent Roman Catholics are legalists, which means that they deny Sola Fide. The only way that charge could be a "preposterous fantasy," would be if the Council of Trent were also a preposterous fantasy. If you, Fred, deny that the Council of Trent defined Roman Catholic dogma, and call its teachings a "preposterous fantasy," then you should be aware that you are under its anathema, for whatever that's worth.

Fred: "And yet Turretinfan (for example) is instantly ready to assume that Dr. Beckwith would act *contrary* to a legalistic gospel by acting in bad faith."

I reply: I waited to publish until I had confirmation from Jimmy Akin (see my original post) that indeed Beckwith had intended to keep his new allegiance to Rome a secret, while maintaining the post of President. Prof. Beckwith's own testimony subsequently confirmed what you, Fred, falsely call an assumption, namely that Prof. Beckwith had intended to keep his switched allegiance incognito for the duration of his presidency.

Fred: "So which is it?"

I reply: This is the set up for a false dichotomy, as will be shown below.

Fred: "Are Catholics evil because they're legalists, or evil because they're not?"

I reply: This a false dichotomy. The doctrines of Rome, which deny the truth of the gospel, are evil because they contradict the Word of God. Those who hold to the doctrines of Rome can fall along a range from those who ignorantly accept the false doctrines of Rome, to those who know the truth but suppress it, because of their hatred of the truth. Secondly, those who profess legalism do not necessarily live according to their profession. Ocassionally, Roman Catholic priests who are sworn to celibacy, not only break their vows, but do so in ways that are extraordinarily reprehensible. Whether or not Prof. Beckwith's system of legalism adopted when he joined Rome would bar his attempted secrecy is open to dispute. However, even if such a thing were officially condemned by Rome, that fact is not sufficient to ensure that Prof. Beckwith would consistently follow Rome's dictates, any more than those priests who fall into immorality.

Fred: "Turretinfan can't have it both ways."

I reply: The facts are the facts. Prof. Beckwith "converted" to Roman Catholicism (whose doctrines regarding legalism were defined by the Council of Trent), and tried to keep that fact secret, as evidenced by his own testimony and that of Jimmy Akin (a practice which Jesuitical ethics would not necessarily condemn). If that is "both ways," then - as with so many other falsely dichotomous situations - I can have it both ways.

Fred: "Or maybe it's just that he thinks Catholics are evil no matter what they believe or do?"

I reply: God restrains the evil of Hindus, Muslims, and Roman Catholics, so that they often obey outwardly the moral of God in many respects.

Fred: "Or - and this is by far the most probable - maybe it's just that he has no idea what we really believe, which is the nearly universal condition of all Protestants who hate the Catholic Church."

I reply: Considering that you, Fred, call the doctrines of the Council of Trent a "preposterous fantasy," I will let the readers consider who has no idea what the Church of Rome teaches on the subject. What I have found, in my own experience, is that most of those who were baptized as Roman Catholics and even who have been confirmed have very little understanding of Roman Catholic theology or history. What you believe or don't believe is individual, and - I have found - varies from Roman Catholic to Roman Catholic.

Fred: "Yet it's quite clear (reading their own comments) that those who actually know Dr. Beckwith have nothing but the highest regard for his personal integrity, even when they strongly disagree with him. "

I reply: Even if that were true, all that it would suggest is that Prof. Beckwith would not knowingly do something that he believed to be wrong. Prof. Beckwith's comments point out that his decision was not one that was so immediately obvious that he made it alone, but instead that it was a difficult decision and that he made it after consulting with friends. Accordingly, Prof. Beckwith should not be surprised that others would come to a different conclusion regarding the propriety of his continuing to mask his change of allegiance.

Fred: "So there's absolutely no basis for this malicious idea that he intended to be a Papist mole in the ETS chancery."

I reply: That wasn't quite the charge. The charge was that he intended to go on being both a member of the organization, and the president, although he was a Roman Catholic and, consequently, no longer an adherent to Sola Scriptura, which is one of the two doctrinal requirments of ETS. But, in any event, the original post, linked here, has the details.

Apparently another poster, going by the handle "Matthew," and listing Jimmy Akin's web site as his homepage replied to Fred thus:

You are right when it comes to the popular anti-Catholic broad stoke of legalism. As Catholics if we live out our faith and abide by the Church's teachings we are labeled as legalistic. However, for those Catholics who do not attend Mass, live out their faith, etc. the broad stroke of anti-Catholic rhetoric goes in the opposite direction of being a "typical Catholic" *wink* *wink* in need of evangelization. Either way you go the pre-supposition is that there is no way one can be Catholic and a good and faithful Christian at the same time. It is sad, but an all too common theme that I've encountered with our non-Catholic brethren.

