The first commenter provided the following points:
Molinism was not a response to Jansenism; it came before Jansenism.This is true, in the sense that Jansen was only 15 when Molina died. More technically, Molinism is a Jesuit response to Thomism, as championed by the Dominican theologian, Domingo Bañez. Jansenism would be one of the heirs to Bañez, rather than the other way 'round. Since no one (that I know of) speaks of Bañezism, and since the Molinists try to claim that they are Thomists, it seems easier to simply identify Molinism as opposed to Jansenism. This, however, is technically anachronistic, and it is fair for my Molinist listener to point this out.
Molinists do not believe "somehow God determined it."This is true, only in the limited sense that some Molinists would be uncomfortable with using the word "determine" this way. Nevertheless, what comes to pass is effectively determined by God in Molinism.
Molinists do not believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists.This is true, and is connected with the grounding problem that Molinists have.
Molinists do believe that God can decide what people will do.
This is true, only in the limited sense that Molinists believe that God can decide from among things that people would do, those things that people will do. God's freedom, therefore, is limited - and in a particular set of circumstances, God cannot decide what that person will do, because he cannot decide what that person would do, he can merely decide whether or not the person will be in those circumstances, in Molinism.
The second commenter was commenting on an earlier blog post, which makes similar comments to those in the podcast (link to blog post):
I had written: "In other words, God cannot (according to the Molinist) decide what man would do in any given circumstance, he can simply decide whether or not to let the circumstance arise."
The commenter responded:
The last phrase is unnecessarily worded to make God sound passive. God doesn't "let the circumstances arise" He actively creates circumstances.Sometimes the circumstances include the free acts of free agents. Molinism does not teach that God "actively creates" those circumstances. The wording was passive to encompass the full range of circumstances.
The commenter stated:
The phrase "God makes the best of the tiles he's dealt" from the Scrabble analogy is also misleading since Molinists believes that God chose to create free agents in the first place. Or in other words, these are the resources God is using. One might just turn around and say that in the Calvinist conception God makes the best of what he can do with compatiblist agents.
This is not a very precise objection. In Molinism, middle knowledge comes prior to the final decree to create the agents. Unlike the Augustinian/Thomistic/Calvinistic position, in Molinism what the creatures would do is not within God's control. In Augustinian/Thomistic/Calvinistic theology, the creatures are clay that can be fashioned by the potter any way that He likes.
The commenter added:
My point is that the phrase is unnecessarily slanted to make God sound powerless. God has to limit Himself to a particular set of options no matter how He creates the world, much like a builder limits himself after he chooses which building materials he is going to use.In Molinism, what men would do is not a limitation God imposes on himself, but rather a limitation imposed on God. It is a little like the difference between a human builder and an ex nihilo creator. But it is more dramatic than the commenter suggests: on Molinism, it is conceivable that God could have considered creating free agents, only to know by middle knowledge that all humans are transwordly damned.
It happens that such is not the case, but there is nothing in Molinism that explains the existence of at least one possible world in which at least one person is saved, because the possible worlds of Molinism depend on the decisions of free agents that do not themselves actually exist.
-TurretinFan
39 comments:
Calvinism was developed as a response to open theism and it teaches that God is the author of sin and man is not responsible.
God be with you,
Dan
Molinism aside, how does the following quote not teach middle knowledge?
"Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.
It looks like I have the requisite name to comment. From what I've listened to so far the episode sounds great. The Reformed community needs more people like you who can explain Molinism in an accurate, clear, and fair way. Daniel, TFan discussed that verse on the episode. Godismyjudge, I'm hoping you're making some sort of joke. I do think that the terminology of possible worlds can be a stumbling block to understanding Molinism, and that such terminology is neither necessary nor sufficient for describing the theory. One can explain the basic ideas in terms of subjunctive conditional truths (as you did).
Daniel:
a) There is nothing to tell us that this describes God's knowledge logically anterior to the decree.
b) Folks like William Lane Craig (within Molinism) say that this is just hyperbole (though other Molinists would disagree).
c) The statement is more harmonious with determinism, with the idea being that the hearts of the Phoenicians were not as hard as those of Chorazin and Bethsaida.
