Presuppositional Debate - Continued

JonathanB has provided a response (link here) to my previous post (link here), in which I responded to several of his objections. In the dialogue below, within the block quotations, the boldface is JonathanB's summary of my response, and the not-boldface type is JonathanB's response.

Rejoinder 1: Some unfounded claims (and some axioms) are arbitrary assertions, some are not. Of course, we are speaking here of claims that are not founded in reasoned argument.
American Heritage Dictionary defines arbitrary as, “Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle.” Any claim that has no reason behind it is arbitrary. Turretinfan can claim that his axiom has necessity behind it. If he says “it is necessary because…” he has provided a reason for his axiom and thus debunked himself. Turretinfan can also claim he has a principle behind it but if he has some principle behind his ultimate axiom then he has both a reason for the axiom and has made the axiom less than his ultimate axiom, ad infinitum.

JB's response relies on equivocation. There is a reason (in the sense of the AHD) but not a reasoned argument (the sense being discussed). The reason that I believe what I believe, is that God has opened my eyes to see that it is true. That is a reason (hence the axiom is not arbitrary), and yet it is not a reasoned argument.

Rejoinder 2: This [that an unfounded claim is arbitrary] is not a legitimate objection, however, because a circular argument is not a foundation (in the sense of a reasoned argument) for a proposition.
Whether or not an assertion made for no reason is arbitrary has nothing to do with circularity, in itself. Take for example the recent Chris Hitchens/Doug Wilson debate: Hitchens asserts that Christianity is bad and Wilson that Christianity is good. Now Hitchens needs to have some ethical standard by which he makes his declaration. However, the fact that Hitchens cannot come up with a standard does not mean that Doug Wilson is relieved of having to come up with a standard for his own assertion.
However, I am willing to bite the bullet on the later half of this assertion. The claim is being made by Van Tilians that in restricted cases circularity is allowed if it is necessary and verified transcendentally. Turretinfan objects that this is not allowed. Okay, so why, Turretinfan, is this not allowed?

At to the first half of the above, the point is that a circular argument does not provide a reason for an otherwise arbitrary assertion. If it did, it would provide a reason for virtually any arbitrary assertion.

As to the second half, given that the general rule is that circular arguments are invalid arguments, the burden is on the Van-Tillians to demonstrate that there is a category of circular arguments that actually are valid. So far, the Van-Tillians have not risen to this challenge.

Instead, the Van-Tillians have simply asserted that the circular argument is "necessary" (which we have demonstrated is not true) and that the circular argument is "verified transcendentally" (which we have demonstrated is actually incorrect, the proposition itself is verified transcendentally, not the circular argument).

Notice that the Bible is a self-attesting authority. To attest to something is to give one’s testimony and to give one’s testimony is to give support for a declaration or a thing. Thus, to self-attest is to give your own support for yourself. Yet this is exactly what Turretinfan needs to avoid. Turretinfan doesn’t want the Bible to be a self-attesting authority but rather to be a mere assertion (admittedly, this is not how Turretinfan would put it but I think this is the position he is forced into). In order for Turretinfan to have his cake and eat it too, he needs to drop the concept of Scripture as a self-attesting authority and instead adopt Scripture as a book of (arbitrary) assertions, or axioms if you prefer.

It should be clear from the second part of the paragraph above, that our position is that Scripture has self-attesting authority. The problem with JB's analysis is to confuse the self-attestation of the Bible with a circular argument, or an argument at all. It is not a deductive argument. That's the simple fact of the matter. Thus, there is no contradiction between saying that the Bible is my set of axioms and that it is not arbitrary. The reason JB thinks I cannot have self-attesting axioms is that JB has mistakenly dichotomized into rigorous proof and arbitrariness, as noted above.

Rejoinder 3: a circular argument is patently worse than just stating that the matter is a presupposition, because it has the appearance of an attempt to decieve the audient into thinking that the matter has been proven using reason.
In order for Turretinfan to be correct he must assume that there can be no self-attesting authority and he must assume that to make a mistake in reasoning is worse than to be arbitrary in reasoning. Sometimes it may be better to make a mistake in reasoning than to be arbitrary. For example, if I arbitrarily decide that the world is sound and fury signifying nothing, and thus I should go on a killing rampage, it would certainly be better to make the mistake of thinking that Scripture is a self-attesting authority (if this is a mistake). On the other hand, it may be worse if the mistake in reasoning is that black people are not people at all but a lower life form and the arbitrary decision is to do what God has said. Thus, he cannot categorically state that to reason in a circle is worse than to be arbitrary.

Here JB continues to mistakenly assert (a) that our position requires that there be no self-attesting authority, and (b) that the only alternative to circularity is arbitrariness. Each of those errors has been thoroughly refuted.

Additionally, based on those mistaken assertions, JB artificially asserts that we must assume that "to make a mistake in reasoning is worse than to be arbitrary in reasoning." Whether we arrive at the right result by the wrong methodology does not make the methodology correct. The ends do not justify the means. If there is a mistake in reasoning, that is something that ought to be corrected, independently of whether "arbitrary in reasoning" is acceptable. Likewise, if "arbitrary in reasoning" is bad, then it should be corrected independently of whether a mistake in reasoning is something bad.

And, as previously noted, the actual position that faces JB's position is not that it is better to be arbitrary than circular, but that one should not be circular. JB's argument is akin to the pinchpurse asserting that I must prove that pinching purses is worse than speeding, if I am going to criticize him for speeding.

What remains unproven by both JB and the pinchpurse, is that the only alternative is what they respectively claim. In other words, one might argue that it is better that one man should die and not the whole nation, if those are really the only two options. But if there is a third option: that both the man and the nation live, for example (or that the pinch purse goes to work, while driving within the law; or that a person acknowledge a presupposition as such, and not attempt to pass it off as a logically deduced conclusion), then the defense of comparative blameworthiness goes out the window.

Here, the third option is to announce the presupposition for what it is, and not attempt to claim that it has been logically deduced, when it has not. It is the path of honesty, and it is better than the deception of asserting that one can prove one's presuppositon by resort to circular argument.

Surely, Turretinfan would want to argue within the context that to arbitrarily assert God’s authority is better than to say that it is its own authority because it is the highest authority. Yet is this true? If Turretinfan allows this arbitrariness then, by his own admission, he cannot offer a reason as to why someone should choose a different axiom and go kill Bob. If I allow this circle in my reasoning then it is not without guidelines, it must be necessitated by the nature of the claim and it must be transcendentally verified. Thus, I can still hold people accountable to not reason in a circle unless they are making a certain kind of claim and when they do make that claim, I can still have some principle of critique.

As noted above, JB continues to (apparently unintentionally) misrepresent our position as advocating arbitrary assertions. However, as has been shown, the assertion of God's authority is not arbitrary, even though it is not the result of logical deduction.

Rejoinder 4: The assertion that God exists is not “arbitrary.” It is God’s own name for Himself. He is the “I AM.” It is not a conclusion that we arrive at by logical reasoning, it is simply the revealed truth of God.
Turretinfan certainly makes this sound nice and what Christian wouldn’t agree that their worldview is not arbitrary? This comment sounds even nicer when he misconstrues the Van Tilian position by making it sound as if Van Tilians believe that we start with logic and can end with God (but maybe he didn’t mean to do that). Turretinfan claims the assertion that God exists is not “arbitrary,” but is this necessarily true? Not necessarily. It isn’t arbitrary because of the nature of who God is. God is the ultimate authority and therefore He can claim that He exists on His own authority. However, I cannot claim that God exists and then leave it at that because I am no authority. If I am going to claim that God exists I must appeal to His authority. Thus, if we merely claim “God exists” we are being arbitrary.

JB's response here appears self-contradictory. JB appears to acknowledge that "God exists" is not an arbitrary assertion. Furthermore, JB appears to recognize that the reason it is not arbitrary is not because it is arrived at by logical deduction. He brings in what he feels are misperceptions of Van-Tillianism, but that discussion is not germane here. JB has to pick: is the assertion of God's existence arbitrary, or not. Those of us who believe know that it is not arbitrary, as JB also appears to recognize.

Rejoinder 5: Consequently, the objection fails both because the Circular Reasoning position is worse than the acknowledgment of the presupposition, and because it is untrue that the only alternative to reasoned proof is mere arbit.
I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that Turretinfan has a misconception of “reasoned proof.” It sounds as though Turretinfan is under the impression that for one to give a reasoned proof they must go to something outside of themselves. Certainly, this is true with one exception: that which is the ultimate authority. God does not go to a reason outside of Himself because reason does not exist outside of Himself. Thus, the fact of reason is, in a sense “a reasoned proof.”

As noted previously, this alleged exception is merely declared by Van-Tillians, not proven by them. Consequently, the burden of showing that it is an exception remains on them.

Their argument appears to be that "ultimate authorities cannot be established by ordinary logical deduction, (so far they are correct) so, we must use a circular argument." It is the latter half where they go astray. There is no more reason to use a circular argument than to employ any other form of invalid argument, or simply to remain silent.

Rejoinder 6: problem is not just that circular arguments are illogical, but that they are (in Frame’s apologetic) being passed off on the unsuspecting public as logically valid.
Notice that this is almost the same as rejoinder 5 and 3. However, I want to raise again the challenge made under rejoinder 2: Why are the types of circular arguments Frame proposes invalid? In addition notice that this rejoinder is in response to my state that “[y]ou assert that circular arguments as illogical and then abandon logic yourself.” One can easily see in Turretinfan’s rejoinder that he did not demonstrate that my objection was not the case. Turretinfan only argues that circular arguments are worse than unfounded assertions. However, my point stands; he wants to use logic to critique other views for being illogical but then wants to put his own view in an ivory tower where logic cannot reach.

As noted in the comment, most of this is addressed above. One point of correction: "Turretinfan only argues that circular arguments are worse than unfounded assertions." That's simply not the case. That is not my argument, nor has it been my argument. JB's failure to get the argument, is disappointing. The argument is that proposing a logically invalid argument (and circular arguments are invalid arguments) as the attempted demonstration is, at best, potentially deceptive.

The "ivory tower" comment is a bizarre mixture of metaphors. In any event, a presupposition is, by definition, outside the bounds of supposition. To assert that it is not is to beat one's head against the wall.

