Exegesis Challenge - Calvinism vs. Non-Calvinism

This challenge goes out to any and all non-Calvinists.

1. Pick five passages that you believe support your view on soteriology, and I will do the same.

2. Write a thorough, detailed exegesis of those five passages (no limit on how long it can be ... make it as long as you need), and I will do the same.

3. Then I will critique and/or provide an alternative exegesis for each of the exegeses you provided, and you will have the responsibility to do the same for mine.

4. Write a rebuttal to each of the critique/alternative exegeses I present, and I will do the same for your critiques/alternative exegeses.

5. Provide comments back and forth in the footnotes of the rebuttals (both yours and mine) until all the arguments have been made.

If you are interested, you can either post a comment here, or you can send me an email. A link to my email address is available through my Blogger profile, which (at present) you can get by clicking on the "About me" information on the left side of this blog.

My preference would be initially to do the papers by email, and then we are both satisfied, to post the final collection as a whole to this blog or another internet site.

Negotation/variation of the proposal is certainly welcome.

Any takers?

-Turretinfan

Why I am not an Evidentialist

Why I am not an Evidentialist

Introduction

There are many available epistemologies. One that is popular in many circles is the epistemology of evidentialism. This epistemology is the favored approach by many, and can be summarized as the view that one believes what one believes because that is what the weight of the evidence indicates is true. I am not an evidentialist, and I believe that evidentialism is a fundamentally flawed epistemology.

The Attraction of Evidentialism

Despite the fundamental weaknesses of Evidentialism, Evidentialism has blossomed in popularity. The primary reason for the attraction is that evidentialism typically presents itself as Science.

Those who dare to challenge Science are viewed today as fools or Luddites: locked in the middle ages and flat earth geography. Scientists are regarded as the most intelligent portion of society, busily improving life on earth through the application of the Scientific Method.

If Science says, "X," that is enough for many people to believe it. Thus, for example, you will hear arguments in public fora that it is absurd to call Homosexuality a deviant practice rooted in mental and spiritual illness, because the science of Psychiatry has not listed homosexuality as a mental disorder in its most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.

One will hear that a young child in his mother's womb is not a person, because the science of biololgy has labelled the child a "fetus." One will likewise hear that the Great Flood could not have happened as described, because Science says otherwise.

Appeals to Science are becoming an entrenched part of the fabric of public discourse. The use of DNA evidence in court has led people to place even more confidence in the ability of Science to provide truth.

On the coattails of this popularity, evidentialism in its most popular form, Naturalism, arrives. Naturalism claims to be the result of scientific investigation, and holds nothing to be known unless it has been verified scientifically. Their opponents are not arguing with them, they will say, but with the evidence.

Some Christians, perhaps even without thinking, have adopted to one degree or another the same epistemology and suggest that they hold what they hold, because the weight of the evidence supports it. Thus, for example, one will hear of apparently Christian apologists claiming to be able to prove that the balance of evidence proves that there is a God, or that the world is intelligently designed, or that rules of morality are good.

Evidentialism and the Scientific Method

As noted above, evidentialism has gained ground because it purports to be scientific. The usual way that something has been viewed as scientific is by whether it applies the scientific method. The scientific method is normally thought to proceed:

1. Guess/Hypothesis/Formulation/Theory


2. Testing/Data/Empirical Analysis


3. Theorization/Verification/Validation/Canonization or Rejection/Rewriting/Reformulation/Revision/Invalidation

The Scientific Method, thus, begins with uncertainty, and proceeds toward (at least this is the goal) greater certainty. The more testing a hypothesis has undergone, the stronger its verification, until it is eventually validated or even canonized as a scientific principle or law. The Scientific Method is also usually cyclical. A guess can turn into a hypothesis, and then a theory.

Evidentialism tries to imitate this principle. It begins with a hypothesis, and then attempts to validate the hypothesis by testing. Thus, evidentialism seeks to wear the mantle of the scientific method, even when some of its hypthothesis are not scientifically testable in the usual sense of the word.

The Scentific Method, despite its foundation on guesses and hunches, gives its holders an aura of objectivity. The reason why this is so, is that the Scientific Method has been used with great success in the applied sciences: engineering and medicine. People assume that technological success is the result of discovery of truth, and consequently they believe the Scientific Method to be a revealer of objective truth.

Presuppositions in Evidentialism

One reason that Evidentilists pick Evidentialism is a belief that by choosing that epistemology, they are beginning with a blank slate. This is false. There are presuppositions in Evidentialism. One standard presupposition of Science, for example, is Naturalism.

Specifically, science normally presupposes that every cause is the result of a purely natural effect. Usually, scientists do not consider this a very problematic presupposition. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that it is a presupposition.

There are other presuppositions as well: that the world is orderly, that there is a connection between perception and reality, that experience is transitive, and a host of other presuppositions. These presuppositions are not items that can be either established or rebutted by evidentialism, whether in the form of science or in any other form.

A response from a typical beaker-filler or spectrum-analyzer is often to blow off this issue, as though it were not an epistemic weakness: "So you're saying that experience might not be transistive?" Such replies are simply belligerant, they do not defend the choice of presuppoisitons - nor (more importantly) recognize that the entire Scientific, Naturalistic, and Evidentialist epistemology is piggy-backed on a presuppositional epistemology.

Result of Adherence to Strict Evidentialism - No Beginning

The result of adherence to strict Evidentialism, denying whatever cannot be proved by appeal to sensory experience and other evidence, is to deny the fundamental presuppositions of Evidentialism. Evidentialism cannot prove (or even test) that experience is transisitive, that the world is orderly, or that the natural is all that there is.

In short, Evidentialism is self-contradictory. Because Evidentialism, strictly taken, is self-contradictory, it is an improper and invalid epistemology from the very beginning. Evidentialism cannot stand on its own to ensure that it has started from the right place, and consequently the Evidentialist can never have any knowledge that has the confidence of a foundation.

Result of Adherence to Strict Evidentialism - No Certainty

The results of Evidentialism are always tenuous; its adherence have no certainty that what is a law today will be a law tomorrow. Newton's laws are a prime example of this phenomena. Until Einstein, Newton's laws enjoyed widespread general acceptance in the scientific community. Now, Newton's laws are viewed as a helpful approximation under certain conditions. There is no reason to fill this account with more examples, though certainly more could be given.

The historical fact is that Science's body of knowledge has always been in flux, and that not even the greatest scientist is unable to be corrected. Aristotle's Physics was a widely accepted work for many centuries, but later Science rejected it, and you will find it rare than any college class (in Physics) will spend more than an hour on the entire body of Aristotle's work.

With such a track record, an Evidentialist might have a hunch that he could could verify by testing that the body of Scientific knowledge at the beginning of each decade for the last hundred years has been different from the body of Scientific knowledge at the end of each such decade. Upon that ground, an Evidentialist may conclude that there are numerous unknown items that are Science today, but will be labelled "error" in the scientific community tomorrow.

Result of Adherence to Strict Evidentialism - No End

Not only can Evidentialism not assure its adherence that it has started from the right place or that it is in the right place now, it cannot assure its adherents that it is converging to the right answer. Because Evidentialism cannot see the end in sight, Evidentialism cannot assure its followers that they are converging to the truth. Evidentialism may currently be converging toward something, but there is no way for the Evidentialist to be sure that this something is the truth.

What Guess has not been Made?

This is the nagging question in evidentialism. Until Einstein, no one had presented his own hunch about the way the universe is supposed to operate. Einsteinian descriptions of the world are very useful, but are they correct? Is there a better guess about the universe that has not been investigated? This is the nagging question that distracts from the beauty of any "truth" of Evidentialism.

Evidentialism tries to silence this nagging question as unfounded speculation. Evidentialism teaches its advocates that the prevailing wisdom should simply be accepted. At the same time, and conflictingly, Evendentialism rewards skeptics who can come up with guesses that test better than the guesses in the prevailing position.

Fundamentally Dishonest

The claims of Evidentialism are fundamentally dishonest: the beginning of Evidentialism must be borrowed from a presuppositional (or similar) framework; it promises truth but delivers constantly changing guesswork; and it promises improvement without any reason for supposing that can provide improvement.

Open to Skepticism

In addition to narrow skepticism regarding particular scientific theories, Evidentialism is open to attack by general skepticism. If there are two ways of interpreting evidence, it is impossible for Evidentialism to decide between them.

Evidentialism tries to resolve this problem by resort to Occham's razor. Occham's razor states that the simpler explanation should be accepted over the more complex explanation. There is, however, no Evdiential reason to adopt Occham's razor. Instead, the mechanism is yet another stop-gap presupposition.

Evidentialism also tries to resolve the problem (sometimes in combination with the razor above) that the more probable of the explanations should be accepted. There is a real problem, however, with this approach. It is often (if not always) difficult to assign a priori probabilities. Accordingly, the resort to probabilitic arguments frequently ends up with mere emotive arguments or, worse, arguments that make up the probabilities from thin air.

Responses to Skepticism are Self-Destructive

Whatever approach Evidentialism takes in responding to Skepticism is self-destructive. An appeal to a presupposition that favors simple explanations betrays the non-evidential underlying epistemology; an appeal to probability betrays both uncertainty and weakness at arriving at the alleged probability.

In short, Evidentialism cannot stand on its own two feet against the Skeptics.

Objections

One objector might object that I myself use evidentialist techniques! I'm not afraid to apply the Scientific method to everyday life, when my car breaks down, my faucet drips, or my dog gets ill. That's certainly an objection with a touch of truth. I do use the scientific method in such circumstances.

I do so, however, recognizing that it is piggy-backed on my dogmatic presuppositionalism. I know why I can trust my senses and the scientific method: because God has revealed Himself to be an orderly God and the world to be a place run by law.

Another objector may complain, "If you can't trust your senses, you can't trust the Bible!" This frequent objection is misplaced. I can trust my senses - I know that I can because the Bible tells me so. God has revealed the truth of His Word to me, and consequently I know that I can trust it. From that, I can deduce that I can also trust my senses, to a degree.

Another objector will argued that if I can use evidentialist techniques, I am not in a position to forbid Evidentialists from doing so. My response is that Evidentialists do not have an epistemic basis for their use of the techniques; they cannot know anything certaintly, and consequently cannot know whether they know anything at all.

Yet another objector might assert that that the Bible uses an evidentialist epistemology. Such an objector would point to the reliance of certain authors in Scripture to tangible evidence. Nevertheless, as the Apostle Peter explained, all the writers of Scripture spoke according to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. They spoke the words of God. And the most frequent appeal by all the prophets and apostles is that they are speaking the Word of the LORD, the Gospel. Their appeal is to the authority of God, and their epistemology is dogmatic and revelation-based.

One last objector may state that he considers himself an Evidentialist, but that he grounds his reason for believing "evidence" in "transcendentals." This is not true Evidentialism, but a slightly modified form of Evidentialism that I will deal with, God Willing, under the separate head of Van-Tillianism / Transcendentalism.