I believe that it teaches God does know what could have happend in those set of circumstances. But the thing it is never conditioned on the choices of man. If Molinism is true then that verse may present a number of problems for them since under those set of circumstances those in Tyre and Sidon would have repented yet God never created or chose that as a reality. My question to a Molinist would be how come God never brought that to pass since God would have had those at the places as repenting ? Another thing is I do not believe that men will act outside of what God eternally foresees what human choices will be made in human history. God is never subject to human choices. Otherwise God is not sovereign in any proper sense of the word. God's predetermined choice is what is being brought to pass in human history. The main folly of molinism is that the word foreknew that is used in Romans 8:29-30 does not mean a mere prescience at all or of a middle knowledge of circumstances of what God will do based on human choices . It rather means an active eternal relationship of God with His elect people. There is no middle knowledge that is being discussed in Romans 8:28-30 at all.
TF Good reply there. I agree with your conclusions there.
TF,
"I assume the point of this comment is to allege that Molinism is being caricatured?"
Yes. Your objections to Molinism were presented as Molinism.
Here's a parallel:
Dan: Calinists believe that God is the author of sin
TF: No, Calvinsts specifically deny God is the author of sin
TF: Molinists believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists
Dan: No, Molinists specifically deny more than 1 actual world exists
TF: The grounding objection to Molinism implies more than 1 actual world exists
As if the objections to Molinism give you grounds to assert Molinism teaches the opposite of what it teaches.
Regarding Jansenism, I would have dropped it, if your response had been simply that it was anachronistic to say that Molinism is a response to Jansenism. But instead you indicated your saying Molinism was a response to Jansenism was intentional on your part. Were you trying to imply that Molinism was a response to Calvinism via Jansenism?
God be with you,
Dan
Godismyjudge:
Perhaps you misunderstood my "This is true," to refer to my position rather than your objection. That would explain your continued objections. Otherwise, if you correctly understood that I affirmed the truth of your objection, your continued complaints seem strange to me.
-TurretinFan
TF,
Do you agree you misrepresented Molinism and if so, did you do it on purpose?
God be with you,
Dan
I initially addressed your question in an edit to your comment. Now, I've gone back and listened to the podcast (at high speed and despite the pain and suffering I feel at having to listen to myself speak).
Regarding Jansenism, that was an anachronism, as I already said. It's not really a misrepresentation of Molinism, it's a misrepresentation of Molinism's opponents. If you think it is a misrepresentation of Molinism, I invite you to explain how.
Regarding "somehow determined," I listened to the context, and I don't agree that in context a reasonable person would misunderstand my use of "determined" to imply that Molinism holds to determinism. In context, no, I don't agree that I misrepresented Molinism. I already addressed the objection, which is only a true objection in the sense that I explained. If you think that "somehow determined" misrepresents Molinism in view of the actual context of that comment, and the explanation above, I invite you to explain how.
Regarding whether Molinists believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists, I said that Molinists believe that there are multiple possible worlds (25:30) and that God knows those. I used the expression "regardless of which actual [worlds/world's/world(s)] will exist." If your point is that "regardless of which actual world will exist" would be better, I agree. However, I don't agree that my use of the ambiguous expression you seem to have mischaracterized misrepresents Molinism. If you are aware of some place where I actually said that Molinists believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists, I invite you to identify it.
Regarding whether God decides what people will do, I think the episode is abundantly clear and accurate regarding what Molinism teaches, namely that God knows what men "would do" in various circumstances, and God can only decide whether or not to instantiate such a world, God cannot decide what a man will do in any particular circumstance (without depriving man of free will).
So, no. I don't agree that I misrepresented Molinism. While the Jansenism point is legitimate, and while there is a sense in which the objections are true statements, they can't serve as a legitimate basis for complaining that Molinism was misrepresented, much less intentionally misrepresented. And I think some kind of apology for suggesting that I was intentionally misrepresenting Molinism would be nice.
-TurretinFan
“Regarding Jansenism, that was an anachronism, as I already said. It's not really a misrepresentation of Molinism, it's a misrepresentation of Molinism's opponents. If you think it is a misrepresentation of Molinism, I invite you to explain how.”