Rejoinder 7: [T]here is not some alternative in which axioms ARE justified by reasoned argument. As noted above, a circular argument is not a reasoned argument.
Notice that this rejoinder was in response to my objection 3, where I state, “If axioms don’t have to be justified by reasoned argument, then I can escape having to justify my position on anything by calling it an axiom.” (In fact, the next 3 Rejoinders by Turretin will be in relation to this objection.) In this, Turretinfan wisely adopts John Frame’s observation that if no alternative exists then no critique can be made. However, this is not a defeater to my Objection 3 because the only thing this means is that the fact that I can escape all justification by calling it an axiom is not a fault (if Turretinfan is correct that there are no other options). The fact remains that I can escape all justification by making all things axioms… a high price to pay to escape Van Til.

JB: yes, if you call your whole position axiomatic, you would remove your position from debate. The only question would be whether your multiple axioms were consistent. No one, however, is proposing making all things axioms, because most people do not hold all of their views with equal dogmatism.

The only question is regarding presuppositions, starting points. As between competing presuppositions, (God exists, God does not exist), either can be "supported" by a circular argument or by any number of other invalid argumentation forms. The honest thing to do is to acknowledge that it is a presupposition and go from there, rather than claiming to have proven the presupposition by the exercise of logic.

Rejoinder 8: The second reason is that if a circular argument IS a reasoned justification, then it could simply be employed to support any arbitrary axiom: consequently, the same criticism would inhere. Frame tries to escape this by saying that circular arguments are only valid sometimes (not all the time), but aside from a self-serving desire to permit circularity when it is helpful, Frame does not justify his resort to fallacious reasoning.
The criticism is not valid because Frame’s guidelines are not artificial. Indeed, most philosophers (I don’t know that all have) have recognized that certain claims are necessarily circular (i.e. induction). (Please note that this “necessary circle” is somewhat dependent on one’s worldview. Under the Christian worldview, induction is not circular: we have the principle because God is uniform and promised the seasons for harvest etc….). When some alternative can be given to a circular argument then a circular argument must not be given and if one does have a circular argument it should be capable of being argued for transcendentally. Turretinfan may not like this but these are in fact reasons for the validity of circularity. Turretinfan’s alternative, arbitrary axioms, cannot have any guidelines which limits their use.

Again, notice the false characterization of our position as "arbitrary axioms."

In addition, yes, Frame's guidelines are artificial. They are a stopgap measure for attempting to prolong deductive reasoning when it has failed. It's not a question of my liking or not liking it. Deductive reasoning dead-ends at presuppositions -- axioms. That's just the way it is.

A circular argument does not help presuppositions, becuase circular arguments do not help propositions in general. The same reasons that a circular argument is not a sound argument for proposition X are valid reasons why a circular argument is not a sound argument for all propositions X: there's nothing about presuppositions that avoid the invalidity problems of circularity.

The fact that a claim cannot be proved apart from circularity does not mean that it can be proved WITH circularity, just the fact that a claim cannot be proved by appealling to the fact that I am a poor, paraplegic orphan whose extraordinarily adorable pet kitten just got run over by the same tank that killed my grandparents does not mean that it can be proven in such a logically invalid method.

"Inductive reasoning" is not deductive reasoning at all, and it is unclear why JB even brings it up.

The proposition may be verifiable in manner that transcends logic, but not the use of a circular argument (or of my pitiful tale).

Rejoinder 9: The third reason is that there is value in people exposing their axioms: their presuppositions. For example, most Arminians have a presupposition that man’s destiny is not (effectively) written in stone, but that the future (to a large degree) is up to each individual person. That’s a presupposition for them, but some (indeed many) refuse to acknowledge that it is a presupposition, choosing instead to assert that is based in Scriptural exegesis. When they acknowledge that it is a presupposition, then the debate can shift to whether that presupposition is consistent with other of their presuppositions, as opposed to whether the presupposition itself is justified.
Notice that this is a type of transcendental argumentation for the axiom. Since Turretinfan doesn’t believe axioms can be justified then it should not be any problem to the Arminian that he cannot justify holding onto two contradictory axioms. Thus, while Turretinfan may be able to show that two axioms contradict, it doesn’t seem to me that the Arminian has to give any of them up; after all, the Arminian has no reason for holding the axioms in the first place. The Arminian can claim that it is his axiom to hold to these two contradictions but that it is also his axiom that he be consistent the rest of the time.

This response again demonstrates that JB consistently fails to identify our actual position. As has been repeated many times, our position is not in favor of arbitrary assertions. It would seem to be a point of fairness that JB try to recognize that.

A second mischaracterization "Turretinfan doesn’t believe axioms can be justified." In fact, I think I've fairly clearly said the opposite. They can be justified, just not by logical deduction.

What JB appears to fail to recognize is that while axioms (as such) are not proved by logical deduction, they can be invalidated within a system by comparison to other axioms. If anyone, Arminian or otherwise, refuses to consistently abide by the law of self-contradiction, they are simply indicating that they refuse to argue.

Rejoinder 10: I don’t see this [the ability to be logical on matters other than your presuppositions is not due to your presuppositions] as a reason to object to my view.
I see this as a reason for objection because it means that the axiom is virtually useless. Turretinfan may wish to object that it is useful in that he has been justified… but this itself is a part of his axiom. His axiom doesn’t give him any thing advantageous over another person with different axioms except the axiom itself. This means that his justification is only useful in that it is a part of his axiom. Unbelieving Bob will not have any use for this “justification” because it is not a part of his axiom. If Bob’s axiom is that murdering is good then it is useful for justifying Bob’s murder, to Bob. It is has no value to anyone other than Bob. I can imagine Turretinfan would want to say that this means everyone should adopt his axiom so they can enjoy its benefits. Yet this assumes that the benefits have a transitive value to the person with different axioms. The shift would have to be arbitrary and Bob can make the same claim.

JB seems to overlook that even if the value of the axiom cannot be proven by logical argument, nevertheless that does not mean that axiom does not have enormous value. A murder-loving person who refuses to debate his view of murder is in an intrisicly bad position, whether we can prove that to his satisfcation or not.

Rejoinder 11: reason has been revealed to be of use in understanding.
Why should I want to be understanding?

There are lots of answers that could be given, including (if you were my son) "because otherwise I'll hit you with this stick." Hopefully, I don't have to tell you why you should want such an object. If some fool really was on the fence about the issue, the answer would be: because God said to make it your goal.

Rejoinder 12: Asserting that a truth is self-evident is dogma, not demonstration, even if one places Aristotle’s signature under the assertion.
First of all, I must object to his reformulation of my statement. My original statement was: “you act as though Van Tilians just made up circular arguments yesterday, when in fact such circularity, which may be justified transcendentally, has been used since Aristotle.” The thrust of this point is not that “Aristotle did it first!” but that the very man who helped systematized western logic realized that in some cases circularity was inescapable. Turretinfan wants to appeal to one logical principle (don’t reason in a circle) and yet abandon another logical principle (don’t be arbitrary). In showing that the principle of non-circularity has exceptions we do not have to throw out the entire system; yet, if we claim that non-arbitrariness has exceptions but we cannot provide any reason for it then we cannot stop the entire system from devolving into arbitrariness.

There is no question of "throw[ing] out the entire system."

On the other hand, JB, you need to recognize that circularity is equally supportive of arbitrary and non-arbitrary assertions. Thus, our rejection of circularity (even if Aristotle himself accepted such arguments as sound in some cases, which has not been illustrated) actually bolsters the system, providing yet another reason NOT to throw it out.

Rejoinder 13: Interestingly, though, even the pagan author Longinus recognized that Paul preached in a style that was different from the Greek orators: ‘Let the following men be takend as the summit of all excellence of eloquence and Grecian intellect - Demothsenes, Lysias, Aeachines, Hyperides, Isaeus, Deinarchus, or Demosthenes Crithinus, Isocrates, Antiphon; to whom may be added, Paul of Tarsus, who was the first within my knowledge who did not make use of demonstration.’”
Every atheist, agnostic, and non-Christian would claim that we have no demonstration for our belief system. The testimony of the pagan author Longinus does not convince me that making use of demonstrations is not biblical.

You're equivocating again. And you would be wrong, even in your equivocation. The Pharoah's magicians may have claimed "no demonstration" at first, but after several demonstrations they were persuaded. Paul's demonstration of snake venom resistance actually persuaded those around him of his own divinity and of that of his companion.

But all this is equivocation. Paul did not demonstrate his first principles by logical deduction: instead he preached, as we should do.

You have an uphill battle, because (as previously noted) the use of a circular argument is not the Biblical model. When I join to that the fact that the pagans recognized the difference between Paul's presentation style (not whether he was successful, as your equivocal response seems to suggest) and the presentation style of the Greeks, then you are even further from your goal.

Rejoinder 14: The circularity is not being justified transcendently; the proposition itself (”I AM”) is justified transcendently.
As I understand it, the transcendental argument does not give justification to the proposition, as Turretinfan claims. The only thing that can “justify” God is His own Word. Rather, the argument demonstrates that such must be the case, and that all men know this to be the case. The Authority has the right to claim whatever He wants without rebuttal: including the statement “I AM because I AM.”

The statement in Scripture, however, is just "I AM," not "I AM because I AM." God does not have any duty or need to justify his own existence: God preaches, and we His messangers do the same in His name.

In any event, the goal of any indirect argument for God's existence is to establish God's existence, not to establish a circular argument for God's existence. It's perplexing why JB would think that latter.

Rejoinder 15: Furthermore, we know that the proposition is evident to everyone, even if they refuse to accept it as true, for Scripture reveals this information to us.
In another post Turretinfan stated that men do not accept the proposition and that they do not know the proposition: “The ‘knowledge’ that the wicked have of God is not belief, but information.” Therefore, all Turretinfan means is that everyone has hear, or seen, or “intuited” (whatever that means) the proposition “I AM” but what is the use of this? I can claim “the proposition ‘Blark IS’ is evident to everyone.”
Smith asks, “So you mean everyone knows it?”
Jones: “No, they don’t know it. It’s more like they intuit it.”
Smith: “What does that mean?”
Jones: “Well, I’m not sure if that word has any logical value, to be honest.”
Smith: “So what exactly do you mean that “Blark IS” is evident to everyone?”
Jones: “It just means its there.”
However, Turretinfan may have a particular meaning in mind when he makes that statement. If so I am open to considering it.

I don't see much (if any) interaction between the rejoinder and the response.

JB's question appears to be: "what is useful about the proposition: "God IS"?" It is an odd sort of question. What is useful about any proposition? It conveys true information. That's its use.