-Turretinfan

Germany Identifies Scientology as a Cult

The good news is that Germany recognized Scientology as a cult/scam (link). The bad news is that Germany does not officially recognize (to my knowledge, anyhow) that Islam is an even worse cult/scam. Scientology may ruin someone financially, but Islam has killed and continues to kill. Maybe we'll see some progress in time.

-Turretinfan

Response to Kurschner on Revelation 5:9-10

Response to Mr. Alan Kurschner

On Revelation 5:9-10

The Present Author Slightly Favoring

The Reading of the Authorized Version

Introduction

In a recent article (link), Mr. Kurschner argued that the Authorized Version (aka the KJV) has several incorrect readings at Revelation 5:9-10. I respectfully disagree with Mr. Kurschner, and I believe that the Authorized Version generally has the better reading, based both on the internal and external evidence. Before I continue, I should point that although I believe that the KJV (in the 1792 edition) is the present paragon of excellence in translation of the Bible in the English language, I am not a KJV-only (KJVO) advocate. I have explained why I am not, previously (link). It is possible that some readings of the KJV could be improved, but this is not such a case, in my opinion, although I leave open the possibility that I could be wrong.

Reference English Readings

For reference, the Authorized Version's reading of the disputed passage is:

Revelation 5:9-10
9And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; 10And hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth.


In contrast:

Revelation 5:9-10 (NASB, notes omitted, italics and quotation marks original)
9And they sang a new song, saying, "Worthy are You to take the book and to break its seals; for You were slain, and purchased for God with Your blood men from every tribe and tongue and people and nation. 10"You have made them to be a kingdom and priests to our God; and they will reign upon the earth."

For further comparison, here is the Westcott & Hort translation, "The Twentieth Century New Testament," (revised ed. 1904) for comparison (formatting omitted):

And they are singing a new song -- 'Thou art worthy to take the book and break its seals, for thou wast sacrificed, and with thy blood thou didst buy for God men of every tribe, and language, and people, and nation, and didst make them at Kingdom of Priests in the service of our God, and they are reigning upon the earth.'

Analysis

For reasons that will be clear rather quickly, Mr. Kurschner begins with the second, rather than the first verse. I'll proceed in the order in which the verses would be read.

With respect to verse 9, Mr. Kurschner takes the position that the omission of "us" is the better reading, with the sole external evidence being the lone testimony of "A". The problem with Mr. Kurscher's view here is that it fails to account properly for the transcriptional evidence. The harder reading is "us" (not its omission). It appears that A (in the Apocalpyse) was copied by ear.

In evidence of the auditory copying of A, note, for example, who A also has a unique spelling of αδουσιν as αδωσιν. Two obvious explanations for this error spring to mind. One would be an error of the eye, the other of the ear. A, if it is as old as is claimed, was copied from an Uncial manuscript written in all capitals. If so, it would be difficult to confuse omicron-upsilon with omega. Accordingly, we can discard the error of eye hypothesis. Instead, it seems more that is simply an itacism, and that the scribe misheard the vowel pair as omega, and copied phonetically. (It is interesting to note, by way of comparison, that A alone likewise omits ημων in the phrase "our God" in verse 10, at which point Mr. Kurshner, Messrs. Westscott and Hort, and the NASB do not follow A.)

Once we recognize that A was copied by hearing, it would be reasonable, then for A simply to fail to hear the word ημας composed, as it is, entirely of vowels and soft consonents, and accidentally omit it.

Mr. Kurschner provides a counter argument that:

there was a scribal tendency to "clarify" ambiguous readings. And in this case, it makes much more sense that a scribe would add an object to clarify who is being purchased, rather than a scribe omitting the object of God's purchasing.

There is a significant problem with Mr. Kurschner's argument here. While it may be possible that a scribe would attempt to clarify who is being purchased, it is unclear why (if the scribe had before him) a text reflected by the NASB, the scribe would choose to insert "us" rather then "men" or "them," unless the scribe had a reason for believing that "us" was intended by the context. If one accepts NASB text as accurately reflecting the context, one is left wondering how "us" could have been the intent.

Furthermore, the internal evidence favors the reading from the standpoint of difficulty. Omission creates no serious difficulty, but insertion creates the difficulty that one must explain how (apparently and on its face) the twenty four enders and four beasts were redeemed out of every kindred, etc.

Furthermore, the versional testimony in favor of "us" is overwhelming. The Vulgate (all versions and old translations I could find except the Vatican II edition), Horner's translation of the Coptic, all the translations of the Peshitto I have (Murdoch's, Lamsa's, and Etheridge's translations), and my copy of the Slavonic.

When we come to verse 10, the reason for Mr. Kurschner's opposition with respect to verse 9 becomes apparent. In verse 10, there is a mixture in the external evidence as to whether the pronoun should be "us" or "them." The majority of the early Greek texts have "them." There are, however, very few early Greek texts of the Apocolypse. Unlike most of the Bible, there are no lectionaries of the Apocalypse presumably because it was not read in church, and accordingly there is no lectionary data at all for the text of the Apocalypse. Thus, the remaining evidence are patristic quotations (which favor "us") and versional evidence, which is mixed with the Coptic, Peshitto, and Armenian favoring "them" and the Slavonic and Vulgate favoring "us."

Furthermore, if we have established that reading of 9 is "us," then the internal evidence favors "us," because it makes more sense. This, of course, raises a slight transcriptional argument in favor of corruption of the text to smooth between 9 and 10, and this raises a slight amount of evidence that "them" could be the original in 10.

However, I'm not persuaded by that transcriptional argument, because the more likely transcriptional variation would flow from the verb "shall reign" (which, in many instances, is 3rd person plural), which is more directly connected with being made kings, than is the foregoing redemption.

This brings us to the final textual variant, the conjugation of the verb "to reign" in verse 10. Again, the same versional information applies in favor, the Vulgate and the Slavonic favoring the third person singular. There is a further split among the Greek witnesses and versions on this very verb, however. At least the following are presented among the various witnesses and versions: basileian, basileis, basileusousin, and basileuiusin (in addition, of course, to basileusomen).

Mr. Kurschner selects basileusousin, but this is not the reading provided by A (his favored text elsewhere in this same argument). A has basileian.

In view of the variety of textual evidence for and against the conjugation of "to reign," I leave open the possibility that the KJV may have the wrong tense expressed. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to believe that the verb conjugation has been corrupted, and that we should restore the verb ending by the context. In the context, the preferred verb ending is first person plural, future.

Conclusion

Accordingly, I conclude that the KJV reading is slightly preferably here, primarily on the weight of the versional testimony of the Vulgate and Slavonic versions, against the apparently accidentally corrupted Greek text.

Almost by way of an afterword, it is important to note that Mr. Kurschner includes an argument that would be better omitted, as it can only weaken his position. That is Mr. Kurschner's argument that suggests that KJVO advocates insist on the KJV's reading here because of an a priori commitment to pretribulation premillenial theology. It seems completely unreasonable to suppose that such a commitment would force one to adopt the KJVO position - it would be sufficient simply to dispute the translation of the text (as, for example, the present author has done above). On the other hand, Mr. Kurschner could more readily be accused (and the accusation would be a false one, in my own estimation) of seeking to maintain a corrupt reading in the text in order to oppose pretribulation premillenialism. Because the KJVO position does not permit monkeying with text, suggesting that it is motivated by the readings of particular passages is not a reasonable critique.

I would encourage Mr. Kurschner to omit this argument in future versions of this same presentation, reserving it instead, for posts such as this one of his, on another site (link).

I would also continue to encourage Mr. Kurschner to address the actual problems with the KJVO position, rather than trying to find fault with Authorized Version. In most, if not all, of the cases of alleged incorrect readings of the KJV there is going to be a substantial argument in favor of the KJV, even when that substantial argument is wrong.

It would seem better to go after the root of the problem: the lack of a reason to suppose that the KJV (in any of its edititions) is entirely free from even the most trivial errors of reading.

-Turretinfan

Clarkian Epistemology - Contra Van-Tillian Objections

Clarkian Epistemology Distinguished

Against Van Tillian Responses

There has been a recent spat of comments flowing out of a discussion generally related to TJH's post (link) and my response (link).

In particular, TJH, Keith, and an internet poster who has adopted the handle "John Calvin" (JC), have provided some comments worthy of further discussion.

TJH's first comments (link) require me to dig through the disarray of tomes that I call my library to try to locate my copy of the relevant book. I have not yet found time to do so. I'll try to do so soon, rather than rely on my memory.

Keith's comments (link) ask:

You say that science collectively says R. In reality, the truth is R’. This is trivial. Who wouldn’t agree with that? Are there people out there who think that science has always given us the truth? The whole idea behind science is that we keep modifying our “knowledge”.
Nevertheless, this makes more sense of Clark’s claim that science is “false.” Collectively, yes it probably is, but once again, if he’s concerned about epistemic certainty then he still can’t say its truly false, only probably false.
By the way, how does Clark know that the Bible says what he thinks it says given the uncertainty of language?

I respond:

As to the first paragraph, that's an intermediate step of the argument, not the final point. I do think that virtually everyone would agree that the truth is R'. Nevertheless, evidentialism does not have the tools either to say with certainty that the truth is R', or even that R is close, far, or converging to R'. In other words, evidentialism is without an anchor. Evidentialism can convince us that the R of science is changing, but cannot tell us with certainty that it is approaching truth.

This does not mean that science is not useful, but that that science ALONE is not an epistemology of any value.

As to the second paragraph, all that is necessary for Clark to prevail is that we agree that evidentialism is an undesirable epistemology. Clark can easily demonstrate that Science collectively includes assertions that are contrary to the truth (for example, in the area of cosmology), but that is not based on evidentialism, but on Clark's own epistemology.

It's important to point out the evidentialism cannot only not show that R is not R' with certainty, but even that R is not R' with probability. There's no a priori way of assigning probabilities to the position. If one jumps out of evidentialism for a second, and presupposes that historical observations are a probable predictor of future events, then whatever you presuppose as that probability that historical observations will predict future events will correspond to the probability that Science is false. I'm not sure how helpful that would be.

As to the final question, Clark (like the Reformers) deduces from Scripture that the important things in Scripture are perspicuous.

TJH's second comments (link) follow on Keith's comments (above).

TJH writes:

Also, that applies to theology as well. I’m sure that Clark’s theology underwent tweaks over the course of his life, and there was probably at least one false proposition left in there. Say it is certainly so. Then, by the same reasoning, can we not say that Clark’s theology was false?

(underscore substituted for italics in original)

I respond:

Clark would agree that the entire body of Clarkian theology (even as it stood on his moment of death) undoubtedly contained some error or other, and consequently is not a suitable presuppositional basis. Clark would, therefore, agree that Scripture, not Clarkian theology, should be our epistemological starting point.