It paints Molinism as a response to Calvinism. You said the Jansenists views reminded the Jesuits of Calvinism and thought of the Jansenists as crypto-Calvinists.
“Regarding "somehow determined," I listened to the context, and I don't agree that in context a reasonable person would misunderstand my use of "determined" to imply that Molinism holds to determinism. In context, no, I don't agree that I misrepresented Molinism. I already addressed the objection, which is only a true objection in the sense that I explained. If you think that "somehow determined" misrepresents Molinism in view of the actual context of that comment, and the explanation above, I invite you to explain how.”
You are attributing to Molinism the contradiction of believing in a non-deterministic determination. That contradiction can only be avoided by not saying that Molinism believes that God somehow determines the future.
“Regarding whether Molinists believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists, I said that Molinists believe that there are multiple possible worlds (25:30) and that God knows those. I used the expression "regardless of which actual [worlds/world's/world(s)] will exist." If your point is that "regardless of which actual world will exist" would be better, I agree. However, I don't agree that my use of the ambiguous expression you seem to have mischaracterized misrepresents Molinism. If you are aware of some place where I actually said that Molinists believe that 1 Sam 23 teaches that more than 1 actual world exists, I invite you to identify it.”
25:50-26:10
God be with you,
Dan
Dan,
if I might? What does 25:50-26:10 reference?
"That contradiction can only be avoided by not saying that Molinism believes that God somehow determines the future."
Molinists *do* believe that God "somehow determines the future." This is the part and parcel of the aim to integrate human freedom with exhaustive divine providence. TF would only be presenting Molinists as believing something contradictory if he said or implied that they believe that God determines and refrains from determining the future in the same sense of determination. God doesn't causally bring about human free actions, but He does orchestrate their occurrence.
Nat, TF was on a podcast or radio program speaking about Molinism. It was a recent post and he links to it in this post. The reference is the time maker in the audio file in which TF ascribes to Molinism the view that two worlds actually exist. That is a misrepresentation of Molinism.
God be with you,
Dan
Incidentally, what would "promising him that more than one actual world exists" if taken literally as written/spoken mean? That there is a multiverse? Isn't it clear that this is just a loose way of speaking? Oh well ...
Maybe I'm misunderstanding the concept of middle knowledge. I thought God's middle knowledge was his knowledge of counterfactuals, which the verse seems to prove. I believe in the doctrines of grace and I don't believe in libertarian free will (at least not since the fall) so I don't accept Craig's molinism. Is there anything to tell us that God's knowledge of counterfactuals is logically posterior to the decree?
How can compatibalism be true if God doesn't have middle knowledge? How is it possible that the circumstances we find ourselves in, which obviously include our nature and the state of our hearts, don't affect our choices? If they do determine our choices then why is it unreasonable or unbiblical to believe that God put us in those circumstances based on his middle knowledge?
TF,
Sorry I asked you misrepresented Molinism on purpose. I should have given you the benefit of the doubt and I believe you when you say you wouldn't misrepresent anyone's theology on purpose. I still think you misrepresented Molinism, but if what I have said so far does not convince you, then I should probably just leave it at that.
God be with you,
Dan
'middle knowledge' is ambiguous. It primarily refers to a stage of knowing, a stage in between God's natural and free knowledge. But there is a certain kind of content annexed to this stage, and the phrase is also used for these items of knowledge. The items of knowledge are subjunctive conditionals about how creatures would act in an indeterministic or libertarian sense. Middle knowledge is not just any knowledge of a subjunctive conditional. If the antecedent necessitates the consequent, it's part of God's natural knowledge; and if God chooses for the conditional to be true, it's part of free. Because of the stage/content distinction (roughly, "when" and "what"), one can say that even if Jesus were invoking a conditional of LFW (the "what"), nothing he says implies that such a conditional was part of MK proper (i.e., known logically prior to a creative decree).
If God's natural knowledge includes certain subjunctive conditionals and his natural knowledge is logically prior to the decree then I guess I was confused and probably don't actually believe in middle knowledge.
However, I'm still not sure as to the freedom Adam and Eve had. There will's were not enslaved to sin, but God decreed that they would sin. How does this work? Why would postulating middle knowledge in this case be wrong?
