William Lane Craig - not a Molinist?

Terrance L. Tiessen (TLT) makes an argument that William Lane Craig (WLC) is not a Molinist. In summary, the argument is (1) a Molinist must hold to Libertarian Free Will (LFW) in the sense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP); (2) WLC claims to hold to LFW but not in the sense of PAP; and thus by combining (1) and (2) WLC is not a Molinist.

(link to Tiessen's post)

The material he quotes from WLC is remarkably similar to what a Calvinist might use as an objection to traditional Molinism. TLT quotes the following:

I’m persuaded that so long as an agent’s choice is not causally determined, it doesn’t matter if he can actually make a choice contrary to how he does choose. Suppose that God has decided to create you in a set of circumstances because He knew that in those circumstances you would make an undetermined choice to do A. Suppose further that had God instead known that if you were in those circumstances you would have made an undetermined choice to do not-A, then God would not have created you in those circumstances (maybe it would have loused up His providential plan!). In that case you do not have the ability in those circumstances to make the choice of not-A, but nevertheless your choice of A is, I think, clearly free, for it is causally unconstrained—it [is] you who determines that A will be done. So the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of free choice.

That does look like an argument for compatible freedom, although - as TLT points out - WLC continues to self-identify as a Molinist (presumably because he does not like the idea of "determinism").

-TurretinFan

R. Scott Clark Responds to Molinism

I am glad to report that R. Scott Clark provided a fairly concise response to Molinism on his blog (link to response). Enjoy!

-TurretinFan

UPDATE/ADDENDUM:

RSC is getting some heat for characterizing MK this way:

According to MK, God knows all the contingencies which could be actualized in the world by persons with free will but he doesn’t know which one will be actualized in the world because he has determined to allow humans to exercise their free will to choose these contingencies.

I understand the basis for the criticism. The criticism is that now, at the present time, Molinism (notice that I say “Molinism” not “middle knowledge”) does claim that God knows what world the free agents will choose. Unless I’ve missed RSC’s point, the criticism misses the mark.

Middle Knowledge isn’t relevant at the present time. Middle Knowledge is only relevant prior to God’s decree, and prior to God’s decree God does not know which possible world his free creatures *will* actualize, though God does know (within the framework of Molinism) what worlds the free creatures *would* contingently actualize under various imagined (by God) conditions.

Now, I agree with RSC that he could have been more precise – and furthermore I’ve seen that RSC has conceded that WLC’s definition of Molinism is a reasonable one. However, if folks are going to police him for precision, they need to be precise themselves.

More to the point, the substance of the criticism of Molinism remains untouched. Notwithstanding a little imprecision (and the fact that not enough Turretin and too much Voetius were used :grin:), I thought the post was a concise capsule of the issues.

-TurretinFan

Responding to Wes Widner

I had been planning to respond to Wes Widner's critique of Dr. White on Molonism (critique here) but then I noticed Steve Hays' response to Widner (Steve Hays' response here).

Steve Hays does a great job, so for a detailed response, see his comments. I'll add a few thoughts of my own by way of supplement to what Steve has already said.

Wes Widner states: "Middle Knowledge (and William Lane Craig in particular) does not teach that God's soverignty is trumped or determined by man's free will or by God's Middle Knowledge of man's free will."

Yes, it does. Consider Craig's claim:

What I am simply saying is that God's aims in this life, in this world, are for a maximum number of people to come to know God and His salvation as fully as possible. And it is possible that that would not be achieved in a world that did not involve as much suffering and evil as this world does. Far from being counter-intuitive, I find that very plausible.

(source)

That's at least a conditional trumping claim. There's no claim that God is required to create, but if he does, and if he creates free will beings, and if he wishes to save the maximum number of people (as Craig insists), he is restricted to actualizing worlds in which their is suffering and evil on account of the free will of the creatures.

Wes Widner also states: "It is disingenuous to claim that Molinism is a philosophy whereas causal determinism isn't."

That's a mischaracterization of the situation. Molinism is merely philosophical. Causal determinism oozes from Scripture. It is provable from Scripture - making it a Biblical, and not merely a philosophical, position. Of course, causal determinism is a metaphysical claim. That's not the issue.

Wed Widner futher states: "You misrepresent Molinism as a doctrine wholly based on the freedom of man's will."

The foundation of Molinism is the novel concept of "middle knowledge." Middle knowledge is defined based on the actions of "free" creatures, especially men. So, to deny that Molinism is a doctrine wholly based on the freedom of man's will is only a plausible comment if one is using the terms "wholly" or "man" in a way that is stronger than anything the critics of Molinism would intend. As such, the assertion of misrepresentation is unfounded.

I'll limit my comments to those points in view of Steve's fuller discussion.

-TurretinFan

So Good Men Differ ... so what?

One of the perennial comments one hears is that if either A or B were correct "it is doubtful that so many Bible-believing, godly evangelical Christians would have wound up on each side." This flawed position assumes that "godly evangelical Christians" always tend to end up agreeing with correct positions.

That's a flawed assumption. In fact, "godly evangelical Christians" often disagree over things of lower consequence than the gospel. Take infant baptism as an example, or the proper ecclesiology.

What's worse is when people (such as Craig Blomberg) make the further leap of advocating something in-between those two positions as though this somehow bridged the gap created by the two positions.

In the case of Dr. Blomberg, the problem is worse because he's not actually adopted a position in the middle between Calvinism and Arminianism (the two positions he originally identified): he's adopted the Arminian position with a Molinistic explanation -- which is more like a halfway point between Calvinism and Open Theism, not between Calvinism and Arminianism. In fact, the "Arminian" position he identifies is that of William Lane Craig, one of the leading advocates for Molinism.

Even if Dr. Blomberg had actually picked something between Calvinism and Arminianism (rather than just picking Arminianism), what Dr. Blomberg has overlooked is that as soon as you set up a third position, the original argument still stands, only now there are three positions instead of two: three positions that "godly, Evangelical Christians" hold to. So the truth must be a fourth, and then (once people find that), a fifth, etc. ad infinitum.

Finally, Dr. Blomberg overlooks the fact that "godly evangelical Christians" disagree (mostly) with his fundamental premise that if "godly evangelical Christians" disagree about something, both sides must be wrong. This creates something of a paradox, since Dr. Blomberg must now rethink his original synthetic premise by synthesizing it with the position that "just because 'godly evangelical Christians' disagree about something doesn't mean both are wrong" position.

Truth is absolute, not relative. Just because "godly evangelical Christians" disagree about something doesn't mean both sides are wrong (or, necessarily, that either side is right). We need to continually go back to Scripture and let that (not counting heads) be our way of determining truth.

Thanks to Josh Walker for pointing this out to me.

-TurretinFan

Springboarding off of Hays Against Molinism

Background:

Steve Hays (Calvinist) wrote: God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.

