Tim Stratton recently posted the following argument (link to source):
1. If God determines all things, then He determines every thought, belief, and action.
2. All people—including Christians—hold false theological beliefs.
3. Therefore, God determines all people to affirm false theological beliefs.
4. A being who intentionally determines people to believe falsehoods about ultimate reality is—by definition—functioning as a deceiver (even if it’s said to serve a “greater purpose”).
5. So if exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, God functions as a “deity of deception.”
I responded on Twitter (aka X)(link to response). However, tweets are so easily overlooked and hard to find. So, I would like to offer the following brief rebuttal, based on my original response, but enhanced in a few additional aspects.
For such a short argument, Stratton's argument has a remarkable number of problems.
The Rabshakeh Problem
The entire rhetorical strength of the argument hinges on referring to the Almighty as a "deity of deception". It's hard to see how such a label comports with the kind of reverence that God demands. Galatians 6:7 reminds us: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." Indeed, the mockery is reminiscent of that offered by Rabshakeh in Isaiah 36, although there the accuser was merely saying that Hezekiah was deceiving the people.
Isaiah 36:13-20 Then Rabshakeh stood, and cried with a loud voice in the Jews' language, and said, Hear ye the words of the great king, the king of Assyria. Thus saith the king, Let not Hezekiah deceive you: for he shall not be able to deliver you. Neither let Hezekiah make you trust in the LORD, saying, The LORD will surely deliver us: this city shall not be delivered into the hand of the king of Assyria. Hearken not to Hezekiah: for thus saith the king of Assyria, Make an agreement with me by a present, and come out to me: and eat ye every one of his vine, and every one of his fig tree, and drink ye every one the waters of his own cistern; Until I come and take you away to a land like your own land, a land of corn and wine, a land of bread and vineyards. Beware lest Hezekiah persuade you, saying, The LORD will deliver us. Hath any of the gods of the nations delivered his land out of the hand of the king of Assyria? Where are the gods of Hamath and Arphad? where are the gods of Sepharvaim? and have they delivered Samaria out of my hand? Who are they among all the gods of these lands, that have delivered their land out of my hand, that the LORD should deliver Jerusalem out of my hand?
Stratton may seek shelter in the position that his irreverent description of God is not something he is himself affirming: he is simply saying that if he (Stratton) is wrong, then such a label would apply to God. As we will see, this is an unsafe shelter for Stratton, as he is wrong in several ways.
The Imprecision Problem
Philosophy is a precise field of study. Details and precision matter. Stratton's argument, however, is poorly constructed. To take a relatively uncontroversial example, his key argument (4) qualifies "determines" with the word "intentionally" but his immediately previous argument (3) lacks such a qualification. Another imprecision (recently pointed out by C Jay Cox) is that it should be obviously true that not all people hold false theological beliefs, unless one is to deny that Jesus Christ is a true person or one is to affirm the unthinkably bad idea that He holds false theological beliefs.
Of course, one might argue that it does not matter to Stratton's argument whether "intentionally" is present in (4) or whether "all people" were replaced by "many people" in (2) and (3). This just highlights the further imprecision of the way in which Stratton has formulated his argument.
There remains much additional imprecision. For example, "determines all things,"
Toward a "Steel man" Version of the Argument
If we were to tighten up the first three arguments by Stratton, we would have something like this:
1. Position X says that God determines every belief of every human.
2. Some humans have false theological beliefs.
3. Therefore, Position X implies that God determines some humans to have false theological beliefs.
However, this could probably just be simplified to:
1'. Position X says that God determines some humans to have false theological beliefs.
We then need to clean up the remaining two points:
4. A being who determines some humans to have false theological beliefs is —by definition—functioning as a deceiver (even if it’s said to serve a “greater purpose”).5. So if Position X is true, God is a being functioning as a deceiver.
Even with all this clean up, there are still remaining problems.
The Definition Problem
First, determining someone to have a false belief is not the definition of functioning as a deceiver. No one defines functioning as a deceiver that way. Even Stratton himself doubtless thinks that someone can function as a deceiver without determining anyone to have any beliefs. Moreover, advocates for Position X do not agree that determining people to have false beliefs is an example of functioning as a deceiver. So, neither Stratton nor his opponents hold to such a definition.
Stratton is presumably aware of the existence of optical illusions, such as a mirage (see this short video for an example of a mirage). In the case of a mirage, a person can be deceived by physical phenomena in such a way that they wrongly conclude that there is water where there is no water. While a person may well be deceived by the mirage, who in their right mind would say that the laws of physics are "functioning as a deceiver"? Moreover, the author of the laws of physics (and the creator of the human mind) is God, as Stratton himself acknowledges. Surely Stratton is not willing to apply his epithet of "deity of deception" to God on the basis of the causally determined mirage impression in the human mind.
This problem is not solved by retreating to dealing only with "false theological beliefs" or "falsehoods about ultimate reality." If the more general examples of false beliefs are not "by definition" linked with "functioning as a deceiver" in the manner Stratton's argument requires, much less so are the more specifically tailored examples. It's not that false beliefs about natural water don't entail "functioning as deceiver" but that false beliefs about the living water would. It's certainly true that false beliefs about some things are more materially significant to human beings than false beliefs about other things. However, it is not the material significance that determines whether "functioning as a deceiver" applies. Indeed, there is no reason to conclude that this is "by definition."