The question of one's moral/spiritual state and the question of libertarian freedom are different. For example, one might think that an unregenerate man has libertarian freedom to choose between lying to his father and killing his father, and that a glorified man would have libertarian freedom to choose whether to walk to the left or the right.
As for Adam and Eve, the question arises as to whether it's coherent to suppose that a sinless creature could be causally determined to sin in a way that does no violence to that creature's will or agency. I think it is, though the details of how that should be understood are not clear. If you don't, then I think you have to choose between God's not planning the Fall (and choose either open theism or passive knowledge) and His planning the Fall through the use of MK. As for why it would be wrong to postulate MK in this case, that's an interesting question. It's not clear that there is a compelling reason to do so. One aim to posit this novel kind of knowledge (in between natural and free) is to accommodate human libertarian freedom, but on the view being considered, that aim isn't really satisfied; since libertarian freedom isn't being accommodated for the vast majority of humanity.
What definition of libertarian free will are you using? Willing something and actualizing it are different things. We can will things that God may prevent us from actualizing whatever our moral state.
If I accepted that God planned the fall through MK do you think there is any biblical truth I wouldn't logically be able to affirm as a result?
By LFW with respect to choosing A at time t I mean having the power both to choose A at t and to refrain from choosing A at t, given all the causally relevant factors affecting the agent. I don't understand the relevance of the rest of your first paragraph.
"If I accepted that God planned the fall through MK do you think there is any biblical truth I wouldn't logically be able to affirm as a result?"
I think that if you understand God's providence with respect to human salvation in terms of MK then you violate explicit biblical truths, and that if you understand God's providence with respect to other matters (alone) in terms of MK then you violate biblical exhortations to wisdom =); though I'm open to reasons. As I see it, you get the worst of both worlds. You introduce the philosophical-theological problems bound up with MK (such as problems concerning the grounding objection and God's aseity), and you don't give synergists what they want.
Godismyjudge,
let me ask you to concisely succinctly define your position, Molinism.
I have listened to the program a couple of times now, very intently the last of the times. I have gone over your comments and TFan's responses to yours and the other person's.
Silly me, I immediately went to 1 Samuel 25! :(
So far, TFan, I see it! You are framing an argument with respect to the knowledge, Molinism; and, it seems very fair the argument you have framed!
The more I think about it the more certain I am that LFW makes no sense. Although we may have equal physical power to choose a or not a, our final choice will always be governed by our ultimate desire which will in turn be governed by our nature and circumstances over which God is sovereign.
The rest of my first paragraph in my last post was not in reference to anything you said, but just me thinking out loud. My point was just that even if we had LFW in regard to our choices God could still limit it by preventing us from actualizing those choices that were not in line with his ultimate desire. For that to work we would need to accept either open theism or MK which, as you said, introduces all kinds of other problems.
Nat,
The twin foundations for middle knowledge are the beliefs that the bible teaches libertarian free will and the bible teaches God's providence over all things. Middle knowledge reconciles the two by stating that God knows what we would choose under any circumstance and He uses this knowledge to accomplish His goals without removing man's freedom. In middle knowledge, God primarily uses His knowledge rather than His power to achieve His ends. Middle knowledge gets the name middle, because God's knowledge of what would happen is logically after God's knowledge of what can happen and logically before His decision and knowledge of what will happen. So for example, God knows if you are in an ice cream shop today you could choose chocolate or vanilla, and you would choose chocolate and He decides to let you choose chocolate so He permits you to be in the ice cream shop today knowing you will choose chocolate. Man's freedom is preserved in that God does not decide what we would freely do under any circumstance - God cannot make you freely do something. God's providence is preserved in that God decides what circumstances we find ourselves in and therefore what will happen.
God be with you,
Dan
On the basis of what do you conclude that God cannot make you freely do something?
Nat,
I am speechless but I certainly appreciate your attitude none the less.
God be with you,
Dan
Daniel,
It sounds like a contradiction to me. It also seems difficult to explain moral responsibility if we are not ultimately responsible for what we do.
God be with you,
Dan
I suppose it all depends on the content we assume the words "make" and "free" have. My parents made me do things freely, even though reluctantly, all the time. If they could do this, how much more could the Creator.
