Gregory Nazianzen (aka Gregory of Nazianzus) (329-390), in his Fifth Theological Oration (Oration 31), section XIX, is sometimes quoted in the battle over the Johannine Comma, because he provides one of the more notable citations of 1 John 5:7-8. As Gregory was a Greek speaker, one presumes he did not have access to the Latin interpolation, known as the Johannine Comma, but only to the original Greek of the epistle.
Recently, certain folks have tried to argue that there is some kind of glaring grammatical error in the text of 1 John, one that would be obvious to any Greek speaker, and consequently one that would call out for correction. The Latin interpolation is then brought forward as the possible correction to this supposed error in God's Word.
Gregory provides useful insight as someone who was fluent in Greek and who was specifically interested in Greek grammatical rules. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider his comments: not as being an infallible interpreter, but rather as being someone who commented on the grammatical issue before the grammar of the text was ever used to try to justify the Latin interpolation of the three heavenly witnesses.
First, a word about the translation. I found this interesting observation from Stephen Reynolds, who provided his own translation (link). Reynolds writes:
The standard English translation of Gregory’s Five Theological Orations has been the one produced by Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow for the Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, volume 7 (1893). I have used this translation in the past, but with mounting misgivings. So, for this course, I went back to the Greek text and began to revise Browne and Swallow’s version. It turned out to be a major undertaking. Browne and Swallow produced a truly awful translation – it is so literal as to be incomprehensible as English, and at many others points it is not only inaccurate but downright wrong. In my revision, I have used The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, ed. Arthur James Mason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899); and besides the Greek text there established, it will be clear that I have been heavily indebted to Mason’s notes on the text.
For those who would like to check the Greek, Mason's Greek is this (link):
I am not here to focus on the claims of Reynolds, as such, but rather to highlight the value of updating translations of works that were previously translated in the Schaff series (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers).
First, the Browne and Swallow translation (from the CCEL):
XIX. But to my mind, he says, those things are said to be connumerated and of the same essence of which the names also correspond, as Three Men, or Three gods, but not Three this and that. What does this concession amount to? It is suitable to one laying down the law as to names, not to one who is asserting the truth. For I also will assert that Peter and James and John are not three or consubstantial, so long as I cannot say Three Peters, or Three Jameses, or Three Johns; for what you have reserved for common names we demand also for proper names, in accordance with your arrangement; or else you will be unfair in not conceding to others what you assume for yourself. What about John then, when in his Catholic Epistle he says that there are Three that bear witness, the Spirit and the Water and the Blood? Do you think he is talking nonsense? First, because he has ventured to reckon under one numeral things which are not consubstantial, though you say this ought to be done only in the case of things which are consubstantial. For who would assert that these are consubstantial? Secondly, because he has not been consistent in the way he has happened upon his terms; for after using Three in the masculine gender he adds three words which are neuter, contrary to the definitions and laws which you and your grammarians have laid down. For what is the difference between putting a masculine Three first, and then adding One and One and One in the neuter, or after a masculine One and One and One to use the Three not in the masculine but in the neuter, which you yourself disclaim in the case of Deity? What have you to say about the Crab, which may mean either an animal, or an instrument, or a constellation? And what about the Dog, now terrestrial, now aquatic, now celestial? Do you not see that three crabs or dogs are spoken of? Why of course it is so. Well then, are they therefore of one substance? None but a fool would say that. So you see how completely your argument from connumeration has broken down, and is refuted by all these instances. For if things that are of one substance are not always counted under one numeral, and things not of one substance are thus counted, and the pronunciation of the name once for all is used in both cases, what advantage do you gain towards your doctrine?
Stephen Reynolds' translation:
§ 19. “But to my mind,” our opponent says, “those things are said to be numbered together and of the same essence when they are reciprocally designated by the same name – for example, ‘three humans’ or ‘three gods’. But this does not apply to a group of three composed of different things.” What does this retort amount to? It befits someone laying down the law as to names, not to one who is asserting the truth. I also will concede that Peter, Paul, and John are not three and are not “of the same being [homoousioi],” insofar as I cannot say “three Peters,” or “three Pauls,” or “three Johns”. counting them under one designation [i.e. “master”] despite the vast difference between them, I should probably be even more ridiculous in your eyes for my method of numbering things together.
