Response to GIMJ re: Necessity

Godismyjudge (GIMJ) wrote:

Dear Turretinfan,Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please. You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action." De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt. So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions. I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion). To clarify this is doing something against our will. The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y. This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want. If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort. But it teaches it by inference. Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts. To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical. In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do. In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will. In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action. Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model. Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!TF: The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.I am not quite sure I see the problem.Dan

I reply:

I'll respond line-by-line:
GIMJ wrote: Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please.

I reply: Exactly. Thus, the Calvinist consistently affirms Biblical free will.

GIMJ wrote: You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action."

I reply: That is an accurate quotation.

GIMJ wrote: De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt.

I reply: That's not true. It does mean that mannot cannot do what is forbidden. See, for example, Genesis 24:50.

Genesis 24:50 Then Laban and Bethuel answered and said, The thing proceedeth from the LORD: we cannot speak unto thee bad or good.

It is an ordinary way of speaking. Of course, you mean "can" in some more narrow, particular way. Nevertheless, within the realm (and using consistent, not equivocal definitions of words) of De Jure necessity we cannot do what is forbidden, and we must do what is commanded.

Your recharacterization of De Jure necessity is troubling for two reasons: (1) the obvious equivocation (using "can" in a non-De Jure sense) and (2) the selection particularly of the Logical Necessity sense of "can" in describing De Jure necessity.

In other words, there are three ways to look at things in De Jure Necessity:

1) Consistent with De Jure Necessity, one cannot steal from one's neighbor, because it is illegal.

2) Equivocating to Logical Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not without guilt, because stealing is illegal.

3) Equivocating to De Facto Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not if the police are watching closely, because stealing is illegal.

GIMJ wrote: So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions.

I reply: No, De Jure Necessity does not add extrinsic aspects to our actions. De Jure Necessity is simply defines necessity as it relates to laws, morals, covenants, and the like.

GIMJ wrote: I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.

I reply: The Bible says that it is, and common sense agrees. Laws tell you what you can and cannot do. But again, you are using "can" equivocally, not as it is used in De Jure Necessity, but with some other sense in mind.

GIMJ wrote: Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion).

I reply: As noted in the Necessity post, that is only sometimes the case. Other times we are not free from such necessity. You cannot steal the Mona Lisa because it is too heavily guarded. That's a de facto necessity from which you are not free.

GIMJ wrote: To clarify this is doing something against our will.

I reply: Or, more properly, not to do something that we want to do. See the example above.

GIMJ: The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y.

I reply: Where Y is "notX."

GIMJ wrote: This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want.

I reply: It simply has nothing to do with the issue of what causes us to want what we want.

GIMJ wrote: If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.

I reply: I suppose that this is a new definition of freedom/necessity that should be added to my original post, and I will plan to add it. Let's call this LFW-2 for now, and plan to define it as "freedom from someone or something external to us controlling what we want." Presumably LFW-N2 would be "someone or something external to us controlling what we want."

GIMJ wrote: Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort.

I reply: Actually, this sort of necessity was not addressed in the original article, because it is not called necessity in ordinary speech or the Bible. Nevertheless, the Bible does talk about what controls what we want, at least to some extent. What the Bible does not do, is discuss any sort of freedom along the lines of LFW-2.

GIMJ wrote: But it teaches it by inference.

I reply: Presumably you would hold that it teaches LFW-2, not LFW-N2. And I welcome your attempted Scriptural basis for asserting that teaching.

GMIJ wrote:

Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts.

I wrote: I skipped the line-by-line format for once in order to make a comment principally about the final sentence. My position is that LFW-N2 is not necessity properly defined. Instead, it is a philosophical definition of something. Furthermore, I do not have to assume that LFW-N2 exists, I can show that LFW-N2 exists from Scripture, common sense, common experience, and logical deduction. I do not have to assume it or infer it. That's one of the strengths of the Calvinist position over the Arminian position.

