Molina's View of Middle Knowledge

Sometimes Calvinists are accused of "straw manning" Molinist positions regarding God's knowledge of conditional future contingents.  I recognize that there are many different Molinists, and that they may have many different views.  The following, however, are Molina's views, as summarized in the introduction to Part IV of Concordia, "On Divine Foreknowledge," by Prof. Alfred J. Freddoso, a go-to expert on this topic (and not someone likely to be accused of being a Calvinist) (pp. 23-24):

 On Molina's view, then, the source of God's foreknowledge of absolute future contingents is threefold: (i) His prevolitional natural knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs, (ii) His prevolitional middle knowledge of conditional future contingents, and (iii) His free knowledge of the total causal contribution He himself wills to make to the created world. By (i) He knows which spatio-temporal arrangements of secondary causes are possible and which contingent effects might emanate from any such arrangement. By (ii) He knows which contingent effects would in fact emanate from any possible spatio-temporal arrangement of secondary causes. By (iii) He knows which secondary causes He wills to create and conserve and how He wills to cooperate with them via His intrinsically neutral general concurrence. So given His natural knowledge, His middle knowledge, and His free knowledge of His own causal contribution to the created world, He has free knowledge of all absolute future contingents. That is, He has within Himself the means required for knowing with certainty which contingent effects will in fact emanate from the actual arrangement of secondary causes.

In a paper on Molina (available here), Freddoso similarly summarizes Molina's views on God's knowledge this way:

According to Molina, then, the basis for God's providence and for his foreknowledge of absolute future contingents is threefold: (i) his pre-volitional natural knowledge of metaphysically necessary truths, (ii) his pre-volitional middle knowledge of futuribilia, and (iii) his post-volitional knowledge of the total causal contribution he himself wills to make to the created world. By (i) he knows which spatio-temporal arrangements of secondary causes are possible and which contingent effects might possibly emanate from any such arrangement. By (ii) he knows which contingent effects would in fact emanate from any such arrangement. By (iii) he knows which secondary causes he wills to create and precisely how he wills to cooperate with them via his intrinsically neutral cooperating grace and general concurrence. So given God's pre-volitional natural knowledge and middle knowledge, he is able to choose a comprehensive providential plan; and given further his post-volitional knowledge of what his own causal contribution to the created world will be, he has free knowledge of all absolute future contingents.

The "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" provides these insights (link) that claim to relate more broadly to Molinism and not specifically to Molina:

In the contemporary discussion of possible worlds, two concepts have proven particularly instructive: actualization and similarity. In popular piety, it is not unusual to refer to God creating the world. However, in possible worlds semantics, this is seen as semantically improper. Instead, God’s creative activity should be referred to as creating the heavens and the Earth, but actualizing a particular possible world (since possible states of affairs do not have a beginning, which the language of creation implies). According to the doctrine of Molinism, God can actualize a world where His will is brought about by the free decisions of creatures, but in order to make this claim, contemporary Molinists have had to distinguish between strong and weak actualization. Strong actualization refers to the efforts of a being when it causally determines the occurrence of an event (e.g., God causes something to happen), while weak actualization refers to the contribution of a being to the occurrence of an event by placement of a free creature in circumstances in which he will freely cause the event. Weak actualization has proven to be a powerful tool for understanding the relationship between God’s providence and human freedom. However, it must be noted that it implies that there may be some states of affairs that God cannot weakly actualize, which leads to the further conclusion that there may be some possible worlds that God cannot actualize.

 

Craig's Dilemma - Escape for Aseity, but Hello Grounding Objection

William Lane Craig says he doesn't think aseity is threatened by middle knowledge, because he is an anti-realist with respect to abstract objects including possible worlds.  In other words, he views possible worlds as non-existent.  Thus, God's middle knowledge is not dependent on something outside himself.

While that's an understandable response, it runs smack into the grounding objection (discussed in more detail here).  By definition, middle knowledge is neither based on God's nature (or else it would be natural knowledge) nor based on God's volition (or else it would be free knowledge).

