(This post may get deleted, in order to harmonize the discussion on free will.)
Godismyjudge has provided a new simple definition of LFW:
An agent has free will if and only if the agent is able to do otherwise than what he will do.
This definition is not harmonious.
Let's break it down.
1) An agent has (present tense) free will This line is understandable. It is an assertion about a present state of the agent.
2) if and only if This line is also understandable. A definition is about to follow.
3) the agent is able (present tense) to do otherwise This line is mostly understandable. It is a statement about a present ability to do something, where the something is defined negatively, and we are waiting for that something. So we continue to the last line
4) than what he will do (future tense) This line by itself is understandable. What is being described is a future action of the agent.
The lack of harmony appears when we combine 3 and 4 in view of 1. That is to say, when we speak of a present quality that depends on a comparison between the present and the future.
This lack of harmony is evidenced several ways:
First: the lack of harmony is evidenced by the fact that in order for the statement to have meaning, there must be (present tense) something that the agent will do (future tense). That would suggest that the future already exists, in some sense. Such a suggestion unravels the entire sweater of LFW, as has previously been seen.
Second: the lack of harmony is evidenced by the fact that my being able to eat steak today, and my actually not eating steak tomorrow would fully qualify under the definition. In other words, if I eat steak on Friday, and not on Saturday, I have proven that I had free will on Friday, under this definition. This would suggest that a completely deterministic (even a mechanically deterministic) world would include agents with free will, because they had the ability to do otherwise than what they did do.
I call these a lack of harmony, not because the definition itself is incoherent, but because these results do not harmonize with a non-compatibilist mentality.
In other words, if the simple definition above defines LFW, then Calvinists all agree that man has LFW, because we all agree that we can do something different today than we will do tomorrow.