GodIsMyJudge (Molinist) wrote: Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?

(source)

God's Will not Like Man's Will:

GodIsMyJudge's question misses part of the reason for Steve's comment. God's will is not like man's will. There is an analogy, but it is not a correspondence. God's will (his secret will - his decree of Providence) is not something time-bound. It is not something that begins from existing circumstances and produces a choice that is responsive to the circumstances in which it finds itself. It itself determines all circumstances. The decrees of God are his eternal purposes according to the counsel of his will, whereby - for his own glory - he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.

The will's decision itself (that is to say, the decree of God) is not something that comes to pass. It is an eternal purpose of God. There was never a time when it was not.

Sometimes, for analytical purposes, we treat it as though we viewed it as active, but it is not. There is no time before God's will chooses what it chose - it is an eternal decree.

Relation to Knowledge of God:

This issue has a bearing on the discussion of the knowledge of God. What GodIsMyJudge seems to have overlooked is that in both the Molinist and Calvinist understanding, God's decrees are eternal - they do not come to be. The order that we discuss is simply a logical order - not a temporal order.

Thus, the Calvinist logical order is as follows:

1) Natural Knowledge
2) Decree
3) Free Knowledge

Whereas the Molinist logical order is as follows:

1) Natural Knowledge
2) Partial Decree
3) Middle Knowledge
4) Rest of Decree
5) Free Knowledge

Comparison to Human Will:

But both Molinists and Calvinists agree that this is simply a logical not a temporal order.

In contrast, human wills (in both systems) operate with temporal order:

1) Nature
2) Circumstance
3) Decree

That is an order that is both logical and temporal. First, there is our nature. This is something that is a given. Next, we and our nature encounter a specific circumstance. Sometimes that circumstance is largely of our making, other times we had nothing to do with the circumstance. Finally, in the circumstance, we make a choice.

Observation about Molinism:

Oddly enough, although Molinism advocates "Libertarian" free will (as opposed to simple, Calvinistic free will), Molinism essentially makes man's decree a product of his nature and his circumstance, such that if the same nature is placed in the same circumstance man's decree will be the same.

Functionally, that sounds quite deterministic. The Molinist insists that the choices are free in a "libertarian" and "indeterminate" sense, but it really isn't apparent how that is possible or even credible. In the Molinist regime, it really looks like man's choices are essentially the product of his circumstances.

Conclusion

I don't want to get too sidetracked by pointing out the apparent inconsistency of Molinism. I understand (I think) the rationale behind GodIsMyJudge's question: he'd like to have Steve say that God has libertarian free will, to open the door to the idea that man could also have libertarian free will. The problem, however, is that while God and man both have wills - they operate in very different ways. In fact, even saying "operate" is a word that is only analogous when speaking of God's will.

No, God is the only uncaused cause. He is the only self-existent being, and his choices are eternal - they did not come into being indeterminately or determinately - they simply did not come into being, but always were. Therein lies the fallacy in, under, or behind the question posed by GodIsMyJudge.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Video Series

I have now concluded the series on Middle Knowledge and specifically of Turretin's treatment of it, in his Institutes of Elenctic Theology. I should note that a summary of the section that I addressed has been created and can be found at the following link (link). I didn't consult this list specifically in the preparation of my videos, but I hope you will find it agrees fairly well with them.

Should you wish to play all the videos in the Middle Knowledge series together, here you go (nothing new in this, just the six videos of the series played one after the other):

If you would like to see a critique of Middle Knowledge from a slightly different perspective (although he does find his way to Turretin around pp. 29-30), Travis Campbell has provided an interesting article, which one can find at the following link (link). I should point out that he seems to give rather more attention to Bruce Ware and Terrance Tiessen than they deserve on this topic and seems to conclude with them that there are "true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom" - a significant and (in my view) unnecessary concession to William Lane Craig, one of the leading Molinists today (although I should qualify this comment by noting that there are some latent ambiguities in the terminology that Mr. Campbell uses, which may actually place him closer to the position I hold than it would at first appear).

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 6

This is the sixth and final section on Turretin's discussion of Middle Knowledge. This section delves into the philosophical arguments that undermine the concept of middle knowledge, demonstrating that the concept of middle knowledge leads to inevitable self-contradictions.

1. Two categories of knowledge are all that are required, because all true objects of knowledge are things possible or things actual (in Turretin's terms, "future").

2. Untrue things cannot be foreseen as true. In other words, unless it is true that a man will do "X" in situation "Y", God cannot foresee such a thing as true.

3. If divine providence is comprehensive (if it extends to men's acts) then men's will cannot be said to be indeterminate.

4. God's knowledge cannot be said to be uncertain. Therefore, if God foresees "X" as certain, then it cannot be said to be uncertain.

5. Middle Knowledge removes God's sovereignty over the creature, because it suggests that God is in essence depending on man's fortuitous cooperation in obtaining the ends he wishes.

6. Middle Knowledge removes God's freedom to base decisions solely on his own good pleasure, thereby contradicting the view of God presented in Romans 9.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 5

This is the fifth video in the series, of which (for those already weary of the series) there are six videos. This section deals with alleged proof texts of Middle Knowledge:


(1) 1 Samuel 23:11-12

This is the place where David asked God whether the men of the city would deliver David up if David stayed in the city, and God told him they would, so David left the city. Turretin notes that this was simply a question about the men's plans, not specifically about a future contingency.

(2) Matthew 11:21

This is the place where Jesus compares those who failed to believe after many miracles were done in their midst by comparing them to Tyre and Sidon and saying that the men of Tyre and Sidon would have already repented if the miracles done had been done in them. Turretin notes that this is hyperbole, much as one might say that if a person had been beating on rocks as long as he had been beating on a judge for justice the rocks would have been broken, or that if a donkey had been taught as long as a very slow pupil that the donkey would be able to understand already.

(3) 2 Samuel 12:8

This is a place where God notes additional blessings that would have come to David if David had obeyed. Turretin notes that these blessings are conditional promises, and consequently they are based on a decree of God necessarily.

Additionally, we noted that in each case the verses relate to God's knowledge after the decree, and consequently they are not really prooftexts for any kind of middle knowledge, because they do not relate to the knowledge of God before the decree of futurition.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 4

This is the fourth section of the discussion of Middle Knowledge taken from Turretin's Institutes. This section deals with Turretin's six main objections to Middle Knowledge:

(1) Two categories of knowledge are enough, because all things are either merely possible or actually future,

(2) Untrue things cannot be foreseen as true,

(3) God's exhaustive providence precludes the possibility that mans' will is indeterminate,

(4) No uncertain knowledge belongs to God, therefore if God foresees men's decision, they must be certain and consequently determinate not indeterminate,

(5) Middle Knowledge would remove God's sovereignty over the creature, and

(6) Gods' freedom to base his decisions solely on his own good pleasure would be undermined.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 3

This is the third video in the series on Middle Knowledge. This section presents the "state of the question." That is to say, it helps describe what exactly is under consideration. Thus, in this video we distinguish the issue from the issue of God knowing all possible contingent things, of God knowing necessarily contingent things (like "if the sun rises, it is day" or "if a person heartily repents, he will be saved"), and from the issue of God knowing freely contingent things prior to ALL decrees.