I respond: This respondent too, seems to fail to understand the connection between legalism and the rejection of Sola Fide. Those who live a godly life without Faith in Christ do better than those who live wantonly, and they receive their reward. But, as Matthew correctly notes, one cannot be a good Catholic that accepts all of what Rome teaches and be a good Christian. The gospel of Rome is not the gospel of Scripture, and those who are Rome, whether they behave themselves well or not, are in need of evangelization.

-Turretinfan

Libertarian Free Will Roundup - Part 1

Libertarian Free Will Roundup

Part 1

So far, we've discussed about seven (give or take) types of LFW. Their various definitions are provided below for a convenient single reference list below. Recall that the simple, ordinary speech, Calvinistic definitions of necessity were discussed above in the Inventokos post. Here is the link. So far, this author has not clearly identified a definition of Libertarian Free Will that satisfies Godismyjudge as being the correct definition of Libertarian Free Will.

LFW

LFW-N: There is no, i.e. zero, ability for things to be otherwise than they are.
LFW-F: There is an ability for things to be otherwise than they are.
Summary of Analysis: LFW-N is simply a species of Logical Necessity. Logical Necessity is universal, because it is based in the nature of God. Thus, the idea of freedom from Logical Necessity is absurd.

LFW-P

LFW-P-F: Man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
LFW-P-N: Man is not able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed.
Summary of Analysis: LFW-P is (a) not particularly germane because it deals only with antecedent freedom, and (b) nonsensical if construed otherwise.

LFW-2

LFW-2-F: Free from someone or something external to us controlling what we want.
LFW-2-N: Someone or something external to us controlling what we want
Summary of Analysis: LFW-2-F is not freedom in common speech or the Bible, and while the Bible does not speak speak of LFW-2-F, it is does describe things that arguably fall within LFW-2-N.

LFW-3

LFW-3-F: Man is able at T=1, to choose or not choose A.
LFW-3-N: Man is not able at T=1, to choose or not choose A.
Summary of Analysis: As it stands, this was rejected as not intended by GIMJ. This definition seems to me, however, to be the most promising as a springboard for further refinement. Nevertheless, since I am not the Arminian, I will not insist on this one being the Arminian's position.

LFW-3A

LFW-3A-F: Man is able at T=1, to choose or not choose A at T=2.
LFW-3A-N: Man is not able at T=1, to choose or not choose A at T=2.
Summary of Analysis: Man is timebound, and consequently can not act at T=2 at T=1, because it creates a temporal contradiction.

LFW-4

LFW-4-F: Man is Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause.
LFW-4-N: Man is not able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause.
Summary of Analysis: Same problem as in LFW-3 above, in that man can only act in the present.

LFW-5

LFW-5-N: Man is unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.
LFW-5-F: Man is able at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.
Summary of Analysis: Clearly no one thinks that LFW-5-F exists. LFW-5-N is a species of Logical Necessity.

LFW-P2

LFW-P2-F: Man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.
LFW-P2-N: Man is not able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.
Summary of Analysis: This has the same problem identified for LFW-3 and LFW-4 above, in that man is time-bound.

LFW-6

LFW-6-N = Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise.
LFW-6-F = Given preceding causes, A can be otherwise.
Summary of Analysis: This definition has two weakness: (1) "causes" probably is intended to have a technical definition, but that definition is not stated, and (2) without the technical definition it reduces freedom to the random.

LFW-7 (Courtesy Hijodedios)

LFW-7-F = The innate capacity of a human being to willingly select to follow, obey and love God...or not...at any given moment.
LFW-7-N = A lack of innate capacity of a human being to willingly select to follow, obey and love God...or not...at any given moment.
Summary of Analysis: The greatest weakness of this definition is that it is not clear what "innate capacity" refers to. As such, a Calvinist, an Arminian, and even a Pelagian could probably both affirm this definition of LFW, while each would probably assign a different sense to the term "innate capacity." The sense that Hijodedios intended, was that fallen man has this ability, which is clearly Pelagian.

LFW-A

LFW-A-N: There is no, i.e. zero, ability for things to be otherwise than they will be.
LFW-A-F: There is an ability for things to be otherwise than they will be.
Summary of Analysis: Things already are different than they will be. Thus, this definition is necessarily true, and is meaningless for the purpurpose of debate.

LFW-8 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)

LFW-8-F: the human will is autonomous.
LFW-8-N: the human will is not autonomous.
Summary of Analysis: The only sticky issue with this definition is determing what "autonomous" means. On its face, we would assert that this definition ascribes a divine attribute to man, and thus that LFW-8-N is the constant state of man.

LFW-9 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)

LFW-9-F: the human will is not in bondage to what is perceived.
LFW-9-N: the human will is bondage to what is perceived.
Summary of Analysis: There is a little bit of stickiness in terms of what "in bondage" means. Nevertheless, it should be clear that perceptions play a huge role in the ability of the will, and, thus, we would assert that LFW-9-N is the constant state of man.