Rejoinder 16: We might be perceived to be arbitrary, but we believe because we have been persuaded of the truth by the Spirit of God.
This claim itself is axiomatic. Thus, everyone can claim that their axiom is not arbitrary because they have been persuaded by “Blark, god of murder who declares murder good.”

They can claim it all they like. They are only proving that they are delusional.

Rejoinder 17: As noted in my previous post, there are further categories of invalid argumentation we could employ in the place of the first two options listed (for example we could argue as the Muslims have historically done, ad baculum) and there is the option of responding that the question (what is the justification of your final justification) is as absurd as the question, ‘which building is taller than the tallest building?’ or ‘what lies below the geometric center of the Earth?’”
This is in response to my claim that, “There are three options: circular reasoning, self-contradiction, and arbitrary assertion.” Whether or not there are 3 categories or 5 really doesn’t make to big of a difference to me. However, I will attempt to argue that in the end, argumentum ad baculum would fall under one of the three categories I have listed. For example, Person A “If you don’t believe X is the ultimate authority I will kill you,” Person B: “Why?” Person A can give a reason that relies upon X (therefore circular) or person A can give a reason that ultimately lies outside of X (therefore is self contradictory) or person A can give no reason and kill him (arbitrary).

JB's response here is puzzling. The ad baculum answer to the question "Why" is, a quick blow and "Any more questions or are you ready to agree?" That's neither self-contradictory, circular, or abitrary.

The other option Turretinfan lists is that the question itself doesn’t make sense. This is because the question is loaded. It assumes an outside justification for that which encompasses all justification. The point here is that in such a case the ultimate commitment is self-attesting.

That's not a defense of the question, its a recognition of the invalidity of the question.

Rejoinder 18: although the presupposition that God exists is not founded on deduction, it is not arbitrary, and … circular argument does not weed out arbitrary presuppositions.
Of course the claim that it is not arbitrary is part of what we have been debating. I see no further argument given here that the axiom isn’t arbitrary. As far as the assertion made concerning circular arguments: I would have to see some explanation. I do not claim that if one adopts my distinction between valid and invalid circularity that all arbitrariness will stop all I am claiming is that one can allow for such a distinction to be made without the whole system sinking, as is not the case with arbitrariness.

Two aspects of response here:
a) Note again that JB feels that his repeated claims (at least sometimes) that the axiom is arbitrary makes it so. His entire proof, however, is that some claims are abitrary. Anyone who has taken even one semester of logic, however, should recognize that the fallacy of:

A is B
Some B are C
Therefore
A is C

That's the fallacy that JB is employing. He provides examples of arbitrary assertions, but fails to show that this assertion is arbitrary. Furthermore, as has been stated many times, the assertion is not arbitrary. Since it is not arbitrary, most of the rest of the argument melt away.

b) A circular argument can "support" any arbitrary assertion.

IFF thunderbolts exist, Zeus exists.
Thunderbolts exist.
Therefore
Zeus exists.

I chose the existence of Zeus more or less arbitrarily. You pick another propisition if you like. I can support it with circular argument. There are a few obvious exceptions: "Circular arguments are false," would have a paradoxical circular proof, and "Self-contradictions are valid" would have no proof at all.

Rejoinder 19: the two options are (from the standpoint of reasoned argument) the same. Circularity does not ADD to the justification of something, and transcendent justification is inherently not reasoned argument. Furthermore, there is no reason that the label “transcendent” cannot be appropriately applied to the presuppositions in the absence of a circular argument.
This of course assumes that my distinction of circularity is invalid. In the case of
one’s ultimate commitment, circularity is the only appeal that can be
consistently made. I would need to see an argument for the rest of these
assertions.

As noted above, ad baculum, ad nauseum, ad miseracordiam, etc. could equally consistently be made with the circular argument, because they are all equally not logical arguments for the proposition. A circular argument is properly considered, no argument at all.

In any event, the issue of "transcendent justification" must be addressed first (under JB's proposal) before the "validity" of the circular argument can be considered. And it turns out that if the answer to that issue is affirmative, then there is no need to construct a circular argument for the proposition, just appeal to the transcendent justification as such.

In short, a circular argument in any "proof" of God's existence is worse than useless: it is potentially deceptive, unbiblical, and distracting. The better, more honest, approach is to simply acknowledge that we believe God because He has revealed himself to us by His work of regeneration in our hearts. This is the message of Scripture, it is the message of Paul, and it should be our message.

Praise be to our Sovereign God!

-Turretinfan

President Bush - Mixed Kudos

President Bush recently called the pope, "Sir," instead of "Your Holiness," drawing gasps from the Catholics present. Personally, I cannot imagine a legitimate reason for Bush meeting with the pope in the first place (one reason my kudos is mixed), but if he is going to do so, he is at least to be commended for not referring to the pope by a misleading title. Nevertheless, I suspect that the use of "sir," was probably not calculated by Bush, but was an accidental reflection of his Protestant view that the pope is not an especially holy person. I'm confident that most official correspondence from Bush to the pope would use the misdescriptive title that the journalists in the story (linked here) were so shocked not to hear.

But, if it was intentional, then Hat's Off to You, Mr. President!

-Turretinfan

Romanist Apologist - Sippo Lampoons Self

Unless someone has hacked his account, Sippo seems to have decided to portray himself as, well, here are the items:

1) "Another example is John Calvin's claim that all human beings are "totally depraved". In reality, we all have our faults, but "total depravity" overstates the condition of mankind." Does Sippo really not have the slightest clue about what total depravity means?

2) Does Sippo really not get that the solution to his "pizza paradox" is that the "center" defined by the intersection of the cuts in the pizza is normally slightly off the geometric center of the pizza?

3) Does Sippo really think that Robin Williams stole his lawyer joke?

So which is it, is Sippo playing the buffoon, or has someone hacked his account?

Check for yourself.

-Turretinfan

Circular Frame - Presuppositional Apologetics

Circular Frame

Presuppositional Apologetics Gone Terribly Wrong

According to another Internet poster, JonathanB, Frame wrote:

Criticism is effective only when the critic can suggest a better way. But there is no alternative to circularity [in relation to one’s ultimate commitment]… Circularity in a system is properly justified only at one point: in an argument for the ultimate criterion of the system… It is possible to argue the Pauline authorship of Second Timothy on the basis of higher and broader princples than the Pauline authoriship of Second Timothy. Allowing circularity at one point in a system, therefore, does not commit us to allowing circularity at all points.

(John Frame The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, p. 13-131) (citation by JonathanB)

Frame is wrong in saying that circularity is "properly justified" at all.

Circularity is never justified in argument. Frame's assertion that it is justified is simply a self-serving ipse dixit. There is no basis for his claiming that it is justified, and there is a categorical problem with circular reasoning: it is logically invalid.

In other words, circular reasoning is not an example of reasoning, it is an example of broken reasoning, just as potsherds are not a category of pottery.

Frame argues that "there is no alternative to circularity." This manifestly incorrect. If one is going to rely on logical fallacies, there are plenty of others that could be employed. Ad baculum is a favorite of mine, and should your argumentative vein be less pugilistic, you could try the ad misericordiam or the ever favorite in certain circles, ad nauseum.

More importantly, the correct response is not a circular argument, but a simple statement: This is my presupposition: I trust God. If someone asks: "But why do you trust God," the response is: didn't you just hear me? I said it is my presupposition. It's absurd to ask what the basis is for a presupposition.

Asking what is beyond an ultimate commitment is like asking which letter comes after zed, or what building is taller than the tallest building. It's a silly question, and the best responses are to point out that the question itself is absurd, to clarify that you have arrived at the tallest building, last letter, or presupposition, or simply to remain silent.

Frame and many of Van Til's followers make the serious logical mistake of attempting to provide an answer to the complex question: "what is the justification for your presuppositions?"

In doing so, they undermine their otherwise good, presuppositional apologetic.

An Alternative view of Frame

I should note that Frame's argument can be expressed other ways. For example, Frame states:

However, it is quite impossible to argue for Christianity, or anything else for that matter, without making a presuppositional choice. One cannot reason without criteria of truth. And criteria of truth come from a wide variety of sources, ultimately religious commitment. Those criteria will either be Christian or non-Christian. If they are non-Christian, they will be self-defeating and subject to divine judgment. To say this is to say that argument for Christianity will always be in one sense circular. Arguments for Christianity must be based on Christian criteria, which in turn presuppose the truth of Christianity. You can't prove God without presupposing him. This is one of the principles of Van Til's apologetics which most irritates our authors. [Footnotes omitted.]

This excellent comment by Frame is in response to the errors of the evidentialists. "Van Til and the Ligonier Apologetic," WTJ V47 #2 Fall 1985 pp. 287-88.

And Frame's comment is not unique to Van Til's apologetics, but also applies to the slightly more pure presuppositional apologetics of Dr. Clark. The one thing that Frame fails to do is properly complete the thought. After correctly stating, "You can't prove God without presupposing Him," Frame ought to have added: "and a proof that presupposes its conclusion is logically invalid, consequently one cannot prove God using deductive reasoning."

Frame appears to believe that this would mean he would then have to accept the evidentialist approach of seeking to prove God (courtroom-style) from the preponderance of the evidence. However, as Frame should be able to recognize, the fact that God's existence cannot be proved by deductive reasoning, does not mean that it must be proved some other way. The response, as noted above (and below in the objections answered section), is to simply say that the presupposition is off the table. Failing to accept the presupposition will lead to judgment, as Frame himself pointed out.

Accordingly, there is certainly room in Frame to accomodate the slight correction needed to avoid the problem of circularity, and thereby purify the VanTilian approach to presuppositional apologetics.

Objections Raised

One follower of Van Til has raised various objections, in a comment below. Rather than simply reply in the comment box, I thought it would add to this post to have those objections addressed within the post.

Objection 1: An unfounded claim (or an axiom) is an arbitrary assertion.

That assertion is incorrect. Some unfounded claims (and some axioms) are arbitrary assertions, some are not. Of course, we are speaking here of claims that are not founded in reasoned argument.

This is not a legitimate objection, however, because a circular argument is not a foundation (in the sense of a reasoned argument) for a proposition.

And a circular argument is patently worse than just stating that the matter is a presupposition, because it has the appearance of an attempt to decieve the audient into thinking that the matter has been proven using reason.

