Calvinism is Wrong Because Love Must Be Free?

I've heard an objection to Calvinism along the lines of the title of this post many times.  The argument is that "irresistible grace" is at odds with the nature of God, since God wants us to love Him freely.  Paul Manata has a succinct answer to that kind of argument.

I would like to build a little on my friend Paul's point.  Often we are told that Calvinism's teaching on irresistible grace is some equivalent to divine rape.  This analogy is necessarily wrong.  First, rape involves violation of the will of the rape victim.  However, God's efficacious grace does not violate man's will, it transforms it.  God's transforming act of regeneration is not coercion of the will (like a rapist), nor is it a fooling of the will (like a hypnotist).  God actually changes the desires of a person so that they not only no longer hate God, nor imagine they love God, but actually love God.

Second, in addition to the fact that God commands love (which is my friend Paul's point, and he makes it effectively), God also threatens punishment to those who do not love.  Roger Olson technically may be able to maintain his position that "it must be factually possible for both [parties] to a possible loving relationship to be able to say 'no' to the other" (p. 167 per Paul's post) even in the face of a command.  After all, people in fact do say "no," to God's commands that we love God and love our neighbor.  However, if this escape is employed the analogy breaks down.  After all, we would still consider someone a rape victim if they gave consent only after a gun was pointed at their head, even if they technically could have said "yes."  But the coercive power of the message of Jesus is even stronger than that: "But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear him." (Luke 12:5)

So, on the one hand, irresistible grace is not coercion and on the other hand God does (undeniably) employ coercion.  So, the objection posed by Olson cannot stand both because it misses the mark and because it strikes a point that Olson must accept as true.  Olson (and other non-Calvinists) have to admit that God employs coercion by threatening punishments on those who do not do as they are told.  Yet irresistible grace is a means that God uses that does not itself involve coercion, but transformation.

-TurretinFan

Free Will, Advance Knowledge, and God

At Triablogue, Paul has posted an item on free will and God's advance knowledge including an answer to the popular non-Calvinist argument: "Just because God knows in advance that X will happen doesn't mean God causes or controls that X to happen." (my paraphrase)

As Paul points out, that argument misses the point. While I like aspects of what Paul wrote, let me put my own spin on this, namely - how can you respond to your friend who uses this argument with you?

First, you can provide some disclaimers. These disclaimers can help remove any straw men that may exist between the two of you. Those disclaimer can be, for example:

1) God's knowledge of future event X is not itself the cause of the future event X. If God's knowledge of the future caused the future to be, then God's knowledge of the future would necessarily entail the future existing as known. We don't allege this. We don't claim God's knowledge causes the future to be.

2) Simply person A knowing the future doesn't entail person A causing the future to be. We know this, because sometimes God tells men what the future will be. At that point, the men know the future, but - of course - this doesn't mean that the men cause the future event of which they have advance knowledge.

Once these disclaimers have been provided, you can go on to explain the force of the argument.

1) God's infallible knowledge of future event X implies that future event X will happen with absolute certainty. God can't be wrong. Thus, God's infallible knowledge of future event X means that future event X is guaranteed to happen.

2) If an event is absolutely certain to happen, it cannot be otherwise. This may seem trivial, but it is an important point. If God knows that X will happen, it is certain to happen, and thus cannot be otherwise.

3) An event's absolute certainty implies an inability of actors to do otherwise. If an event cannot be otherwise, a person cannot bring about the event being otherwise; for if a person could bring about the event being otherwise, then the event could be otherwise. But the event cannot be otherwise, because the event is absolutely certain to be as foreseen.

4) An event's absolute certainty implies an absence of "Libertarian" Free Will with respect to the event. If we take as an example a particular choice of a free agent, such as man, and if we say this particular choice is known in advance to God and consequently is absolutely certain to happen, then - as we have shown above - the person making this choice will not be able to choose otherwise. But this absence of ability to choose otherwise contradicts the "Libertarian" account of free will. In other words, such a choice is not "free" according to the "Libertarian" model.