JC's comments (link) are lengthier, more vehement, and seem to reflect a personal stake in the debate, but are not remarkably different from Keith's.

JC wrote:

[1] And of course you don’t know that my conclusion proves the absurdity of trying to argue like a Van Tillian, do you? It’s just your mere opinion, isn’t it?
[2] I see you *assert* that the sun’s heat is being spoken of literally, but you don’t know that, do you? Sure you can “presuppose it,” but whopp-dee-doo.
[3] Then I can prove God is a bird by “presupposing” that it is speaking literally? No. So, just “presupposing” anything willy-nilly is a bit unwise. And, of course you don’t even know that Scripture says “sun.” That word could be “oven,” and so your eyes are tricking you. How would you know otherwise?
[4] So, no free lunches. I want to know how the Clarkian doesn’t commit epistemological suicide every time he opens his mouth. Your saying “just grant me that I know what the Bible says,” sems like the evolutionist asking me to grant him that “life evolved from non-life just once,” and then he’ll show me how everything else follows. Like Tim said above, “of where one cannot speak, one should be
silent.”
[5] You don’t know Clark existed, and you don’t know he had a high standard of knowledge, either. That’s another mere opinion. Also, you don’t know that you don’t need to know. So that was another opinion. A mere assertion. Why do you expect “Van Tillians” to grant you your unjustified opinions? Is it because it’s “absurd” to reason like us so you think you can pass assertions on as substantive answers and we won’t “get it” because we’re “absurd.”
[6] You don’t know that Clark existed, that’s right. But, you also don;t know that eh
should have been ordained because you don’t know if he was a man. You don;t even
know if you’re a man, how much more then do you not know that Clark is?
[7] I mean, you don’t even know that Scripturalism is the case! If all knowledge is either found in Scripture, or able to be deduced from Scripture, then since *that proposition* cannot be deduced from Scripture, you don’t know it! So, the Scripturalist can’t even know his own Scripturalist package. Thus it looks like you have in-house problems in your backyard that needf cleaning before you tell me to clean up my own backyard.

(all errors in original, numbering added for convenient reference)

I respond:

As to [1], as I had previously stated (link), your conclusion demonstrates the absurdity of arguing like a Van Tillian. I'm not interested in proving that, or establishing to your satisfaction that I know it. If you don't see the absurdity of your previous argument (link), so be it. I think others can and will see the absurdity, but if not - I'll have to look for a more clear example. Perhaps the remainder of your present argument will provide such an example.

As to [2], the answer is that I do know that it is being spoken of literally; I have deduced that from Scripture.

As to [3], if you presuppose that God is a bird, it is your presupposition against mine. Yours are foolish presuppositions that will place you in the lake of fire, if you really hold to them. But I doubt you do. You only suggest such presuppositions to be argumentative.

As to [3] (cont'd), I do know that the word there is "sun," and you know it too. Your objection is not something you believe, but simply an attempt to be argumentative. I know otherwise by deduction from Scripture. If you would pay attention to the arguments presented previously (link), you would understand that.

As to [4], a better choice for comparison would have been the context of the recent PCA debate on justification. The elders have agreed that the WCF is Scriptural, and, thus, the debate centers around whether the FV doctrines are confessional. Nevertheless, yes, evolutionists are frequently trying to persuade people to accept their presupposition of Naturalism. If you do, you're not left with a lot of other choices besides evolution. As for epistemic suicide, Clark is not an evidentialist, and his epistemology is not evidentialism. His rebuttal of evidentialism, consequently, does not damage his epistemology. Your perception that it does appears to be a similar mistake to that made by Keith above.

As to [5], the questions of whether or not Clark existed or had a high standard for "knowledge" are not serious questions. If refusing to engage in puerile games is "taking a free pass," so be it. If the presentation of objections that are not one's own is all that Van Tillianism has to offer, I will let people decide for themselves whether it is worth anyone's time. Furthermore, "mere opinion" and "mere assertion" are not the only alternative to Clark's high standard of "knowledge." Your own assertions reflect your adoption of a false dichotomy.

As to [6], this argument relies on an implicit equivocation between the high standard of knowledge (absolute certainty) and ordinary knowledge. No one has suggested that we should act only on the basis of things for which we have absolute certainty, or that certainty is necessary in every aspect of life.

As to [7], despite the claims of many anti-Reformed apologists, Sola Scriptura is, in fact, a doctrine of Scripture. Here, at least, I think you go beyond any reasonable scope of Van Tilianism, if you deny that Sola Scriptura is a doctrine of Scripture. Perhaps, on the other hand, you simply either do not know what the doctrine is, or you are again equivocating between the high definition of knowledge and the ordinary definition of knowledge.

-Turretinfan

P.S. A response by JC with respect, primarily, to number 7 can be found here (link). In summation, JC falsely accused me of not understanding what Sola Scriptura is.

I respond:

The only things we can know with the highest confidence are the things that God himself reveals. That is the reason behind the use of Scripture as the supreme judge. Once one has grasped that, the rest should fall into place, as long as one commits oneself to abandon consistent implicit equivocation over the words “know” and “knowledge.” So far, I don’t see the VT side doing that.

-Turretinfan

Centuri0n Makes a Good Point

This post (link) provides an excellent warm-up. If you have time, I encourage you to read it. It won't take long.

After you've read it, consider whether your evangelism technique mentions only love and heaven, or whether it also mentions wrath and hell ... but more importantly if it mentions, persecutions, trials, and difficulties.

Our spiritual ancestors, many of them, were martyred for their faith. Our brothers, in some lands, are being martyred and imprisoned even today. John the Baptist was imprisoned and eventually beheaded for preaching that someone's lifestyle was ungodly.

Guess what! Today, those whose lifestyles are even more depraved than those of the Herod family are trying to label John the Baptist-style preaching "hate speech," and trying to push for criminal sanctions. I doubt beheading is coming any time soon, but fines and imprisonment is definite possibility.

There can be real cost in terms of standing up for the truth of God's word - if you forget to mention this in your discussion with unbelievers, aren't really giving them a short 20?

-Turretinfan

Doug Wilson - Clearly Upset by the PCA

Doug Wilson, clearly upset by the PCA's condemnation of FV, wrote (link):

But Lane is correct. I was not saying that those Reformed folk who did this thing deny the truth of the Confessions, or that they have embraced heretical doctrines. I am saying that they have adopted a means of defending their Confession that is at odds with the content of the Confession itself, and hence they will not be able sustain a defense of the Confession over any extended period of time. If there are any leading lights in the PCA who are able to defend the truths of the Reformation against those who contradict it (as it is claimed we in the FV do) by means of open debate, relevant interaction, and appeal to Scripture, this controversy has not revealed their names to us. A stacked committee, followed by time for debate on the floor of GA that could be measured in minutes. What a joke.

I respond:

There is no reason to suppose that the PCA should have permitted a lengthy oral debate on the topics identified in the PCA's report. There is also no reason to suppose, and - indeed - it is unfair to suppose that the PCA committee and assembly did not appeal to Scripture. The articles presented in the report were clearly contrary both to the WCF and to Scripture. As far as I can see, the question is not whether the articles presented are wrong (they undeniably are wrong), but whether they accurately portray FV.

It is for that reason that I have provided an open challenge to any advocate or proponent of FV/AAT to identify the FV/AAT distinctives (Link). So far, there have been no takers. The floor of the general assembly is not the place for "open debate" on the subject. There time constraints to be considered, and the parliamentary format is going, inevitably, to leave one side or the other feeling that they did not have a full chance to air their views.

-Turretinfan

Calvin - Infants - Original Sin

The Reformed Puritan recently wrote a post (link) which indicatesd that he was taking the position that God "condemns and punishes actual sin, not our original sin state." It seemed to me that this suggested that the guilt of original sin alone is insufficient to damn his children. Such a position would clearly be incorrect, contrary to Scripture, contrary to Reformed doctrine, and would seem to be an incorrect reading to suggest that this position was held by Calvin. If, however, Calvin held this view, then Calvin was wrong.

Nevertheless, I think that the Reformed Puritan's view that God "condemns and punishes actual sin, not our original sin state," while it may be correct (it is not our state of depravity that is the basis for guilt, but the actual sin of Adam our Federal head), is potentially misleading, because of the implicit follow-on that God therefore does not punish children, because they do not have "actual sin." But (as can be seen from the comments below) I had initially missed the Reformed Puritan's point, and perhaps I am now 0-2.

The Reformed Puritan's quotation from Calvin was (UPDATE: The Reformed Puritan has removed this quotation, because it could not be independently verified.):

“I everywhere teach that no one can be justly condemned and perish except on account of actual sin; and to say that the countless mortals taken from life while yet infants are precipitated from their mothers’ arms into eternal death is a blasphemy to be universally detested.” ~ John Calvin, Institutes, Book 4, p.335

I could not confirm that this quotation was an accurate quotation, possibly because I have a different publication of the Institutes.

However, I note that Calvin, in "Calvin on Secret Providence," wrote:

As to your objection, that no one is justly condemned, unless on account of crime, and after crime, I have no quarrel with you on the former point, since I everywhere teach that no one perishes, except by the just judgment of God. At the same time I may not dissemble that a secret venom lurks in your language; for if the similitude you propose is admitted, God will be unjust for involving the whole family of Abraham, in the guilt of original sin. You deny that it is lawful for God to condemn any man, except on account of actual sin. Innumerable infants are, to this day, hurried out of life. Discharge now your virulence against God, for precipitating into eternal death innocent babes torn from their mother's breasts. Whoever detests not this blasphemy, when it is openly detected, may curse me to his heart's content. For I have no right to demand exemption from the railings of those who spare not the Almighty himself.

~ pp. 102-103, Lille's translation (1840)

The passage above is so directly contrary to the presentation in the Reformed Puritan that I cannot help but think that Calvin has been misquoted, and/or mistranslated.

Furthermore, it is plainly the teaching of Scripture that all are subject to the guilt of Adam's first sin, and that consequently even children who do not have personal sin, nonetheless are justly subject both to physical death and to eternal condemnation, unless God (in his mercy) spares them.

God makes no promise to show mercy on all infants who die before committing voluntary sin. God would be fully just to condemn all such to hell. After all, God is fully just to permit their death. If God does not show entire mercy on such infants, even in their death, God shows a degree of mercy in that He does not permit them to compound their guilt through voluntary sin of their own.

The Reformed Puritan states: "I heartily affirm the doctrine of Original Sin. We are radically corrupt, totally depraved and completely helpless towards our salvation without the monergestic work of God regenerating our souls. " But the doctrine of Original Sin encompasses:

The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin. (WSC, I forget which question number, emphasis added, wording may be slightly off)

Consequently, I'm not sure that endorsing only the corruption of His nature is completely endorsing the Reformed (and Scriptural) doctrine on the subject. But perhaps the Reformed Puritan was not trying to be exhaustive, and mentioned part for the whole, metonymously.