The assertion that God exists is not "arbitrary." It is God's own name for Himself. He is the "I AM." It is not a conclusion that we arrive at by logical reasoning, it is simply the revealed truth of God.

Consequently, the objection fails both because the Circular Reasoning position is worse than the acknowledgment of the presupposition, and because it is untrue that the only alternative to reasoned proof is mere arbit.

Objection 2: You assert that circular arguments as illogical and then abandon logic yourself.

This objection has a facade of validity, in the sense that at first glance it appears to be a valid objection. As noted above, however, the problem is not just that circular arguments are illogical, but that they are (in Frame's apologetic) being passed off on the unsuspecting public as logically valid. That passing off is deceptive and unworthy of Christian apologetics. The simple acknowledgement: "This is my presupposition: this is what God has revealed to me," is worlds better than attempting to suggest that one has "proven" one's presuppositions.

Furthermore, such an obvious deception is readily detected both by anti-Christian philosophers and evidentialist Christian philosophers, who then come (wrongly) to despise presuppositional apologetics in general as dishonest.

Objection 3: If axioms don't have to be justifed by reasoned argument, then I can escape having to justify my position on anything by calling it an axiom.

This objection does not have much force, for three reasons.

The first reason is that there is not some alternative in which axioms ARE justified by reasoned argument. As noted above, a circular argument is not a reasoned argument.

The second reason is that if a circular argument IS a reasoned justification, then it could simply be employed to support any arbitrary axiom: consequently, the same criticism would inhere. Frame tries to escape this by saying that circular arguments are only valid sometimes (not all the time), but aside from a self-serving desire to permit circularity when it is helpful, Frame does not justify his resort to fallacious reasoning.

The third reason is that there is value in people exposing their axioms: their presuppositions. For example, most Arminians have a presupposition that man's destiny is not (effectively) written in stone, but that the future (to a large degree) is up to each individual person. That's a presupposition for them, but some (indeed many) refuse to acknowledge that it is a presupposition, choosing instead to assert that is based in Scriptural exegesis. When they acknowledge that it is a presupposition, then the debate can shift to whether that presupposition is consistent with other of their presuppositions, as opposed to whether the presupposition itself is justified.

Objection 4: Your ability to be logical on matters other than your presuppositions is not due to your presuppositions.

I agree. I don't see this as a reason to object to my view.

Objection 5: Your decision to be logical is arbitrary

This objection is not true. I am logical because reason has been revealed to be of use in understanding.

Objection 6: Aristotle was circular before we were.

That's hardly an objection worth mentioning. Asserting that a truth is self-evident is dogma, not demonstration, even if one places Aristotle's signature under the assertion.

Interestingly, though, even the pagan author Longinus recognized that Paul preached in a style that was different from the Greek orators: "Let the following men be takend as the summit of all excellence of eloquence and Grecian intellect - Demothsenes, Lysias, Aeachines, Hyperides, Isaeus, Deinarchus, or Demosthenes Crithinus, Isocrates, Antiphon; to whom may be added, Paul of Tarsus, who was the first within my knowledge who did not make use of demonstration."

This, of course, relates back to the objection in my previous post (Link here) that Van-Tillian apologetics are (at their starting point) unbiblical: not derived from exegesis.

Objection 7: Such circularity can be justified "transcendentally" (by which this author supposes that the objector means: transcendently)

The circularity is not being justified transcendently; the proposition itself ("I AM") is justified transcendently. Distinguishing the fallacy attempt to justify the proposition using logic from the proposition itself is an important step. God's declaration "I AM" is a transcendent declaration. It is outside the bounds of proper debate. It is impudent and even lèse majesté to debate contrary to God's own declaration that he IS. Furthermore, we know that the proposition is evident to everyone, even if they refuse to accept it as true, for Scripture reveals this information to us.

Thus, the propositon is not arbitray and - at the same time - there is no reason to seek to justify the proposition using logical deduction.

Objection 8: If we attempt to give no explanation at all we would be arbitrary.

No. We might be perceived to be arbitrary, but we believe because we have been persuaded of the truth by the Spirit of God.

Objection 9: There are three options: circular reasoning, self-contradiction, and arbitrary assertion.

False trichotomy. As noted in my previous post, there are further categories of invalid argumentation we could employ in the place of the first two options listed (for example we could argue as the Muslims have historically done, ad baculum) and there is the option of responding that the question (what is the justification of your final justification) is as absurd as the question, "which building is taller than the tallest building?" or "what lies below the geometric center of the Earth?"

If we choose the path of posing as presenting a logical argument, we risk being deceptive: for a circular argument is no more of a logical argument than is a self-contradictory argument.

Objection 10: If we allow presuppositions to be justified without circular argument, then we forfeit the right to make any argument at all; for, in allowing arbitrariness into our system (indeed at the very foundation of our system) we have forfeited the right to claim that others not be arbitrary on other points.

This objection is not valid, both because (as noted above) although the presupposition that God exists is not founded on deduction, it is not arbitrary, and because circular argument does not weed out arbitrary presuppositions.

Objection 11: Circularity with transcendental justification or no justification at all for anything.

This objection is a false dichotomy for two reasons: first, the two options are (from the standpoint of reasoned argument) the same. Circularity does not ADD to the justification of something, and transcendent justification is inherently not reasoned argument. Furthermore, there is no reason that the label "transcendent" cannot be appropriately applied to the presuppositions in the absence of a circular argument.

-Turretinfan

Response to: TJH's Gordon Clark on Science

Another blog recently provided a review of a book by Gordon Clark on science. It was not a particularly favorable review. That, of course, is not neecessarily bad. Poor writing deserves to be panned. But I think the author of the blog read into Clark's writing, rather than reading Clark's writing for what it is.

For example, I doubt Clark would agree with either:

For Clark, causality and a world are in principle understandable with or without God.

or:

For him, science is either a praxis of pure techne that works, who knows why? or a sinister activity by which men conspire to prove that God does not exist.

I get the sense that this blog author may be aware of his disagreements with Van Til and may be reading some negation of Van Til (though not necessarily Clark's own negation of Van Til) into Clark.

The first example he gave sounds almost precisely like an inversion of something Van Til wrote, and I would be unsurprised to discover that the latter was as well (though I don't recall Van Til's relevant comment off-hand).

In fact, Clark's central thesis of the book appears (at least to me) to be that while science may provide useful information, useful information is not the same as absolute truth.

The application, of course, is that we need the propositional truth of Scripture, and it is accepting the presupposition of Scripture's divine authority and reliability that gives us truth.

The fallibility of non-presuppositional science is variously demonstrated by Clark using the example of the paradox of motion, the problem of optical illusions, and the like. This, Clark teaches, should demonstrate the fraility of science to the reasonable person for the purpose of obtaining certain truth, as opposed to merely useful knowledge.

Indeed, it is only by accepting the presuppositional truth expressed, for example, in Genesis 1:28 that a proof of God's existence becomes possible.

It is there that Clark and Van Til really seem to part ways, with Van Til appearing to suggest that the presuppositions themselves can be proved, whereas Clark rather clearly argues that they must be accepted on faith.

But I may be misunderstanding Van Til. It's not easy to pin down a precise epistemology of Van Til, although he would normally be considerd a presuppositionalist.

The following is a quick example:

I believe in God now because unless I have Him as the All-Conditioner, life is Chaos.

- Van Til, from "Why I believe in God"

There are two major problems with this apology
1) It's not from Scripture: it's not exegetical
2) The term "Chaos" only makes sense if one assumes a Theistic world-view, but the apology is phrased as though it is the reason for the world-view

Some might take my comments above to suggest that I do not believe that at least some of the world appears chaotic to at least some men. Nevertheless, it does not appear chaotic to me, but that's because I look at it through the goggles of Reformed Theology.

Without the knowledge that comes with those goggles, how would the world appear? It depends on the goggles one is wearing. To the naturalist atheist, it appears chaotic, but that appearance of chaos itself implies the existence of order in order to define chaos.

Seeing order in the world is the result of one's presuppositions, and it is important to recognize them as presuppositions, and not claim to have arrived those presuppositions through reason.

One might think that this means that, to avoid seeing the world as chaotic, one must have the presuppositions of a theist. This is not quite precies. Many atheists see only part of the world as chaotic and all men have the knowledge of God written in their hearts (i.e. it may be a hidden presupposition, even for atheists, that there is a god).

The problem with Van Til's apologetic is that the logical flow ought to be from presupposition to conclusion. That is to say:

A => B

But one cannot validly invert the logical implication such that one then concludes

NotB => notA

Indeed, I will readily agree that to the consistent atheist the world is chaotic. He has to borrow from the Reformed worldview for the world not to appear chaotic. After all, there is no god but God, Christians are the only theists. Furthermore, only Reformed Christians consistently hold to a worldview that includes God. After all "open theists," for example, would be expected to have a similar perspective to atheists, if they were consistent. It is only in the Reformed view that God gives meaning to all of life, down to the most minute detail.

Thus, I can affirm that not just theism, but the Christian God (as explained by Reformed Theology) must be presupposed for life not to appear chaotic.

Someone will say that this appears to agree with what Van Til said, except he stated it inverted. I would respond that inversion is one way to put it, but I think a better way to put it is that, as an apology, it is circular. One will not seek to avoid viewing life as chaotic without the presuppositions. In other words, the conclusion is also the premise.

But all that is an aside. Van Til's apology is not derived from Scripture - that's its biggest weakness. Van Til's apology purports NOT to use God as a presupposition, but a desire for lack of chaos. He says I believe because of the alternative, but he would not even know the alternative if he did not believe.

In short, Van Til's apologetic is phrased as though it is based on reason. However, as noted above, it contains a circularity. The escape from circularity would be to acknowledge his presuppositions, identify them as presuppositions, and not seek to "prove" the presuppositions.

-Turretinfan

P.S. At TJH's request (here), here is a link to his post (here). I'm not sure what there is to "double-check," but the reader can certainly verify that I have quoted accurately from TJH's blog, if that was ever in doubt. And, of course, TJH, your comments here would certainly be valued.

Response Regarding Philsophical Language

Response Regarding Philsophical Language

Godismyjudge, some time ago, had responded to my complaint that "libertarian free will" defines the issue only in philosophical terms, and not in terms of ordinary speech. In contrast, Calvinism describes free will in easily understood, ready words of plain English according to their accepted usage.

Godismyjudge writes:

It seems you are reluctant to use philosophical terms to define freewill.