Some Immediate Conclusion

1) Because God's knowledge of the future is absolutely complete, we know that there is no such thing as Libertarian Free Will. There may be free will of some kind, but not of the Libertarian kind, because people are not able to do otherwise than has been foreseen.

2) But, per our earlier disclaimer, God's knowledge is not itself the cause of the absence of Libertarian Free Will. In other words, what ensures that people cannot do otherwise is not simply God's knowledge of what will happen. After all, we can have advance knowledge, but no one would reasonably say that our advance knowledge is the cause.

Larger Conclusions

1) Whatever kind of free will we have, it cannot be "Libertarian" free will. There's no reason that the term "free will" has to be thrown out, just because we can demonstrate that we lack an ability to do otherwise. There's still a very real sense in which some human acts are "free will" acts, and others are either involuntary or coerced. This would be a definition of "free will" that is compatible with extensive Divine sovereignty, not one that is opposed to it.

2) There is a larger explanation for both God's knowledge and our actions. Since God's knowledge itself does not explain why we choose X and not Y, we should look to a larger explanation. The larger explanation is one that explains both God's knowledge and our actions. The correct explanation to this is God's Providence, his most holy and wise and powerful preserving and governing all His creatures and all their actions.

-TurretinFan

An Odds Rebuttal

Not an odd rebuttal - a clever rebuttal - but one that deals with the question of odds (link to rebuttal). The explanation is important: it shows the silliness of simply assuming that a large number of alternatives (for example, the large number of alternatives to the the truth that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is the one true God) is an argument against the truth of a proposition.

The fact that there are 1,000 or 10,000 or 100,000 false religions is of no more significance than the infinite number of wrong answers to 2+2.

-TurretinFan

Steve Hays on Liberty's Schedule of Discipline

He's joking, of course, but I think his points will strike a chord with lots of people who are bewildered by the mildness of Liberty's decision regarding Ergun Caner (link to Hays' post).

Resources: Triablogue

Triablogue has a wealth of information thanks to its high quality contributers (link to Triablogue). Back in 2007 they kindly featured one of my posts on Molinism (link to the post). Molinism, Arminianism, Romanism, Atheism, and many other -isms are addressed by the erudite blogging team.

Another Consequence of Forbidding Marriage to Clergy

We have previously noted that one consequence of forbidding marriage to clergy is that one gets a higher ratio of homosexual clergyman (link to brief discussion). Another consequence is that priests do to nuns the kinds of things that Maria Monk reported (link to Vatican's acknowledgment that this happens). The report makes Steve Hays' satire (link) seem not so far from the mark.

These abuses take place in part because of Rome's unscriptural policy of mandatory clerical celibacy, as Roman Catholic priest and former theologian, Hans Küng, agrees (link). Such a policy is a serious error and is contrary to Scripture, though we acknowledge that it is not an error as to an essential doctrine. If this were the worst error that Rome has, she would still be a true church.

There are, however, many other and worse errors in Rome's teaching. While Rome's gospel that involves subjection to the Roman Pontiff and veneration of Mary may not injure the bodies of its nuns, it is something that does far more serious damage - it harms their souls. The way of salvation is through trust in Christ alone for salvation.

(Update: Cardinal Schönborn appears to agree with Hans Küng and this blog)

-TurretinFan

Steve Hays Responds to Francis Beckwith

I enjoyed this article (link) from Steve Hays on Francis Beckwith and his (Francis') peeve about the label "Roman Catholic."

Hays on the Atonement

Steve Hays at Triablogue has a succinct response to a commonly heard Wesleyan argument against limited atonement (link).

Problems with Paradoxes

Over at the Triablogue, in the comments box, Mr. Anderson wrote:

Unless I've badly misunderstood it, which is entirely possible, your argument is designed to show that the claim that there can be irresolvable paradoxes is itself a paradox.