Instead, the question is whether God knows what men or angels (rational creatures) will freely do without a special decree preceding (if placed with these or those circumstances and in such-and-thus an order of things).



-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 2

This is part 2 of the series. The first part of the series can be found here (link). The first part discussed the true doctrine of the knowledge of God, but this section defines the erroneous doctrine of middle knowledge and describes its history. As is discussed in the video, Molinism was the brainchild of Lessius, Fonseca, and/or Molina (three Jesuits who couldn't decide among themselves who invented the doctrine) in opposition to Dominicans who held to a view of free will that is similar to that of Calvinists.

The Jesuits were seeking to make God's election to be based on foreseen faith and good works, as well as to defend their view of man's free will as autonomous. The only way they saw around the Dominicans' observation that God's will consists of natural and free knowledge was to invent a third category of knowledge that they designated "middle knowledge."

This "middle knowledge" is allegedly different from natural knowledge in that it is indeterminate, not being based on the nature of God, but on a decree. This "middle knowledge" is allegedly different from free knowledge, however, in that it is not about things certainly future, or - to put it another way - it is not based on God's decrees but on the decrees of creatures.

-TurretinFan

Middle Knowledge - Part 1

This is the first part of what is planned as a multi-part discussion on middle knowledge and free will. This part discusses the fact that God's knowledge is intrinsically simple (undivided) but can be divided extrinsically (as to its objects) into two categories: natural and free. These two categories exhaust all the objects of God's knowledge.

To summarize what I've put in the video, the following are the main points:

1) God's knowledge is, in and of itself, simple and undivided.

2) God's knowledge can be, however, considered by us (theologians) in relation to its objects as either natural or free.

3) Natural Knowledge is God's knowledge of the extent of his own power without considering how God plans to exercise this power. Thus, God knows what God could do, if God so chose to do it. He knows every way that he could exercise his own power, if he wished to exercise it.

4) Free Knowledge is God's knowledge of the actual exercise of his power. That is to say, Free Knowledge is God's knowledge about the world that he has made and the history that he has brought into being, as well as the future that remains to be seen.

-TurretinFan

Response to Jay Dyer on Calvinism (Part 3 of 13)

This is part 3 of the thirteen part series in response to Jay Dyer. The previous part may be found here (link).

Jay Dyer says:
2) "[A consistent Calvinist must be] Manichaean, in that nature is inherently evil."

(Note, "Manichaean" and "Manichean" are both widely used spellings for this position.)

I answer:

a) The Calvinist Position (whether right doctrine or error let Scripture decide)

Men are, by nature, children of wrath (Ephesians 2:3). Nevertheless, God originally created man good (Genesis 1:26-31) although fallible (Genesis 2:16-17). By Adam's fall, he and all those whom he represented died and came under bondage to sin (Romans 5:12). In regeneration, the old becomes new (Colosians 3:10 and Ephesians 4:24) as a result of the work of Christ (Ephesians 2:15). Thus, Christ is called the new Adam (1 Corinthians 15:45). God has foreordained all things that come to pass (Acts 17:26), and has a purpose even in the evil acts of men (e.g. Genesis 50:20). Thus, as Proverbs 16:4 states, "The LORD hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil," and as it is written in the Epistle to the Romans, "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." (Romans 9:18)

b) The Accusation Disputed

The error of the Manicheans may be succinctly described as asserting that the physical world is intrinsicly evil, having been created by an evil opposite of God. Thus, the Manicheans deny that evil has a purpose in God's plan, view the body as contemptible, and deny God's omnipotence. Calvinism, however, teaches that God has a purpose even in the evil that happens, that the bodies of believers will be redeemed, and that God is omnipotent, even to the point of affirming that nothing can happen apart from the permission of God. Thus, no consistent Calvinist could be a Manichean.

c) The Accusation Redirected

On the other hand, Manichean errors - particularly the dualism of viewing the body as intrinsically evil - have had a perceptible impact on the theology of Roman Catholicism. Thus, for example, we seen in modern Roman Catholicism things like a view that abstinence from sexual relations is more holy than normal marital relations and an exaltation of asceticism.

Furthermore, Catholicism does not have a clear answer to the question of the purpose of evil. That is to say, Catholicism cannot consistently account for the existence of evil in the Creation. This can be seen from the widespread denial of predestination in Catholicism. To be sure, there are some Thomistic folks within Catholicism who would have a similar view to Calvinists (which in itself should cause Mr. Dyer to pause), but the Roman magisterium has not clearly sided with either Thomists or the Molinists (in fact, folks like Jimmy Akin (a popular lay apologist for Catholicism) claim that the Roman magisterium has adopted the essentially relativistic position that Thomism, Molinism, and at least one other view are all acceptable, and none can call the others heretics (source)). Nevertheless, Molinism or a form/variant of it, is the most widely promoted view in Catholicism today. This position ultimately denies God's omnipotence, by asserting that man's "free-will" decisions are something that God cannot control.

-TurretinFan

Continue to Part 4

Responses to Response to Twilight/Molinism Post

Both Steve Hayes and TheoJunkie (TJ) have responded to my previous post (link) on the movie Twilight and Molinism.

TJ wrote:

But what would Joe the Plumber think?

You gave a basic premise statement regarding Molinism... can you provide a corresponding direct basic premise statement regarding Calvinism? Your post hints at it, but does not come out and say it.

You said that the basic premise of middle knowledge is that God knows what a particular person would do in a particular situation, prior to God's decision as to what the future will be...

It seems clear that you would not state the Calvinistic premise in exact opposite terms from the Molinist premise, i.e.: that God knows what a particular person would do in a particular situation, AFTER God's decision as to what the future will be. For this statement falls somewhere between nonsense and the fatalistic "floppy string" idea.

Your post suggests that the basic premise of Calvinism is that God knows what a particular person will do in a particular situation, because God decided that is what the person will do in that particular situation (which of course is informed by God's decision as to what will occur in the future).

However, this statement-- without elaboration-- appears to affirm the accusations of "puppetry" that some levy against Calvinism.

We know the bible says God directs a man's steps. Yet we observe that those steps are the steps we choose to take.

Do you consider that God directs the will in each decision, or is it possible that God directs circumstances (the particulars of a particular situation) in order to bring about the steps he has chosen for the man in advance? Or would you agree it is a little of both (or either/or depending on what needs to be done in the moment)?

Is it even possible to incorporate that into a basic premise statement?