I respond:

It's not that I'm reluctant to use philosophical terms. It's just that if the philosophical terms are to have any use, they must relate back to the real world. In order for that to occur, the terms have to have meaning.

Godismyjudge writes:

This appears to me to be a question of method. I think we have the same goal, clarity. But we are going about clarifying in different ways. I want to use precise, analytical terms, define things and then define the components. You want to use common everyday language.

I respond:

The problem is that when you begin, middle, and end with introspective philosophical jargon without tying back into the real world, you might as well have done a Sodoku puzzle, because the result will have as much to do with theology as such a puzzle does.

Godismyjudge:

Perhaps you take exception to my skills a using philosophical language (as opposed to the overall method). That would be understandable.

I respond:

No, that's not necessarily it. I'm more than a little concerned that some authors, like William Lane Craig, use philosophical jargon to obscure their position. When I read other of the few LFW authors who bother to try to study the matter seriously, I see the same problems. And I'm concerned that it's not always intentional.

Philosophical terms are symbols: they represent something. But many LFW philosophers appear to get lost in the symbols, until they forget what they are supposed to represent. That's why definitions, more definitions, and return to definitions are important if we are going to employ the tools of philosophy to explain a position.

Godismyjudge writes:

I have a hard time seeing you as someone that takes exception at using philosophy to clarify. Particularly since your namesake was a philosophy professor.

I respond:

I would simply disagree that tendency of philosophy is necessarily to clarify. Oftentimes philosophy befuddles more than it clarifies.

Godismyjudge:

In general, Calvinism does not have mass appeal, but it has garnered the support of many of the intellectual elite in Christianity. Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Turretin and Edwards are well known as scholars of the highest caliber in Christian community with significant philosophical training and they share similar views on predestination and freedom. To me, that's what makes Calvinism interesting.

I respond:

I'm not going to debate the mass appeal topic. I do think that the more one studies the Bible, the more Calvinistic one will become, because Calvinism is simply a restatement of the truth of Scripture. I don't necessarily put much stock in whether Calvin or the others were clever men. Even the uneducated Bunyan was a marvelously eloquent Calvinist preacher who simply studied the Bible.

Godismyjudge wrote:

Beyond my surprise at your approach, perhaps it would be helpful if I explained why I think a philosophical method is helpful. First off we are trying to define freewill. The term autexousiou itself originated from Platonic philosophers and is not found in the New Testament. The term was introduced into Christianity I believe by Justin Martyr. (to my knowledge) It was introduce in a debate against Stoic philosophers, Justin being schooled in Platonic philosophy. So the term comes to us with philosophical roots and it seems appropriate to use philosophical methods to understand it.

I respond:

I don't completely agree with your history. The freewill/predestination debate was alive and well in Josephus' day, with the Pharisees (among which Paul numbered himself) apparently taking the compatibilist view and the Saducees taking the view of complete human autonomy. Whether Justin borrowed the term from Platonists or recast the term in Christian light, who knows. In any event, if we wanted to view the term etymologically, we could go back and examing the writings of Plato and the Platonists, as well as Justin's own use of the word.

I don't think that such an investigation would be enormously helpful. What is more important is whether the term corresponds to the truth of Scriptures.

Godismyjudge writes:

Second, the specific context in which are trying to understand freewill is its compatibility with the foreknowledge of God. This is an abstract subject to say the least and it's not one that comes up in everyday conversation. So it's not surprising that a technical approach to defining terms is preferable to common usage meanings derived from other contexts.

I respond:

The issue of compatability may not come up in everyday conversation. Neither does the repair of Bible bindings. Nevertheless, if a bookbinder presented the process using only technical jargon, his comments would be useless. The bookbinder needs to explain things in terms that correspond to reality. Perhaps by "medium" the bookbinder may be referring to the fact that the Bible is paper bound in leather, perhaps he means that the Bible is stitched with catgut. Who knows? Until, of course, the bookbinder explains his terms.

Godismyjudge writes:

Third, philosophies role in general is to explain things. As Christians we start from ground truth: the Scriptures. But the bible isn't a textbook on how foreknowledge and freewill fit together. Philosophy is the method used to reconcile truths we accept by faith.

I respond:
Philosophy has the role of exploring things, more than explaining them. We do start from the truth of Scripture, and we build on that with reasoning. The Bible is not a textbook, but there are nevertheless discussions on the compatibility between human agency and divine predetermination. The questions that need to be asked have Biblical answers. Furthermore, when we decide what is man's will - we can look to the Bible for information to answer that question. Finally, when someone presents a definition of "free will," we can analyze it to see whether it has internal consistency, common sense consistency, and Scriptural consistency.

Godismyjudge writes:

Fourth, most Calvinist/Arminian debates are full of equivocation, context dropping, straw man arguments and general confusion. As a result they tend to generate more heat than light. Using common speech, agreement or event mutual understanding has not been obtained. To avoid equivocation, careful definitions must be put forward and stuck to. Even if agreement cannot be reached via philosophy, perhaps just understanding where the other guy is coming from would help.

I respond:

Definitions are certainly important to avoid equivocation, but then again, that's also what we have each other for. If I begin to equivocate, I trust you will call me on it. I will certainly try to do the same for you. But your response hits the nail on the head, to a large degree. We need definitions.

And I have asked you for a definition of the philosophical term "free will," from the LFW perspective. Yet most, if not all, of the responses I have received from you have employed philosophical jargon, which in turn must be defined, and so forth, ad infinitum with result being that ultimately no definition is provided, but only a chain of caveats.

Godismyjudge writes:

This question of method really pauses the debate. I am not sure how to move foreword. You have asked what I mean by freewill and necessity. I have provided "common speech" definitions (the ability to do otherwise and "cannot be otherwise") but you request more.

I respond:

These definitions, however, either do not stand up to intellectual scrutiny (if pushed one way) or are adoptable with ease by any Calvinist (if pushed another way). For example, those definitions are not good English, because they do not specify the "than" that an "otherwise" requires.

Of course, what I am pushing you towards by pointing out the inconsistencies and mistakes in some of the definitions, and what your recent posts seem to have acknowledged, is that LFW is actually not about freedom and necessity. It is about whether man has the final role in deciding his future, or whether God has the final role in deciding man's future.

Godismyjudge writes:

I provided details via Freddoso, but his method is philosophical. I can't go deeper without using a philosophical method. On the other hand you won't use a philosophical method to define freewill.

I respond:

I think this issue may mostly be moot in view of our discussion in the meantime.

Godismyjudge writes:

I don't know if choice is a physical reaction or if it has it's origin in an immaterial soul. I have no way of determining if your use of testing and interacting with machines is equivocating. I don't know if we agree or disagree on the definition of freewill.

I respond:

Hopefully these issues are becoming more clear as we progress.

Godismyjudge writes:

I also know not to touch the subject of then sense in which the future "is" using common speech. It's not a subject that comes up in common speech.

I respond:

Ah, but it is. After all, tomorrow will be another day.

-Turretinfan

Theoretical Sufficiency?

Theoretical Sufficiency?

"Enough for as many worlds of men as there are men in the world."

Some Reformed Christians hold to a view that is essentially that Christ's blood was theoretically sufficient for all of humanity. This view lacks Biblical support.

I came across this view recently in reading commentaries on 1 Peter 2:1. Compare Gill's thoughtful commentary, with Henry's off-handed remarks on the same verse:

not the Lord Jesus Christ, but God the Father; for the word κυριος is not here used, which always is where Christ is spoken of as the Lord, but δεσποτης; and which is expressive of the power which masters have over their servants (i), and which God has over all mankind; and wherever this word is elsewhere used, it is spoken of God the Father, whenever applied to a divine person, as in Luke 2:29 and especially this appears to be the sense, from the parallel text in Jude 1:4 where the Lord God denied by those men is manifestly distinguished from our Lord Jesus Christ, and by whom these persons are said to be bought: the meaning is not that they were redeemed by the blood of Christ, for Christ is not intended; and besides, whenever redemption by Christ is spoken of, the price is usually mentioned, or some circumstance or another which fully determines the sense; see Acts 20:28 whereas here is not the least hint of anything of this kind: add to this, that such who are redeemed by Christ are the elect of God only, the people of Christ, his sheep and friends, and church, and who are never left to deny him so as to perish eternally; for could such be lost, or deceive, or be deceived finally and totally by damnable heresies, and bring on themselves swift destruction, Christ's purchase would be in vain, and the ransom price be paid for nought; but the word "bought" regards temporal mercies and deliverance, which these men enjoyed, and is used as an aggravation of their sin in denying the Lord; both by words, delivering out such tenets as are derogatory to the glory of the divine perfections, and which deny one or other of them, and of his purposes, providence, promises, and truths; and by works, turning the doctrine of the grace of God into lasciviousness, being disobedient and reprobate to every good work; that they should act this part against the Lord who had made them, and upheld them in their beings and took care of them in his providence, and had followed them with goodness and mercy all the days of their lives; just as Moses aggravates the ingratitude of the Jews in Deuteronomy 32:6 from whence this phrase is borrowed, and to which it manifestly refers: "do ye thus requite the Lord, O foolish people and unwise! is not he thy Father that hath bought thee? hath he not made thee, and established thee?" nor is this the only place the apostle refers to in this chapter, see 2 Peter 2:12 compared with Deuteronomy 32:5 and it is to be observed, that the persons he writes to were Jews, who were called the people the Lord had redeemed and purchased, Exodus 15:13 and so were the first false teachers that rose up among them; and therefore this phrase is very applicable to them:

The above is Gill's commentary on the verse. Compare Matthew Henry's short excursis on the verse:

They reject and refuse to hear and learn of the great teacher sent from God, though he is the only Saviour and Redeemer of men, who paid a price sufficient to redeem as many worlds of sinners as there are sinners in the world.

The statement that Christ "paid a price sufficient to redeem as many worlds of sinners as there are sinners in the world" makes for a catchy phrase from the pulpit, but does not find support in Scripture. Instead, in Scripture we see much more precision in the counting of payment (Cf. Matthew 5:26 and Luke 12:59) and even so when the payment is a sacrifice (Cf. Exodus 23:18, Exodus 29:34, and Leviticus 19:6).

Consider also the Lord's disgust with "vain oblations" (Isaiah 1:13).

So then, shall we imagine that even one drop of Christ's blood was spilled in vain, or that Christ suffered any more than precisely the amount necessary to save His people?