Your premise (i) states your opponents' position, for the second of argument. Your (ii) then apparently tries to deduce some further proposition from (i) (since you say "Given (i)..."). What you deduce from (i) is that the negation of (i) (i.e., that there cannot be an irresolvable paradox) would be "either a paradox or a real contradiction".

But as I've pointed out, this is just a non sequitur. You've given no good reason to think this follows from (i).

Perhaps the idea is that, if irresolvable paradoxes are possible, then for just any proposition p we affirm, we must also be prepared to affirm non-p. But again, this is simply a non sequitur. It doesn't follow from (i) at all. Why think that it does?

One might as well argue that, if irresolvable paradoxes are possible, and we believe that the Earth orbits the Sun, then we should also be prepared to believe that the Earth doesn't orbit the Sun. The problem, of course, is that we have plenty of good reason to affirm the former and no good reason to affirm the latter. So your suggestion (if I read you correctly) that if the irresolvable-paradox view is true then it must (by its own lights) be on a par with the no-irresolvable-paradox view, begs the question entirely.

(source)

Mr. Anderson is no lightweight when it comes to critical thinking, so I've taken a good bit of time to mull over his comments. Nevertheless, I see a few problems with his critique, or at least a few weaknesses. Let's see if I can explain.

Restatement of the Main Argument

The main argument against irresolvable paradoxes is this:

Suppose for the sake of the argument, a first premise

(P1) The situation that both proposition P is true and P is false (at the same time and in the same way) is a possible situation for any given P.

P1 actually combines two ideas: (1) irresolvable paradox is possible, where irresolvable paradox is defined by a given statement being both true and false in the same way and at the same time; and (2) paradoxes are not limited to only certain categories of propositions.

If P1 is accepted, and if we further add a second premise

(P2) P1 is a proposition, i.e. a member of the set of "any given P"

then we may conclude

(C1) It is possible that (P1) is also false.

Or in other words, if we accept the existence of unlimitable paradoxes, we must also be prepared to accept at least the possibility of the nonexistence of unlimitable paradoxes.

Enhancement to the Main Argument

The main argument may be enhanced, however, through simplification. One enhancement is as follows:

(P3) Reasoned thought is present IFF (i.e. if and only if) the law of non-contradictions is not violated;

(P4) Paradoxes violate the law of non-contradiction; and

(C2) Therefore, reasoned thought is not present when paradoxes are present.

Responses to Objections

Mr. Anderson's main objection seems to be to the boundless aspect of P1. Mr. Anderson, if I have understood him correctly, believes in the existence of irresolvable paradoxes, but only within certain bounds. I'm not sure what objection Mr. Anderson would be able to give to the enhancement argument.

Mr. Anderson's main objection does not appear to be sustainable. It is, of course, handy to say that paradox only exists within special, contained boundaries. And if that were strictly true that would seem to address the problem. Unfortunately, we cannot be assured (within a system that accomodates paradox) that the boundaries themselves are strictly true as opposed to merely paradoxically true.

Conclusion

I don't see any good reason to accept the existence of irreconcilable paradoxes. Such things, were they to exist, would seem to be outside the realm of rational discussion. Accordingly, it would be odd to call any basis for accepting them a "reason." Furthermore, I have seen no reason to reject the strongly intuitive position of the universality of the laws of logic and particularly the law of non-contradiction. I also would see no valid reason for setting boundaries on irreconcilable paradoxes if I were to accept them at all. I'm willing to hear arguments for why I should deny the universality of the laws of logic, but so far I haven't seen any that are logical ... and I'm willing to hear reasons to set boundaries on irreconcilable paradoxes but so far, again, I haven't seen anything beyond simple fiat to support the idea that irreconcilable paradoxes only exist within specific boundaries.

-TurretinFan

Common Man Argument for Libertarian Free Will (rebutted)

Paul Manata has an interesting, if somewhat philosophical, post that seems to sum up most of the major arguments responsive to the "Common Man" Libertarian Free Will (LFW) argument (link). It's a good article, and I encourage folks who think that there is some merit to the "common man" argument for LFW to read it and be disabused of such an idea. I have a couple minor nitpicks.