I answer:

Calvinism teaches that God's knowledge, which is truly simple, is viewed for analytical purposes under two aspects. First, there is natural knowledge. Second, there is free knowledge. Natural knowledge is the knowledge of all possible things - all things that are logically possible. Free knowledge is the knowledge of all things that arise from God's exercise of his will.

One might argue (and probably a Molinist would argue) that hypothetical questions (for example: "If I stay in the city, will the men of the city deliver me into the hands of my enemy?") raise a third category of knowledge. This apparent third category, however, disappears upon further examination.

A hypothetical question, properly framed, hypothecates something (the hypothecand) and asks for a consequence of that hpyothecand. There are a number of possible forms of hypothetical questions.

1) Questions as to abstract ideas.
Example 1: If the conclusion does not follow from the premises, is the syllogism valid?
Example 2: If three is divided by pi, is the quotient less than one?

These questions would be answered from natural knowledge. Both relate to matters of definition and/or logic. These are not the sorts of hypothetical questions that Molinists are interested in.

2) Questions as to Factual Things
Example 1: If Christ is raised, will we also be raised?
Example 2: If I am a man, do I have authority over all women?

In both of these example, the hypothecand is factual. Christ is raised, and I am a man. These questions would normally be answered from free knowledge. God has decreed that we will be raised with Christ - and God has not given me authority over all women.

3) Questions as to Logically Impossible Things
Example 1: If up is down, ...
Example 2: If nothing truly exists, ...

In these cases, the hypothecand is logically impossible. The rest of the question does not really matter, because the question is predicated on something incoherent. This category of hypothetical questions is also not interesting to the Molinist.

4) Questions as to Factually Untrue Things
Example 1: If Abraham Lincoln had not been shot, would Reconstruction of the South progressed differently?
Example 2: If I die tomorrow, will I go to heaven?

I don't really know whether the hypothecand in Example 2 is factually untrue yet. Let's just assume it is not true for the sake of the argument. These are the sorts of questions to which Molinists typically appeal, referring to them as "counterfactual" statements.

These questions raise some interesting epistemological issues. Is any answer to these questions totally speculative, are there "true" and "false" answers to these questions, or is there some other available category? I believe the best answer is to specify a third category.

The third category is that the question should not be interpreted as looking for a "true" or "false" answer with respect to history. After all, in the first example, one recognizes that historical hypothecand did not take place, in the latter example, one has no way of knowing whether the future hypothecand will take place.

Accordingly, the question is looking for an answer that has a speculative component, but not simply a speculative component. If we provide a third example, we can see how this might be:

Example 3: In a game of War, Mike played a Queen. If I had played a King, would I have beaten Mike? (Or, "Mike has played a Queen. If my next card is a King, will I beat Mike?")

Those people who know the rules of the card game, War, can readily answer the question in the affirmative. After all, that's what the question is really getting after: what are the rules? (You could also phrase the question such that you are saying, "Mike has played a King, will my next card beat Mike's?" which is really asking about what card is next in your stack of cards.)

Example 2, above, has a similar object. It is asking less about the existence of a situation in which the hypothecand is true, and more about the rules of salvation, as it were. When a preacher asks you, "If you died right this minute, would you go to heaven?" he is asking about whether you are justified - right with God. If you are right with God, then the answer would be in the affirmative. If you are not justified, then the answer would be in the negative.

Example 1, above, is a bit more complex. Ultimately, though, what it looks like is that the questioner is asking about is a cause/effect relation. Obviously, there is some speculation, but the answer will typically revolve around the differing attitudes of Lincoln vs. Johnson towards the South, as well as the psychological impact of the assassination.

The underlying presupposition to such a question is that humans behave an orderly, generally predictable way. If we say that Reconstruction would have been kinder and gentler, then we are really saying something about the softer character of Lincoln. Alternatively, if we say that it would have been more severe, we may be saying something about the terror that the assassination had on Johnson.

To take a Biblical example:

1 Samuel 23:12 Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the LORD said, They will deliver thee up.

The LORD here is saying something about the character of the men of Keilah: their fear of Saul was greater than their loyalty to David. Had David stayed, this aspect of their nature would have resulted in their handing David over to Saul. God doesn't answer David either, "They might or might not - depends what I decree," or "They might or might not - depends what they choose." Instead, God reveals something to David about the hearts of men of Keilah, something that God could see, though David could not see.

So, to answer, your question: no, there's not a corresponding statement in Calvinism, because Calvinism rejects a third category of knowledge called "middle knowledge." Instead, Calvinism addresses hypothetical questions asked now, in time, as relating either to natural or free knowledge, depending on the situation, as illustrated above.

You also asked: "Do you consider that God directs the will in each decision, or is it possible that God directs circumstances (the particulars of a particular situation) in order to bring about the steps he has chosen for the man in advance? Or would you agree it is a little of both (or either/or depending on what needs to be done in the moment)?" God works all things together - so that the operate according to his infinitely perfect plan. How God does this is not always clear. God seems to have set in place "laws of nature" (for example) that dictate how matter moves and acts, and God also seems to have set in place certain sociological or psychological laws that dictate how human beings move and act. The study of economics, for example, is possible because of the general predictability of humans, which suggests underlying laws of behavior. Nevertheless, it is not always clear in any given case how God directs such-and-such a person to decide on such-and-such a course of action. One thing we deny: that God does violence to man's will in the ordinary course of life.

Steve Hays of Triablogue also has provided some comments (here). His thoughts are mostly not directly directed as critique on what I wrote but as relating to science fiction stories regarding time travel. I have enjoyed at least one of Steve's short stories on time travel (I have this one in mind), and obviously my post shouldn't be interpreted as any sort of condemnation of those stories.

Steve mentions, "5. Finally, I’m not entirely sure if I agree with Turretin Fan on the coherence of prophecy. The potential problem is this: if a prophecy is too detailed, it generates a dilemma. For it thereby invites its own failure." Steve mentions that a very detailed prophecy could still be fulfilled even if it were communicated in great detail to a person, but he states that "However, Calvinism traditionally rejects such a coercive model of fulfillment." I think it is fair to say that Calvinism generally does reject the idea that God normally operates coercively with respect to man's will. Of course, though, God is not limited to using coercive means to bring about his end. On the other hand, the story of Jonah provides something of a counter-example. Ultimately, though, I agree that God does not bring about the fulfillment of prophecy in a fatalistic way. Thus, if the prophecy about Cyrus' name was communicated to Cyrus' mother, God also arranged that this woman would enjoy fulfilling the prophecy.