LFW-10 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)

LFW-10-F: the human will cannot be worked by outside powers.
LFW-10-N: the human will can be worked by outside powers.
Summary of Analysis: It is obvious that, at least to a degree, the human will can be worked by outside powers. Thus, we would assert that LFW-10-N is the constant state of man.

LFW-11 (Courtesy Calvinist KingJamesBond)

LFW-11-F: the equal ability under the same given circumstances, to choose either of two or more courses of action, wherein no other power could determine the choice, wherein choice is defined as the mental act that consciously initiates and determines a further action, and wherein choice is the same as deliberate volition.
LFW-11-N: a lack of equal ability under the same given circumstances, to choose either of two or more courses of action, wherein no other power could determine the choice, wherein choice is defined as the mental act that consciously initiates and determines a further action, and wherein choice is the same as deliberate volition.
Summary of Analysis: One downside of this definition is that it is so detailed that may be objectionable to for any number of potential ambiguities. Nevertheless, this definition does have a certain elegance in terms of trying to close loopholes and stave off ambiguity. It may provide an even better way forward thaN LFW-3 above.

Other

Although this list is supposed to capture all of the definitions in the discussion so far, this list is not intended to be exhaustive. I encourage Godismyjudge (and any other LFW advocate who may be interested) to consider which definition of the above, or any other definition, best fits his view of what human freedom in contrast to necessity is, if it is something more than the simple, Scriptural definition provided in the Inventokos post provided previously.

-Turretinfan

Dialogue with GIMJ re: Necessity - A continuation

Dialogue Regarding Freedom of the Will

with Godismyjudge

(Continued)

This post is a continuation of

this earlier post, which itself is an offshoot of

the Inventokos post.

Now, Godismyjudge (aka GIMJ or Dan) has written:

Dear Turretinfan,You asked for a reconciliation between LFW-P and my three points.

That is:

LFW-P “man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed”

And Man is:

1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A

2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause

3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.

#1 “Man is Able T=1, to choose or not choose A” is essentially LFW-P. I suspect that’s not where you have questions, but if you do please ask them.

#3 is essentially the excluded middle principle you used to drive a wedge between LFW and LFW-P. IE man can’t do the logically impossible.

#2 is the interesting one. I will try to make it boring by rephrasing.

2* man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.

Now it’s the same as 1 and LFW-P. The only difference is inception verses continuation of a choice. IE let’s say I choose to run a mile. At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice.

I worded #2 differently. I didn’t use alternates (ie stop or continue), but only one object: continuation. Hence I added the qualifier: “without an external sufficient cause”. For our present purposes, please think of a sufficient cause as that which necessitates in an LFW-N sense. So if there is a sufficient cause for A, A is LFW-N. So 2 and 2* have the same import.

That’s a high level matching of points 1-3 and LFW-P.

Thanks for your response to my question. I will get back to you on it.

God be with you,

Dan

I reply:

Dear Dan:

I respectfully disagree with at least some of your statements above.

Allow me to begin by pointing out again the definition of LFW-P:

LFW-P is defined as “man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed”

Your numbers 1-3 do not derive from LFW-P, but are rather new ideas.

In view of that position of mine, and for convenient reference, I will refer to them as LFW-3 (your number 1), LFW-4 (your number 2), LFW-5 (your number 3). At one point you provide yet another definition which at first appears to be neither derived from LFW-P, nor from your points as written, but which you refer to as 2*. Nevertheless, because it may be derivable from LFW-P, I will refer to this definition as LFW-P2.

LFW-3

LFW-3 defines freedom as: “Man is Able [at] T=1, to choose or not choose A”

This is not the same as LFW-P.

The first difference is minor, in that the genus "deed" has been replaced by the species "choice," which is one type of deed. This is a minor difference, as I would view LFW-3 as derived from LFW-P if it were a species of LFW-P.

The notable difference, however, is "is able ... prior to the deed ... to do," vs. "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose."

Surely you see the difference.

"Prior" means before the event, whereas "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose" means at the event. At and before are distinct concepts.

You wrote: "I suspect that’s not where you have questions, but if you do please ask them."

I respond: It's not so much that I have questions, as that it is important for us to be clear. To be clear, as shown above, LFW-3 is not the same as LFW-P, nor is it derived from LFW-P.

LFW-4

LFW-4 defines free will as: "Man is Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause."

This definition has the same "at"/"prior" difference from LFW-P as does LFW-3. LFW-4 introduces a further difference, the qualification "without an external cause."

This qualification did not derive from the definition of LFW-P. Instead, the qualificaiton LFW-4 appears to be simply your insertion, Godismyjudge. That's one reason it really ought to have its own label, as opposed to be a species of LFW-P or even LFW-3.