1) Manata mentions, but I would more heavily emphasize, that the common man's definition of "choose" is better represented by essentially the Least Common Denominator of dictionary definitions than by simply the first entry of the most popular dictionary. As such, the common man's definition does not have as a core aspect the "possible" element that is so key to the Libertarian (in the philosophical sense) argument.

Thus, for example, if one goes to Princeton's Wordnet and punches in "choose" one gets:

# S: (v) choose, take, select, pick out (pick out, select, or choose from a number of alternatives) "Take any one of these cards"; "Choose a good husband for your daughter"; "She selected a pair of shoes from among the dozen the salesgirl had shown her"
# S: (v) choose, prefer, opt (select as an alternative over another) "I always choose the fish over the meat courses in this restaurant"; "She opted for the job on the East coast"
# S: (v) choose (see fit or proper to act in a certain way; decide to act in a certain way) "She chose not to attend classes and now she failed the exam"

Notice that none of these definitions included the word "possible" or an equivalent concept.

Likewise, Webster's New World Collegiate Dictionary provides:

transitive verb chose, chosen cho′·sen, choosing choos′·ing

1. to pick out by preference from what is available; take as a choice; select to choose a book at the library
2. to decide or prefer: with an infinitive object to choose to remain

Etymology: ME chesen, cheosen < OE ceosan < IE base *ĝeus-, to taste, relish > L gustare, Goth kausjan

intransitive verb

1. to make one's selection
2. to have the desire or wish; please do as you choose

Same thing. "possible" is not part of the definition, although in one case the word "available" is there, which might arguably be an equivalent concept.

One certainly can find dictionaries that include "possible" in the definition of choose (The first - and only the first - definition in the American Heritage dictionary, for example, has this feature: "To select from a number of possible alternatives; decide on and pick out" - I've added the emphasis), but such a feature that is not found in most dictionary definitions of a word can hardly be viewed as the actual "common man" meaning of the term. A better way to assess the "common man" meaning is to look for the commonalities and overlap of the many dictionary definitions.

2) What's up with the gratuitous reference to Michael Sudduth? :)

-TurretinFan

Recommended Reading - Jason Engwer - New Testament Canon

I heartily recommend for your reading edification a series of posts by Jason Engwer of Triablogue on the topic of the New Testament Canon. They are well-researched and well-written. If it is a topic that is of interest to you, I hope you will check out the series (link to index post for series).

-TurretinFan

Epistemic Certainty - Competing Warrants

I really don't Mr. Manata's fascination with Sudduth.

Sudduth's fundamental problem in his attempt to bolster his thesis that "theistic belief (and belief in other theological propositions) is not epistemically certain" is his essential relativism. This is seen in his frequent appeals to consensus authority at critical junctures ("Most accounts of epistemic certainty are tied ..." "A baseline requirement is typically that ..." "It is generally held that these sorts of beliefs have ...").

I understand, of course, that Sudduth is writing to the academic crowd: a crowd in which such consensus appeals will be well received (and are even standard fare). Such an approach, however, is at odds with a Christian (i.e. Biblical) view of truth. The truth (including the truth about how we know and are certain of the truth) is not determined by what most people accept, what is typically thought to be necessary, or what is generally held in the world.

No, truth is an objective reality and it is communicable reality. Scripture informs us plainly that God conveys truth to us in Scripture (John 17:17 Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth."

We can know the truth. (see, for example, 1 Timothy 4:13 "Forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth.") Of course, knowledge is not bare coincidence of our mental state and the objective reality of the truth.

Instead, knowledge is belief that rests on a proper foundation. This is not really disputed. What is disputed, evidently, is what constitutes certainty.

Certainty is connected with the foundation for the belief. People assign their own rankings for what constitutes a good foundation for belief, and this is reflected in the Sudduth article that Manata posted. It is also observed in popular culture. Thus, it is a joke when one of the Marx brothers asks, "Who are you going to believe, your own eyes or me?" It is a joke, because (of course) the person is going to believe his own eyes rather than the man.

