Warren McGrew's Outlandish and Slanderous Accusations

Warren McGrew recently obtained a lot of attention by making a bizarre accusation against his theological opponents.

Warren states: 

I just wanted to highlight how that's the same kind of spirit and mindset that the ancient worshippers of pagan deities would engage in when they would sacrifice their children to Baal. Because as long as I get my good crops I'm willing to throw my child on the pyre. You know, as long as I am being blessed financially I'm willing to throw my child on the pyre.  It's the same mindset where they're like well God may have eternally reprobated my child but as long as I get into heaven I'm cool with that.

That clip is taken from his appearance on Leighton Flowers' show.  On his own show, Warren doubled down on this ridiculous claim.  He stated:  

It's the same mindset -- the same Spirit -- behind adherence of infant damnation and those ancient worshippers of Molech and Ba'al who would burn their children alive in sacrifice. They say I'm out of line for drawing this comparison and to those who've raised this complaint I do want to apologize. I'm sincerely wrong that I did not use harsher terms to condemn it: like noting it's the spirit of antichrist and that it's contrary to the god of scripture. 

Shortly after the clip above, Warren continued with more of the same:

Let's consider that comparison for a moment. You have a pagan and they love their baby and in profound grief they toss it into the fire because ultimately they want their God's approval and if the crops come, well then ultimately the parents are okay with the loss of their beloved child. Similarly, adherents of infant damnation love their baby and are in profound grief when they see God toss it into the Eternal fires of hell because ultimately they want their God's approval. And in the grand scheme of Eternity, ultimately the parents are okay with the loss of their beloved child.  And there you have it: that's the same mindset - same Spirit - same energy. So the comparison sticks. So, no other differences between them will actually serve to invalidate the comparison.  

The Rebuttal

It's not hard to rebut Warren's comparison, and there are several ways that it could be rebutted.  One rebuttal that was offered by some Calvinists is that they don't hold to infant damnation.  Warren's comments sounded to some people as though they were intended as a critique of Calvinism.  Since infant damnation is not a core tenet of Calvinism (much less a distinctive of Calvinism), it seemed like an odd criticism, to put it mildly.

However, even if we give Warren the benefit of the doubt that he intended this as a criticism of the subset of those who do think God does damn to hell at least some humans who die in infancy, there are still gaping holes in his comparison.

First, it's one thing to offer up one's children as a sacrifice to false god, and it's quite another to accept the loss of one's children at the hand of God.  Job, who had sacrificed for his children while they were alive, when he heard God had taken their lives (not knowing, of course, that Satan was God's instrument in this), responded: " the LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away; blessed be the name of the LORD." (Job 1:21)  This is not the same spirit as those who caused their own children to pass through the fire.  

Second, as hard as it would be to stomach, if God were to command child sacrifice, it would be evidence of great faith in God to proceed toward doing it, as we saw with Abraham.  The author of Hebrews tell us:

Hebrews 11:17 By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac: and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son,

Indeed, Moses tells us that God himself said:

Genesis 22:12 And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.

Third, the quid pro quo inherent in the analogy Warren offered is absent from the mindset of the folks that Warren criticizes.  Those who sacrificed their children to false gods did so to obtain something from their gods.  Those who humbly accept the loss of their children do not do so in order to obtain God's favor.  

Even, in the case of our father Abraham, he did what he did because he trusted God, not because he was hoping to get something from God.  There is nothing Abraham wanted more than a son.  Not so for those who caused their children to pass through the fire: they wanted something more than they wanted their children, and consequently were willing to engage in an unholy attempt to obtain a benefit this way.

This stands in stark contrast to the resignation of believers to a hard Providence.  We see David offered as both a negative example of sin causing the death of infants, but also of David's acceptance of God's decision:

2 Samuel 12:16-23

David therefore besought God for the child; and David fasted, and went in, and lay all night upon the earth. And the elders of his house arose, and went to him, to raise him up from the earth: but he would not, neither did he eat bread with them. And it came to pass on the seventh day, that the child died. And the servants of David feared to tell him that the child was dead: for they said, Behold, while the child was yet alive, we spake unto him, and he would not hearken unto our voice: how will he then vex himself, if we tell him that the child is dead? But when David saw that his servants whispered, David perceived that the child was dead: therefore David said unto his servants, Is the child dead? And they said, He is dead. Then David arose from the earth, and washed, and anointed himself, and changed his apparel, and came into the house of the LORD, and worshipped: then he came to his own house; and when he required, they set bread before him, and he did eat. Then said his servants unto him, What thing is this that thou hast done? thou didst fast and weep for the child, while it was alive; but when the child was dead, thou didst rise and eat bread. And he said, While the child was yet alive, I fasted and wept: for I said, Who can tell whether GOD will be gracious to me, that the child may live? But now he is dead, wherefore should I fast? can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me.

