Saturday, October 27, 2012

When You Ignore the Scriptures ...

You get this tragic tale about a "deeply religious man" who was seriously injured by a falling crucifix (link).

Isaiah 41:7
So the carpenter encouraged the goldsmith, and he that smootheth with the hammer him that smote the anvil, saying, It is ready for the sodering: and he fastened it with nails, that it should not be moved.

Jeremiah 10:4
They deck it with silver and with gold; they fasten it with nails and with hammers, that it move not.

If you are going to worship an idol (even one purporting to be of the true God), make sure you screw it down properly, or you could receive injury for your insult to the one true God.

From the article:
“David attributed the cure to his devotion to that cross,” Jimenez attorney Kevin Kitson said.

Because of that, Jimenez said, he got permission to clean the crucifix, which was long-neglected. But in doing so, the statue dislodged and toppled onto him.

“Throwing him down to the parking lot, crushing his right leg,” Kitson said.


The attorney for Jimenez, who would not allow his client to speak, said the 600-pound statue was supported by a single screw in the base.

“The screw was useless. The screw is useless. It supported no anchoring system,” Kitson said.
The statue can't clean itself, but you think your devotion to it resulted in a cure? Surely you must see the absurdity of this.

-TurretinFan

Friday, October 26, 2012

The Third of a Thousand Responses to Steve Hay's Rebuttal

My good friend Steve continued:

This is confused on several grounds:

i) To begin with, TFan has offered what appear to be contradictory statements on 1 Cor 7:15. In an earlier response to me, he said:

Where does the Bible ever speak of a woman divorcing her husband?

In 1 Corinthians 7 Paul addresses the issue of the attempted desertion of a believing spouse by an unbelieving spouse. You are right that a kind of gender neutrality is maintained. Neither a Christian man nor a Christian woman is to prevent the desertion of the unbelieving spouse. You should notice, however, that divorce is not mentioned. May I encourage you to re-read the context of the verse you quoted, and you will see the contrast between men divorcing and women leaving.

Here he seems to deny that 1 Cor 7 is even referring to divorce. “You should notice, however, that divorce is not mentioned.”

Yet in the same paragraph he also says “you will see the contrast between men divorcing and women leaving”–which seems to concede that it does address divorce, but limits that to a male prerogative.

Yet in the same paragraph he also says “You are right that a kind of gender neutrality is maintained.”
The distinction I mentioned derives from the KJV way of translating 1 Corinthians 7, which seems to reflect interpretation of the text more than it reflects the underlying sameness of the Greek verb.  So, I don't think simply relying on the KJV here is especially helpful, since the point is disputed.  Which is why I had said in my positive presentation:

“There is some question about whether women ever divorced their husbands even in the NT era. There is no discussion about wives writing writs of divorcement for their husbands, and yet the discussion of marriage relationships is sometimes balanced (see Mark 10:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 7).”
Steve responded:

But if the discussion is “balanced,” if  “a kind of gender neutrality is maintained,” then there’s no “contrast between men divorcing and women leaving.”

On the face of it, TFan is twisting himself in knots. I think the reason for his contradictory explanations is that he wants to reserve 1 Cor 7:15 as a prooftext for the right of men to divorce women, but not vice versa. Unfortunately for him, appeal to 1 Cor 7:15 either proves too much or too little. If it’s a prooftext for divorce, then it applies irrespectively to husbands and wives. The only way of denying that to women is to deny it to men.

Apparently, that’s why TFan is so equivocal in his treatment of 1 Cor 7:15.
a) Actually, on the face of it TFan is leaving behind his argument that was based on the interpretive gloss of the KJV.
b) And even if that is not on the face of it, that's what I'm doing. I'm not using the arguments from the combox in my positive presentation, because they are flawed.
c) 1 Corinthians 7:15 is not being used in my positive presentation as a prooftext for the right of men to divorce women.  In fact, 1 Corinthians 7 is about Christians permitting divorce in certain cases where Christians themselves could not justly divorce their spouse.
d) The fact that marriage breakups apply both to men and women is true, whether or not the verses are discussing the mechanism for that break up.
ii) Sensing, perhaps, the inadequacy of his exegetical arguments, TFan tries to bolster his case by a last-ditch appeal to the Westminster Confession. But that’s an illicit appeal to authority. You can’t rightly invoke the WCF to leverage the interpretation of Scripture. Your exegesis just stand or fall on the merits.
Not every reference to an authority is an illicit appeal to authority.  And mine is not such an illicit appeal.  Surely Steve recognizes this category of licit references to authorities - he refers to authorities frequently.
iii) Moreover, his appeal to the WCF is self-defeating. For the WCF doesn’t confine the right of divorce to husbands.
Well, actually I mentioned the WCF in the context of what the possible grounds for divorce are, not who can divorce whom.  The WCF, as Steve points out, uses a gender neutral approach that does not specifically state whether both men and women can divorce, but certainly tolerates such a view.  And I don't think we would need to exclude people from the ministry if they held a wrong view on such a minor point, theologically speaking.