This popular ranking, however, is flawed. Our Grandmother Eve is a perfect example: she ranked the word of the serpent over the word of God as a foundation for belief. As her children, we have often made similar mistakes.

As a matter of objective fact, however, God's word is the most sure foundation upon which belief can be based. Can this be shown to the satisfaction of every atheist, gnostic, Romanist, or Mormon? Not necessarily. If Eve before the fall could be deceived, even more so men who are fallen can (and frequently are) deceived - and furthermore their minds are darkened.

But this inability of proof to the satisfaction of the skeptic does not negate the objective reality of the solidity of revelation. As a matter of fact, not opinion, God's word is truth and God cannot lie. Furthermore, God conveys truth to men. Thus, when God conveys truth to men (whether it be in propositions provided innately to man or propositions provided in Scripture) such truth has better warrant for belief than the testimony of our own eyes, even while it informs us of the general reliability of our senses.

Sudduth's article fails because it fails to recognize (at least explicitly) that the issue is a battle of warrants, and that in the battle of warrants, there is (and can be) no stronger warrant than divine revelation. As such, it is divine revelation (even though it is widely rejected) that brings epistemic certainty.

-TurretinFan

Determined Choices

Paul Manata at Triablogue has a fascinating post on Determined Choices (link). He provides a reasonably concise explanation of how God's declaration that he decides when we die (John 14:5) and the fact that people sometimes choose to kill themselves are compatible, not contradictory. Thus, he reasonably concludes that the nature of free will is at it is described in Calvinism.

-TurretinFan

Pharisees and Jesus - A Study in "Arminian" Logic

First Caveat: I'm using "Arminian" here to refer to a broad range of non-Calvinists - and specifically to refer to those representative of the population of non-Calvinists that regularly criticize Calvinism. I realize that there are Arminians out there who take a very different approach. This is not directed to them.

Spurred on by Triablogue's amusing posts "Prominent Arminian Blogger Denies that Jesus is Human" (link); "Why Freewill Theism makes God the author of Evil" (link); and "Why Jesus was a Sinner" (link), I thought I'd throw my own variant of their theme onto the stack.

Did you know that all the Pharisees followed Jesus? Yes, it is a little known fact.

1) World means World (This is an important tenet of "Arminianism.")

2) John 12:19 The Pharisees therefore said among themselves, Perceive ye how ye prevail nothing? behold, the world is gone after him. (Bold added to assist one's vision.)

3) Therefore, by "Arminian" logic, it follows that the Pharisees were saying that they themselves followed Jesus!

Remarkable, eh? And totally bogus.

Second Caveat: Yes, it is totally bogus. This post is satire (as were the Triablogue posts), trying to humorously show how the argument that "World means World" like the argument that "All means All" is easily abused. The "world" in John's gospel doesn't necessarily mean (and perhaps rarely if ever means) "each and every person on the face of the earth considered as individuals."

-TurretinFan

Myths and Realities about Arminianism

Paul Manata of Triablogue has provided a thorough and detailed (and consequently lengthy) review of and response to Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities, by Roger E. Olson (link to review). Olson is a self-described Arminian responding to what he views as various misconceptions about Arminianism both those of Calvinists and those of self-identified Arminians. I hope that the more serious Arminians out there will take the time to consider what Manata has written. His precise explanations, in many cases, cut right to the heart of the matter. I am thankful for this sort of piece, since it can promote understanding by clearly stating points of difference, while providing supporting explanation.

-TurretinFan

Responses to Response to Twilight/Molinism Post

Both Steve Hayes and TheoJunkie (TJ) have responded to my previous post (link) on the movie Twilight and Molinism.

TJ wrote:

But what would Joe the Plumber think?

You gave a basic premise statement regarding Molinism... can you provide a corresponding direct basic premise statement regarding Calvinism? Your post hints at it, but does not come out and say it.