So, either what is called middle knowledge is based on something in God himself (in which case it is really free or natural knowledge, and there is no middle knowledge as such) or middle knowledge is based on something outside God (in which case we have the aseity problem).  It does not seem possible that grounds could be something that is outside God but that doesn't exist, since - by definition - nothing meets that definition.

-TurretinFan

Don't Conflate Middle Knowledge and Knowledge of Contingents of Creaturely Freedom

Alfred J. Freddoso in his lengthy introduction to his translation of Molina's "On Divine Knowledge," provides some advice that would be well taken by his fellow Molinists (p. 23):

Molina claims that infinitely many conditional future contingents obtained from eternity and that from eternity God had comprehensive knowledge of them. However -- and this is very important, though not widely appreciated -- neither of these claims distinguishes him from his Bañezian antagonists.[fn35 For an unambiguous admission of the point in question by a Bañezian, see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The One God (St. Louis, 1943), pp. 461-462 (n. 134) and 471. It is hard to overemphasize the importance of this point, given a marked tendency among recent writers to err by simply identifying the Molinist doctrine of middle knowledge with the claim that God has knowledge of conditional future contingents (or so-called counter-factuals of freedom). This claim, to repeat, is not a distinctively Molinist one, and, indeed, it was never in dispute in the rancorous sixteenth-century debates between Molinists and Bañezians.] What is distinctive about Molina is his controversial claim that God's knowledge of conditional future contingents is prevolitional rather than, as the Bañezians would have it, postvolitional.

I would add that Calvinists in the tradition of the real Francis Turretin agree with Bañezians on this point.  Thus, when Dan (who clearly has good taste) argues for Middle Knowledge in Exodus 3:19 by simply arguing that God shows knowledge of a conditional future contingent, or makes similar arguments as "I Told You So Molinism" from Deuteronomy 7:3-4 and 1 Kings 11:2 & 9, he is missing the point.

Rather, he is missing an argument for the distinctively Molinistic view as contrasted with a Bañezians (aka Thomistic) or Calvinistic view.  In other words, we firmly agree that God knows future contingents that are contingent on creaturely freedom (the so-called counter-factuals of freedom).  We simply affirm that God knows those future contingents postvolitionally.

Nothing in or about the cited verses suggests a prevolitional knowledge, and thus appeals to these verses continue to leave Molinism without support as to its distinctive assertions.  We recognize that some Molinists, such as William Lane Craig, are content to acknowledge that Molinism is not something taught by Scripture, and we think that all Molinists ought to join with him in this important concession.

-TurretinFan

UPDATE:

On the difference between prevolitional and postvolitional:

Prevolitional: This term refers to God's knowledge logically prior to God's decree of what will be.
Postvolitional: This term refers to God's knowledge logically following God's decree of what will be.

In other words, Calvinists say that God knows what a man would freely do or will freely do because God has decided what they would do or will do.  Thus, to take a pedestrian example, if it is true that Dan would eat pepperoni pizza if I offered to him, that is true because God decided that it is true.  Thus, God's knowledge of this truth is post-volitional - it arises from God's deciding it to be so.  By contrast, in Molinism God does not decide whether Dan would eat pepperoni pizza if I offered it to him.  This leads to a grounding problem, which I've discussed at length elsewhere (link to discussion).

However, contrary to some apparent Molinist thinking, the Calvinistic model does not assume that God decides what would be apparent from means.  Thus, for example, God has decreed what sort of person Dan is, his cultural background, his tastes, and so forth - all of which contribute to Dan's decision to accept (or not) my offer of pepperoni pizza in our hypothetical.  And my examples of what God has decreed are far too limited: God has decreed just what pepperoni pizza will smell like and how well Dan's nose will smell that, as well as whether this discussion is making you as hungry as it is making me.

Responding to Wes Widner

I had been planning to respond to Wes Widner's critique of Dr. White on Molonism (critique here) but then I noticed Steve Hays' response to Widner (Steve Hays' response here).

Steve Hays does a great job, so for a detailed response, see his comments. I'll add a few thoughts of my own by way of supplement to what Steve has already said.