Ultimately, any thought there is need for fatalistic measures lies in a limited view of the extent of God's arrangement of things. In other words, God could arrange it so that He would not be revealing the future to uncooperative people (I think this corresponds - at least roughly - to the restrictions that Steve places on prophecy in his article). If God communicates the future, he does so for a reason - perhaps even the reason of bringing about the future. I found it interesting to observe in the recent Disney film, "Kung Fu Panda," that the Kung Fu master is depicted as a type 2 seer, seeing the unavoidable future. In an interesting plot device (*spoiler alert*), the fact that the prophecy cannot be avoided is foreshadowed by a cryptic comment by the senior master. The prophecy relates to the escape of a particular prisoner. The junior master, not realizing that the escape is inevitable, sends his messenger to warn the prison. While at the prison, the messenger drops an item (a feather) that enables the prisoner to escape, thereby leading to the fulfillment of the prophecy.

-Turretinfan

Seers, Choice, Open Theism, Molinism, and Calvinism

The recent vampire movie, Twilight, contains a cinematic element that is frequently employed: a seer, a character in the movie that can see the future. Most movies that I've seen generally treat the visions of seers in one of two ways:
1) As projections based on a current but mutable stream of events; and
2) As inevitabilities.

Twilight is a type 1 film. The seer in the film is able to see the future, but her visions are subject to change if people make different choices. Other stories employ type 2 seers. An example of such a story is the famous ancient tale of Oedipus. In that story, the king is told that his newborn son will commit various heinous acts. He tries to prevent these acts by leaving the child to death by exposure. However, despite the king's attempts to prevent the inevitable from happening (and, indeed, even in part as a result of the fact that the grown son does not know who his parents are), the seer's vision comes true.

Most people - the average Joe, if you will - would view the type 2 situation as essentially fatalistic. "X" will happen, and there is no way to prevent it from happening. Thus, the average Joe prefers the kind of seer found in Twilight, in which the future is somewhat predictable, but still subject to change at the leisure of the common man.

Now, the charge of "fatalism" to type 2 seers is not necessarily appropriate. Fatalism, properly expressed, views some force as ensuring the important thing seen in the vision, quite without regard to (or perhaps "despite") the way in which the thing comes about. Thus, one could view the chronology of a particular person as a string that is generally loose, but pinned down at one particular point. By their choices, a person can try to to avoid arriving at that particular point, but all they will do is change how they arrive at that point.

To provide a specific example, in a fatalistic outlook, a man be told that he will die in Paris. Consequently, in an attempt to prolong his life, the man may purposely never go to Paris. Nevertheless, fate will bring it about that the man will have a wreck in the French countryside and be airlifted to Paris while unconscious and then die in a Parisian hospital.

The concept of "fate" is not a Christian concept. Christianity does not posit an impersonal force that brings about certain important events essentially in isolation. Instead, Christianity describes a God, who "of him, and through him, and to him, are all things" (Romans 11:36) and "we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose." (Romans 8:28) Thus, Christianity does not view history as a bunch of mostly loose strings pinned down at certain points, but as a tapestry woven together by an Almighty Artist.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of a person simply learning the seer's vision, the two positions are interchangeable. Unless the seer explains exactly how event "x" will occur, the person listening to the vision cannot distinguish the fatalistic worldview from the Biblical worldview. We see the same thing in Biblical prophecies. For example, the Scriptures clearly teach that Christ will come again in judgment. Still, some people treat that prediction as though it were a fatalistically determined event pinned to the end of the string of history, while others view it as the final act of a most well-written play. It is important to note that either of those views is consistent with the bare prophecy itself.

Reverting for the moment to the type 1 seers, one can see that this form of prognostication is really the only kind fully consistent with view of complete human autonomy. Thus, this view (like modern Arminianism) appeals to the humanistic side of man: the side of man that likes to think that he is the master of his own destiny. It is the view, one might say, of Open Theism. Certain Open Theists would object that God can make fatalistic prognostications, because he can bring about certain outcomes he wants regardless of what happens in the near term. Nevertheless, unless the Open Theist is to deny that God himself has the same kind of autonomy they attribute to man, they must assert that any future prediction that God makes is based on the contingency that he does not decide to do otherwise.

On the other hand, both Molinists and Calvinists acknowledge that God has complete knowledge of the actual future, knowledge that is not subject to being changed. Thus, both Molinist and Calvinist seers see an inevitable future - they fall into the second category.

This may seem a bit odd. Molinism claims to hold to the autonomy of man, and asserts that it holds that man has Libertarian Free Will (LFW). Nevertheless, Molinism also is forced to acknowledge that God's omniscience includes future events, and that consequently, God has advance knowledge of what will be.

There is sometimes an attempt by proponents of Molinism to argue that God's knowledge of the future does not convert to God being a causal influence on the future. While this attempt is doubtless important to the philosophical defense of LFW, it does not address the psychological difficulty that the Average Joe has with what he perceives to be a fatalistic future.

The Average Joe is not fond of the idea that the length of his life is already known and cannot be changed, particularly if that time is short. The idea that the future is - in effect - already written, poses a psychological problem for the autonomous man. If a seer comes to him and says, "You will die in a plan crash tomorrow," you can imagine that the Average Joe would not immediately go and board a plane, but would try to get as far as possible from planes.

Of course, if the seer is a true seer, the event will come to pass. What the Average Joe has overlooked is that the seer has seen what will be, and what will be, will be. What would be more puzzling for the Average Joe is if the seer not only announced the day and means of death, but also all the events leading to that death.

A sufficiently knowledgeable seer could even tell our Average Joe whether Average Joe will like the fact that events will unfold just as the seer said. Imagine yourself in the Average Joe's shoes. One feels a bit helpless knowing what will happen, without being able to bring it about that the seer's prognostication is wrong.

Indeed, between the two extremes of simply knowing the date and manner of death, and knowing every event leading to that death, the Average Joe would really rather not know what will transpire, so that he can maintain the illusion that what will be is not a fixed concept.

One might even note that while knowledge of the day of one's death is useful for planning other things (such as when to write one's will, whether to invest in a long-term investment, or the like), having an exhaustive knowledge of the future doesn't seem to have any particular use from a planning purpose.

From a Molinist standpoint, this result is somewhat paradoxical. Knowledge of the actual future doesn't help one to plan - more importantly it doesn't even help God to plan. Molinists try to avoid the idea that God causes the actual future to be the actual future, but they cannot escape the fact that God has exhaustive knowledge of the actual future.

Calvinism has a ready explanation for this difficulty. God's exhaustive knowledge of the actual future is logically the consequence of God's decision. That is to say, God knows what the actual future is, because he planned it to be that way. The exhaustive knowledge of the actual future is as useless for God's planning purposes as it would be for us. Nevertheless, this is not problematic because the actual future is logically the result of God's plan, not the premise of God's plan.

Molinism relies on this same explanation, but attempts to evade the impact of God's deciding what the future will be, by asserting that God has a special category of knowledge known as "middle knowledge." The basic premise of middle knowledge is that God knows what a particular person would do in a particular situation, prior to God's decision as to what the future will be.