You said that the basic premise of middle knowledge is that God knows what a particular person would do in a particular situation, prior to God's decision as to what the future will be...

It seems clear that you would not state the Calvinistic premise in exact opposite terms from the Molinist premise, i.e.: that God knows what a particular person would do in a particular situation, AFTER God's decision as to what the future will be. For this statement falls somewhere between nonsense and the fatalistic "floppy string" idea.

Your post suggests that the basic premise of Calvinism is that God knows what a particular person will do in a particular situation, because God decided that is what the person will do in that particular situation (which of course is informed by God's decision as to what will occur in the future).

However, this statement-- without elaboration-- appears to affirm the accusations of "puppetry" that some levy against Calvinism.

We know the bible says God directs a man's steps. Yet we observe that those steps are the steps we choose to take.

Do you consider that God directs the will in each decision, or is it possible that God directs circumstances (the particulars of a particular situation) in order to bring about the steps he has chosen for the man in advance? Or would you agree it is a little of both (or either/or depending on what needs to be done in the moment)?

Is it even possible to incorporate that into a basic premise statement?

I answer:

Calvinism teaches that God's knowledge, which is truly simple, is viewed for analytical purposes under two aspects. First, there is natural knowledge. Second, there is free knowledge. Natural knowledge is the knowledge of all possible things - all things that are logically possible. Free knowledge is the knowledge of all things that arise from God's exercise of his will.

One might argue (and probably a Molinist would argue) that hypothetical questions (for example: "If I stay in the city, will the men of the city deliver me into the hands of my enemy?") raise a third category of knowledge. This apparent third category, however, disappears upon further examination.

A hypothetical question, properly framed, hypothecates something (the hypothecand) and asks for a consequence of that hpyothecand. There are a number of possible forms of hypothetical questions.

1) Questions as to abstract ideas.
Example 1: If the conclusion does not follow from the premises, is the syllogism valid?
Example 2: If three is divided by pi, is the quotient less than one?

These questions would be answered from natural knowledge. Both relate to matters of definition and/or logic. These are not the sorts of hypothetical questions that Molinists are interested in.

2) Questions as to Factual Things
Example 1: If Christ is raised, will we also be raised?
Example 2: If I am a man, do I have authority over all women?

In both of these example, the hypothecand is factual. Christ is raised, and I am a man. These questions would normally be answered from free knowledge. God has decreed that we will be raised with Christ - and God has not given me authority over all women.

3) Questions as to Logically Impossible Things
Example 1: If up is down, ...
Example 2: If nothing truly exists, ...

In these cases, the hypothecand is logically impossible. The rest of the question does not really matter, because the question is predicated on something incoherent. This category of hypothetical questions is also not interesting to the Molinist.

4) Questions as to Factually Untrue Things
Example 1: If Abraham Lincoln had not been shot, would Reconstruction of the South progressed differently?
Example 2: If I die tomorrow, will I go to heaven?

I don't really know whether the hypothecand in Example 2 is factually untrue yet. Let's just assume it is not true for the sake of the argument. These are the sorts of questions to which Molinists typically appeal, referring to them as "counterfactual" statements.

These questions raise some interesting epistemological issues. Is any answer to these questions totally speculative, are there "true" and "false" answers to these questions, or is there some other available category? I believe the best answer is to specify a third category.

The third category is that the question should not be interpreted as looking for a "true" or "false" answer with respect to history. After all, in the first example, one recognizes that historical hypothecand did not take place, in the latter example, one has no way of knowing whether the future hypothecand will take place.

Accordingly, the question is looking for an answer that has a speculative component, but not simply a speculative component. If we provide a third example, we can see how this might be:

Example 3: In a game of War, Mike played a Queen. If I had played a King, would I have beaten Mike? (Or, "Mike has played a Queen. If my next card is a King, will I beat Mike?")

Those people who know the rules of the card game, War, can readily answer the question in the affirmative. After all, that's what the question is really getting after: what are the rules? (You could also phrase the question such that you are saying, "Mike has played a King, will my next card beat Mike's?" which is really asking about what card is next in your stack of cards.)

