The Fallible(?) God of Molinism and the Problem of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies

One aspect of "Libertarian" (nothing to do with politics) Free Will (LFW for short) is the idea that a free agent can, in the same circumstance, either do A or not do A.  God's advance knowledge of the future, coupled with God's infallibility, poses a serious problem to this idea, since it seems that either what God knows will happen will necessarily (i.e. it cannot be otherwise) happen or that God is fallible (i.e. it can be otherwise than God knows).  James Anderson previously pointed this out in an article called "The Fallible God of Molinism."

William Lane Craig responded to Prof. Anderson's article regarding the "Fallible God of Molinism" in a predictable way - by arguing that although the possible worlds where the people choose otherwise are possible, in those worlds God's knowledge would be different. Thus, although a person could not bring about a world where God's knowledge is wrong, he could bring about a world where God's knowledge is different. That sounds confusing, and raises several objections.

A first layer of objection is that in this allegedly possible world is a world with different circumstances than the actual world immediately prior to the alleged free choice. In the actual world, God already has knowledge that the man will do X. Thus, in this set of circumstances, saying that the man "can avoid doing X" on its face requires different circumstances.

A typical Molinist response can be seen in Dr. Anderson's summary here (link):

Craig is correct that I made a misstep in the original argument, as I acknowledged in reply to a comment by Greg Welty. I said at first it wasn’t relevant whether God’s decree (or “providential plan,” to use Craig’s terminology) is included in C, i.e., the circumstances in which God places the free agent S, knowing that S will do A in C. But that’s mistaken, because Molinists will say that C doesn’t include God’s decree, such that in those possible worlds in which S does not do A in C, while C is the same, God’s decree is different. (As Craig puts it, God’s providential plan is not “firm and fixed” across worlds in which S chooses in C, even though C is fixed.) The counterfactuals are different in those alternate worlds and therefore God’s decree will also be different in those worlds, since it is based on those counterfactuals.

In other words, people like Craig argue that because God's knowledge is not the cause of the future action of the person, it can properly be excluded from the circumstances.  Anderson mentions how this looks like special pleading.  Molinists typically argue that it should be clear that God's knowledge is not itself the cause of the future event.  Presumably, Molinists would ground God's knowledge in his decree to instantiate and his middle knowledge.

Nevertheless, in some cases God's knowledge is plainly one of the causes of human action.  For example, we have a category we call "self-fulfilling prophecies."  While this category is not usually applied to God, we note that God's knowledge is plainly the basis for actual prophecies. Furthermore, some people whose actions are prophesied hear the prophecy and act based on their own knowledge of the prophecy.  For example, leaders of the Israelites were sometimes motivated to go up to battle by prophetic revelation of victory in that battle.  In such a case, saying that God's knowledge is not part of the relevant circumstances seems totally indefensible.

Worse than that, Molinists are overlooking the problem that even if God's knowledge itself were always kept secret and were never revealed, there is an antecedent cause of God's knowledge, which is also a cause of all the (other) circumstances.  Anderson explains it this way:

The Molinist has to say, in effect, “Don’t worry, it’s possible for S not to do A in C provided we don’t include God’s decree in C, for then it would be possible for S to do other than what God has decreed.” In other words, the Molinist has to restrict C to intramundane circumstances.

But why should the Molinist be permitted to make that move? After all, the circumstances are causally connected to God’s decree (and necessarily so in the Molinist system). The circumstances obtain only because God decided that they should obtain and caused them to obtain. If we can draw the boundary line of C so as to exclude God’s decree and his actions to implement that decree (i.e., his manipulation of intramundane circumstances), why not draw the boundary line even more narrowly, so as to exclude, say, all circumstances more than five years prior to S’s choice, or all circumstances more than fifty miles away from S’s location? Is there any principled reason to draw the boundary line of C where the Molinist wants to draw it other than to save the system? Why think that it being hot and sunny in Charlotte today is a relevant element of my circumstances but God’s making it hot and sunny in Charlotte (partly in order to direct the choices  of Charlotteans) is not a relevant element?

In other words, God's knowledge is based (at least in part in the Molinist system) on God's decree.  But God's decree is always a cause of at least some of the circumstances for every human choice.  Thus, it is fair to say, as Anderson did:

[T]here’s a clear sense in which, on the Molinist view, God determines S’s choices. It isn’t a causal determinism, but it’s still determinism in the sense that God’s decree that S will do A (which is fixed prior to any of S’s choices) guarantees that S will do A. Given that God has decreed that S will do A, S cannot do otherwise than A.