Some of us have taken this as an expression of David's hope to see his son in paradise, not merely in the grave.  However, whether we adopt that view or not, David clearly did not want his child to die, and was grieved at the thought of it.  Nevertheless, when God took the child's life, David acquiesced in what God had done.  David did not curse God, but acknowledged that if the child lived it would be simply by God's grace.

In his follow-up video, Warren alleged that he did not hear rebuttal of his points, merely outrage.  Well, of course there was outrage.  The comparison is bumbling at best.  Those who credit Warren with some measure of intelligence saw it not as a failure of his ability to understand the ill-fitting criticism of "Calvinism" nor to see the errors in his comparison even as offered more narrowly of advocates for the existence of the damnation of some humans who die in infancy.  They saw it as simple slander.  I'm sure those others who complained could also have offered the rebuttals above, but I offer this anyway, to close the loop.

 

Is Open Theism Actually Theism?

The position (or perhaps group of positions) known as Open Theism represent a god that is rather different from the God of the Scriptures. Still, is their god even the kind of god that we could properly refer to as theistic?

Cosmological Argument
The god of Open Theism does not fully map to the cosmological argument for the existence of God. Although the god of Open Theism may be viewed as the Creator of all Creation, the god of Open Theism comes to be in various states and consequently requires a prior explanation. Thus, the god of Open Theism does not provide a solution to the problem of infinite regression.

Ontological Argument
The god of Open Theism does not correspond to the ontological argument for the existence of God. The god of Open Theism is not the greatest conceivable being, since the god of Open Theism can change.

Teleological Argument
The god of Open Theism does not correspond well to the teleological argument for the existence of God. Although the god of Open Theism may have some purposes or intentions in things, those purposes or intentions do not extend to all things. In other words, many things exist that the god of Open Theism did not intend or have a purpose for.

Transcendental Argument
Naturally, the god of Open Theism cannot correspond to the transcendental argument for the existence of the Christian God - both because the god of Open Theism is not the Christian God, and because the god of Open Theism does not provide meaning to everything, as required by the argument.

There may be some other arguments for the existence of God that the god of Open Theism would fit (or to which its adherents would attempt to fit it), but it is interesting to note how many of the significant arguments cannot map to the god of Open Theism.

-TurretinFan

Response to Prophecy Channel

The video below is a response to Prophecy Channel's (PC's) response to Dr. James White. There three main sections to the video, and consequently three main sections to the response:

1. Does Dr. White think only Calvinists are Christians?

No. Dr. White acknowledges that there are non-Calvinist Christians. On the other hand, Dr. White recognizes that not everyone who calls himself a Christian actually is one.

2. Does Calvinism make God the Author of Sin?

Not by the definition of that term found in the Westminster Confession of Faith. But PC has his own definition of "author of sin." Since the term isn't a Biblical term, I'd rather not get stuck on labels. I know "author of sin" has a nasty ring to it, but what's wrong with saying that God is the "author of sin" in some remote sense of ordaining that sin will transpire. Why should that be problematic beyond being susceptible of an ugly label?

2. What about three passages in Jeremiah?

PC raises three passages in Jeremiah that say that some particular sin was not what God commanded or decreed, nor did it enter into God's mind. Three such passages are:

Jeremiah 7:30-31
For the children of Judah have done evil in my sight, saith the LORD: they have set their abominations in the house which is called by my name, to pollute it. And they have built the high places of Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my heart.

Jeremiah 19:5-6
They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal, which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind: Therefore, behold, the days come, saith the LORD, that this place shall no more be called Tophet, nor The valley of the son of Hinnom, but The valley of slaughter.

Jeremiah 32:34-35
But they set their abominations in the house, which is called by my name, to defile it. And they built the high places of Baal, which are in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to cause their sons and their daughters to pass through the fire unto Molech; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my mind, that they should do this abomination, to cause Judah to sin.