Wes Widner states: "Middle Knowledge (and William Lane Craig in particular) does not teach that God's soverignty is trumped or determined by man's free will or by God's Middle Knowledge of man's free will."

Yes, it does. Consider Craig's claim:

What I am simply saying is that God's aims in this life, in this world, are for a maximum number of people to come to know God and His salvation as fully as possible. And it is possible that that would not be achieved in a world that did not involve as much suffering and evil as this world does. Far from being counter-intuitive, I find that very plausible.

(source)

That's at least a conditional trumping claim. There's no claim that God is required to create, but if he does, and if he creates free will beings, and if he wishes to save the maximum number of people (as Craig insists), he is restricted to actualizing worlds in which their is suffering and evil on account of the free will of the creatures.

Wes Widner also states: "It is disingenuous to claim that Molinism is a philosophy whereas causal determinism isn't."

That's a mischaracterization of the situation. Molinism is merely philosophical. Causal determinism oozes from Scripture. It is provable from Scripture - making it a Biblical, and not merely a philosophical, position. Of course, causal determinism is a metaphysical claim. That's not the issue.

Wed Widner futher states: "You misrepresent Molinism as a doctrine wholly based on the freedom of man's will."

The foundation of Molinism is the novel concept of "middle knowledge." Middle knowledge is defined based on the actions of "free" creatures, especially men. So, to deny that Molinism is a doctrine wholly based on the freedom of man's will is only a plausible comment if one is using the terms "wholly" or "man" in a way that is stronger than anything the critics of Molinism would intend. As such, the assertion of misrepresentation is unfounded.

I'll limit my comments to those points in view of Steve's fuller discussion.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Video Series

I have now concluded the series on Middle Knowledge and specifically of Turretin's treatment of it, in his Institutes of Elenctic Theology. I should note that a summary of the section that I addressed has been created and can be found at the following link (link). I didn't consult this list specifically in the preparation of my videos, but I hope you will find it agrees fairly well with them.

Should you wish to play all the videos in the Middle Knowledge series together, here you go (nothing new in this, just the six videos of the series played one after the other):

If you would like to see a critique of Middle Knowledge from a slightly different perspective (although he does find his way to Turretin around pp. 29-30), Travis Campbell has provided an interesting article, which one can find at the following link (link). I should point out that he seems to give rather more attention to Bruce Ware and Terrance Tiessen than they deserve on this topic and seems to conclude with them that there are "true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom" - a significant and (in my view) unnecessary concession to William Lane Craig, one of the leading Molinists today (although I should qualify this comment by noting that there are some latent ambiguities in the terminology that Mr. Campbell uses, which may actually place him closer to the position I hold than it would at first appear).

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 6

This is the sixth and final section on Turretin's discussion of Middle Knowledge. This section delves into the philosophical arguments that undermine the concept of middle knowledge, demonstrating that the concept of middle knowledge leads to inevitable self-contradictions.

1. Two categories of knowledge are all that are required, because all true objects of knowledge are things possible or things actual (in Turretin's terms, "future").

2. Untrue things cannot be foreseen as true. In other words, unless it is true that a man will do "X" in situation "Y", God cannot foresee such a thing as true.

3. If divine providence is comprehensive (if it extends to men's acts) then men's will cannot be said to be indeterminate.

4. God's knowledge cannot be said to be uncertain. Therefore, if God foresees "X" as certain, then it cannot be said to be uncertain.

5. Middle Knowledge removes God's sovereignty over the creature, because it suggests that God is in essence depending on man's fortuitous cooperation in obtaining the ends he wishes.

6. Middle Knowledge removes God's freedom to base decisions solely on his own good pleasure, thereby contradicting the view of God presented in Romans 9.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 5

This is the fifth video in the series, of which (for those already weary of the series) there are six videos. This section deals with alleged proof texts of Middle Knowledge:


(1) 1 Samuel 23:11-12

This is the place where David asked God whether the men of the city would deliver David up if David stayed in the city, and God told him they would, so David left the city. Turretin notes that this was simply a question about the men's plans, not specifically about a future contingency.