In short, in order to make the God of Molinism infallible, Molinists have to compromise LFW of creatures by artificially excluding things like the divine decree.  But about the only reason to even consider Molinism is an a priori commitment to LFW.

Furthermore, if Molinists are willing to compromise by excluding some of the causal factors of choices, what's the principled basis for rejecting a Calvinistic free will, in which a will is free in the sense that it could choose differently in different circumstances?

-TurretinFan

Craig's Dilemma - Escape for Aseity, but Hello Grounding Objection

William Lane Craig says he doesn't think aseity is threatened by middle knowledge, because he is an anti-realist with respect to abstract objects including possible worlds.  In other words, he views possible worlds as non-existent.  Thus, God's middle knowledge is not dependent on something outside himself.

While that's an understandable response, it runs smack into the grounding objection (discussed in more detail here).  By definition, middle knowledge is neither based on God's nature (or else it would be natural knowledge) nor based on God's volition (or else it would be free knowledge).

So, either what is called middle knowledge is based on something in God himself (in which case it is really free or natural knowledge, and there is no middle knowledge as such) or middle knowledge is based on something outside God (in which case we have the aseity problem).  It does not seem possible that grounds could be something that is outside God but that doesn't exist, since - by definition - nothing meets that definition.

-TurretinFan

Rebuttal to Craig's Denial of the Historicity of the Guard Account

The Bible declares:

Matthew 27:62-66
Now the next day, that followed the day of the preparation, the chief priests and Pharisees came together unto Pilate, saying, "Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, 'After three days I will rise again.' Command therefore that the sepulchre be made sure until the third day, lest his disciples come by night, and steal him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead: so the last error shall be worse than the first."
Pilate said unto them, "Ye have a watch: go your way, make it as sure as ye can." So they went, and made the sepulchre sure, sealing the stone, and setting a watch.

Matthew 28:2-4 & 11-15
And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it. His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow: and for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead men.

Now when they were going, behold, some of the watch came into the city, and shewed unto the chief priests all the things that were done. And when they were assembled with the elders, and had taken counsel, they gave large money unto the soldiers, saying, Say ye, His disciples came by night, and stole him away while we slept. And if this come to the governor's ears, we will persuade him, and secure you. So they took the money, and did as they were taught: and this saying is commonly reported among the Jews until this day.

But William Lane Craig says, in response to the question "were there guards at the tomb":

Well now this is a question that I think is probably best left out of the program, because the vast, vast majority of New Testament scholars would regard Matthew's guard story as unhistorical. I can hardly think of anybody who would defend the historicity of the guard at the tomb story. And the main reasons for that are two:
One is because it's only found in Matthew and it seems very odd that if there were a Roman guard or even a Jewish guard at the tomb that Mark wouldn't know about it and that there wouldn't be any mention of it.
The other reason is that nobody seemed to understand Jesus' resurrection predictions. The disciples - who heard them most often - had not an inkling of what he meant and yet somehow the Jewish authorities were supposed to have heard of these predictions and understood them so well that they were able to set a guard around the tomb. And again, that doesn't seem to make sense.
So, most scholars regard the guard at the tomb story as a legend or a Matthean invention that isn't really historical.
Fortunately, this is of little significance for the empty tomb of Jesus, because the guard was mainly employed in Christian apologetics to disprove the conspiracy theory that the disciples stole the body. But no modern historian or New Testament scholar would defend a conspiracy theory, because it's evident when you read the pages of the New Testament that these people sincerely believed in what they said. So, the conspiracy theory is dead, even in the absence of a guard at the tomb.
The true significance of the guard at the tomb story is that it shows that even the opponents of the earliest Christians did not deny the empty tomb, but rather involved themselves in a hopeless series of absurdities trying to explain it away by saying that the disciples had stolen the body. And that's the real significance of Matthew's guard at the tomb story.

This shows part of the soft underbelly of William Lane Craig's excessive reliance on scholarship over revelation. The text itself treats the account as historical. There are no signals in the text that the account is mythical or parabolic. Indeed, the theory that the "vast, vast majority of New Testament scholars" would be adopting here is one that says that the text has its origins in the will of man rather than in the inspiration of the Spirit.