In other posts we have discussed (for example, here) and will discuss how "middle knowledge" is not only an unbiblical concept, but also an incoherent philosophical concept. Suffice to say, however, for the purposes of this article, that whether "middle knowledge" is correct, Molinism does not and cannot escape the "Average Joe" concept of fatalism, since now - after the decree - God has an exhaustive knowledge of the future.

Molinism (like Calvinism) does not permit type 1 seers, and consequently movies like Twilight should be recognized as portraying a mistaken (albeit) popular view of "free will" in contrast either to LFW of Molinism or the simple Calvinistic model of free will.

-TurretinFan

More Response to Godismyjudge

Godismyjudge (GIMJ) has responded again (link). My reply, for the few still interested, follows.

***

I previously wrote: That we are not the reason God chooses us has nothing to do with determinism.

GIMJ responded: "I think most folks would disagree with this statement, but I will let them decide that and won’t argue this point further."

I answer: Since GIMJ has not provided a link, they wouldn't seem to have any reason to disagree with the statement, unless (as I suppose) they have a vague sense of what determinism is (the very objection I have to GIMJ slinging that term about).

***

I had written: As I already said, "actual sufficiency" has to do with intrinsic value. To build on the Scriptural analogy of redemption with a price, the price of Christ's death was enough to save an infinite number of people.

GIMJ responded:

This explanation wouldn’t be an issue if Calvinists only said the value of Christ’s death was sufficient for all. But they say Christ’s death was sufficient for all [meaning the value of Christ’s death was sufficient for all], while in the background, other aspects of Christ’s death move against Christ’s death being sufficient for all. Granted, these other aspects don’t “block” the value of Christ’s death from saving, but perhaps they make use of the value of Christ’s death in such a way that the reprobate remain unsavable. If the reprobate are unsavable, clearly Christ’s death was insufficient for them. Something more than the value of Christ’s death is required. This article suggest that the “something more” is intention, and that intention is implied in the phrase sufficient for all. (link) But whatever the “something else” is, if something more is required from X for Y, X is insufficient for Y. This is why I suspect you are speaking in a divided sense.

To my overall point of checking philosophy against scripture, are there any cases in scripture where Christ’s death is spoken of, meaning that the intrinsic value of the redemption price was enough to save everyone? I ask, because I don’t see Calvinists explaining passages like 1 John2:2 as “the value of Christ’s death was sufficient for all. Rather, I see them explain all texts about Christ’s death as pertaining to the elect alone.

a) GIMJ's argument glosses over the difference between sufficiency and savability. The price is sufficient to save, but is not used to that end. To go back to the ransom analogy, if the cost to ransom any and all captives is $1 Million, then a payment of $1 Million is sufficient for all, even if it is not intended or used to free all the captives.
b) GIMJ's criticism belies one of the problems we have with Arminian soteriology. GIMJ writes, "If the reprobate are unsavable, clearly Christ’s death was insufficient for them. Something more than the value of Christ’s death is required." Arminianism seems to be focused on making man merely "savable." But even this is only from man's perspective. In Arminianism, the death of Christ makes man "savable" from man's perspective, but not from God's perspective. From God's perspective, to borrow GIMJ's phrase, "Something more than the value of Christ's death is required." In point of fact, however, Christ's death makes men savable from Christ's perspective. If he offers his sacrifice to God on their behalf, they will be saved. Thus, his death (without more) makes men savable.
c) Intention is not something "added" to Christ's death to make it sufficient - it is not even, itself, the thing that makes the death of Christ efficient. It is the "joy that was set before him," as Scripture teaches. The act of offering is what makes the sacrifice efficient, and the Holy Spirit actually executes the effect in the life of the elect.

***

I had written: One of the objections in my post is that the term "determinism" was used in GIMJ's post in such a broad umbrella way that basically only the open theists are outside it (n.b. this is true only when considered as to effects, as proposed in GIMJ's post) and yet the term is popularly misunderstood to refer quite narrowly to mechanical/physical determinism and/or fatalism (neither of which corresponds to Calvinism). In other words, the word "determinism" can both be too encompassing (if we measure determinism by the places where Calvinism and Molinism overlap) and too limiting (since Calvinism explicitly rejects physicalism and fatalism).

GIMJ responded:

By saying only open theists fall outside of determinism, you are dismissing the entire Foreknowledge/LFW issue without engaging it. Are you looking for me to argue why foreknowledge doesn’t entail determinism? Isn’t that asking me to prove a negative? I stand ready to defend the citadel. I will not be drawn out into the field for a fight. If you want what’s in the keep, come and get it. I will be happy to kick down your ladders and pour boiling oil on you. But don’t stand in the valley and declare victory.

a) GIMJ's post was the ladder attempting to storm the citadel of Calvinism. If GIMJ had presented a meaningful definition of "determinism" in his original post, to avoid confusion, this particular dishwater wouldn't have been dumped on him from above. But the problem with trying to smear Calvinism using broad characterizations is that you leave yourself open for a nice shower of this sort.
b) I'm not particularly looking for GIMJ to argue why knowledge of the future doesn't involve "determinism." I'm indicating that his characterizations of what constitutes "determinism" are so broad as to rope in even views that purport to include LFW but also embrace divine omniscience with respect to the future.
c) GIMJ could try to duck this dishwater by characterizing "determinism" differently than he did in his opening post. He seemed to be trying to do that in the last post, but when he does that, most of the objections go away.
d) And that is the point, after all. If a fair portrayal of Calvinism had been provided in the original post, the present series of objections wouldn't be here. There would be no need for a shower of dishwater, if clods of dirt hadn't been lobbed at the castle wall.

***

I had written: Molinism is normally represented as God deciding to instantiate a particular future from among possible futures. This is one form of predetermination of the future.

GIMJ wrote: "Again, by saying the Molinist explanation of the decrees is a form of predeterminism, you are dismissing Molinism without engaging it."

It's easy simply to answer that this argument itself (like the previous one and the first one) simply dismiss the objections without responding to them. GIMJ hasn't bothered either to retract the original, objectionable post or to set forth distinctions related to Molinism that prevent it from being tarred by the same label GIMJ applies to Calvinism. On the contrary, using the same sweeping strokes, I've pointed out how GIMJ's own position, using GIMJ's lodestone, is determinism.

***

I had written: Actual ability unless/until used is hypothecated on something. Consequently, there is no meaningful line between "actual" and "hypothetical" ability as to unused ability.

GIMJ responded: "I disagree. Ability (whether it will be used or not) does not require a hypothesis. Projecting the results might. If he chooses A, B will follow. But the actual ability does not."

Despite GIMJ's disagreement, he's mistaken. One can see that he's mistaken from the fact that he conflates "unless/until used" with "whether it will be used or not." The two concepts are not convertable, though they are related. Ability unless/until used exists in hypothecation. Instantiation or prohibition removes that hypothecation.