May we all praise our Merciful and Longsuffering God!

-Turretinfan

UPDATE: The Reformed Puritan, place of the original quotation above, which has now been removed, has quoted this:

His (Servetus’) third point is, That all who believe not in the Son remain in death, the wrath of God abideth on them (John 3:36); and, therefore, infants who are unable to believe lie under condemnation. I (Calvin) answer, that Christ does not there speak of the general guilt in which all the posterity of Adam are involved, but only threatens the despisers of the gospel, who proudly and contumaciously spurn the grace which is offered to them. But this has nothing to do with infants. At the same time, I meet him with the opposite argument. Every one whom Christ blesses is exempted from the curse of Adam, and the wrath of God. Therefore, seeing it is certain that infants are blessed by him, it follows that they are freed from death.

~ Calvin, Institutes, Bk 4

While I appreciate that the new quotation appears to be fully accurate, I don't think it establishes the point that the Reformed Puritan is trying to make. I don't think it says that infants are punished only for personal and not imputed sin.

-Turretinfan

Murder Update

Murder Update

Here's a particularly brazen couple, who are providing a great example of exortion.

(Link)

They threaten to kill their own child, unless , within three months, they are paid $50,000.

It is a particularly depraved person who will hold his own child hostage for ransom.

In case they happen to read this post, no - I won't pay; and if you kill the child, you must deal with the moral, physical, and psychological consequences.

Shame on you!

-Turretinfan

P.S. Of course, there is a real possibility that this is simply a scam, and that there is no couple and no child, just a greedy person who wants money. Only the most naive person would contribute money to these folks.

Response to Dave Armstrong's Reply - Part II

Response to Dave Armstrong's Reply
to James White's Review of
One-Minute Apologist, by Dave Armstrong

(Cont'd)

Here's a link to the reply. (Dr. White has provided his own response, here.) There are several parts to Mr. Armstrong's reply, and doing justice in response requires separating the issues into those parts, and replying to each seriatim. Part 1, relating to the Roman Catholic departure from the Scriptural identity between Bishop and Elder is provided above (link). The present post relates to the donation of the keys.


2. Keys to Peter alone?


A. Original Argument by Dave Armstrong


Dave Armstrong had written: "Peter alone is given the 'keys of the kingdom of heaven'--a symbol of stewardship and supervisory capacity over the house of God, or the Church," with a footnote pointing to Matthew 16:19.

Matthew 16:19 states: "And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."


B. Dr. White's response

Dr. White had pointed out that Armstrong's reliance on Matthew 16:19 as indicating a donation of the keys to Peter alone is fatally flawed, because Matthew 16:19 is future tense: it is not recording the donation of the keys, but pointing forward to it.

Dr. White also pointed out the fulfilment of the promise in Matthew 18:18, but notes that there the recipient is clearly not Peter alone, but all the apostles.

Matthew 18:18 states: "Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

Finally, Dr. White asked: "So I would ask Armstrong: where in Scripture do we see the giving of the keys to Peter alone, as he claims? We all know this is the Roman claim. Outside of the self-serving interpretations of the bishops of Rome, upon what basis are we to accept this claim? "

C. Dave Armstrong's response

DA begins by quoting a comment by Paul Hoffer (who had commented on DA's blog), who wrote:

[A]t Matt. 16:18, Jesus says to Peter that He "will" give Peter the keys of the kingdom. Is he trying to say that Jesus is not a person that keeps His word because the Scriptures don't record the actual conveyance of keys later? If one reduces Mr. White's argument to its logical conclusion, it would suggest that Jesus is not "the Man of His Word (pun intended).

(reproduced as presented on DA's blog)

DA then adds his own two cents:

Yes, I thought this was rather bizarre and striking also. What does it matter what tense the statement was? Obviously Peter was singled out for an extraordinary position and we can assume from common sense that Jesus intended for this to be during his earthly lifetime.So who cares whether it was a reference to the future? The fact remains that only Peter was promised the "keys of the kingdom." What God says will happen inevitably does happen. Another fallacy of White is to assume that "binding and loosing" represents the sum total of the responsibilities and prerogatives of the "keyholder." This is untrue. It involves much more than that.

In addition to this, DA spends a significant amount of time and space seeking to establish that the "power of the keys" (note that this is not the Biblical description) is that of a steward or vizier. DA relies on various authors in support of his keys-steward connection, including some Protestants. In addition, DA links to a pair of his own previous posts, in which he had generally addressed the topic of the keys and Peter, and which appear to be the source material that DA has reposted in this post.


D. Response / Surcritique


i. Missed the point


Mr. Armstrong seems to miss the point of Dr. White's argument. Whether he misses it or not, Mr. Armostrong fails to interact in any substantive way with the argument. Mr. Armstong's one argument that comes close to interacting with Dr. White's argument is the argument he adopts from Mr. Hoffer. Unfortunately, Mr. Hoffer also missed Dr. White's point. Let's explicate.


Mr. Hoffer (and DA by adoption of Mr. Hoffer's argument) seems to think that Dr. White is saying that Jesus promised to give Peter the keys, but then never did. Nothing could be further from the truth. Dr. White clearly indicated that Peter was given the keys, two chapters later.


ii. The main points remains unaddressed by DA


As noted in my parallel discussion with Mr. Hoffer (PH, TF, PH, TF, PH, TF), the main points are this:

a. Matthew 16:19 is not the time when Peter received the keys.


b. Matthew 18:18 (in Dr. White's view) is the time when Peter received the keys.


c. When Peter received the keys in Matthew 18:18, he did not receive them alone, but with all the apostles (note the "ye" in Matthew 18:18 above).


d. The explanation for Jesus using third person singular in Matthew 16:19 is that Jesus was speaking directly to Peter.


e. The word "alone" or any equivalent thereof is not found Matthew 16:19.


Thus, Matthew 16:19 does not teach or suggest that Peter alone received the keys to the kingdom of heaven, and Matthew 18:18 indicates that at least the other apostles also received what Peter was promised in Matthew 16:19.


iii. There is a Roman Catholic viewpoint that DA could try to defend


As noted by Mr. Hoffer in the parallel dialogue linked above, Vatican I claimed that the keys were given to Peter in the famous "Feed my sheep" dialogue. Mr. Armstrong could try to present explanation as to why that passage is a more valid fulfillment of the promise to Peter in Matthew 16:19 than is the fulfillment that Dr. White identified in Matthew 18:18.

Mr. Armstrong, however, completely omits any such apology.


iv. Even if Vatican I were correct about the (apparently ad hoc) connection between "keys" and "Feed my sheep" again there is no indication that the feeding of the sheep was entrusted to Peter alone.

Indeed, the Apostle Peter himself does not claim a unique role in that regard, but writes:

1 Peter 5:1-4
1The elders which are among you I exhort, who am also an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed: 2Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind; 3Neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock. 4And when the chief Shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory that fadeth not away.

The duties and responsibilities of feeding the sheep are something that Peter does not claim for himself, that he explicitly denies is monarchical ("neither as being lords" "neque ut dominantes" "μηδε ως κατακυριευοντες"), but rather exemplary ("but being ensamples" "sed formae facti" "αλλα τυποι γινομενοι"). Additionally, he points to Christ as the head Shepherd ("the chief Shepherd" "princeps pastorum" "του αρχιποιμενος") and refers to himself only as a co-elder with the other elders ("who am also an elder" "consenior" "ο συμπρεσβυτερος").

v. Furthermore, Vatican I's interpretation (to the extent that it asserts that the keys were given to Peter alone) is inconsistent with Trent's interpretation

Trent relates the power of the keys to the confessional, to all the priests and bishops, and to the Church:

From the institution of the sacrament of Penance as already explained, the universal Church has always understood, that the entire confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord, and is of divine right necessary for all who have fallen after baptism; because that our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests His own vicars, as presidents and judges, unto whom all the mortal crimes, into which the faithful of Christ may have fallen, should be carried, in order that, in accordance with the power of the keys, they may pronounce the sentence of forgiveness or retention of sins.

(Session 14th, Chapter V, On Confession)

But, as regards the minister of this sacrament, the holy Synod declares all these doctrines to be false, and utterly alien from the truth of the Gospel, which perniciously extend the ministry of the keys to any others soever besides bishops and priests; imagining, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, that those words of our Lord, Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven, and, Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained,were in such wise addressed to all the faithful of Christ indifferently and indiscriminately, as that every one has the power of forgiving sins,-public sins to wit by rebuke, provided he that is rebuked shall acquiesce, and secret sins by a voluntary confession made to any individual whatsoever.

(Session 14th, Chapter VI, On the ministry of this Sacrament, and Absolution)

For the ancient Fathers likewise both believe and teach, that the keys of the priests were given, not to loose only, but also to bind.

(Session 14th, Chapter VIII, On the necessity and on the fruit of Satisfaction)

CANON XV.--If any one saith, that the keys are given to the Church, only to loose, not also to bind; and that, therefore, priests act contrary to the purpose of the keys, and contrary to the institution of Christ, when they impose punishments on those who confess; and that it is a fiction, that, after the eternal punishment, has, by virtue of the keys, been removed, there remains for the most part a temporal punishment to be discharged; let him be anathema.

(On the most Holy Sacrament of Penance)

C. Conclusion

As has been shown above, Mr. Armstrong's response on the keys is entirely without merit. He fails to address the argument presented, he fails to defend the modern Roman Catholic view, and the modern Roman Catholic view itself is inconsistent with the historic Roman Catholic view expressed by the council of Trent. Consequently, even the testimony of the RCC is set against itself, and cannot stand. Thus, Mr. Armstrong's position is both Scripturally and historically untenable and should be rejected by all the faithful.

-Turretinfan

P.S. Note that there were other issues raised in Dr. White's review. These were not directly related to Mr. Armstrong's book, and I'm not sure that additional discussion on them is needed. Accordingly, at the present time, I'm not inclined to follow up with a more detailed response. The first part of the response and the present response jointly and fully establish the flaws of Mr. Armstrong's presentation.

Judas Iscariot - Response to Sippo

Judas Iscariot

A Response to Art Sippo's Synthesis

In a recent blog post, (link), Roman Catholic (lay) apologist, "Art-of-Attack" Sippo attempts to strike a middle path between extreme views of Judas. He think the conventional view of Judas is too harsh, while he realizes that the Gnostic portrayal is clearly wrong.

It's really undeniable that Judas is portrayed in a harshly negative light by Scripture. Here's an exhaustive list of the passages in which Judas is mentioned by name. In every single one, something bad about Judas is mentioned, most of the time focusing on his betrayal of Jesus, though his avarice and suicide are also mentioned.

Matthew 10:4 Simon the Canaanite, and Judas Iscariot, who also betrayed him.