PC's problem in analyzing these passages is this: he has overlooked the difference between the Revealed Will (what one should do) and the Secret Will (what one will do). These passages are talking about God's decrees relative to the revealed will: his commandments, not his decrees of Providence.

Furthermore, PC has a problem ahead of him. If he insists that God cannot hold men responsible for things that God has foreordained, he's going to run into a problem:

Acts 2:23-24
Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain: whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death: because it was not possible that he should be holden of it.

John 19:10-11
Then saith Pilate unto him, Speakest thou not unto me? knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and have power to release thee? Jesus answered, Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin.

God foreordained that the Jews would deliver up Jesus to Pilate and yet the Jews had not just sin, but a greater sin than Pilate's sin in executing Christ unjustly. That's a greater sin than the rape of a child, as shocking as that might sound. So, are you going to "blame" God for the crucifixion? Or are you going to justify God although he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass?

-Turretinfan

Bruce Ware contra Open Theism

I happened to recently come across the following linked article by Bruce Ware on the topic of whether Open Theism is properly classified as evangelical. (link) Ultimately, I agree with what I understand his conclusion to be, namely that the doctrines of open theism are not evangelical doctrines. They compromise the nature of God.

Of course, they are also not Reformed doctrines in consequence of not being evangelical doctrines.

Ultimately though, we should be cautiously charitable in approaching professing believers who hold such errant views as open theism. There is an important difference between people simply being in error (due, for example, to inadequate teaching), and those who stubbornly resist the truth. By correctly identifying open theism as outside the evangelical walls, we must be careful not to insist that everyone must have a perfect understanding of every aspect of the nature of God in order to be saved.

I don't think Ware was trying to suggest anything to the contrary. Indeed, reading Ware's article, one can sense the tension in Ware, who would prefer to include Pinnock and other open theists within the walls of broad evangelicalism.

-TurretinFan

On Freedom In Choices - Response to "Orthodox"

I had written: The fact that men do make choices, and that some of those decisions are free, does not mean that they are free in the sense required by Arminian, Molinist, or Open Theist interpreters.

"Orthodox" responded: If you admit that some decisions are free, you have a lot of work to do to prove a special category of non-free decisions.

I answer:

I think O's comment provides an example of a typical failure to understand free will in its conventional sense: the Calvinistic sense.

What is the will? It is a name we give to the decision-making functionality of a man. The will functions to make choices, decisions, selections, elections, and judgments. We generally call such acts of man, acts of a man's will.

Sometimes those acts are free, sometimes they are not.

We do not consider a choice made under extreme duress to be a "free" choice. It is still a choice, certainly. Nevertheless, the man who hands over a wallet because a gun is pointed at his head is exercising his will in an un-free, constrained way.

You see, when we speak of something being free, we ordinarily speak of freedom from external constraints. Thus, for example, we say that a woman is free to marry when her husband is dead. Occasionally, we also speak of something being free when it is free from dominating internal constraints. Thus, for example, we typically do not view an alcoholic as "free" in this occasional sense, and it is in this sense that Luther was writing in his famous book, "Bondage of the Will." The will of fallen man is not free from the bondage of sin. Instead, man's will is enslaved by sin before God's grace of regeneration is poured forth in a man's heart.

Nevertheless, when we speak of the will's freedom, we normally only refer to the former, external, constraints. In that sense, we say that man's will is usually largely free. Many and perhaps most of man's decisions are made without any or with minimal external coercion or compulsion.

Some choices are not free, but are - instead - coerced. We could provide examples, but perhaps the most obvious is the choice to pay one's taxes. The government normally provides coercion in the force of threat of fine and/or imprisonment to those who fail to pay, which prevents us from choosing freely. Certainly, some people choose to ignore the threat, just as sometimes people refuse to hand over their wallet at gunpoint. Nevertheless, we do not view such externally compelled choices to be "free."

We object to the philosophical importation by Molinists, Arminians, Open Theists, and others of a non-conventional definition of "free will," as an "ability to do otherwise." This odd ability, which is - by definition - never ever used, is made up from thin air. It is itself the conclusion and the premise of many anti-Calvinistic arguments. Oh well. There is no need to delve at great length into that subject at present.

Hopefully, the above presentation will help to set "Orthodox" and others straight on the will and its various kinds and senses of freedom.

May God bless our wills with grace to do His will,

-Turretinfan