***

GIMJ continued: "I had asked Turretinfan a question (well 2 questions) that he didn’t answer, so I will ask again: do you consider yourself a determinist and if so, what type of determinist are you?"

I answer: I think GIMJ needs to read my response more carefully. I indicated that under GIMJ's proffered definition of "determinism" (from the Stanford philosophy web site) Calvinism was obviously not determinism. Since GIMJ knows I am a Calvinist, one might expect him to make the mental connection that was there implicitly.

Furthermore, I have repeatedly noted that I find the label "determinism" misleading, because of the fact that people construe it approximately in the way that the Stanford philosophy web site roughly defines it. It's not a helpful or useful title, except for smearing.

***

GIMJ continued: "I’ll add a third. BB Warfield explains that the difference between fate and Calvinism is primarily that fate is mechanical and Calvinism is personal (link). Are you are with Warfield?"

I answer that from the same short and popular piece, Warfield stated in conclusion, "all the language of men cannot tell the immensity of the difference [between Fate and Predestination]." I would certainly agree that all the language of Warfield in that article did not tell the immensity of the difference, and that those who like to smear Calvinism tend to like to act as though the difference were minor rather than immense. I'm not with Warfield on everything, everywhere, but his piece to which GIMJ linked does help to clear up some of the misconceptions, even if providing hooks for folks to try to create new misconceptions.

-TurretinFan

More on Calvinism and Determinism - Disambiguated

Godismyjudge (GIMJ) has provided a new entry in our on-going discussion on Calvinism, Molinism, and "determinism." (link) For those interested in that discussion (perhaps only GIMJ), I've responded below.

GIMJ wrote:

Turretinfan responded to my post on Calvinism and Determinism. (link) The purpose of my post was to point out that Calvinists are determinists and exhort people to check not only their soteriology but also their philosophy against scripture. Turretinfan’s response is odd, because at first he at first tries to put some space between himself and determinism, but then he argues forcefully for determinism and against libertarianism (the opposite of determinism). I didn’t intend the term “determinist” to be a pejorative, and if one is a determinist, I have no idea why they should be ashamed of it. As for Turretinfan’s concern that people don’t understand determinism or the subcategories that fit under the umbrella of determinism, I suggest the solution is not hiding facts, but rather examining them.

I answer:

a) It still looks like the purpose of GIMJ's post was to label Calvinists "determinsts," which is confusing at best.

b) The reason not to like the term "determinist," is because it is linked in the popular conception with mechanical/physical determinism.

c) The idea that Calvinistic "philosophy" should be compared to Scripture is fine, of course. One of the points I've brought up time and time again is that Calvinistic philosophical is directly drawn from Scripture, in contrast to the specially pled philosophy of its main opponents: Molinism/Arminianism/Semi-Pelagianism/Pelagianism.

GIMJ wrote:

I wasn’t denying that under Calvinism, God appoints the means. If anything, this idea makes Calvinism even more deterministic, not less so. This is exhaustive determinism. But I didn’t consider the means relevant because Calvinism teaches that God decrees the end logically prior to the means. All I was saying was that under Calvinism, we are not the reason God chooses us.

(a) That we are not the reason God chooses us has nothing to do with determinism.
(b) The idea that "God decrees the end logically prior to the means" is true of any system of thought in which God degrees the end, since means are not means without an end.
(c) Again, whether this makes Calvinism "more deterministic" (as though determinism has degrees, which is an interesting idea in itself) is not really the issue. One has to deny Scripture to deny that God decrees both means to an end and the end itself.

GIMJ wrote:

Yes, but I suspect that your very concept of “actual sufficiency” with respect to a counterfactual future (i.e. the salvation of the non-elect) entails a counterfactual past. When determinists claim we are able to do otherwise, if we had chosen to, or we are able to choose otherwise, if we had wanted to; they are defining “ability” in terms of a counterfactual past. For more please see here.

(a) No. As I already said, "actual sufficiency" has to do with intrinsic value. To build on the Scriptural analogy of redemption with a price, the price of Christ's death was enough to save an infinite number of people.
(b) The question of people's choice is really irrelevant to the issue of Christ's sufficiency. If only Paul had been elected, Christ's death would have been exactly as sufficient as it is in reality.

Can Christ save the reprobate? Under Calvinism, in one sense He can and in another sense He cannot. The sense He cannot is obvious. Given the Father didn’t elect them, Christ would almost have to “freak out” and run contrary to the Father to do so. Obviously that can’t happen. But the sense in which He can relies on a counterfactual past in which they were not reprobate.

(a) This is also true of Molinism. In one sense He can and in another sense He cannot.
(b) The sense in which He can also relies on a counterfactual past in Molinism: a counter-factual past in which he did not forsee what he has foreseen, and in which the real future to be was not selected from among all "possible" futures.

Molinism is a side issue, and has nothing to do with Calvinists being determinists or not.

Logically, that is true. Polemically, it is not. On the one hand, if you are going to apply a confusing label to the other side, you should be prepared for them to point out that the same label, in the same sense, applies to you. On the other hand, since Molinism generally presents itself as an alternative to determinism, it is fair to point out that commonalities between Calvinism and Molinism cannot (if Molinism's claim about itself is true) be evidence of determinism.

That said, I don’t mind a good rabbit trail. A few preliminaries on Molinism…

As I'm preparing some more detailed posts on the subject of Molinism, I'm going to severely curtail my own journeys down those rabbit-trails. Instead, I'll limit myself to a few observations.

The first thing to note about Turretinfan’s points on Molinism is that the current reaction to Molinism has done a 180 from the historic reactions. Today, people claim that the distinctions between Molinism and determinism are so subtle (if they are distinctions at all) that Molinism is a “veiled determinism”. Arminius and Molina were not charged with “veiled determinism”, they were charged with heresy.

(a) If heresy and determinism are 180 from each other (as GIMJ appears to claim), then I guess I'm glad to be charged by GIMJ with determinism (rather than heresy).
(b) GIMJ seems to have overlooked the distinction, mentioned in passing in my post, between determinism properly defined and determinism broadly defined. One of the objections in my post is that the term "determinism" was used in GIMJ's post in such a broad umbrella way that basically only the open theists are outside it (n.b. this is true only when considered as to effects, as proposed in GIMJ's post) and yet the term is popularly misunderstood to refer quite narrowly to mechanical/physical determinism and/or fatalism (neither of which corresponds to Calvinism). In other words, the word "determinism" can both be too encompassing (if we measure determinism by the places where Calvinism and Molinism overlap) and too limiting (since Calvinism explicitly rejects physicalism and fatalism).

Getting back to the rejoinders:
GIMJ wrote:

That would be true, but Molinists deny predeterminism. Rather we teach predestination. In general, predestination is about “the plan” or “the goal” and predeterminism is how that goal is obtained. Perhaps you didn’t mean that Molinists teach predeterminism, but rather you meant that Molinism leads to predeterminism. But in that case you would need to form a reductio ad absurdum argument (link).