Matthew 26:14-15
14Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went unto the chief priests, 15And said unto them, What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you? And they covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver.

Matthew 26:25 Then Judas, which betrayed him, answered and said, Master, is it I? He said unto him, Thou hast said.

Matthew 26:47 And while he yet spake, lo, Judas, one of the twelve, came, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the chief priests and elders of the people.

Matthew 27:3 Then Judas, which had betrayed him, when he saw that he was condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and elders,

Mark 3:19 And Judas Iscariot, which also betrayed him: and they went into an house.

Mark 14:10 And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went unto the chief priests, to betray him unto them.

Mark 14:43 And immediately, while he yet spake, cometh Judas, one of the twelve, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the chief priests and the scribes and the elders.

Luke 6:16 And Judas the brother of James, and Judas Iscariot, which also was the traitor.

Luke 22:3 Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve.

Luke 22:47-48
47And while he yet spake, behold a multitude, and he that was called Judas, one of the twelve, went before them, and drew near unto Jesus to kiss him. 48But Jesus said unto him, Judas, betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss?

John 6:70-71
70Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? 71He spake of Judas Iscariot the son of Simon: for he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve.

John 12:4-6
4Then saith one of his disciples, Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, which should betray him, 5Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence, and given to the poor? 6This he said, not that he cared for the poor; but because he was a thief, and had the bag, and bare what was put therein.

John 13:2 And supper being ended, the devil having now put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him;

John 13:21-30
21When Jesus had thus said, he was troubled in spirit, and testified, and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you shall betray me. 22Then the disciples looked one on another, doubting of whom he spake. 23Now there was leaning on Jesus' bosom one of his disciples, whom Jesus loved. 24Simon Peter therefore beckoned to him, that he should ask who it should be of whom he spake. 25He then lying on Jesus' breast saith unto him, Lord, who is it? 26Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a sop, when I have dipped it. And when he had dipped the sop, he gave it to Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon. 27And after the sop Satan entered into him. Then said Jesus unto him, That thou doest, do quickly. 28Now no man at the table knew for what intent he spake this unto him. 29For some of them thought, because Judas had the bag, that Jesus had said unto him, Buy those things that we have need of against the feast; or, that he should give something to the poor. 30He then having received the sop went immediately out: and it was night.

John 18:1-5
1When Jesus had spoken these words, he went forth with his disciples over the brook Cedron, where was a garden, into the which he entered, and his disciples. 2And Judas also, which betrayed him, knew the place: for Jesus ofttimes resorted thither with his disciples. 3Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and torches and weapons. 4Jesus therefore, knowing all things that should come upon him, went forth, and said unto them, Whom seek ye? 5They answered him, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus saith unto them, I am he. And Judas also, which betrayed him, stood with them.

Acts 1:16-20
16Men and brethren, this scripture must needs have been fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost by the mouth of David spake before concerning Judas, which was guide to them that took Jesus. 17For he was numbered with us, and had obtained part of this ministry. 18Now this man purchased a field with the reward of iniquity; and falling headlong, he burst asunder in the midst, and all his bowels gushed out. 19And it was known unto all the dwellers at Jerusalem; insomuch as that field is called in their proper tongue, Aceldama, that is to say, The field of blood. 20For it is written in the book of Psalms, Let his habitation be desolate, and let no man dwell therein: and his bishoprick let another take.

Acts 1:24-25
24And they prayed, and said, Thou, Lord, which knowest the hearts of all men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen, 25That he may take part of this ministry and apostleship, from which Judas by transgression fell, that he might go to his own place.
Sippo provokes a response from the Reformed church when he writes:

First of all, Judas Iscariot was one of the Twelve Apostles chosen by Jesus himself to be in his inner circle and literally in his messianic Sanhedrin. For this reason, even as a child I could never understand why Jesus would have let an evil person get so close to him. There must have been something good -- if not exemplary -- in this man for Jesus to have elevated him to such an intimate relationship with Him. I cannot believe that Jesus would pick someone just to be His betrayer. There must have been more depth and character to Judas of which we are unaware.

I respond:

Sippo's mistake is understandable, because he is embedded in a religion of merit and works righteousness. It is hard for Sippo to imagine that God could choose an unworthy man for the role of apostle. Yet, Paul himself was most unworthy to be called an apostle because He persecuted the church. Paul was not saved because of something good in him, but despite the great evil in him. Judas was picked to be the betrayer. Recall Jesus' own words to that effect in John 6.

Jesus himself refers to Judas Iscariot as a devil.

Sippo even goes so far as to question Judas' avarice, claiming that the Apostles disliked Judas and exagerated his faults!

The Gospels tend to magnify Judas' faults and portray him as a hypocrite. We are told that he held the common purse of the group and stole from it (John 12:6). But is that not a mere peccadillo of which many of us are guilty? Who hasn't padded an expense account or somehow funded a pet project from company funds? Mea culpa! I find the fact that Jesus trusted Judas with money to indicate that he was a better candidate to do so than any of the other disciples. He may have dipped into the till, but he also may have been very careful with how the money was spent and kept everyone on a budget. Maybe the other Apostles resented how Judas controlled the purse strings. Nobody likes a bean-counter.

That's simply shocking. It's not as though Jesus and the 12 had much money at all. Recall that Jesus indicated that he did not even have a place to lay his head. Furthermore, when it came to ride into Jerusalem, Jesus did not have the cash for a mule. Perhaps we might even go so far as to suggest that Judas' theft is what kept Jesus poor, but to suggest that Judas was hated because he was a good accountant that occasionally padded an expense report is bizarre!

Sippo's punchline is about equally shocking:

I sincerely believe that Judas did not intend to betray Jesus to his death. Instead I think that was trying to goad Jesus into a final confrontation with the High Priest which he thought Jesus would win.

One is almost left without words! Judas may have be unaware that the Jews would kill Jesus, but he certainly intended to betray Jesus, and Judas certainly did do it for the money.

Furthermore, immediately before Judas' pretend interest in the poor (at least, immediately before in the order of Matthew, though not necessarily immediately before chronologically), Jesus had told the disciples:

Matthew 26:1-4
1And it came to pass, when Jesus had finished all these sayings, he said unto his disciples, 2Ye know that after two days is the feast of the passover, and the Son of man is betrayed to be crucified. 3Then assembled together the chief priests, and the scribes, and the elders of the people, unto the palace of the high priest, who was called Caiaphas, 4And consulted that they might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him.

Judas should have known that the betrayer was betraying him unto crucifixion, even if the Jews somehow hid their murderous intent from Judas when they solicited his betrayal of Christ.

It is a strained optimism to suppose that Judas thought it impossible that his betrayal would result in the death of our Lord. Jesus had often spoken of his death before hand, and we are told that the idea to betray Jesus was placed into Judas' mind by Satan.

Sippo goes on to speculate that Christ's death caught Judas by surprise, and that it was the surprise of a plan gone wrong that caused Judas' remorse. The problem is this, there is a powerful Scriptural reason not to suppose that Judas was not merely a misguided well-wisher, intending to set up Jesus so that Jesus could triumph over the Jewish leaders.

The Apostle Peter (in Acts 1) declared that Judas was to be numbered as one of those foretold by Psalms 69 and 109, i.e. that Judas was a wicked man. Furthermore, Peter, in his prayer, acknowledged that Judas fell from the ministry and apostleship by transgression.

But Peter does not stop there, he indicates that Judas fell "that he might go to his own place." That is to say, this was the place to which Judas was appointed, namely to hell. It's something that should give us all pause.

After all the punchlines, Sippo reminds us of his works-based religion with this closing remark:

And this hope serves a higher purpose. If there can be hope for Judas Iscariot, then there is hope for the rest of us! And to be honest, I identify better with the poor screw-up who blew it than with those sleek and sassy saints who never seem to have taken a misstep. May God have mercy on us all!

I respond:
What Sippo correctly realizes is that we all make mistakes. If perfect obedience were the measure of salvation, then no one (not even those whom Sippo calls the "sleek and sassy saints") would be saved. Our hope is in the substitionary work of our Christ. It is His perfection on our account that saves us, not our works of righteousness. We do not avoid hell because we are more holy than Judas, but because God has chosen to show mercy upon us. Sippo's request for mercy is exactly right in one respect - it is mercy that we need to be saved. Sippo's request is somewhat off in another respect, however, namely that God will not have mercy on all, but on whom He wishes to have mercy - which is not necessarily those who are the most deserving.

Accordingly, we should see Judas' example and tremble. It is not enough to go to a good church, to be in the fellowship of the apostles, or even to be a disciple sitting at the feet of Jesus himself. Our hearts must be changed, we must trust in Jesus, we must love God, and worship Him.

And yet Judas is a testimony to the goodness of God, and an answer to the supposed problem of evil. Judas, Satan, and the Jews had bad intent and purpose in the crucifixion, but God meant it unto good to save much people. God, therefore, ordained that the wickedness of man should be the instrument of crucifying His only begotten Son and the salvation of his flock, the elect.

May God provide us with both fear and praise at the story of Judas Iscariot, whose habitation was rendered desolate by the curse of God against sin!

-Turretinfan

Do Modern Roman Catholic Apologists Care about Pope Leo X?

Do Modern Roman Catholic Apologists Care about Pope Leo X?

Do they fear the automatic excommunication he set in place?

The reason I ask is this.

Leo X, on June 15, 1520, issued a bull, Exsurge Domine, in which (among other things) he demanded the following:

With the advice and consent of these our venerable brothers, with mature deliberation on each and every one of the above theses, and by the authority of almighty God, the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and our own authority, we condemn, reprobate, and reject completely each of these theses or errors as either heretical, scandalous, false, offensive to pious ears or seductive of simple minds, and against Catholic truth. By listing them, we decree and declare that all the faithful of both sexes must regard them as condemned, reprobated, and rejected….We restrain all in the virtue of holy obedience and under the penalty of an automatic major excommunication....
Moreover, because the preceding errors and many others are contained in the books or writings of Martin Luther, we likewise condemn, reprobate, and reject completely the books and all the writings and sermons of the said Martin, whether in Latin or any other language, containing the said errors or any one of them; and we wish them to be regarded as utterly condemned, reprobated, and rejected. We forbid each and every one of the faithful of either sex, in virtue of holy obedience and under the above penalties to be incurred automatically, to read, assert, preach, praise, print, publish, or defend them. They will incur these penalties if they presume to uphold them in any way, personally or through another or others, directly or indirectly, tacitly or explicitly, publicly or occultly, either in their own homes or in other public or private places.

In case you missed it, it states that all the faithful of either sex is (under penalty of automatic major excommunication) forbidden even to read the books or writings of Martin Luther.

Nevertheless, some lay apologists have recently begun reading, and indeed republishing on the Interent various portions of Luther's writings. I've even seen some (but certainly fewer) go so far as to praise Luther's writings.