What does John say? In his Catholic Epistles he says: There are three that bear witness: the Spirit and the water and the blood. For what you have reserved for names which are common to a general class of things, we claim – in conformity with your analytical figment – for proper names as well; otherwise, you will be unfair in not conceding to others what you arrogate for yourself. Do you think he is talking nonsense? – Talking nonsense, first, because he has been so bold as to assign a single numeral to things which are not “of the same being [homoousia],” though you say this ought to be done only in the case of things which are “of the same being”. For who would assert that these three “witnesses” have the same essence? Talking nonsense, secondly, because he has not been consistent in the way he happened upon his terms. For after using three in the masculine gender [τρεις – treis], he adds three words which are neuter [τα τρια – ta tria], contrary to the rules and regulations which you and your grammarians have laid down. For what is the difference between putting a masculine-gender three first, and then adding one and one and one in the neuter gender, or after a masculine-gender one and one and one to use the three not in the masculine but in the neuter gender? Is this not what you yourself reject in the case of the divinity?
What have you to say about the word καρκινος [karkinos], which can mean an animal, an instrument, and a constellation? And what about the word “dog”? – now something which runs on the ground, now something which swims in the sea, now something which sits in the heavens? Do you not see that three crabs or three dogs are being spoken of? – “Why, certainly.” – Well then, are they therefore of the same essence [homoousia]? – “Only a fool would say that.” – So you see how completely your argument – that only things of the same essence [homoousia] can be counted together – has broken down, and is refuted by all these instances. For if things of same essence are not always designated by the same numeral, and things not of the same essence can be designated by the same numeral, and if the nouns in both cases are stated with the numerals – what remains of your teachings?
There is also a Williams & Wickham translation:
But, someone may say, what I am talking about is things of the same substance being counted together that have nouns, which are mentioned as well, to match them. For example: Three men, three gods—not three odds and ends.
What answer are we to make? This is the behavior of a man who lays down the law for words, not one who uses them to speak the truth. What I am talking about is Peter, Paul, and John’s not being three or consubstantial, so long as three Pauls, three Peters, and as many Johns cannot be spoken of. We shall demand that you apply to more specific nouns the new-fangled rule you have kept to in the case of the more generic ones. Or will you break the rule by not conceding whatever rights you have assumed? Why does John in the Catholic Epistles say that there are “three who bear witness, the Spirit, the water, and the blood?” Is he not talking nonsense in your opinion? First, because he has been rash enough to count together things that are not consubstantial—and that right you only allow to things that are consubstantial. Who could call these “of one substance”? Secondly, because he happens to have got his grammar wrong. He puts the Greek word for “three” in the masculine and then tacks on three words in the neuter, in defiance of your definitive rules of grammar. Yet what is the difference between putting “three” in the masculine and tacking on single things in the neuter, and using “one” thrice in the masculine without calling them “three” in the masculine but instead “three” in the neuter? This is the very proposition you reject in the case of the Godhead!
What do we make of the fact that the same Greek word can mean the animal a crab, a pair of tongs, or the sign of the zodiac, Cancer? What about the word that can denote a dog, a dog-fish, or the dog-star in the sky? Do you not agree that people talk about “three crabs” or “three dogs”? Of course you do. Does that mean that they are of the same substance? What man in his senses would assert that? You see how your argument about counting things together has collapsed under the weight of so many proofs to the contrary. If consubstantial things are not always counted together and nonconsubstantial things are counted together, and if in both cases nouns are used along with the numerals, what is left of your doctrinaire pronouncement?
Gregory's explanation is significant in three respects.
First, Gregory is not aware of any interpretation of "Spirit, water, and blood" as being Father (who is spirit), Spirit (who hovered over the water), and Son (who shed his blood on the cross). If He did hold to such an interpretation, he would certainly not deny that Spirit, water, and blood are consubstantial. In context, Gregory is arguing that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial, but his opponent is arguing that they are not.
Second, Gregory is aware of the difference in gender between "three" and the nouns that follow, and of the fact that this violates the gender agreement rule, but he does not think this means that the next needs to be corrected.
Third, Gregory discards the supposed "consubstantiality rule" as a being a legitimate grammatical rule. This is, of course, less relevant to the argument of the advocates of the Latin interpolation.
I suppose we could add that if Gregory were aware of the so-called TR reading of 1 John 5:7-8, it would be so helpful to his argument on this point, that it seems impossible that he would not cite it. It would satisfy his objector's so-called rule, and it would support his view that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son.
So, Gregory's citation is a powerful testimony that the Greek of 1 John 5:7-8 as it is found in the Greek manuscripts today was also the Greek of 1 John 5:7-8 in the 4th century. This conclusion is further supported by the fourth century manuscripts of 1 John that we have.