Let's consider the two reasons that Craig gives. The first reason is Mark's omission of the account. This is hardly a compelling reason. After all, while Matthew includes the vast majority of the material found in Mark, Mark contains less than three quarters of the material found in Matthew. Mark is simply a significantly shorter gospel. The guard at the tomb story, while significant to the conspiracy story and consequently to Matthew's apparently Jewish primary audience, is not a central aspect of the resurrection account. It's not only absent from Mark but also from Luke and John.

In this way it is similar to Matthew's account of the temple tax (Matthew 17:24-27) that Jesus miraculously paid for himself and Peter with the help of a fish. That account likewise is not found in Mark, Luke, or John, and likewise is of particular interest to Matthew's presumably Jewish primary audience.

Moreover, while the first half of the guard at the tomb account is in an easily separable pericope, the second half of the guard at the tomb account is woven into the account of the arrival of the women at the tomb, which is part that Craig would undoubtedly consider historical. Thus, the keepers of the tomb should also be regarded as historical.

The second reason that Craig gives is that the disciples did not understand Jesus' resurrection predictions, and therefore it is unlikely that Jesus' critics would have recalled these predictions. This analysis seems contrary to our common experience. Often, one's harshest critics pay even more attention to one's words than one's own friends. Moreover, the disciples had a mistaken notion that Jesus first coming was to be like his second coming, in terms of being triumphant. They seemed not to accept his very clear predictions of his own death. By contrast, Jesus' critics mocked his prediction of his death and accused him of paranoia ("The people answered and said, Thou hast a devil: who goeth about to kill thee?" John 7:20, for example).

Thus, the disciples were quick to overlook Jesus' comments specifically predicting his resurrection. By contrast, Jesus' critics hung on his every word. ("Laying wait for him, and seeking to catch something out of his mouth, that they might accuse him." Luke 11:54) So, when they were thinking how to eliminate this movement, they were not depressed and in despair over Jesus' death, but instead were focused on trying to stamp out the movement altogether.

Neither of Craig's reasons, therefore, provide a compelling case for rejecting the historicity of the guard at the tomb account.

The clip from the John Ankerberg show can be seen in the embedded video, below.

By the way, Geisler got on Mike Licona's case for denying the historicity of the mass Jerusalem resurrection account. Why hasn't he criticized Craig for denying the historicity of the guard at the tomb accounts? In fact, William Lane Craig's analysis of the account and its significance are significantly more harmful to the doctrine of inerrancy than Licona's treatment of the mass resurrection as apocalyptic. Where is the consistency? Is Geisler simply unaware?

-TurretinFan

William Lane Craig - not a Molinist?

Terrance L. Tiessen (TLT) makes an argument that William Lane Craig (WLC) is not a Molinist. In summary, the argument is (1) a Molinist must hold to Libertarian Free Will (LFW) in the sense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP); (2) WLC claims to hold to LFW but not in the sense of PAP; and thus by combining (1) and (2) WLC is not a Molinist.

(link to Tiessen's post)

The material he quotes from WLC is remarkably similar to what a Calvinist might use as an objection to traditional Molinism. TLT quotes the following:

I’m persuaded that so long as an agent’s choice is not causally determined, it doesn’t matter if he can actually make a choice contrary to how he does choose. Suppose that God has decided to create you in a set of circumstances because He knew that in those circumstances you would make an undetermined choice to do A. Suppose further that had God instead known that if you were in those circumstances you would have made an undetermined choice to do not-A, then God would not have created you in those circumstances (maybe it would have loused up His providential plan!). In that case you do not have the ability in those circumstances to make the choice of not-A, but nevertheless your choice of A is, I think, clearly free, for it is causally unconstrained—it [is] you who determines that A will be done. So the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of free choice.

That does look like an argument for compatible freedom, although - as TLT points out - WLC continues to self-identify as a Molinist (presumably because he does not like the idea of "determinism").

-TurretinFan

William Lane Craig - If God's Just a Player, Who is the House?

William Lane Craig wrote:

God doesn’t create such a choice for Himself. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt.

(source)

One of the objections to Molinism is precisely that it reduces God to playing the cards he has been dealt, rather than being the dealer. But then who is the dealer? The creature? And we're back to the grounding objection (link to discussion of grounding objection).

-TurretinFan

Why Don't These Arguments Persuade All the Atheists?