Now, Leo's bull, which summoned the authority of both Peter and Paul, is almost 500 years old. Perhaps these lay apologists have merely forgotten it. Or perhaps some later council or Pope, by some higher authority than Peter and Paul has set aside this bull. I do not pretend to have an exhaustive knowledge of the machinations of the Vatican.

Can anyone shed any light on the subject? As far as I can see, all of those lay apologists (and perhaps even some ordained apologists) are under Leo's automatic major excommunication. Furthermore, as Leo pointed out (negatively) in the same bull, it is (according to Leo) an error to suppose that "Christians must be taught to cherish excommunications rather than to fear them." So then, if Leo is to be trusted (and I certainly would say he should not - but then again I am not in communion with Pontificus Maximus) then those lay (or ordained) apologists should be in fear. But I have not detected any hint of this fear. How can it be? Have I missed some subsequent overruling of Leo's dispensation of Peter's and Paul's power? Or perhaps Luther's rebuttal (use the bull as kindling) was sufficient to revoke the bull.

Ah yes, for the truly dubious, here is the obligatory link to source. (link) See also (link).

-Turretinfan

Transcendental Apologetics - Tidbit

In the processing of reviewing a dialogue between non-Calvinist evangelical Ergun Caner and atheist/agnostic "Rational Response Squad," I stumbled across an interesting transcendental argument.

The Rational Response Squad asked for the three best reasons to believe in God.

Ergun Caner's very first response, interestingly, was to appeal to the universal practice of worship, stating that even those who did not believe in God at all "still held to a view of transcendants - you've got to believe in something greater than yourself, other than yourself." He stated this "universal yearning" is his "first apologetic."

It's certainly not mine, but I wonder how it strikes VanTillians?

-Turretinfan

Says Who? - A Challenge to Lay Apologists

Says Who? - A Challenge to Lay Apologists

Particularly, to those who call Rome or Constantinople home.

If you are not ordained to teach or interpret Scripture and/or "Tradition," by what authority do you do so?

As a Reformed Christian, my source of authority to teach and interpret Scripture comes from Scripture, but the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches do not adhere to Sola Scriptura, so the questions above naturally arise.

By what authority do you teach? Why should anyone listen to you? You are not even part of your respective church's ordinary and fallible magisterium, much less part of your church's extraordinary and allegedly infallible magisterium.

More imporantly when you say "X," and Augustine (who is regarded as a "saint" by both your churches, and as a "father" by those of Rome) says "notX," why should I take your testimony over that of an elder and bishop?

May the God of Scripture, who revealed himself in Scripture, and whose Scripture confounds the innovations and idolatries of mankind, enlighten our minds by study of His Word by the illumination of the Spirit of God,

-Turretinfan

Nepalese Darkness Comes to America

Nepalase Darkness Comes to America

This video (link) illustrates the sad state of darkness of a significant segment of the Nepalese people. For those less inclined to wait for the video to load, watch the obligatory advertisement, etc., this article (link) provides much the same material. The subject of the video and article, a young girl, is regarded among the Nepalese as a goddess.

It should be evident, when you watch the video, that the girl is just a girl. She is not a goddess. Her religion claims that she is the earthly manifistation of "Kali." If Kali exists at all, Kali is an evil spirit and no god.

Let me by clear: my God, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the prophets and apostles, is the one, Triune, Living God. There is none other like Him, in heaven and in earth. Kali is a dumb idol, the work of mens hands. Those who claim to be living manifestations of Kali are either deluders, self-deluded, or demoniacs.

Those who worship "Kali," know that this (link) is your so-called god. It is not a representation of your god, it is the god itself, for your god is simply an idol, the work of men's hands. It represents the foolishness of your imagination.

There is one Incarnation of God, and that is the Son of God, Jesus Christ the Righteous, who died and rose again, and who has ascended into heaven and reigns. He will come again to judge the living and the dead. In that day of judgment, you will see the foolishness of your idols. If you call on Kali, no one will answer, for no one is able to stay the hand of the LORD.

Turn now from your dumb idols, from your superstitions and worship of demons. Worship the True and Living God, and Him alone. He is a jealous God - He demands to be worshipped, and those who do not will certainly perish eternally.

And those who live in America, who hold to pluralism and believe that all religions are equally valid, this message is to you too. Our God, Jehovah, the Maker of Heaven and Earth says otherwise. He declares Himself to be the One True God, and all of Creation and History provides evidence of the truth of His claim. Even your own conscience recognizes that God is, and is powerful, whether you try to silence its testimony or not.

All men have sinned, and all deserve to be judged when Christ Jesus comes again. There is only one way of escape. Turn now from your sins, from your idolatry, from your worship of the false gospels of Smith and Muhammed, from the worship of the dead. Repent, confess your sin to God, and beg for His forgiveness.

He is a Fearsome God to whom you have no right to ask for anything. Nevertheless, He is a merciful and compassionate God, patient, and abounding with love toward those who serve Him. Now then, cast yourself upon His mercy, trust in Him, for He has not only declared the judgment to come, but also that no one who trusts in Him will be ashamed on that day.

-Turretinfan

Dialogue on the Death Penalty

Dialogue on the Death Penalty

An Illustration of the Exegetical Impotence

of the Modernist Movement

A dialogue between the present author (TF), and a fictious writer named Ms. Antijur (AJ for short), sadly based on an actual dialogue.

AJ: I don't agree with the death penalty on any grounds for anything.
TF: Your view is not valid, because it passes judgment on the Pentateuch.
AJ: I believe that the death penalty was valid then but I do not believe it is valid under the new covenant.
TF: That would seem to be like some form of agreement with the death penalty. Nevertheless, your view raises some interesting questions. What penalties from criminal acts are permitted, in your view, under the new covenant? Bonds, prison, hard labor, scourging, stocks, torture, maiming, branding, tagging, publishing names in the newspaper, or what? I mean, we all think that felony crimes should be punished pretty severely. If the death penalty (in your view) is out, what is the maximum amount of punishment we can inflict? I know the laws of lots of countries don't allow certain kinds of punishments, but just suppose that we can change the laws in order to best punish those who deserve it. What can we do?
AJ: What is the maximum punishment? Loss of priveledge, loss of freedom, to be provided with only those things necissary for health hygeine and nourishment, solitary confinement, counselling if needed, and labor of a useful variety maybe.
AJ (cont'd): I don't have all the answers but "Bonds, prison, hard labor, scourging, stocks, torture, maiming, branding," why do you want to hurt people? Why are people clinging to an eye for an eye? Don't we trust god to punish the wicked? When that adultress woman was pulled before Jesus did Jesus say, "Yeah, she's a wrongun', stone her"?
TF: Your response is logically and exegetically invalid. You claim that we can take away privilege and freedom, and yet you also claim "Don't we trust god to punish the wicked?" (appealling to Jesus' failure to condemn the woman)
TF (cont'd): If you don't think we should punish those who commit felonies at all, I think you're on an island by yourself. If you grant that they should be punished, you have no basis in relying on Jesus' dealing with the woman, because she was not just not stoned, but not punished at all. Also, if you grant that they should be punished, and you refuse to accept the Old Testament's just punishment for their offense, you have no basis for deciding from Scripture what that punishment should and shouldn't be.

May the God of Justice, who has provided the power of the sword, not in vain to the King, but so that the King may be a terror to evil, provide our nation with mercy for failing to mete out justice as we ought,

-Turretinfan

Response to Dave Armstrong's Reply

Response to Dave Armstrong's Reply

to James White's Review of

One-Minute Apologist, by Dave Armstrong

Here's a link to the reply. (Update: Dr. White has provided his own response, here.)

There are several parts to Mr. Armstrong's reply, and doing justice in response requires separating the issues into those parts, and replying to each seriatim. The following is part 1, relating to the Roman Catholic departure from the Scriptural identity between Bishop and Elder.

1. Presbyter / Episcopos (επισκοπους) / Elder / Bishop

A. History:
i. Dave Armstrong had written that Protestants believe that: "The Bible teaches that bishops, elders, and deacons are all synonymous terms for the same office: roughly that of a pastor today."
ii. James White had pointed out that this is absurd, Protestants hold to two offices: elder and deacon.
iii. Dave Armstrong more or less admits that he made a mistake to include "deacon" in the list.

B. Substantive

Dave Armstrong, however, argues in substance, that the point of his argument was directed to the Protestant view that there is no office of Bishop separate from Elder. Dave's presentation also includes tangential arguments related to sola Scriptura and the alleged infallibility of councils. Since those are off-topic here, discussion of them will be reserved for another occassion, should such occasion arise.

Let's examine the arguments Dave Armstrong sets forth in defense (apology) of the Roman Catholic distinction between Bishop and Priest.

i. The Roman Catholic view is "more developed."

Dave Armstrong cites various Scriptures that are alleged to show "fluidity and overlap" among the offices in the apostolic period. Mr. Armstrong then states, "[S]ome Protestants ... adopt this more fluid and primitive New Testament ecclesiology and use the terms interchangeably, whereas Catholics follow a far more developed ecclesiology." This is a startling admission from a Roman Catholic apologist, when we consider how often Rome has fondly claimed to be teaching just what was always taught from the beginning. Nevertheless, we would agree with Dave Armstrong that Protestants are more like the Apostolic church with regard to church offices than are Roman Catholics. It's hard to see how this is a defense at all.

ii. One Bishop, but a plurality of elders

Mr. Armstrong next quotes an old argument of his own, which states that "Bishops are always referred to in the singular, while elders are usually mentioned plurally."

This is simply not true. Philippians 1:1 states: "Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons." In case anyone thinks this is a translation error, the Vulgate reads episcopis and the Greek reads επισκοποις, both of which are obviously plural, and the DRB confirms the KJV's translation on this point.

iii. The burdern lies on Dr. White to establish his novel ecclesiology

Mr. Armstrong argues that "Of course, the far greater burden lies on White, to establish his novel ecclesiology of bishops in the New Testament having no higher status than a mere elder or pastor of a local church ... ."

The response is that this argument contradicts argument i above. If the Roman Catholic ecclesiology is "more developed" then it has the burden of justification, not an ecclesiology that is the same as the primitive church.

iv. Council of Jerusalem shows a hierarchical episcopacy

Mr. Armstrong writes: "Hierarchical episcopacy is most apparent in the New Testament in the Council of Jerusalem."

Mr. Armstrong's support of this assertion is the following:

The Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15:1-29) bears witness to a definite hierarchical, episcopal structure of government in the early Church. St. Peter, the chief elder (the office of Pope) of the entire Church (1 Peter 5:1; cf. John 21:15-17), presided and issued the authoritative pronouncement (15:7-11). Then James, Bishop of Jerusalem (rather like the host-mayor of a conference) gives a concurring (Acts 15:14), concluding statement (15:13-29). That James was the sole, "monarchical" bishop of Jerusalem is fairly apparent from Scripture (Acts 12:17, 15:13,19, 21:18, Gal. 1:19, 2:12). This fact is also attested by the first Christian historian, Eusebius (History of the Church, 7:19).