Example 2, above, has a similar object. It is asking less about the existence of a situation in which the hypothecand is true, and more about the rules of salvation, as it were. When a preacher asks you, "If you died right this minute, would you go to heaven?" he is asking about whether you are justified - right with God. If you are right with God, then the answer would be in the affirmative. If you are not justified, then the answer would be in the negative.

Example 1, above, is a bit more complex. Ultimately, though, what it looks like is that the questioner is asking about is a cause/effect relation. Obviously, there is some speculation, but the answer will typically revolve around the differing attitudes of Lincoln vs. Johnson towards the South, as well as the psychological impact of the assassination.

The underlying presupposition to such a question is that humans behave an orderly, generally predictable way. If we say that Reconstruction would have been kinder and gentler, then we are really saying something about the softer character of Lincoln. Alternatively, if we say that it would have been more severe, we may be saying something about the terror that the assassination had on Johnson.

To take a Biblical example:

1 Samuel 23:12 Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the LORD said, They will deliver thee up.

The LORD here is saying something about the character of the men of Keilah: their fear of Saul was greater than their loyalty to David. Had David stayed, this aspect of their nature would have resulted in their handing David over to Saul. God doesn't answer David either, "They might or might not - depends what I decree," or "They might or might not - depends what they choose." Instead, God reveals something to David about the hearts of men of Keilah, something that God could see, though David could not see.

So, to answer, your question: no, there's not a corresponding statement in Calvinism, because Calvinism rejects a third category of knowledge called "middle knowledge." Instead, Calvinism addresses hypothetical questions asked now, in time, as relating either to natural or free knowledge, depending on the situation, as illustrated above.

You also asked: "Do you consider that God directs the will in each decision, or is it possible that God directs circumstances (the particulars of a particular situation) in order to bring about the steps he has chosen for the man in advance? Or would you agree it is a little of both (or either/or depending on what needs to be done in the moment)?" God works all things together - so that the operate according to his infinitely perfect plan. How God does this is not always clear. God seems to have set in place "laws of nature" (for example) that dictate how matter moves and acts, and God also seems to have set in place certain sociological or psychological laws that dictate how human beings move and act. The study of economics, for example, is possible because of the general predictability of humans, which suggests underlying laws of behavior. Nevertheless, it is not always clear in any given case how God directs such-and-such a person to decide on such-and-such a course of action. One thing we deny: that God does violence to man's will in the ordinary course of life.

Steve Hays of Triablogue also has provided some comments (here). His thoughts are mostly not directly directed as critique on what I wrote but as relating to science fiction stories regarding time travel. I have enjoyed at least one of Steve's short stories on time travel (I have this one in mind), and obviously my post shouldn't be interpreted as any sort of condemnation of those stories.

Steve mentions, "5. Finally, I’m not entirely sure if I agree with Turretin Fan on the coherence of prophecy. The potential problem is this: if a prophecy is too detailed, it generates a dilemma. For it thereby invites its own failure." Steve mentions that a very detailed prophecy could still be fulfilled even if it were communicated in great detail to a person, but he states that "However, Calvinism traditionally rejects such a coercive model of fulfillment." I think it is fair to say that Calvinism generally does reject the idea that God normally operates coercively with respect to man's will. Of course, though, God is not limited to using coercive means to bring about his end. On the other hand, the story of Jonah provides something of a counter-example. Ultimately, though, I agree that God does not bring about the fulfillment of prophecy in a fatalistic way. Thus, if the prophecy about Cyrus' name was communicated to Cyrus' mother, God also arranged that this woman would enjoy fulfilling the prophecy.