(a) Molinism is normally represented as God deciding to instantiate a particular future from among possible futures. This is one form of predetermination of the future. That is the one future that will occur, and in order to speak about the "possibility" of other futures after the divine decree it is necessary to divide out the divine decree from consideration.
(b) It's not clear to me whether GIMJ doesn't appreciate this aspect of Molinism, doesn't agree that this is an aspect of Molinism, or just doesn't like the idea of using predetermination to refer to God deciding ahead of time what is going to happen. Only if the middle of those three options is the case is there really any substantive dispute. With respect to the last of the three options there is an interesting semantic dispute.

GIMJ wrote:

Fair warning, this argument has some hair on it…

Counterfactual pasts are not a distinctive of Molinism. Many libertarians that affirm God’s foreknowledge hold to some sort of “counterfactual past”. But there’s a difference between this and the determinist counterfactual past. As noted above, the determinist definition of the ability to do otherwise entails a counterfactual past. In libertarianism it does not. Rather, the hypothetical that man uses their ability entails a hypothetical counterfactual past. Again, in determinism, there is a definitional relationship between the actual ability and a hypothetical past. In libertarianism, the relationship is between the hypothetical future and the hypothetical past. This distinction makes libertarians suspect that the determinist’s ability is not actual, but rather hypothetical.

Further, in determinism the counterfactuals in the counterfactual past are causal forces influencing the person. In libertarianism the counterfactuals are not causal forces influencing the person, but rather things that are logically (but not causally) dependent on the persons’ future choice.

(a) What this is, from my perspective, is a lengthy admission that the cursory remarks in GIMJ's initial, objectionable post glossed over the issues.
(b) Whether the line of "determinism" should be drawn where GIMJ draws it is a semantic debate. It is an interesting one, perhaps, but it is not really germane to the objections I was raising. If the claim regarding Calvinism were that in Calvinism's man's ability is related to a counter-factual past in a different way than in Molinism - that's not particularly a problem - but that wouldn't lead to sweeping statements to the effect that "Calvinism is determinism applied to soteriology," it would lead to more precise statements.
(c) Actual ability unless/until used is hypothecated on something. Consequently, there is no meaningful line between "actual" and "hypothetical" ability as to unused ability.
(d) The use of terms like "causal forces" may be present to make distinctions, but it is not clear that the distinctions themselves make a difference in any way that helps Molinism.

God has contrary choice between good options. Same goes for us when we get to heaven. The unregenerate, without grace, can only choose between bad options. For more, please see here.

(a) As noted in my previous post, if that counts as not smacking of determinism, then perseverance of the saints doesn't smack of determinism and neither does total depravity.
(b) Furthermore, admission that "free will" is consistent with having only choice among (for example) good options, undermines the bulk of the "intuitive" arguments for the existence of libertarian free will. It may also undermine the more scholarly arguments - and it certainly undermines the "virtue morality" arguments.
(c) Moreover, once "free will" no longer requires that a person be able to choose between good and evil, there is no non-arbitrary reason to set ones stakes down at "among good options" or "among bad options."
(d) Ironically, Calvinism ascribes to God a real will that chooses good over evil, something that GIMJ's conception of God denies. Likewise, Calvinism ascribes to fallen (totally depraved) man a real will that chooses evil over good, something that GIMJ's conception of the totally depraved man denies. In fact, to avoid Calvinism, GIMJ has to innovate universal prevenient grace, so that man can have a will that (unlike God's will in GIMJ's conception) can choose between good and evil.

GIMJ wrote:

I am generally unimpressive. You on the other hand, are not a novice on Calvinism. Do you consider yourself a determinist and if so, what type of determinist are you? For a technical explanation of determinism see here and for general info on how a wide variety of info on how people use the term, please see here. =-)

(a) For those who haven't clicked through, the first link GIMJ provides is a link to a discussion of "causal determinism". That page begins, "Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature." Obviously, this is not what Calvinism teaches. GIMJ should know that. If GIMJ is trying to assert that Calvinism = causal determinism as defined by that web page, he's simply dead wrong.
(b) The second link is to a search, using the Google engine, of all the instances on the World Wide Web of the term "determinism." I suppose he simply meant the link to the search (which yields about 2 million hits) to be humorous.
-TurretinFan

On Freedom In Choices - Response to "Orthodox"

I had written: The fact that men do make choices, and that some of those decisions are free, does not mean that they are free in the sense required by Arminian, Molinist, or Open Theist interpreters.

"Orthodox" responded: If you admit that some decisions are free, you have a lot of work to do to prove a special category of non-free decisions.

I answer:

I think O's comment provides an example of a typical failure to understand free will in its conventional sense: the Calvinistic sense.

What is the will? It is a name we give to the decision-making functionality of a man. The will functions to make choices, decisions, selections, elections, and judgments. We generally call such acts of man, acts of a man's will.

Sometimes those acts are free, sometimes they are not.

We do not consider a choice made under extreme duress to be a "free" choice. It is still a choice, certainly. Nevertheless, the man who hands over a wallet because a gun is pointed at his head is exercising his will in an un-free, constrained way.

You see, when we speak of something being free, we ordinarily speak of freedom from external constraints. Thus, for example, we say that a woman is free to marry when her husband is dead. Occasionally, we also speak of something being free when it is free from dominating internal constraints. Thus, for example, we typically do not view an alcoholic as "free" in this occasional sense, and it is in this sense that Luther was writing in his famous book, "Bondage of the Will." The will of fallen man is not free from the bondage of sin. Instead, man's will is enslaved by sin before God's grace of regeneration is poured forth in a man's heart.

Nevertheless, when we speak of the will's freedom, we normally only refer to the former, external, constraints. In that sense, we say that man's will is usually largely free. Many and perhaps most of man's decisions are made without any or with minimal external coercion or compulsion.

Some choices are not free, but are - instead - coerced. We could provide examples, but perhaps the most obvious is the choice to pay one's taxes. The government normally provides coercion in the force of threat of fine and/or imprisonment to those who fail to pay, which prevents us from choosing freely. Certainly, some people choose to ignore the threat, just as sometimes people refuse to hand over their wallet at gunpoint. Nevertheless, we do not view such externally compelled choices to be "free."

We object to the philosophical importation by Molinists, Arminians, Open Theists, and others of a non-conventional definition of "free will," as an "ability to do otherwise." This odd ability, which is - by definition - never ever used, is made up from thin air. It is itself the conclusion and the premise of many anti-Calvinistic arguments. Oh well. There is no need to delve at great length into that subject at present.

Hopefully, the above presentation will help to set "Orthodox" and others straight on the will and its various kinds and senses of freedom.

May God bless our wills with grace to do His will,

-Turretinfan