After all, if God can ordain the army of Babylon so that every arrow counts:

Jeremiah 50:9 For, lo, I will raise and cause to come up against Babylon an assembly of great nations from the north country: and they shall set themselves in array against her; from thence she shall be taken: their arrows shall be as of a mighty expert man; none shall return in vain.

Even so must the sacrifice of Christ be of even more well-targeted efficacy.

It is only with that understanding that we can truly affirm what Paul preaches, namely:

Galatians 2:21 I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.

Christ's death had no measure of vanity, and there is no reason to suppose from Scripture that it was anything other than the perfect sacrifice.

He is the fulfilment of this sacrifice:

Leviticus 19:5-8
5And if ye offer a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the LORD, ye shall offer it at your own will. 6It shall be eaten the same day ye offer it, and on the morrow: and if ought remain until the third day, it shall be burnt in the fire. 7And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is abominable; it shall not be accepted. 8Therefore every one that eateth it shall bear his iniquity, because he hath profaned the hallowed thing of the LORD: and that soul shall be cut off from among his people.

And likewise, he is the Manna from heaven, which was precisely sufficient for the needs of the people (see Exodus 16).

And we need not rely only on external texts, the text itself does not hint at mere hypothetical sufficiency: the word for bought used here is αγορασαντα. It's an aorist active participle. It does not say that a sufficient price was paid to purchase them, it say they were bought. Whether Gill's explanation above is correct, or whether Peter is relating their claim, there is nothing hypothetical about the word that is used here.

And I think that if Matthew Henry had studied the verse in more depth he would no doubt have come to the same conclusion.

-Turretinfan

A Quick Look at the Complex Definition of LFW

A Quick Look at the Complex Definition of LFW

This post may be deleted shortly. It is intended to serve as the second part of my previous "quick look" post at Godismyjudge's definition of libertarian free will (link here to that previous post).

Godismyjudge had proposed a simple and complex definition of libertarian free will. He seems to believe that the two definitions are "the same." I cannot fully agree with him. The complex definition does not follow from the simple definition. It is more detailed, and those details do not flow deductively from the simple definition.

In the previous quick look post, we saw that the simple definition is not harmonious with synergist thought, but more importantly that as it stands a Calvinist could uncompromisingly agree that man is a free agent under the simple definition.

The complext definition attempts to more precisely define the boundaries of what is being discussed. Let us see whether it brings harmony to the definition.

Complex Definition of LFW (by Godismyjudge):

An agent has libertarian freewill if and only if what the agent will do is not, causally, logically, or accidentally necessary, but rather the alternative is within the agent's power and the agent is able to do otherwise that [sic] what he will do.

This definition introduces a number of problems that need to be resolved. Some of them Godismyjudge attempted to address, and we will see his comments on those points, as we proceed. The most obvious problem is the apparent typo of the fifth from last word. As I'm fairly confident that Godismyjudge meant "than," I'll simply correct the typo in the analysis that follows.

We'll break the definition into phrases for easier analysis:

1. An agent has libertarian freewill

2. if and only if

3. what the agent will do is not,

a) causally,
b) logically, or
c) accidentally necessary,

4) but rather

5) the alternative is within the agent's power

6) and

7) the agent is able to do otherwise than what he will do.

Phrase (1) is the same as line (1) from the simple definition, and the same analysis applies: "This line is understandable. It is an assertion about a present state of the agent."

Phrase (2) is also the same as line (2) from the simple definition, and the same analysis enures: "This line is also understandable. A definition is about to follow."

For the moment we will skip over phrases (3) to (6).

Phrase (7) is the same as lines (3) to (4) of the simple, definition, and the same analysis attaches: "[Line 3] is mostly understandable. It is a statement about a present ability to do something, where the something is defined negatively, and we are waiting for that something. ... [Line 4] by itself is understandable. What is being described is a future action of the agent. The lack of harmony appears when we combine 3 and 4 in view of 1. That is to say, when we speak of a present quality that depends on a comparison between the present and the future. ... I call these a lack of harmony, not because the definition itself is incoherent, but because these results do not harmonize with a non-compatibilist mentality."

Of the skipped phrases, we will now turn to phrase (5).

Phrase (5) states, "the alternative is (present tense) within the agent's power." This statement makes one thing clear. Whatever the alternative may be, it is something presently within the agent's power. The bigger question is what "power" means. Does it mean physical ability? That's the usual sense that "power" has. Does it mean mental ability? That's the usual figurative sense that "power" has. Either way, compatablists agree that man has the mental and physical ability to do things he is not currently doing: things that are alternatives to the reality of history. Another sense would be legal permission, and again, in most cases men also have legal permission to do other things than those that they actual do. As noted above, this means that what has been defined is not something that Calvinists and LFW advocates disagree about.

The "and" in phrase (6) is not completely clear. Perhaps Godismyjudge will clarify whether it is intended conjunctively or appositively. In other words is phrase (5) supposed to be in addition to phrase (7) or is it supposed to be another way of expressing phrase (7)? Under either sense, there may be new conflict between (5) and (7), because they appear to overlap, but are not identical. Perhaps Godismyjudge just means that we should view phrase (6) as expressing a logical "union" between (5) and (7). Godismyjudge, please clarify if this is not intended.

The "but rather" in phrase (4) has a similar ambiguity. It appears that it is intended as a logical "union" between the negatively worded phrase (3) and the union of (5) and (7). Godismyjudge, please clarify if this is not intended.

With those understandings, the only chance that Godismyjudge would appear to have, in rescuing the definition from being completely acceptable to compatablism, is the third phrase of the complex definition. Before we get there, though, we should note that Godismyjudge has provided a proposed definition of "power."

Godismyjudge wrote:

Positively
It is with[in] the agent['s] power to perform or refrain from performing an action

Negatively
No other agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed. If another agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed, then the event is not within the agent's power.

This definition raises more questions than answers. The positive definition defines the word using the word, and thus appears at best to be an attempt to define by example. In this case, the example appears to be with respect to a meta-act. A meta-act is an act before the act of interest. In this case, the act of interest is the second item, which is preceded by the act of choosing to perform or refrain from the act. This sense is philosophically amusing, because it attempts to resolve the definitional problem by leapfrogging. The act is free if it is the result of choice. But then the choice itself may not be free, because it may not be the result of choice. Or, if it is, then the choice that preceded that one may not be free. And, of course, with any human being there is going to be a first choice by the human that cannot find a previous choice to leap-frog. And once that one is not free, the lack of freedom ripples back along the chain of choices. If anyone cannot see this, please feel free to ask how this follows, and I will be happy to provide a more detailed explanation.

That's a big reason not to attempt to evade the issue by appealing to a previous choice.

But suppose that this leap-frogging problem could be avoided, for the sake of the argument. If so, it just means that if the act is the result of a choice, it is free. If so, then of course compatibilists would simply refer to this power as the power of choice.

The second half of the definition raises further issues. It states: "No other agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed. If another agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed, then the event is not within the agent's power." This part of the definition could create problems for the compatibilist, and thus provides the best basis we see so far for a real definition of LFW that distinguishes the LFW position from the compatibilist position.

This definition appears to suggest that the "power" in question is predetermination, and that only one agent can predetermine any event. There are two main problems with this definition.

1) The first problem is a Biblical problem, but this objection should wait, as we are still working on the definitions. Once Godismyjudge has locked onto a definition that is clearly not acceptable, then we should debate whether the LFW position or the compatiblist position is correct.

2) The second problem is that this sense of "power" meaning that the agent is the sole predeterminer of the event is far from the ordinary sense of the term. It does not have the support of common sense, or common parlance. As long as this is acknowledged, it's not a big problem. But for clarity I would suggest that we call it by a name that acknowledges that it has a special meaning, such as PWR or something like.

In view of those problems, it is not clear whether Godismyjudge is willing to accept such a definition of power. If so, at least that part of the definition could provide a basis for a concise definition of LFW that we could reasonably debate. If not, we will need to continue on to the third phrase.

Phrase (3) has three parts.

3. what the agent will do is not,

a) causally,
b) logically, or
c) accidentally necessary,

A quick kill of this phrase would be to apply Godismyjudge's previous criticism that the future does not exist to the introductory portion of the phrase. That is to say that according to Godismyjudge's definitions, the future does not exist. Accordingly, it cannot have any other attributes, such as necessity or freedom. In that sense (in the sense that the future does not exist, because it is not occurring), it is always the case that what the future is not, and consequently does not have any attributes. Thus, for this phrase to have meaning, the earlier the-future-does-not-exist position must be abandoned. Godismyjudge, please clarify if this is not intended.

Continuing under the presumption that the phrase has meaning, there is still conflict when a future event is said to have attributes in the present. Again, we will try to find a way to understand the phrase to avoid this contradiction. As best understood, the phrase is attempting to convey the idea that the future event will not occur as a result of the various types of necessity. Godismyjudge, please clarify if this is not intended.

A final difficulty is trying to figure out what the various kinds of necessity mean. Here Godismyjudge has provided some explanation, if not precisely definitions:

Causality

Positively
Choices are a result of agent causation
Agent Causation: Some events are caused, not by events, but rather personnel [sic] agents.

Negatively
Choices are not the result of a sufficient cause
Sufficient cause: Given the circumstances a sufficient cause always produces its effect, unless impeded by agent causation. Sufficient causes determine events. An event (E) is causally determined if some other event (E2) beyond the agent's control has already occurred, where the state of affairs that E has occurred and E2 does not occur is causally impossible. If an event is causally determined, it's casually necessary.

The obvious error here is the typo, which I'm confident was intended to read "personal."

The second error is that positive presentation is some vague as to be acceptable to everyone. Even hard determinists (non-compatabilist deniers of free will) agree that personal agents can be causes.

There are a significant number of problems with the negative presentation. The biggest of these problems surrounds the use of the term "sufficient cause."

Godismyjudge attempts to define sufficient cause, but the definition is not fully intelligible.

Let's examine it carefully: "Given the circumstances a sufficient cause always produces its effect, unless impeded by agent causation. Sufficient causes determine events. An event (E) is causally determined if some other event (E2) beyond the agent's control has already occurred, where the state of affairs that E has occurred and E2 does not occur is causally impossible. If an event is causally determined, it's casually necessary."

At first glance, this appears to be a heavily bootstrapped (self-referential) definition. Nevertheless, let's treat the first two sentences as examples.

Example 1: "Given the circumstances a sufficient cause always produces its effect, unless impeded by agent causation."