The Bailey Problem
The retreat to "ultimate reality" leads to yet a further problem. While it is uncontroversial that many humans have wrong beliefs about some things, it is not uncontroversial when it comes to the most significant ultimate realities. For example, Scripture tells us:
Romans 2:14-15 For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and [their] thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;)
And again:
Romans 1:19-20 Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed [it] unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, [even] his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:
There certainly may be senses in which people hold false beliefs about the existence and power of God and false beliefs about the moral law, but even when they do so, they are doing so in conflict with true beliefs that they somehow also have, and their true beliefs on these ultimate issues are more fundamental.
The Positive Deception Texts
The usual definition of "functioning as a deceiver" is when someone tricks or misleads another person. There are a number of statements in Scripture itself that seem more closely to align to this definition:
Jeremiah 20:7 O LORD, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived: thou art stronger than I, and hast prevailed: I am in derision daily, every one mocketh me.
1 Kings 22:19-23 And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him. And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade [him], and prevail also: go forth, and do so. Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.
2 Chronicles 18:18-22 Again he said, Therefore hear the word of the LORD; I saw the LORD sitting upon his throne, and all the host of heaven standing on his right hand and [on] his left. And the LORD said, Who shall entice Ahab king of Israel, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one spake saying after this manner, and another saying after that manner. Then there came out a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will entice him. And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go out, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And [the LORD] said, Thou shalt entice [him], and thou shalt also prevail: go out, and do [even] so. Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil against thee.
Genesis 19:9-11 And they said, Stand back. And they said [again], This one [fellow] came in to sojourn, and he will needs be a judge: now will we deal worse with thee, than with them. And they pressed sore upon the man, [even] Lot, and came near to break the door. But the men put forth their hand, and pulled Lot into the house to them, and shut to the door. And they smote the men that [were] at the door of the house with blindness, both small and great: so that they wearied themselves to find the door.
2 Kings 7:5-6 And they rose up in the twilight, to go unto the camp of the Syrians: and when they were come to the uttermost part of the camp of Syria, behold, [there was] no man there. For the Lord had made the host of the Syrians to hear a noise of chariots, and a noise of horses, [even] the noise of a great host: and they said one to another, Lo, the king of Israel hath hired against us the kings of the Hittites, and the kings of the Egyptians, to come upon us.
And we could probably point to many other similar passages. Those do look like they meet a broad definition of deception or functioning to deceive. We are not suggesting that God is lying, or that there was any moral failure on God's part. However, if Stratton's argument is a problem for Position X, it seems like it should be at least as big a problem, if not bigger, for any position that embraces Scripture. The resolution, of course, is that it is not a problem for either position.
The Internal Critique Problem
The parenthetical in the key argument (4), namely: “even if it’s said to serve a 'greater purpose',” seems to hint that this critique is intended as an internal critique of the position, rather than an external critique of the position. However, if this is an intended as an internal critique, then Stratton has to grant not only that it is said to serve a greater purpose, but that God has a morally sufficient reason for ordaining what God ordained or for determining what God determined, to borrow Stratton's wording.
However, if for the purposes of an internal critique, Stratton grants that God has a morally sufficient reason for determining some humans to have false theological beliefs, then the epithet "deity of deception" seems obviously unjustified.
The Internal Critique Problem
On the other hand, if this were an external critique, and Stratton were claiming that God cannot have a morally sufficient reason, Stratton would need to establish why God cannot have a morally sufficient reason. It is not sufficient for Stratton just to claim it.
The Missing Conclusion
You will notice that the argument in the form that I've quoted it above just abruptly ends on the epithet. It certainly sounds irreverent, but one is left wondering why the label matters to Stratton. An earlier form of his argument was expressed thus (source):
A1- If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.
A2- If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.
A3- God is not deceptive and His Word can be trusted.
A4- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.
A5- Therefore, EDD is false.
This form of the argument has some of the same characteristic imprecision we saw in the previous argument, but even once we steel man the argument, A2 remains fundamentally problematic for Stratton.
His statement "God is deceptive" does not follow from "God determines [steel version: some people; original version: all Christians] to affirm some false theological beliefs." It does not follow in an unqualified sense even from the verses listed above (Jeremiah 20:7, 1 Kings 22:19-23, etc.).
Additionally, even if "God is deceptive" in some sense follows, the further statement: "His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted," does not reasonably follow, and Stratton offers no serious argument to establish this point.
Inconsistent Presentation
In making his previous argument, Stratton stated: "God might be a liar for morally sufficient reasons ... However, it is irrelevant to my case." It is baffling that Stratton does not recognize the relevancy to calling God names, much less to the bigger question of whether God is trustworthy.
Stratton later clarified(?) his argument in this way:
The problem is that if EDD is true, then God *IS* trustworthy – trustworthy to determine you to get theology wrong. That is to say, this deity cannot be trusted to always determine his followers to think and believe rightly regarding important theological matters (which may include the one’s we are discussing now). If that’s the case, then we stand in no epistemic position to know which of our theological beliefs are true and which are false.
This bizarre claim amounts to saying that unless God guarantees us personal infallibility, we cannot know anything. And, of course, there is no reasonable argument in support of the claim.
My Conclusion
Stratton's argument is not just disrespectful to God, that's the main rhetorical force of his argument. For key elements of his argument, Stratton offers plainly false claims ("by definition") or unsupportable claims ("If God determines [some people to have false beliefs] ... His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted").