William Lane Craig gave an amusing but persuasive lecture in which he "Eastwooded" Richard Dawkins (embedded below). The argument rehashed arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument and the ontological argument.

Some of these, like the cosmological argument, are so airtight that one really wonders how some atheists continue to reject them. One possibility is that the arguments are too strong. Atheists think it can't be that easy, and that they must be being tricked. There must, they think, be some flaw in the argument that just has not yet been appreciated.

I would add that those arguments are valuable, but they are not enough. Acknowledging that God exists and created the world is not enough to escape God's wrath. One must repent of one's sins and trust in the Son of God for salvation from sin.

Craig's good, but incomplete, presentation is embedded below:

-TurretinFan

William Lane Craig vs. Sam Harris Debate "Does Good Come From God?"

William Lane Craig recently handily defeated Sam Harris in a debate titled, "Does Good Come From God?" (link to debate) Mr. Harris provided a very limited attempt to ground an atheistic morality in his opening speech. After that, virtually all of his arguments were simply either anti-theistic or simply anti-Christian. Those arguments were pretty clearly off the topic. In fact, they were demonstrated to be off topic in Sam Harris' own response to the very first audience question.

Mr. Harris' defeat was partly due to his approach of being unable to present any grounding for atheistic morality. Partly Mr. Harris' defeat was ensured by Prof. Craig's avoidance of reliance on the premise "God exists."

Mr. Harris' defeat was also partly due to the fact that his attempt to ground morality involved a significant and obvious category error. Mr. Harris argued that the worst possible world would be one in which all sentient beings suffered a maximum amount for a maximum duration. He argued that this "worst case" provides an objective reference point from which morality can be judged. However, that is not a maximally immoral universe, just a maximally unpleasant (for sentient beings) universe.

Prof. Craig pointed out this problem and Mr. Harris' response was extremely weak. He tried to argue that Prof. Craig has to grant Mr. Harris' premise because hell (the realm of the immoral) involves suffering and consequently the aim of mankind is to seek the pleasure of heaven as opposed to the misery of hell. However, this simply confuses the reward/punishment in a particular system with the means by which it is accomplished.

Moreover, for the atheist, this life does not provide heaven/hell-like reward/punishment. Often a person who causes great suffering receives little suffering himself in this life. Moreover, there is no obvious correlation (in this life) between reducing overall suffering and obtaining reward.

Therefore, as Prof. Craig pointed out repeatedly, while an atheist may have morals, he has no foundation for them. He cannot give a reasoned account of his morals. He may think that the Holocaust is dreadful, but he cannot give you an authoritative answer to the question, "Says who!" in response to his moral condemnation.

Mr. Harris didn't do himself any favors by essentially accusing Christians of being psychopaths (and then saying he wasn't doing that -- and then doing it again). However, Mr. Harris delivered his speech in a very calm and measured tone, and maintained his cool despite some fairly solid hits he was taking from Prof. Craig.

-TurretinFan

R. Scott Clark Responds to Molinism

I am glad to report that R. Scott Clark provided a fairly concise response to Molinism on his blog (link to response). Enjoy!

-TurretinFan

UPDATE/ADDENDUM:

RSC is getting some heat for characterizing MK this way:

According to MK, God knows all the contingencies which could be actualized in the world by persons with free will but he doesn’t know which one will be actualized in the world because he has determined to allow humans to exercise their free will to choose these contingencies.

I understand the basis for the criticism. The criticism is that now, at the present time, Molinism (notice that I say “Molinism” not “middle knowledge”) does claim that God knows what world the free agents will choose. Unless I’ve missed RSC’s point, the criticism misses the mark.

Middle Knowledge isn’t relevant at the present time. Middle Knowledge is only relevant prior to God’s decree, and prior to God’s decree God does not know which possible world his free creatures *will* actualize, though God does know (within the framework of Molinism) what worlds the free creatures *would* contingently actualize under various imagined (by God) conditions.

Now, I agree with RSC that he could have been more precise – and furthermore I’ve seen that RSC has conceded that WLC’s definition of Molinism is a reasonable one. However, if folks are going to police him for precision, they need to be precise themselves.

More to the point, the substance of the criticism of Molinism remains untouched. Notwithstanding a little imprecision (and the fact that not enough Turretin and too much Voetius were used :grin:), I thought the post was a concise capsule of the issues.

-TurretinFan