There are number of problems with this definition by example. First, it is unclear what causes are connected with what effects. Second it is unclear what is to be included within circumstances. Finally it is unclear in what a cause can be "impeded." Once these ambiguities were removed, it appears that what is being stated is that a sufficient cause is a cause that has an expected (but fallible) effect, with the fallibility due either to circumstances or the actions of agents (which are evidentally not part of the circumstances).

Example 2: "Sufficient causes determine events." This seems to suggest that sufficient causes are a subset of effecient causes, with (one would think) agent causes being the other subset of efficient causes.

Example 3: "An event (E) is causally determined if some other event (E2) beyond the agent's control has already occurred, where the state of affairs that E has occurred and E2 does not occur is causally impossible."

Perhaps this item ought not to be viewed as an example of sufficient causality, but of causal determination. In any event, it has several problems.

First, the exception that E2 (which has already occurred) is beyond the agent's control is strange. The past is always beyond any agent's control.

Furthermore, whether or not event E2 was beyond the agent's control does not have any bearing on the relationship between E and E2. At least, there is no reason to suppose that it does.

Finally, the term "causally impossible" in the phrase "where the state of affairs that E has occurred and E2 does not occur is causally impossible," is unclear. Nevertheless, we know that God is capable of causing any state of affairs, except the logically impossible. Therefore, "causally impossible" may simply reduce to "logically impossible."

Additionally, it is logically impossible that there would be a state of events in which God would know X will happen at time 2, and then E2 would be something other than X. Also recall that God has exhaustive knowledge of the future. Thus, under this definition, all of history is "causally determined," which would appear to be out of harmony with LFW thought.

Next we will examine the second set of explanations:

Logic

Positively
considering everything prior to the event, the event is logically possible

Negatively
nothing prior to the event is logically incompatible with the event
If something prior to the event is logically incompatible with the alternative event, the event is logically necessary.

There's nothing particularly wrong with this definition. However, because God's knowledge of the future is exhaustive, and because that knowledge is as good as existing prior to the event (see my stone diary post linked here), nothing besides what actually will happen is logically possible, because it is logically incompatible with God's prior knowledge. Thus, again, we see that this definition is not really harmonious with LFW thought.

Let us then turn to the third area of "accidental necessity."

Accidental necessity

Positively
Given A will occur at T3, prior to T3, nonA is possible at T3

Negatively
Given A will occur at T3, nothing prior to T3 renders nonA impossible
If something prior to T3 renders nonA impossible, A is accidentally necessary

This definition has explanation has a couple of quirks.

The first is the logical fallacy of stating (in the Positive statement) that it is a given that A will occur at T3, and yet that nonA is possible at T3. This fallacy is a violation of the law of the excluded middle.

The second is the statement that A will happen at T3, but that nonA is not rendered impossible by anything prior to T3. This is simply a denial that A is caused to be. If A is caused to be, then nonA is rendered impossible by the cause.

The idea of things being uncaused is both contrary to the Bible, and to common sense. Nevertheless, such a lemma may provide additional basis for a concise statement of LFW that distinguishes the LFW position of Godismyjudge from a Calvinistic view.

Finally, Godismyjudge offered up an explanation apparently designed to help link the various senses discussed above.

Temporal transition
Before the event, the agent is able to cause or not cause the event.
At the time of the event (T2) the agent is:
1) able to cease from causing the event at a subsequent time (T>T2)
2) in a divided sense (excuding the event), able to cause the alternative event (T=T2)
3) in a compound sense, unable to cause the alternative event (T=T2)
Why is the relevant sense of freedom temporally before the event? Because causation works forward in time. If an agent at T2 cause an effect which is produced at T3, in effect the event at T3 is necessary in the tautological sense that it is what it is. But it's not necessary in the relevant sense: it had to be what it is.

This explanation also raises several issues.

The first line states: "Before the event, the agent is able to cause or not cause the event." Nevertheless, if the event occurs and the agent causes it, and not everything the agent does causes the event, then the agent clearly was able both to cause and not to cause the event, and the agent did both. However, the event is the agent doing somthing. And the agent causing the event appears to be a meta-deed. See above regarding the leap-frogging problem associated with meta-choice. Finally, if we eliminate the meta-deed aspect, the result is absurd, see above regarding the simple definition.

The second line states: "At the time of the event (T2) the agent is:1) able to cease from causing the event at a subsequent time (T>T2)2) in a divided sense (excuding the event), able to cause the alternative event (T=T2)3) in a compound sense, unable to cause the alternative event (T=T2)." Item (1) is yet a further meta-deed problem, and really has no place in the discussion. (2) creates a problem of self-contradiction, because it impossible to define "the alternative" in a divided sense that excludes the event. Without knowing the event, we cannot know what the alternative is. (2), however, provides an interesting alternative to the "successive" definitions of LFW, because it address man at the time of the act. Finally, (3) does not distinguish LFW from compatabilism.

Godismyjudge's explanation continues: "Why is the relevant sense of freedom temporally before the event? Because causation works forward in time. " This means that (2) in the paragraph above is not viewed by Godismyjudge as the relevant freedom. That's certainly puzzling, because I've seen that presented as the relevant freedom (I think by Godismyjudge) on previous occasions.

Nevertheless, as noted above, the "before the event" freedom has been discussed in most of the discussion above. Godismyjudge, please clarify that (2) in the paragraph two paragraphs above is NOT the relevant kind of freedom, in your point of view.

Godismyjudge's explanation concludes: "If an agent at T2 cause an effect which is produced at T3, in effect the event at T3 is necessary in the tautological sense that it is what it is. But it's not necessary in the relevant sense: it had to be what it is. " This explanation is perhaps the clearest and best of Godismyjudge's explanations of the previous-freedom view. The main objections to this definition of freedom are Biblical objections and objections from common sense.

I will await Godismyjudge's response.

Hopefully that response will identify which thesis Godismyjudge is willing to advocate:

I. The Power-based discrimantor:

"No other agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed. If another agent or event determines that the action in question is performed or not performed, then the event is not within the agent's power."

II. The Accident-based discrimantor:

"Given A will occur at T3, nothing prior to T3 renders nonA impossible. If something prior to T3 renders nonA impossible, A is accidentally necessary."

III. The Simultaneous discrinator:
"2) in a divided sense (excuding the event), able to cause the alternative event (T=T2)"

and/or

IV. The Had-to-be discriminator:
"If an agent at T2 cause an effect which is produced at T3, in effect the event at T3 is necessary in the tautological sense that it is what it is. But it's not necessary in the relevant sense: it had to be what it is."

I suspect that any of I, II, or IV would be acceptable to Godismyjudge as being representative of different aspects of LFW. My suggestion for how we should proceed forward is to pick one of those items as the position, and then we can debate that particular definition.

-Turretinfan

A response to GNRHead

A Response and Challenge to GNRHead

A internet poster named William, going by the handle GNRHead, has posted a series of videos on the internet, in which he defends Roman Catholic theology, with an emphasis on patristic issues. This is a response to his most recent video here (link here, warning, near profanity employed).

I'm not a big fan of the video format, because it is a slow format, particular if a conversation speed of delivery is used.

As GNRHead is discovering, there are many kinds of apologetics out there on the internet, including vile, abusive apologetics. I am sorry that he has been a recipient of those attacks. I also appreciate his apparently sincere belief that the Early Church Fathers held to Roman Catholic doctrines.

On the other hand, I firmly disagree.

Let me provide a single example, and permit GNRHead decide whether he would like to continue the interaction.

GNRHead states that "every single early church father agrees that Peter was the rock" in Matthew 16:18. That's simply not true.

In my own research, every time before the third century that an Early Church Father explains a metaphorical use of the term "Rock" they make that refer to Christ, not Peter.

Likewise, in the Shepherd of Hermas, the rock is Christ, the tower is the church, and the tower is built upon the rock.

Indeed, the first time an "Early Church Father" that might be taken to support the view you suggest is Tertullian in his letter against Marcion, some time around the the turn of the 3rd century.

Yet even Tertullian in later writing comments that Peter was called Peter in order to typify Christ, the Rock. And we look back more carefully at what Tertullian wrote in the single passage where Tertullian makes the connection, you will see that Tertullian writes not that Peter was the rock, but that Peter was called the rock.

Nevertheless, a further time Tertullian appears to call Peter the rock, again against Marcion.

In addition to that Hippolytus (a Bishop of Rome, though not not - according to the modern RCC, a pope, but an anti-pope), in his Discourse on the Holy Theophany, makes two references that could be taken to mean that Peter was the rock. He was writing in the first half of the 3rd century.

Then Cyprian applies the term rock to Peter, but not just to Peter but to all the bishops of the Church. Firmillian, in contrast, applied the term only to Peter, and mocked Stephen for claiming to sit in the chair of Peter. Both would have been writing toward the middle of the third century.

If you are reckoning Early Church Fathers as those before the council of Nicea, I wonder what makes you think that "all" of them held your view: the vast majority make no reference at all to the subject, and the few who mention it do so in very few places.

So here's the challenge to you:

Back up your claim that "every single early church father agrees that Peter was the rock" and then reconcile that with Augustine, who explicitly stated that it was mistaken to say that Peter was the rock.

Finally, note that even Trent does not have your back. After all Trent writes:

"For which cause, this council has thought good, that the Symbol of faith which the holy Roman Church makes use of,--as being that principle wherein all who profess the faith of Christ necessarily agree, and that firm and alone foundation against which the gates of hell shall never prevail,--be expressed in the very same words in which it is read in all the churches."

Faith, not Peter, is described as being the foundation by Trent, which if you are to remain RCC, you must be bound to accept as true.

What will it be then? Is Peter or Faith in Christ the Rock in Matthew 16:18?

-Turretinfan

Quick Challenge on the Atonement

Quick Challenge on the Atonement

(I'm in the middle of responding to Godismyjudge's last comment, that included a complex definition of LFW, this little challenge shouldn't be a big diversion from that.)

Here's the challenge, if you believe that this verse:

1 John 2:2 And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.

means that the atonement is universal, i.e. that it was made for the sins of each and every person that ever was or ever will be (excluding, presumably, Christ himself since he was sinless).

If that is you:

1) What was the purpose in God's doing so? What did He hope to accomplish by propitiating universally?

2) Does Scripture state that purpose? If so, where does it state that purpose?

3) Will God accomplish that purpose? If not, why not? Is the answer to "why not" a conflicting purpose?