(2) Matthew 11:21

This is the place where Jesus compares those who failed to believe after many miracles were done in their midst by comparing them to Tyre and Sidon and saying that the men of Tyre and Sidon would have already repented if the miracles done had been done in them. Turretin notes that this is hyperbole, much as one might say that if a person had been beating on rocks as long as he had been beating on a judge for justice the rocks would have been broken, or that if a donkey had been taught as long as a very slow pupil that the donkey would be able to understand already.

(3) 2 Samuel 12:8

This is a place where God notes additional blessings that would have come to David if David had obeyed. Turretin notes that these blessings are conditional promises, and consequently they are based on a decree of God necessarily.

Additionally, we noted that in each case the verses relate to God's knowledge after the decree, and consequently they are not really prooftexts for any kind of middle knowledge, because they do not relate to the knowledge of God before the decree of futurition.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 4

This is the fourth section of the discussion of Middle Knowledge taken from Turretin's Institutes. This section deals with Turretin's six main objections to Middle Knowledge:

(1) Two categories of knowledge are enough, because all things are either merely possible or actually future,

(2) Untrue things cannot be foreseen as true,

(3) God's exhaustive providence precludes the possibility that mans' will is indeterminate,

(4) No uncertain knowledge belongs to God, therefore if God foresees men's decision, they must be certain and consequently determinate not indeterminate,

(5) Middle Knowledge would remove God's sovereignty over the creature, and

(6) Gods' freedom to base his decisions solely on his own good pleasure would be undermined.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 3

This is the third video in the series on Middle Knowledge. This section presents the "state of the question." That is to say, it helps describe what exactly is under consideration. Thus, in this video we distinguish the issue from the issue of God knowing all possible contingent things, of God knowing necessarily contingent things (like "if the sun rises, it is day" or "if a person heartily repents, he will be saved"), and from the issue of God knowing freely contingent things prior to ALL decrees.

Instead, the question is whether God knows what men or angels (rational creatures) will freely do without a special decree preceding (if placed with these or those circumstances and in such-and-thus an order of things).



-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 2

This is part 2 of the series. The first part of the series can be found here (link). The first part discussed the true doctrine of the knowledge of God, but this section defines the erroneous doctrine of middle knowledge and describes its history. As is discussed in the video, Molinism was the brainchild of Lessius, Fonseca, and/or Molina (three Jesuits who couldn't decide among themselves who invented the doctrine) in opposition to Dominicans who held to a view of free will that is similar to that of Calvinists.

The Jesuits were seeking to make God's election to be based on foreseen faith and good works, as well as to defend their view of man's free will as autonomous. The only way they saw around the Dominicans' observation that God's will consists of natural and free knowledge was to invent a third category of knowledge that they designated "middle knowledge."

This "middle knowledge" is allegedly different from natural knowledge in that it is indeterminate, not being based on the nature of God, but on a decree. This "middle knowledge" is allegedly different from free knowledge, however, in that it is not about things certainly future, or - to put it another way - it is not based on God's decrees but on the decrees of creatures.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 1

This is the first part of what is planned as a multi-part discussion on middle knowledge and free will. This part discusses the fact that God's knowledge is intrinsically simple (undivided) but can be divided extrinsically (as to its objects) into two categories: natural and free. These two categories exhaust all the objects of God's knowledge.

To summarize what I've put in the video, the following are the main points:

1) God's knowledge is, in and of itself, simple and undivided.

2) God's knowledge can be, however, considered by us (theologians) in relation to its objects as either natural or free.

3) Natural Knowledge is God's knowledge of the extent of his own power without considering how God plans to exercise this power. Thus, God knows what God could do, if God so chose to do it. He knows every way that he could exercise his own power, if he wished to exercise it.

4) Free Knowledge is God's knowledge of the actual exercise of his power. That is to say, Free Knowledge is God's knowledge about the world that he has made and the history that he has brought into being, as well as the future that remains to be seen.

-TurretinFan

Reconciling Universal Redemption with Limited Decree to Save

I had asked:
How is purchasing a redemption for both believers and non-believers consistent with decreeing to save only believers?