Another difference is "stop willing" as compared to "do" (LFW-P) or "choose" (LFW-3). Since to forebear is a deed, albeit a negative deed, this simply provides a species or example, and if it were only for this difference, we could accept LFW-4 as a species of LFW-3.

LFW-5

LFW-5 defines (apparently necessity) as: "Man is Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A."

LFW-5 is simply a species of Logical Necessity. I think we are in agreement (for once) on this, inasmuch as you comment: "#3 is essentially the excluded middle principle you used to drive a wedge between LFW and LFW-P. IE man can’t do the logically impossible."

One follow-up needs to be provided, though. I am not here to force any position on non-Calvinists. You can pick your definitions, and I wll analyze them. My analysis will be as pointed and thorough as I can provide, but we're keeping busy enough with actual definitions.

LFW-P2

LFW-P2 is defined as "man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3."

LFW-P2 can be viewed as a species of LFW-P.

Reasons why LFW-P2 can be viewed as a species of LFW-P:
- The specific designations T=2 and T=3 (understood as T = 3 is later than T = 2) are examples of the general principle of "prior."
- The two qualifers of the act of "willing," namely "stop or continue" are mutually exclusive qualifiers, such that they form examples of the general principle "do A or not-A."

The criticism provided in the Inventokos post applies with equal force to LFW-P2, and LFW-P2 does not provide freedom at the example T=3, but only at the example, T=2. Thus, man's acts under LFW-P2 are not free any more than man acts are free under LFW-P, which (we have shown) is zero freedom.

You remark: "Now it’s the same as 1 and LFW-P."

I reply: It is a species of LFW-P, but it is not the same as LFW-3 (your "1"). The same "prior" difference noted above applies to LFW-P2 as it did to LFW-P.

You continue: "The only difference is inception verses continuation of a choice."

I reply: You have verbally conflated the act of choosing with the object of the choice. The inception versus continuation are not differences in the choice, but in the object. Allow me to demonstrate.

Using your example: "IE let’s say I choose to run a mile. At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice."

I reply: Notice that the object of the choice is "run a mile." At the ½ mile point (and arguably at every conscious moment along the way), you have a choice about whether to complete the running of the mile or quit. Nevertheless, those choices are different choices - not the same choice, strictly speaking.

The language in your example provides an interesting hook for our discussion. You wrote: "At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice."

Now, we both know you meant that "have to continue" as assuming the unstated "if I am to go on to complete the mile." In other words, neither of us would say that you are under an absolute necessity to complete the mile, in ordinary speech.

Nevertheless, if we adopted LFW-P or LFW-P2, we might imagine such a scenario, where you were free to choose to continue only at the starting line, not at the ½ mile point. That, of course, is an absurd world, which is why we should recognize the absurdity of LFW-P and LFW-P2 and return to the simple, Calvinistic sense of freedom of will, as de jure and de facto freedom, as described in the Inventokos post.

You stated: "I worded #2 differently. I didn’t use alternates (ie stop or continue), but only one object: continuation."

I reply: I don't have a problem with your implying one of the two alternatives. I know what you mean when you say a choice to continue: you mean a choice between continuing and not continuing (and likewise you convey the same thing negatively when you say "stop").

You wrote: "Hence I added the qualifier: “without an external sufficient cause”."

I reply: Non Sequitur. No qualifer is necessary if your goal is simply to convey the same information, since - as noted above - we can deduce the other alternative from the stated alternative.

You continued: "For our present purposes, please think of a sufficient cause as that which necessitates in an LFW-N sense."

I reply: I point you back to my earlier comments about the confusion that the use of the verb "necessitate" creates.

Nevertheless, as I understand you, you are saying that sufficient cause (SC) is anything that produces LFW-N in an act. Recall, however, that we already established that LFW-N is just logical necessity. Furthermore, recall that we established that the basis for logical necessity is the nature of God. This would seem to render "external" superfluous for everyone except God. As a corollary, however, it also produces the result that "without [the nature of God]" is a null set, because the nature of God applies everywhere and over all of time.

Nevertheless, there's no reason to start addressing the sufficiency of causes, so let's not force that particular definition on SC just yet.

You continued: "So if there is a sufficient cause for A, A is LFW-N."

I reply: Possibly you meant to insert "external" again? Or perhaps you recognized its superfluity and omitted it? In any event, everything that happens is LFW-N, because LFW-N just logical necessity, and everything is subject to logical necessity.

You wrote: "So 2 and 2* have the same import."

I respond: NS, QED.

-Turretinfan

A Quick Correction to Doug Wilson's Doctrine

A Quick Correction to Doug Wilson's Doctrine

Doug Wilson, an eminent preacher and influential writer in Reformed circles, recently published a blog post regarding his Reformed status. Here is a link.

I'll analyze Pastor Wilson's post in chunks.