Daniel,
that is an excellent insight to wit I would hope Dan/godismyjudge would heed?
Sometimes I think we forget God became a man and He Himself can persuade us to the Truth. It is on this basis we can develop a relationship with Him, too.
I am convinced that once that process begins, the calling, the election and the regeneration, it's just a matter of time before darkness fades away and the Day is at hand!
Here's some verses that, in my view, enhance what you pointed out there about your parents and doing what they wanted. If we, naturally, end up doing what our parents want while growing up in this life with them, whether or not we do it reluctantly, how much more do these verses underscore Our Great God's ability to "change" our hearts and to persuade them to "want" to hear and believe and receive His repentance that He alone gives that the forgiveness of sins follows after as does the baptisms, the laying on of hands, the teaching about the resurrection and the life and eternal judgment:
Act 16:13 And on the Sabbath day we went outside the gate to the riverside, where we supposed there was a place of prayer, and we sat down and spoke to the women who had come together.
Act 16:14 One who heard us was a woman named Lydia, from the city of Thyatira, a seller of purple goods, who was a worshiper of God. The Lord opened her heart to pay attention to what was said by Paul.
Act 16:15 And after she was baptized, and her household as well, she urged us, saying, "If you have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come to my house and stay." And she prevailed upon us.
You see, God touched her heart, opened it and gave her ears to hear the Faith once delivered to the Saints and after she was baptized, and her household as well, she urged them to stay with them asking them to "judge" her faithfulness!
It seems to me, from where I sit, these verses neuter the idea of a "middle knowledge" teaching and doctrine that Dan holds too?
Natamllc,
When you say "Dan/godismyjudge," and when you say just "Dan," one might get the impression you're talking about me. In case you happen to be intentionally talking about me, I'll just say that I reject the existence of middle knowledge.
Godismyjudge/Dan
I have been thinking about your last sentence from your response to me defining "middle knowledge", " God's providence is preserved in that God decides what circumstances we find ourselves in and therefore what will happen." Let me ask you to explain how middle knowledge works basis these verses from the book of Acts?
Act 12:1 About that time Herod the king laid violent hands on some who belonged to the church.
Act 12:2 He killed James the brother of John with the sword,
Act 12:3 and when he saw that it pleased the Jews, he proceeded to arrest Peter also. This was during the days of Unleavened Bread.
.............Act 12:18 Now when day came, there was no little disturbance among the soldiers over what had become of Peter.
Act 12:19 And after Herod searched for him and did not find him, he examined the sentries and ordered that they should be put to death. Then he went down from Judea to Caesarea and spent time there.
I may be mistaken? It seems there are three, a Daniel, a Dan and Godismyjudge/Dan commenting in here?
Is that your understanding?
I was addressing the "Daniel" post and the story he tells about reluctantly obeying his parents. If that is you then maybe I have it wrong and there is only two Daniels in here?
There are three Daniels, and so when addressing a certain one, I think you should use the name with which each one signs his posts (so either "godismyjudge," "Dan," or "Daniel") You've claimed that "Dan" subscribes to MK. I don't subscribe to MK, so you're either mistaken (if you think I do) or you're speaking in a misleading way (if by "Dan" you meant godismyjudge).
Doesn't Godismyjudge believe in MK? He is a Molinist, yes?
"It also seems difficult to explain moral responsibility if we are not ultimately responsible for what we do."
a) That's the objection that Paul rebuts in Romans 9.
b) But, more importantly, even if Romans 9 was talking about something else, why should moral responsibility be tied to ultimate responsibility?
c) And why doesn't ultimate responsibility (as distinct from moral responsibility) lie with the instantiator in Molinism? What cuts God off from ultimate responsibility in Molinism? If nothing can happen except by God's say so, how can one really say that God is not "ultimately responsible"?
-TurretinFan
"The twin foundations for middle knowledge are the beliefs that the bible teaches libertarian free will and the bible teaches God's providence over all things. "
In addition to my other comments already submitted, the Achilles' heel of this foundation is the first of the two - the Scriptures do not teach libertarian free will. I look forward to our debate on this topic.
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