Dan (aka Godismyjudge), at Arminian Chronicles replied (link to Dan's reply):

1) the decree to save believers should not be understood as foreknowledge of individual believers (i.e. Sue and John, but not Robbie), but rather the formula that anyone who believes shall be saved

2) that decree was preceded by a decree that Christ, by His death, shall be the basis of salvation (this decree can't be limited to the elect, because is explanatorily prior to the decree of election)

3) the decree regarding Christ's death means salvation is possible for everyone through Christ's death

I answer:

I don't find Dan's answer very clear, partly because he uses words that either have different meanings to him than to me or have no standard meaning (such as "foreknowledge" and "explanatorily"). Allow me to try to explain Dan's position for him.

As to (1-2), it seems to me that Dan is trying to say that the decree to purchase redemption for mankind universally was a first decree, and that a decree to apply that redemption to the class of believers was a second decree, and that God's advance knowledge of who would be members of that class follows the second decree. I think that by "explanatorily prior" Dan means what we call "logically prior." Thus, we should not read a temporal sequence into the order.

I hope that if I have misunderstood Dan, he will correct my misunderstanding. Assuming I have correctly understood him:

a) The order seems purposeless or at cross purposes;
b) For example, the first decree seems to be aimed at a purpose to save mankind universally, whereas the second decree seems to be aimed (at least in part) in saving mankind only partially;
c) The attempted escape is to place God's advance knowledge of the membership of the class of believers posterior to the second decree, but
d) It doesn't seem credible that God would make the second decree without first knowing whether it would save anyone, because He Himself is bound by His own decrees.
e) Another attempted escape might be to argue that the first decree was only aimed at making all men savable, but
f) A similar criticism arises that the second decree still seems counter to the first decree by providing a barrier to the savability of men, and
g) There is a real question about whether there is any Scriptural basis for an intent to make mankind "savable," as distinct from "saved."

Thus, it does not really seem that (1-2) of Dan's reply help resolve the apparent conflict, or - at best - they simply move the conflict someplace else.

As to (3), it seems that "the decree" referenced is supposed to be the first decree. This would seem to begin to take escape (e) discussed above. Additionally, since the first decree does not include any decree for application of the benefit of Christ's death, it actually does not mean "salvation is possible for everyone through Christ's death." In fact, it does not mean that salvation is possible for anyone at all, since it does not include any way for the benefit of Christ's death to be applied to men.

Alternatively, "the decree" in (3) might be aimed at pointing to the second decree. If so, then the same criticism from (f) as well as (d) above would apply. A decree to save those who fit within a formula is inherently discriminatory, with the formula being the discriminator. Unless there is some kind of expectation that everyone would fall within the formula (which apparently, per (3), there was not) then the formula does not mean "salvation is possible for everyone through Christ's death."

Indeed, one could (though why they would, I have no idea) insert between Dan's second decree and the advance knowledge a recognition of human total inability to meet the formula. Then, it becomes clear that a decree that Jesus die for everyone (in the abstracted way Dan posits in his first decree) is not sufficient to make "salvation is possible for everyone through Christ's death."

I'm guessing that Dan's ultimate order would look something like this:

1. Decree to create.
2. Recognition of the fall.
3. Decree that Christ will die.
4. Decree that Christ's death will be applied to those who have faith.
5. Decree that it will be "possible" for anyone to have faith.
6. Recognition of who actually has faith.

Embedded within (5) would be a decree to give all men prevenient grace, or something like that.

There are a number of problems with this expanded order, though.

(a) The idea of creating without having the purpose of the creation mind already seems odd. One pictures the person in Dan's order saying to himself, "So I've got this creation, what should I do with it?"

(b) The idea of the fall being something that is only recognized once there is a decree to create does not seem fully consistent with God's omniscience. Even if this could be escaped by middle knowledge, though ...

(c) The idea of the knowledge of who will believe being recognized somehow separately from the fall does not seem fully consistent either with God's omniscience or middle knowledge.

In short, I'm not sure how Dan's explanation doesn't just make matters worse for the Arminian or Amyraldian.

-TurretinFan