I respond:

The problem with Mr. Armstrong's claims are that they are not supported by the Scriptural evidence. The council of Jerusalem is recorded at Acts 15:1-29. Other than that claim, every other Scriptural claim is incorrect.

DA: "St. Peter [was] the chief elder (the office of Pope) of the entire Church (1 Peter 5:1; cf. John 21:15-17)."

Truth: 1 Peter 5:1 does not say that Peter is the chief elder, but "also an elder" (Vulgate reads consenior and the Greek reads συμπρεσβυτερος, both of which indicate parity, not supremecy.)

Truth: John 21:15-17 does not say that Peter has any relative authority at all, it simply records Jesus asking whether Peter loves Jesus, and commands Peter to feed the sheep. There's not even the slightest original language question involved here, so a detailed linguistic analysis is omitted.

DA: "St. Peter ... presided and issued the authoritative pronouncement (15:7-11).

Truth: Actus 15:7-11 neither states that Peter presided, nor that he gave an authoritative pronouncement. In fact, Peter testified to the salvation of the Gentiles through grace. This was immediately followed by Paul's and Barnabus' testimony regarding the work of God among the Gentiles. There is no indication that Peter presided, nor is there indication that Peter's pronouncement was authoritative.

DA: "Then James, Bishop of Jerusalem (rather like the host-mayor of a conference) gives a concurring (Acts 15:14), concluding statement (15:13-29)."

Truth: James it not called the "Bishop of Jerusalem" but simply James. His statement in verse 14 does not concur with Peter's statement, but instead refers to the testimony of Simeon who by inspiration of the Holy Spirit declared

Luke 2:25-32
25And, behold, there was a man in Jerusalem, whose name was Simeon; and the same man was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel: and the Holy Ghost was upon him. 26And it was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost, that he should not see death, before he had seen the Lord's Christ. 27And he came by the Spirit into the temple: and when the parents brought in the child Jesus, to do for him after the custom of the law, 28Then took he him up in his arms, and blessed God, and said, 29Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word: 30For mine eyes have seen thy salvation, 31Which thou hast prepared before the face of all people; 32A light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel.

Some have doubted that this Simeon was intended. There is another Simeon of whom we know, a fellow Antiochan elder of Barnabus' (Acts 13:1), who may very well have been at the council. This seems less likely, because we are not told that Simeon spoke with Paul and Barnabus in verse 12.

But even supposing (as some do) that James meant Simon Peter, not one of the Simeons, James does not simply "concur" with Simeon, James states what Simeon said, and then appeals to the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures, the testimony of the prophets.

Furthermore, James' words are not a "concluding" statement, but a statement of his opinion, based on Scripture, vs. 19-21.

DA: " That James was the sole, "monarchical" bishop of Jerusalem is fairly apparent from Scripture (Acts 12:17, 15:13,19, 21:18, Gal. 1:19, 2:12). "

Truth: Not one of the cited passages supports either the view that James was the sole bishop, that James was a monarchical bishop, or that James was the sole bishop that was a monarchical bishop.

Acts 12:17 simply makes mention of James and the fact that he was at Jerusalem. Acts 15:13,19 does not portray James acting monarchical, and he is far from alone, but again is at Jerusalem. Acts 21:18 mentions Paul coming to James and all the other elders, who then respond to Paul collectively, though again, they are at Jerusalem. Galatians 1:19 mentions that the only other apostle that Paul saw in Jerusalem was James (of course, this is in addition to Peter in verse 18). Galations 2:12 merely mentions that certain men came from James.

In short, all that the verses show was that James was resident in Jerusalem, that he was an apostle.

The remainder of Dave Armstrong's argument relies on the testimony of Eusebius who was born more than two centuries after the council of Jerusalem.

Before the conclusion of this topic, Mr. Armstrong quotes from D. G. Dunn who, as quoted, states that, "Timothy and Titus ... begin to assume something of the role of monarchichal bishops...." Of course, this is only tangentially related to this portion of the post, and - more importantly - it Dunn is speaking of their relationship to the community, not to the other bishops or elders.

At the conclusion of this topic, Dave Armstrong links in four previous posts of his.

The first relates the Roman Catholic office of priests. Its opening statement of the extensive reply portion of the post,

The priesthood as we know it today is not a strong motif in the New
Testament. But this can be explained in terms of development of doctrine: some
things were understood only in very basic or skeletal terms in the early days of Christianity.

is enough to render it moot for our discussion here.

The second relates to a debate between Mr. Armstrong and [eastern, presumably] Orthodox reader about whether Apostles became bishops. This discussion is not germane to our discussion here.

The third is a dialogue regarding ecclesiology, but does not address the alleged distinction between elders and bishops, except to reiterate DA's argument i above, about the Roman Catholic doctrine being a development.

The fourth is essentially an attempted proof that many historians agree that episcopacy was an earlier development in the church. Of course, again, this would relate to DA's argument i above.

C. Conclusion

What may we conclude from the analysis above? What we have seen is that the main thrust of Armstrong's attempted reply is that the Roman Catholic doctrine is a development. Protestants willing grant that it is a development, and reject it as lacking Scriptural basis. The limited Scriptural interaction that Mr. Armstrong provides for the most part misrepresents Scripture. Thus, we can see that Mr. Armstrong's attempted apology for the Roman Catholic doctrine of the separation of the role of Bishop and Elder has failed on Scriptural grounds.

More parts to follow, if the Lord wills,

-Turretinfan

W. L. Craig's Game

W. L. Craig, a prominent non-Calvinist, presents the following argument (summarized):

Newcomb's Paradox provides an illuminating non-theological illustration of the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We are to imagine a being with great predictive powers and to suppose we are confronted with two boxes, B1 and B2. B1 contains $1,000; B2 contains either $1,000,000 or nothing. We may choose either B2 alone or B1 and B2 together. If the being predicts that you choose both boxes, he does not put anything in B2; if he predicts that you choose B2 only, he puts $1,000,000 in B2. What should you choose? A proper construction of the pay-off matrix for the decision vindicates the one-box choice. If this is correct, then those who claim that God's knowledge is counterfactually dependent on future contingents foreknown by Him are likewise vindicated.

Let's analyze this problem.


I. Initial Analysis


As an initial analysis, let's assume that (a) we want more money than less money, and (b) the predictive ability of the being is perfect, not just very great.


In that case, the solution is obvious, pick B2. Result %100 chance of receiving $1M.


II. Return to the Presented Question

When we take away (b), such that the predictive power is great, but not perfect, we are faced with options that are somewhat more complicated. We'd like to increase our amount from $1M to $1.001M, but we don't want to receive only $0.001M or, even worse, nill.


There are four possible scenarios:

1. You pick both, and the being predicts that correctly.
2. You pick both, but the being predicts you pick only B2.
3. You pick B2, and the being correctly predicts that.
4. You pick B2, and the being predicts that you pick both.


If each were to occur, the results (payout) would be as follows.


1. $0.001M
2. $1.001M
3. $1.000M
4. Nada


Looking only at your payouts, there is not a monotonic preference between picking B2 or both. In other words, there is no one choice that is always better than the other.


A. Strategies that do not involve assessing the being's predictive ability

i. Maxi-Min
There are a couple game theory strategies that you could employ at this stage. If you were aiming to minimize your worst outcome, you would pick both. This is called the "maxi-min" strategy. Employing that strategy, you are guaranteed at least $0.001M, and you could get lucky and strike it rich. A person whom we would consider very risk averse would choose both to avoid getting nothing.



ii. Maxi-Max
Likewise, a very risk loving person would (using a different game theory strategy) choose both, becuase doing so provides the possibility of the maximum payout. This is called the "maxi-max" strategy. Employing this strategy, there is some chance (however remote) that you will obtain the big prize of $1.001M. Such a person would be willing to take the risk that he could get the low payoff in the hope of obtaining the big prize.


Notice that neither of these strategies requires any knowledge about how good the being is at predicting, as long as the being does not have perfect predictive ability.


B. Strategies that requiring assessing the predictor


i. Expected Value

The most analytical strategy for making a selection is based on assessing the ability of the predictor. This is the expected value strategy.


In the expected value strategy, we multiply the payout for each outcome of each of the scenarios by the chance of the scenario occurring. Thus, we would have the following, in which P is the probability that the predictor predicts correctly, expressed as a decimal.


1. $0.001M x P
2. $1.001M x (1-P)
3. $1.000M x P
4. Nada


Item number 4 remains zero, because zero times anything is zero.


Notice that there are two pairs A (1,2) and B (3,4). The expected value strategy cannot pick just one of the items, it must pick one of the pairs. The value of each pair is the sum of the outcomes within the pair. The expected values of the pairs is:


A. ($0.001M x P) + ($1.001M x (1-P))
B. $1.000M x P


B is equal to 3, because adding zero adds nothing.


Let's examine a few sample values for P.


If P = 0, A = $1.001M and B = Nada.


Such a scenario is the scenario where the predictor always picks wrong.


In contrast, if P = 1, A = $0.001M and B = 1.000


Such a scenario is the scenario where the predictor always picks correctly.


In the first scenario, the Expected Value strategy would be to pick A, and in the second scenario, the Expected Value strategy would be to pick B. As you might expect, as P increases from zero chance to a 100% chance, A loses favor to B.

The precise point at which the Expected Value stategy says both A and B are equally good, is:

($0.001M x P) + ($1.001M x (1-P)) = $1.000M x P

which simplifies to

$1.001M = $2M x P

or P = 0.5005

When P = 0.5005, A = $0.5005M and B= $0.5005M

When P is less then 0.5005, A is going to be higher than B, and when P is greater than 0.5005, B is going to be higher than A.

Thus, if we believe that the being's predictive power is greater than 0.5005, and we use the expected value strategy, we will pick B, and if we believe that the being's predictive power is less than 0.5005, we will pick A.

If we had no information about the predictive being's guessing abilities, we might default to the view that the predictive being guessed correctly 50% of the time. If we had that view, and we employed the expected value strategy, we would pick A.

But the problem stipulates that predictive being does not just have average guessing ability, but that the predictive being has great predictive ability. Accordingly, we would be inclined to pick B using the expected value strategy, as long as we believed that 0.5005 is not >> 0.5.

C. Second Guess Strategies

In addition to the strategies that evaluate risk or payoff alone, and the strategy of using expected value, there is an additional level of strategy that is intuitively attractive. This intuitively attractive strategy is to try to predict the prediction of the predictor.

In other words, we ask the question, what would the predictor expect me to pick? If we predict that the predictor will predict our selection of B (i.e. that we pick B2), then we will actually pick A (i..e. both boxes) because then we will have $1.001M instead of $1.000M. If we predict that the predictor will predict our selection of A (i.e. that we will pick both boxes), then we will pick A again because that way we will have $0.001M instead of nada.