4) And does the Gospel have the same purpose as the universal propitiation?

Please try to answer the three questions above before continuing to the last section.

Now, if your answers were:

1) To save everyone.

2) Yes.

2 Peter 3:9

3) No. God wants man to have free will. Yes.

4) Yes.


If those were your answers to the questions, then let me ask you this final question:

Given this:

Luke 11:17 But he, knowing their thoughts, said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth.

Matthew 12:25 And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand:

Mark 3:25 And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.

And Given this:

Isaiah 55:11 So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.

How can it be that God's own will for humanity is divided against itself, and how can the Gospel fail to accomplish what God pleases?

-Turretinfan

Torching of the Text?

Torching of the Text?

A dubious argument in favor of the received text commented upon, with several objections thereto readily discarded.

Mr. Kurschner recently wrote a follow-up article (link is here) to an early article he had written (my response to that article is linked here) against the King James Version Only crowd. This presnt article of Mr. Kurschner's is stronger than the last, but still deserves some correction, and I still want to encourage Mr. Kurschner to address the easier topic of the alleged Scriptural basis for the KJVO movement.

In his article, Kurschner continues to perpetuate a fundamental misunderstanding of the textual scenario, writing: "In a recent article, I explained the historical facts that before the fourth century there were no distinct Byzantine readings in any Greek MSS of the papyri, majuscules, and other versions as well that would give for us a suggestion that the Byzantine textual family (or text-type) existed during that time."

Notice that the way this is worded, two possible views of the alleged historical facts are possible: first, that there are early Byzantine readings, but just not enough to suggest an early Byzantine textual family, and second that there are no early Byzantine readings, and thus no reason to suppose an early Byzantine textual family.

Mr. Kurschner continues, however, thereby eliminating the ambiguity: "Further, the 800-pound gorilla is that there are no Byzantine texts or distinct readings used in the voluminous writings of any early church fathers for the first 300 years of church history!" And there Mr. Kurschner is plainly wrong. The facts are against him.

Kurchner claims that no distinctively Byzantine readings are found in early texts. Rather than just assert that he is incorrect, I will refer the reader to Barbara Aland's "New Testament Textual Criticism, Exegesis and Early Church History: a discussion of methods," pages 16-17, and to the references cited therein, including Kurt Aland and B.M. Metzger, whose fame in the modern textual community should silence any fan of modern textual criticism. The following website, without citation, identifies some particular papyri that are alleged to contain Byzantine readings, if one would rather forgo buying a book.

Nevertheless, the generally accepted fact is that are early distinctive Byzantine readings, unless one automatically denies that a reading is distinctively Byzantine if it is found in any manuscript outside the Byzantine text-type.

Accordingly, the 800 lb. gorilla turns on its creator. If the absence of such readings was supposed to disprove the early presence of the Byzantine text-form, so much more does the verified presence of them rebut that argument.

But Mr. Kurschner is not content to stop there. He continues: "The Ante-Nicene fathers cited all the text-types, except the Byzantine." Considering that Mr. Kurschner got the issue of manuscript support wrong, I would like to see Mr. Kurschner's evidence for this claim, before accepting it as fact. It is somewhat similar to Hort's claim (although as I recall, Hort merely asserted that they failed to quote distinctive Byzantine readings). In any event, as we know, few of the writings of the Ante-Nicene fathers have been preserved, the authenticity of many of the Ante-Nicean fathers' writings are in question, and (the autographs of the Ante-Nicean Fathers having perished, and in some case even the original language copies have perished as well) the Ante-Nicean Fathers are also beset by various textual critical issues in themselves. I wonder whether Mr. Kurschner believes that the extent copies of any of the Ante-Nicean Fathers date from before the 9th century, and - if so - which ones and how many?

Mr. Kurschner continues on even further, stating: "I have responded with asking if the Byzantine text was so "highly valuable that they wore out," then why do we find all of the early church fathers for 300 years using other texts such as the Alexandrian text-type, mix-types, etc., but absolutely no Byzantine texts?"

There are two responses: first "distinct" Byzantine readings are much fewer than Byzantine readings in general. There is plenty of evidence of Byzantine readings in the early church fathers, just not evidence of the "distinct" Byzantine readings. Second, the number of early church father writings is relatively small, is not well preserved, and is not necessarily authentic or representative.

Furthermore, they were highly valuable to scribes who devoted themselves to copying, not to the "fathers" who devoted themselves to teaching. It's not like the "fathers" could log on to Amazon.com (R) and download a copy of the Byzantine text-form to their Palm Pilots (R). They had to work with what they had, and - in some cases - may have had to work from memory.
Mr. Kurschner then concludes: "There is no evidence that anyone possessed or used this phantom “popular” and “highly valued” Byzantine text because it was a conflation after the turn of the fourth century." One supposes that Mr. Kurschner concludes that there were autographs of the New Testament, without any of them surviving to the present, yet his argument could be used with equal force to assert their non-existence. None of the early church fathers quote from a pure original text, and none of the manuscripts show any evidence of belonging to a family of error-free copies of the originals. Are then the autographs phantoms? Are they non-existent because direct evidence of them is absent? Of course not. Mr. Kurschner's argument is a logically fallacious appeal to the absence of evidence. It is an argument from silence.

Mr. Kurschner recognizes that there is explanation for the absence of early manuscripts (in the Byzantine textual family) besides the "worn-out" explanation, and that is the "intentional scribal destruction" theory.

Mr. Kurschner states: "another explanation for the silence of Byzantine readings have been offered: After a scribe made a copy of a manuscript, he "destroyed" the exemplar." This is not a particularly strong alternative explanation, for various reasons, several of which Mr. Kurschner states. The explanation seems to be based itself on the absence of parent texts for any of the early texts. In other words, nowhere do we find both a parent and its child (at least as far as we know). Even if that fact is so, it is weak support for the intentional destruction hypothesis.
There is some further basis in the fact that sacred items that had become unusably worn were sometimes cremated when they could not be washed. Accordingly, it would be unsurprising that such a practice could have been applied to very old manuscripts, a sort of Korvokian death-with-dignity for the early manuscripts at the hands of their keepers.

Mr. Kurshner provides 8 attempted resposes to this argument.

Mr. Kurschner's first argument states that the result would be only one copy per manuscript. However, Mr. Kurschner notes that sometimes there were scriptoriums with several copyists copying at once from a single manuscript. This argument is flawed, because if the alleged practice of burning the document was done after the copying was complete, since the multiple scribes were copying in parallel, the original would be destroyed when the scriptorium finished its parallel copies.

Mr. Kurschner's second argument states that if this practice were followed, there would always only be one copy of the Bible. However, as noted above, multiple parallel copies alleviates this difficulty to the alleged practice.

Mr. Kurschner's third argument is more persuasive, which is that there is no historical documentation for its practice, and no obvious reason to make such a practice standard. I agree with Mr. Kurschner and would add that one reason for doing so would be to conceal omissions and/or insertions (i.e. to intentionally corrupt the text). If such texts were in the Byzantine family, the family would fall under harsh scrutiny.

Mr. Kurschner's fourth argument is that manuscripts were very expensive, and it would have been very costly to engage in such a practice. This is also a sound argument and weighs against intentional destruction. I would add that we see evidence of the reuse of old parchments, writing be removed by sponge (or other techniques) and new writing placed on top.

Mr. Kurschner's fifth argument is not entirely cogent: it asks which scribes were destroying documents, and then states that it was not the orthodox fathers, a fact that is utterly aside from the question. No one supposes that any of the ante-Nicean fathers were copyists.

Mr. Kurchner's sixth argument is that early Christian Scribes would not "dare think about destroying God's Word" in view of the warning against adding or subtracting to God's word in the book of Revelation. The idea that burning a copy (or even an autograph) would be within the scope of Revelation's warning seems superstitious and unsupported by exegesis. That warning would encourage the scribes to copy accurately, but it would say nothing to them about the parchment being available as kindling or a spill. One wonders whether Mr. Kurschner personally believes that discarding a worn out Bible subjects one to being blotted out of the book of life. I would find that hard to believe. Why then attribute such superstitious nonsense to the early scribes?

Mr. Kurschner's seventh argument is more of a question plus a hypothesis. He asks why there are so many copies of the Byzantine textual family after 350 a.d. and none before. He posits that the explanation may be that the practice of burning the original died out around then. A simpler explanation is that in a time of less persecution, preparing multiple copies in parallel became easier, and simple geometry took over.

Mr. Kurschner's eighth argument is "Lastly, it is special pleading to argue that only scribes who copied Byzantine texts destroyed their texts, and the scribes who copied other non-Byzantine text-types did not, since they have early attestation." This argument, however, is not quite correct. There is no need to further plead anything with regard to copies of the non-Byzantine text-type manuscripts. The answer is that those manuscripts are rejects that were not copied, consequently not burnt, and therefore their presence indicates their untrustworthiness in the eyes of the early church, or at best that they never fell into the hands of copyists. Nevertheless, the whole mechanism of copy and burn appears to be special pleading (at least to me), because of the absence of historical documentation of the procedure, and the lack of motive by reputable scribes sufficient to outweigh to the economic incentive to preserve the manuscripts as long as possible.

Mr. Kurschner concludes: "All of this brings us back to the 800-pound gorilla sitting on the KJVO's desk: There are no distinct Byzantine readings in the writings of the Ante-Nicence fathers of the first 300 years of church history, not to mention any early versions testifying to it as well." Of course, I'm not KJVO, so if this gorilla exists, it is not sitting on my desk. But if it were, I'd question its weight. It is an argument from silence - pure and simple. It weighs little, because it could easily be overturned if we were to find a single cache of a half dozen ancient Byzantine text-form manuscripts that were reliably dated to the second century.

Mr. Kurschner goes on to explain that the explanation for the absence of Byzantine text-form manuscripts is that there was conflation in the manuscript collection in the Byzantine region around 400 and that the rest of the world stopped using Greek around that same time, thereby permitting the errant manuscripts to preponderate. Mr. Kurschner concludes that the Alexandrian text-form is therefore the superior Greek text. Leaving aside the lack of historical documentation that conflation occurred in the Byzantine region at that time, Mr. Kurschner's claim is puzzling for a few reasons. With a few exceptions, the ancient versions other than Greek did not follow the Alexandrian text-form. Thus, the explanation does not match the evidence, and should be discarded.

-Turretinfan