DW wrote:

Green Baggins has come to the chapter of RINE where I seek to establish my Calvinistic bona fides. Some have interpreted the FV as though it were some form of Arminianism or semi-Pelagianism. So early in the book, I set aside a chapter to demonstrate that I wish that the Synod of Dort had promulgated a couple extra points so I could believe them too.

I reply:
One problem with the Federal Vision (FV) is that it has no tangible systematic theology for anyone to critique. Instead it is held in various flavors by various advocates, and reflected primarily in passing references and oblique commentary. The presbyteries that have considered the issue have generally opposed it (example here), but the individual preachers responding to the opposition have typically claimed that they were misunderstood. Thus, the moving target of FV continues to persist. While it certainly appears to be at variance with Orthodoxy, its distance from the narrow path of doctrinal orthodoxy is less so than Arminianism or semi-Pelagianism, at least as far as this author can tell.

DW wrote:

The review of this chapter is fair, with Green Baggins mostly wanting to have a few questions clarified. So here I go.

I reply:
Note that DW is responding to someone else's critique of DW's book. That critique, in relevant part, can be found linked here or more specifically here.

DW wrote:

The first is whether I am a compatibilist when it comes to questions of free will. The answer is yes, if we are talking about creaturely choices, like whether to go left or right, or whether to pick this flavor or that one at the ice cream store. But when it comes to moral choices, I believe that unregenerate men are not free unless and until God creates that freedom in them by granting them a new heart.

I reply:
This response indicates that DW does not understand the theological terms involved in the discussion.

First, "compatibilist on questions of free will." It is clear from DW's response that DW does not understand what the term means. To be clear, a compatibilist is someone who asserts that Sovereign Divine Providence (also known as "predetermination" and/or "predestination") and Human Freedom are compatible.

The Reformed position in contrast to the Arminian and Hyper-Calvinist positions is that God both sovereignly decrees all that will happen, and that man is free in the choices man makes. In other words, the Reformed position asserts the compatibility of the Decree of Providence and the freedom of man.

This is in contrast to the Arminian position (which denies compatibility and chooses to accept human freedom) and the Hyper-Calvinist position (which denies compatibility and chooses to accept the Decree of Providence).

Second, the distinction between "creaturely" and "moral" choices is a poor explanation of the issue. Possibly because DW does not understand the issues, DW creates to classes of choices, one which he refers to as "creaturely" and the other "moral."

This distinction is not a Biblical distinction, a conventional distinction, a relevant distinction, or a coherent distinction. That this distinction is not Biblical can be seen from the lack of Biblical support for the distinction. The Bible does not distinguish anywhere between "creaturely" and "moral choices."

The distinction is also not a conventional distinction. The lack of conventionality can be seen, for example, by a quick Internet search on the terms. For the truly lazy Internet scholar, here is a pre-defined search, which provided only four hits at the time this article was written, one of those four being DW's own article. Presumably this article will boost the number of hits by 25%. Here is the link.

Relevance is also not a strong suit of this distinction. In Reformed Theology, the "creaturely choices" as defined by DW are every bit as predetermined as the "moral choices" that DW mentions. Even supposing that DW means by "creaturely" those choices that are morally indifferent (and assuming for the sake of brevity that such a set of choices exist), the Free Will debate is not significantly concerned with those choices.

Finally, the distinction is not coherent. Moral choices are not distinct from creaturely choices. Creatures, man included, make many choices, at least some of which are moral choices. Furthermore, God makes choices that appear to be morally indifferent (for example, his choice to create precisely the number of people that will ever live and not one soul more) and yet God cannot be said to be "creaturely" in his choices.

Thus, the sets are ill-formed and poorly named.

Worse, DW denies compatibilism where it really matters, i.e. on moral choices. In doing so, DW abandons the Reformed view of Scripture on the issue of human freedom. The Reformed view is that fallen man freely out of a corrupt heart brings forth corrupt fruit, just as a sanctified man freely out of a good heart brings forth good fruit.

It looks as the DW has, perhaps, read Cliff's Notes on Luther's "Bondage of the Will," and is attempting to repeat what he learned.

It certainly is true that man's will, his entire heart, is in bondage to sin and corruption prior to God giving grace. Nevertheless, man has a free will, even in a fallen state, prior to regeneration. Man's will is given over to corruption and sin, and so man freely chooses what is bad, wicked, and evil.

Thus, DW seems to be confusing freedom of will in the sense of natural ability with freedom of will in the sense of compatibilism. That is to say, DW seems to have failed to recognize the important difference between Pelagianism and Arminianism, namely that Arminianism asserts that grace is necessary for a fallen man to do what is right, whereas Pelagianism asserts that man can do what is right without divine assistance.