If we employ this second guess strategy, we will always pick A, because (regardless of what we think that the predictor will predict) the result is that A will be better.

III. Comparison of the strategies

There is really no one strategy that is better than the other strategies. One might argue that the Expected Value strategy is the best strategy, but such a strategy assumes that one is willing to accept the risk of a zero payout, and willing to lose the thrill of the maximum payoff. Likewise, such a strategy assumes that one cannot second guess the predictor and try to choose based on predicting the predictor. The strategy also assumes that the predictor has a predictive ability that exceeds (or at least equals) 0.5005.

IV. Comparison to W. L. Craig's claims

Recall that W.L. Craig had claimed:

A proper construction of the pay-off matrix for the decision vindicates the one-box choice. If this is correct, then those who claim that God's knowledge is counterfactually dependent on future contingents foreknown by Him are likewise vindicated.

As has been shown above, a pay-off matrix "vindicates" the one-box choice if and only if the other available game strategies are ignored, and the predictive ability of the being is assumed to be greater than a certain threshold. Such a qualified vindication cannot be said to vinidicate those who say that "God's knowledge is counterfactually dependent on future contingents foreknown by Him."

Additionally, there is no apparent link between this game and the point to be proved. But let us briefly review and critique W. L. Craig's own analysis detailed analysis of the problem.

V. A Common-Sense Strategy

The common sense strategy is simply to deny that what one does now will have any effect on what is in the second box. That is to say, either the predictive being placed the money in the box already or he did not. If he did, picking both boxes won't hurt, and if he did not, picking only the second box is foolish, because it automatically discards the $0.001M in the first box, leaving you with nada.

VI. A critique of W. L. Craig's analysis (Link to his analysis, here.)

In W. L. Craig's article, he favors the expected value strategy, while noticing various objections, including the common sense objection noted above.

W. L. Craig's main point appears to be that God already knows what you are going to pick, i.e. P = 1. As we have shown above, if P = 1, we should choose B2, in order to maximize our wealth.

The problem is that such a state of perfect predictability requires, as a mechanism, backwards causation. In other words, the only reason to favor the one-box strategy over the common-sense strategy, is if one believes that one's choice will actually affect the contents of the box. But the contents of the box have already been determined. Accordingly, one's choice must have a causal effect in the past, in order for one's choice to matter in whether the box is empty or full.

WLC attempts to interact with this rebuttal in a manner that reminds me greatly of Godismyjudge's comments in previous posts. Here goes:

This analysis, however, seems to rest upon a misunderstanding in which the causal relation between an event or thing and its effect is conflated with the semantic relation between a true proposition and its corresponding state of affairs. For if at tn I choose B2 alone, then the proposition "W chooses B2 alone" is true at tn because of the semantic relation which obtains between a true proposition and the corresponding state of affairs which makes it true; by the same token " W will choose B2 alone" is true prior to tn. "W chose B2 alone" is true subsequent to tn, and " W chooses B2 alone at tn" is omnitemporally true. The relation obtaining between a true proposition and its corresponding state of affairs is semantic, not causal. Now God, knowing all true propositions, therefore knows the true future contingent proposition concerning my choice of the boxes. Again no causal relation obtains here. Hence, the charge of backward causation seems entirely misconceived: we have simply the semantic relation between true propositions and their corresponding states of affairs and the divine property of knowing all true propositions.

I respond:

Here WLC makes much the same error that we have seen previously in Godismyjudge's posts. There is confusion between the proposition and the event. This confusion is somewhat subtle. Let's see if we can make it evident in a line-by-line analysis.

WLC writes: "This analysis, however, seems to rest upon a misunderstanding in which the causal relation between an event or thing and its effect is conflated with the semantic relation between a true proposition and its corresponding state of affairs. "

I respond: This is WLC's thesis, that cause-and-effect relationship has been confused for "the semantic relation between a true proposition and its corresponding state of affairs." Before we rush to judgment regading this thesis, let's see what WLC tenders as support.

WLC writes: "For if at tn I choose B2 alone, then the proposition "W chooses B2 alone" is true at tn because of the semantic relation which obtains between a true proposition and the corresponding state of affairs which makes it true; by the same token " W will choose B2 alone" is true prior to tn."

I respond: Let's leave aside the portion after the semi-colon for now. Looking at the first part of WLC's assertion, you will notice the following terminology, "... if ... then ... true ... because ... which makes it true." This is the language of causation, with the effect being the truth of the proposition. If the word "broken" were used instead of "true," no one would have the least doubt that the omitted portion of the quotation explained how the object came to be broken.

Calling this relationship between the cause of the proposition being true, and the truth effect of the cause a "semantic" relationship, appears intentionally obfuscatory. The term "semantic" usually conveys the sense of "relating to meaning," and derives from the Greek word semantikos, which indicates signification. Yet, WLC's explanation is one of cause and effect, not signification or meaning.

In other words, the correspondence to reality is the reason that a statement about reality is either true or false. That relationship is a causal relationship. If reality is as the statement says, then the statement has a "true" truth value. If reality is contrary to the statement, then the statement has a "false" truth value. In other words, the state of reality is the cause of the truth/falsehood value of propositions that describe reality.

WLC appears to attempt to bolster his view by the following example pair: ""W chose B2 alone" is true subsequent to tn, and " W chooses B2 alone at tn" is omnitemporally true. "

I respond: This difference between the two statements is something semantic, it has to do with the relation between the action verb and time. The first statement employs the past tense, and thus is making a claim regarding the past. The second statement employs language that simply states an event at a particular point in time (without a relative reference) and thus states a general, or gnomic, truth. As such, it avoids the semantic problem of the first statement.

Nevertheless, the same causal relationship exists between the second statement and the event. The second, gnomic, statement is true or false as result of its correspondence or lack thereof to reality. The fact that there are semantic differences between different descriptions of an event does not mean that the proposition's truth is causally independent of the event. Such a conclusion cannot possible follow from the demonstration provided.

WLC then simply asserts: "The relation obtaining between a true proposition and its corresponding state of affairs is semantic, not causal."

I respond: But we have shown that the truth value is causal, and even WLC's own explanation testifies to the causal relationship.

WLC continues: "Now God, knowing all true propositions, therefore knows the true future contingent proposition concerning my choice of the boxes."

I respond: Since WLC acknowledges that God knows all true propositions, it would appear that WLC is acknowledging that God not only knows them, but knows their truth or falsehood value. If so, then there is no way to exclude from God's knowledge the gnomic absolute proposition concerning the act of choosing the boxes. For if God knows the proposition, and if God knows that the proposition is true, then God knows the reality of the act/event, because God surely recognizes that the only proposition to be true is for it to have a positive correspondence to reality. If not, (i.e. if God does not know which propositions are true, and which are not true), then knowing the "the true future contingent proposition concerning my choice of the boxes," cannot help Him.

Either way, WLC's argument again collapses. As shown above, God knows the absolute gnomic truth of the proposition "A picks B2 at tn," regardless of whether God additionally knows the reason why the event occurs (either "contingently" or "determinately").

WLC again simply states: "Again no causal relation obtains here."

I respond: And of course, WLC's saying three times does not make it so. We have shown above, that there is a cause and effect relationship between the proposition's truth and reality. That's enough to show backward causation IF God has advance knowledge of the truth of the proposition.

WLC then concludes: "Hence, the charge of backward causation seems entirely misconceived: we have simply the semantic relation between true propositions and their corresponding states of affairs and the divine property of knowing all true propositions."

I respond: I have shown above why this conclusion is incorrect. There is more than just a semantic relationship between gnomic propositions and events - if the gnomic proposition corresponds to reality, then (and as a result of that correspondence) it is true. That is a causal relationship, and even WLC's own explanation (as demonstrated above) shows that it is a causal relationship.

Since WLC acknowledges that backward causation is a problem for his view of what he calls God's "foreknowledge," we are in a position to refuse to accept WLC's view of God's omniscience.

WLC has the opportunity to make one more attempt to address the shortcomings of his argument. WLC provides the following discussion and objection.

Choosing B2 alone is the right strategy, but one must live with the "uncomfortable knowledge" that at the time of choosing B2 alone God's belief is "unalterably tucked away in the past" and there is really $1,001,000 in the boxes. After choosing B2 alone one must be prepared to say, "If I had chosen both boxes, I would not have gotten the $1,001,000. " But an opponent might retort, "Of course you would have, since it was there! Therefore, you must not have been free to choose both."

Interestingly, WLC never finds time to the opponent's retort described above.

VII. A Reformed alternative

The Reformed alternative is to deny that God acts based on what he foresees us doing. The Reformed alternative indicates that God has, out of his infinite wisdom, foreordained all that will occur, and that includes both His and our actions. God is immutable and impassive. Acordingly, nothing that a creature does can cause God to do anything.

Thus, the Reformed critic can look at the problem two ways:

1) as absurd, because God knows the future as a logical result of knowing His eternal decree, not as a result of prediction,
2) as absurd, because whatever God decided to put in the box is already in the box, and will not come out, or
3) with slight modification, as a confusing revelation: i.e. God has revealed the consequence of picking one or two boxes. If two boxes are picked, the person will receive $0.001M and if one box is picked, the person will receive $1.000M; but how that would be implemented is simply a mystery, because it would appear that the only way that prophecy could be true with respect to the one-box-choice is if there is already the cash in the box, and likewise that for the two-box-choice if there is already no cash in the box. The solution being that God is behind both the cash placement and your choice. If God has ordained that you will choose both, he has already prepared no cash in box 2, and likewise if God has ordained that you will chose box 2, he has placed in that box. This solves the problem, solves the paradox, and leaves the reader wondering why WLC holds to an autonomous view of man in the first place.

VIII. Conclusion
WLC leaves a couple of gems in his own conclusion, and it is worth touching on them here.
WLC states:

A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation.

Neither of these propositions have been established in WLC's article, nor can they be. Furthermore, the straw man is the "counterfactual conditionals" in contrast to the gnomic absolutes. God both knows the truth of hypothetical scenarios, but also the reality of the future. Finally, the second sentence is shocking in obvious self-contradictory nature. "... determine ... past ... without invoking an objectionable backward causation." The only possible hope for WLC to extricate himself from the self-contradiction would appear to be to rely on the "an objectionable" to qualify (rather than describe) the kind of backward causation that the present determination of a past event implies.

And of course, that's the penultimate problem with WLC's position: it is internally inconsistent and self-contradictory. The ultimate problem is that it is unscriptural. That it is internally inconsistent and self-contradictory is an outworking of its failure to begin from the presuppositions contained in the Word of God.

In short, in this critique of WLC, we see the practical impact that a flawed epistemology has.

-Turretinfan