GIMJ wrote: To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.

I reply: Let's first look at the verse in context.

Nehemiah 6:5-8
5Then sent Sanballat his servant unto me in like manner the fifth time with an open letter in his hand; 6Wherein was written, It is reported among the heathen, and Gashmu saith it, that thou and the Jews think to rebel: for which cause thou buildest the wall, that thou mayest be their king, according to these words. 7And thou hast also appointed prophets to preach of thee at Jerusalem, saying, There is a king in Judah: and now shall it be reported to the king according to these words. Come now therefore, and let us take counsel together. 8Then I sent unto him, saying, There are no such things done as thou sayest, but thou feignest them out of thine own heart.

In context, Nehemiah is telling Sanballat that Sanballat is falsely reporting the facts. Disagreement over what Scripture means is not the same or equivalent to fabricating false reports about one's political enemy.

GIMJ wrote: Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.

I reply: I question whether that it is an accurate characterization of Calvinism. I know that the article to which you were responding does not make that positive assertion. I'm concerned that you are building up a straw man position beginning with the use of the word "necessary" in the line above. My proposal is, for this discussion, for you to allow me to define the Calvinist position, which is more likely to provide an accurate picture, since I am a Calvinist.

GIMJ wrote: The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God.

I reply: This seems to be reference to Romans 9 and/or an attempt to debate the perceived Calvinist position. I will table the discussion of the consequences of the Arminian position until we have clarified what that position is, and whether it is even internally coherent and Scripturally based. Since it does not appear (so far) to be either, I'm not sure we will ever need to get to arguments that are based on assuming it to be correct.

GIMJ wrote: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html

I reply: I don't object to GIMJ reading Calvin, but since Calvin is not part of this discussion, there is no reason to suppose that Calvin knows about the definitions we are explaining. Also, Calvin did not write in English, and so additional problems can accrue due to translation. Those things set aside, for the moment:

GIMJ wrote: The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical.

I reply: Calvin is addressing an objection, and it is the objector that uses the term necessity. In fact, Calvin does not rely upon necessity to define his opinion, but concludes:

but since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his sovereign appointment.

Accordingly, it is inaccurate to say that Calvin is "using" some kind of "necessity."

Furthermore, Calvin later states:

I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine that the will of God is necessity, and that every thing is necessary which he has willed; just as those things will certainly happen which he has foreseen (August. de Gen. ad Lit., Lib. 6, cap. 15).

But again, you have already conceded that those things which He has foreseen will certainly happen, so you cannot object to a definition of necessity that is phrased along the lines that Calvin phrases it above.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do.

I reply: That's very imprecisely worded. Certainly, God's decree of Providence is not a law that binds us morally. It is isntead an ordering of history. To say that it impacts what we can do, is to speak with great imprecision, particularly in view of the various senses that "can" has been given in various contexts. It appears that you are trying to use "can" here in an LFW-N2 sense. However, we have not determined that such a sense of "can" or "necessity" is a proper or Biblical sense of the term.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will.

I reply: That's certainly correct.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action.

I reply: This contrast looks like a false dichotomy. That is to say, Calvin appears to be arguing that it is logically necessary that what God has forseen will happen, because of the definition of God. The apparent dichotomy is raised by the equivocal use of "restricts our action." As noted in the previous article, logical necessity does restrict us from doing to two actions in two different places at the same time.

GIMJ wrote: Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model.

I reply: This is mostly addressed above, where Calvin's own use of the word of necessity is distinguished. Furthermore, it is addressed by providing the "logical necessity" ground for what Calvin was trying to communicate.

GIMJ wrote: Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!

I reply: See above. Expression of angst is not a rebuttal.

GIMJ quoted me as writing:

The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.

GIJ replied: I am not quite sure I see the problem.

I respond: "Man's choices and acts are apparently not free." Is that a problem for you or not?

-Turretinfan