DW continued:

Secondly, when I said that God ordained us making free choices, one of the commenters at Lane's blog was correct in assuming that I was referring to the teaching of the Westminster Confession at that point -- that God's ordination is the foundation and establishment of our creaturely freedom, not the annihilation of it. But I want to keep categories distinct. Lane appealed to the "coercive" nature of Saul's conversion. And okay, I would agree that the new birth is "coercive" in the same way my first birth was. Nobody consulted me in 1951 about whether I wanted to be born in 1953. But we don't normally describe that kind of thing as coercive, but it is clearly monergistic. And I affirm that as well.

I respond:

I, for one, am not fully persuaded that DW knows what he is talking about on these issues. In as far as the printed words above stand, however, they do generally comport with the Reformed view. God ordained men's free choices, each and every one of them.

DW:

And last, Lane points to a place where I say that I am not denying the Reformed faith -- the objectivity of the covenant is the Reformed faith. He is right to catch me here; this was an unfortunate overstatement. I have said in other places that there are those in the Reformed stream who do not emphasize the objectivity of the covenant, and yet should be recognized as Reformed (Reformed Baptists). I should have said that here. I do believe that this understanding is the best understanding of the Reformed faith (which is why I hold it), and that this part of the stream in which I am floating goes all the way back. But I did not mean to say that there were not disagreements over these issues all the way back.

I respond:
I'm not going to kick DW when he is down, more than to point out that surely, with more careful thought before writing, DW would say that he believes what he believes not because it is the Reformed faith, but because it is Scriptural.

-Turretinfan

Why I am not KJV Only

Why I am not KJV Only

I prefer the KJV, and I consider it to be the best widely available English translation of the Bible.

Nevertheless, I am not a so-called "KJV Only" advocate.

The reasons I am not a so-called "KJV Only" advocate are as follows:

• The original languages were inspired, translations are better or worse to the the degree that the conform to the original languages. The reason for preferring the KJV as an English language translation is its fidelity to the original languages.

• Although God has blessed the KJV translation with widespread usage in the Church, this is more of a testimony to its accuracy than an indication of special inspiration of the KJV translators.

• The KJV translators themselves did not claim to be specially inspired, but instead employed scholarly techniques in their translation of Scripture.

• The KJV translators had to make fallible decisions in certain instances (such as whether - or how - to include 1 John 5:7), and - while in most instances I would agree that their decision was correct - there is no reason to suppose that they decided correctly in every instance.

• Although the KJV may provide a useful version from which to translate into minor languages, in the long term it would be preferable for Christians of every language to retranslate from the original languages in their own language.

• Virtually all of the arguments in favor of KJV Only are susceptible to being applied to the Vulgate, which should be sufficient to show their non-unique status.

• The KJV is largely an improvement of earlier English versions, and there is no reason to suppose that the ultimate pinnacle and epitome of translation perfection has been achieved in the English language, even if the KJV is the best we have so far.

Other reasons have been proposed, which I reject, such as complaints about readability (particularly in the 1611 edition of the KJV), the assertion that various translations are erroneous (such as the term "Easter" or the inclusion of 1 John 5:7), and quibbles over the underlying Greek text (primarily by those in the W-H textual tradition). Those reasons are not persuasive to me for a variety of reasons, and I do not consider them to be particularly powerful arguments against the KJV Only position.

I plan to address in another post the arguments made by KJV Only advocates in favor of their position.

-Turretinfan

Wesley on 1 John 5:7-8 (The Comma)

On the theme of the Johannine Comma, the following is Wesley's brief take on the subject. I have presented Wesley mostly to show that I have not quoted Calvin above to support the argument by the personal authority of Calvin, but have simply included Calvin's comments (and Wesley's and others) to show the historical acceptance of the Comma.

The Authenticity of the Comma Johanneum

by John Wesley

excerpted from his

John Wesley's Explanatory Notes

7. What Bengelius has advanced, both concerning the transposition of these two verses, and the authority of the controverted verse, partly in his "Gnomon," and partly in his "Apparatus Criticus," will abundantly satisfy any impartial person. For there are three that testify - Literally, testifying, or bearing witness. The participle is put for the noun witnesses, to intimate that the act of testifying, and the effect of it, are continually present. Properly, persons only can testify; and that three are described testifying on earth, as if they were persons, is elegantly subservient to the three persons testifying in heaven. The Spirit - In the word, confirmed by miracles. The water - Of baptism, wherein we are dedicated to the Son, (with the Father and Spirit,) typifying his spotless purity, and the inward purifying of our nature. And the blood - Represented in the Lord's supper, and applied to the consciences of believer. And these three harmoniously agree in one - In bearing the same testimony, - that Jesus Christ is the divine, the complete, the only saviour of the world.

Calvin on 1 John 5:7-8 (The Comma)

In keeping with my series on the historical view of the Johannine Comma, here are the thoughts of John Calvin on the subject, even though Calvin is neither particularly favorable to the position that I favor, nor particularly dogmatic. It should be noted that apparently the Jerome document that Calvin is referencing is actually pseudo-Jerome, in light of further historical research.