Ultimately, any thought there is need for fatalistic measures lies in a limited view of the extent of God's arrangement of things. In other words, God could arrange it so that He would not be revealing the future to uncooperative people (I think this corresponds - at least roughly - to the restrictions that Steve places on prophecy in his article). If God communicates the future, he does so for a reason - perhaps even the reason of bringing about the future. I found it interesting to observe in the recent Disney film, "Kung Fu Panda," that the Kung Fu master is depicted as a type 2 seer, seeing the unavoidable future. In an interesting plot device (*spoiler alert*), the fact that the prophecy cannot be avoided is foreshadowed by a cryptic comment by the senior master. The prophecy relates to the escape of a particular prisoner. The junior master, not realizing that the escape is inevitable, sends his messenger to warn the prison. While at the prison, the messenger drops an item (a feather) that enables the prisoner to escape, thereby leading to the fulfillment of the prophecy.

-Turretinfan

Jeeves' Job

Steve Hays at Triablogue has a provocative post that lures in his readers (while ruffling their feathers) with this opening line: "Watching Catholic laymen defend Catholicism is like watching a dutiful butler put his drunken master to bed." (link) Since some of my most thoughtful readers (whose comments I much appreciate, even when I do not immediately post them) would probably fit into the general category Steve is trying to address, I figured they would like to know what is being said about them.

-TurretinFan

Steve and Turretin vs. Bryan Cross

I enjoyed a recent article by Steve Hays of Triablogue taking Bryan Cross to task on the issue of the perspicuity of Scripture, and relying on Turretin's excellent summary of that issue. (link)

-TurretinFan

Challenge to J.C. Thibodaux

Those who have been following along at Triablogue may be aware of a non-Reformed writer who has presented what he calls a challenge to Reformed theology. To summarize the challenge, he believes that these three passages pose a problem for Reformed theology:

Matthew 5:27-30;
Hebrews 4:9-11; and
Revelation 22:18-19.

His reasoning is that Reformed theology denies that genuine believers can eventually go to hell, and that the passages above contradict that denial.

JCT's challenge is available here (link).

Now, JCT has been engaged in various posts over at Triablogue, as follows, as well is in the comment boxes both in those posts (in some cases) and other posts.

1. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/arminian-perspectives.html
2. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/libertarian-free-will-and-total.html
3. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/thiboredux.html
4. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/jc-thibodaux-bully-of-bayou.html
5. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/pillbury-thibodaux-boy-hee-hee.html
6. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-jc.html
7. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/12/how-to-get-ambushed.html
8. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/12/endangered-theological-blogger-546.html
9. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/marsupial-playground.html
10. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/aladdins-arminian-lamp.html
11. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/jc-thibodauxs-chasezs-boy-band-theology.html
12. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/kangaroo-court-hangs-jury.html
13. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/dumpster-diving.html
14. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/what-does-heb-6-really-mean.html
15. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/behind-beat.html
16. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/thibochiuhuahua.html
17. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/sockpuppetdom.html
18. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/boethian-solution.html
19. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/is-thibodaux-sockpuppet.html
20. http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/automated-radio-station.html

Nevertheless, perhaps JCT still believes that there is life in his challenge. Perhaps he still does not appreciate the full consistence of Reformed theology with each of the passages above.

If so, I want to challenge him to a written debate on the subject at my debate blog. If he is interested, we can work out the debate details according to mutual preference. I don't think it would need to be a very long or complicated debate, so - while I am busily preparing for another debate at the moment - it may be possible to fit it in immediately.

J.C. Thibodaux, the ball is in your court.

-TurretinFan

UPDATE: Updated to place Steve's final response into the list.

Steve Makes a Good Point about Oral Tradition

Over at Triablogue, Steve Hays has provided a short and amusing look at the logic behind the flawed argument that goes:

1. Paul says Timothy should keep the things Paul communicated to him orally;
2. Paul did not place any time limit on that command;
3. Therefore, Timothy had to follow them indefinitely; and
3. Therefore, also, we have to keep those oral commands.

Of course, the argument is flawed. But Steve Hays tweaks the argument's nose in a fairly succinct and effective way.

Enjoy! (link) (to which I would simply add: That thou doest, do quickly.)

-Turretinfan