The Authenticity of the Comma Johanneum

by John Calvin (1509-1564)

excerpted from his

Commentary on the Catholic Epistles

7. There are three than bear record in heaven The whole of this verse has been by some omitted. Jerome thinks that this has happened through design rather than through mistake, and that indeed only on the part of the Latins. But as even the Greek copies do not agree, I dare not assert any thing on the subject. Since, however, the passage flows better when this clause is added, and as I see that it is found in the best and most approved copies, I am inclined to receive it as the true reading.

And the meaning would be, that God, in order to confirm most abundantly our faith in Christ, testifies in three ways that we ought to acquiesce in him. For as our faith acknowledges three persons in the one divine essence, so it is called in so really ways to Christ that it may rest on him.

When he says, These three are one, he refers not to essence, but on the contrary to consent; as though he had said that the Father and his eternal Word and Spirit harmoniously testify the same thing respecting Christ. Hence some copies have εἰς ἓν, “for one.” But though you read ἓν εἰσιν, as in other copies, yet there is no doubt but that the Father, the Word and the Spirit are said to be one, in the same sense in which afterwards the blood and the water and the Spirit are said to agree in one.

But as the Spirit, who is one witness, is mentioned twice, it seems to be an unnecessary repetition. To this I reply, that since he testifies of Christ in various ways, a twofold testimony is fitly ascribed to him. For the Father, together with his eternal Wisdom and Spirit, declares Jesus to be the Christ as it were authoritatively, then, in this ease, the sole majesty of the deity is to be considered by us. But as the Spirit, dwelling in our hearts, is an earnest, a pledge, and a seal, to confirm that decree, so he thus again speaks on earth by his grace.

But inasmuch as all do not receive this reading, I will therefore so expound what follows, as though the Apostle referred to the witnesses only on the earth.

Response to GIMJ re: Necessity

Godismyjudge (GIMJ) wrote:

Dear Turretinfan,Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please. You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action." De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt. So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions. I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion). To clarify this is doing something against our will. The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y. This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want. If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort. But it teaches it by inference. Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts. To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical. In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do. In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will. In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action. Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model. Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!TF: The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.I am not quite sure I see the problem.Dan

I reply:

I'll respond line-by-line:
GIMJ wrote: Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please.

I reply: Exactly. Thus, the Calvinist consistently affirms Biblical free will.

GIMJ wrote: You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action."

I reply: That is an accurate quotation.

GIMJ wrote: De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt.

I reply: That's not true. It does mean that mannot cannot do what is forbidden. See, for example, Genesis 24:50.

Genesis 24:50 Then Laban and Bethuel answered and said, The thing proceedeth from the LORD: we cannot speak unto thee bad or good.

It is an ordinary way of speaking. Of course, you mean "can" in some more narrow, particular way. Nevertheless, within the realm (and using consistent, not equivocal definitions of words) of De Jure necessity we cannot do what is forbidden, and we must do what is commanded.

Your recharacterization of De Jure necessity is troubling for two reasons: (1) the obvious equivocation (using "can" in a non-De Jure sense) and (2) the selection particularly of the Logical Necessity sense of "can" in describing De Jure necessity.

In other words, there are three ways to look at things in De Jure Necessity:

1) Consistent with De Jure Necessity, one cannot steal from one's neighbor, because it is illegal.

2) Equivocating to Logical Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not without guilt, because stealing is illegal.

3) Equivocating to De Facto Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not if the police are watching closely, because stealing is illegal.

GIMJ wrote: So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions.

I reply: No, De Jure Necessity does not add extrinsic aspects to our actions. De Jure Necessity is simply defines necessity as it relates to laws, morals, covenants, and the like.

GIMJ wrote: I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.

I reply: The Bible says that it is, and common sense agrees. Laws tell you what you can and cannot do. But again, you are using "can" equivocally, not as it is used in De Jure Necessity, but with some other sense in mind.

GIMJ wrote: Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion).

I reply: As noted in the Necessity post, that is only sometimes the case. Other times we are not free from such necessity. You cannot steal the Mona Lisa because it is too heavily guarded. That's a de facto necessity from which you are not free.

GIMJ wrote: To clarify this is doing something against our will.

I reply: Or, more properly, not to do something that we want to do. See the example above.

GIMJ: The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y.

I reply: Where Y is "notX."

GIMJ wrote: This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want.

I reply: It simply has nothing to do with the issue of what causes us to want what we want.

GIMJ wrote: If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.

I reply: I suppose that this is a new definition of freedom/necessity that should be added to my original post, and I will plan to add it. Let's call this LFW-2 for now, and plan to define it as "freedom from someone or something external to us controlling what we want." Presumably LFW-N2 would be "someone or something external to us controlling what we want."

GIMJ wrote: Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort.

I reply: Actually, this sort of necessity was not addressed in the original article, because it is not called necessity in ordinary speech or the Bible. Nevertheless, the Bible does talk about what controls what we want, at least to some extent. What the Bible does not do, is discuss any sort of freedom along the lines of LFW-2.

GIMJ wrote: But it teaches it by inference.

I reply: Presumably you would hold that it teaches LFW-2, not LFW-N2. And I welcome your attempted Scriptural basis for asserting that teaching.

GMIJ wrote:

Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts.

I wrote: I skipped the line-by-line format for once in order to make a comment principally about the final sentence. My position is that LFW-N2 is not necessity properly defined. Instead, it is a philosophical definition of something. Furthermore, I do not have to assume that LFW-N2 exists, I can show that LFW-N2 exists from Scripture, common sense, common experience, and logical deduction. I do not have to assume it or infer it. That's one of the strengths of the Calvinist position over the Arminian position.

GIMJ wrote: To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.

I reply: Let's first look at the verse in context.

Nehemiah 6:5-8
5Then sent Sanballat his servant unto me in like manner the fifth time with an open letter in his hand; 6Wherein was written, It is reported among the heathen, and Gashmu saith it, that thou and the Jews think to rebel: for which cause thou buildest the wall, that thou mayest be their king, according to these words. 7And thou hast also appointed prophets to preach of thee at Jerusalem, saying, There is a king in Judah: and now shall it be reported to the king according to these words. Come now therefore, and let us take counsel together. 8Then I sent unto him, saying, There are no such things done as thou sayest, but thou feignest them out of thine own heart.

In context, Nehemiah is telling Sanballat that Sanballat is falsely reporting the facts. Disagreement over what Scripture means is not the same or equivalent to fabricating false reports about one's political enemy.

GIMJ wrote: Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.

I reply: I question whether that it is an accurate characterization of Calvinism. I know that the article to which you were responding does not make that positive assertion. I'm concerned that you are building up a straw man position beginning with the use of the word "necessary" in the line above. My proposal is, for this discussion, for you to allow me to define the Calvinist position, which is more likely to provide an accurate picture, since I am a Calvinist.

GIMJ wrote: The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God.

I reply: This seems to be reference to Romans 9 and/or an attempt to debate the perceived Calvinist position. I will table the discussion of the consequences of the Arminian position until we have clarified what that position is, and whether it is even internally coherent and Scripturally based. Since it does not appear (so far) to be either, I'm not sure we will ever need to get to arguments that are based on assuming it to be correct.

GIMJ wrote: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html

I reply: I don't object to GIMJ reading Calvin, but since Calvin is not part of this discussion, there is no reason to suppose that Calvin knows about the definitions we are explaining. Also, Calvin did not write in English, and so additional problems can accrue due to translation. Those things set aside, for the moment:

GIMJ wrote: The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical.

I reply: Calvin is addressing an objection, and it is the objector that uses the term necessity. In fact, Calvin does not rely upon necessity to define his opinion, but concludes:

but since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his sovereign appointment.

Accordingly, it is inaccurate to say that Calvin is "using" some kind of "necessity."

Furthermore, Calvin later states:

I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine that the will of God is necessity, and that every thing is necessary which he has willed; just as those things will certainly happen which he has foreseen (August. de Gen. ad Lit., Lib. 6, cap. 15).

But again, you have already conceded that those things which He has foreseen will certainly happen, so you cannot object to a definition of necessity that is phrased along the lines that Calvin phrases it above.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do.

I reply: That's very imprecisely worded. Certainly, God's decree of Providence is not a law that binds us morally. It is isntead an ordering of history. To say that it impacts what we can do, is to speak with great imprecision, particularly in view of the various senses that "can" has been given in various contexts. It appears that you are trying to use "can" here in an LFW-N2 sense. However, we have not determined that such a sense of "can" or "necessity" is a proper or Biblical sense of the term.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will.

I reply: That's certainly correct.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action.

I reply: This contrast looks like a false dichotomy. That is to say, Calvin appears to be arguing that it is logically necessary that what God has forseen will happen, because of the definition of God. The apparent dichotomy is raised by the equivocal use of "restricts our action." As noted in the previous article, logical necessity does restrict us from doing to two actions in two different places at the same time.

GIMJ wrote: Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model.

I reply: This is mostly addressed above, where Calvin's own use of the word of necessity is distinguished. Furthermore, it is addressed by providing the "logical necessity" ground for what Calvin was trying to communicate.

GIMJ wrote: Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!

I reply: See above. Expression of angst is not a rebuttal.

GIMJ quoted me as writing:

The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.

GIJ replied: I am not quite sure I see the problem.

I respond: "Man's choices and acts are apparently not free." Is that a problem for you or not?

-Turretinfan