v) In addition, the WCF is a 17C document. But 17C society was quite hierarchical. You had upperclass women and lower class men. For instance, when Richard Baxter married Margaret Charlton, he married up. She was his social superior. His father was genteel poor whereas her father was a wealthy justice of the peace.

Does TFan think Puritan or Anglican women in the 17C never had the legal right to divorce their husbands? If we’re going to interpret the WCF in its historical context, we have to take social class into account. Some women outranked some men. And that had legal implications.
a) As mentioned above, my comment was not intended to assert that the WCF held that only husbands can divorce.  So, the question is mostly moot.
b) My recollection is that generally only men could divorce in that particular society:
The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act allowed ordinary people to divorce. Before then, divorce was largely open only to men, and had to be granted by an Act of Parliament, which was hugely expensive, and therefore was also open only to the rich. (Long before then, of course, Henry VIII was granted a divorce by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and church courts retained the power to dissolve marriages.)
(source)

In fact the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 was one example of a legal redefinition of the marriage relationship.  Whether it was for better or worse may be a question Steve would like to assess.  Nevertheless, the law was added to change society, and it had an effect.

Of course, whether or not the Westminster Divines thought that a woman could, in principle, divorce her husband is different from whether such a category existed in the time of Moses.  The answer to the latter question is that it did not.

And with this third response, I believe I've now responded to all of Steve's arguments contained in his first of at least two responses to me.

-TurretinFan

The Second of the Thousand Responses to Steve Hays ...

We pick up with new arguments by my good friend Steve:
i) It’s odd that TFan also quotes the Markan and Lukan passages to establish adultery/fornication as the one legitimate ground of divorce, for those Synoptic variants lack the exceptive clauses in Matthew.
This isn't really an objection to my point. And, of course, the point of quoting the other synoptics is to exhaust the field of inquiry. To demonstrate to the reader that Jesus didn't offer other exceptions in other cases, just in case the reader is concerned that Jesus offered many exceptions. Instead, Jesus is generally reported just as stating the rule, but in the two accounts in Matthew, Jesus is dealing with a further issue: the one exception to the general rule.
ii) This also illustrates the weakness of TFan’s argument from silence. One the one hand, Mark and Luke give no grounds for divorce. On the other hand, Matthew only gives a single ground for divorce.
Steve is wrong in categorizing this part of the argument as an argument from silence. Jesus says, "saving for the cause of fornication." That's not silence, it's speech. The fact that Mark and Luke don't mention this exception is an example of silence, but - of course - I'm not arguing from their silence, beyond the fact that they only confirm the general rule.

Steve may be trying to argue from this silence to open season on exceptions, but such an argument would be an argument based on silence.
iii) Moreover, the exceptive clauses in Matthew are worded in terms that apparently exclude any other grounds for divorce. Yet TFan will later concede that 1 Cor 7:15 offers an additional ground for divorce–desertion.
a) Steve is not analyzing precisely here.
b) Yes, there are two exceptions to the general rule.
c) However, only adultery/fornication justifies committing divorce;
d) Whereas only desertion justifies permitting unjustified divorce.

Jesus is addressing the commission of divorce, as contrasted with the permission of divorce.  Paul is addressing the permission of divorce.
iv) It’s also unclear to me why TFan limits the exceptive clauses to “adultery/fornication.” As I pointed out before, porneia has a wider semantic range. It covers a range of sexual immorality, viz., adultery, fornication, incest, bestiality, and homosexuality.
I'm glad for this opportunity for clarification: I mean broadly to include any sexual offense punishable under Hebrew law (as distinct, for example, from lust in the heart). It's worth pointing out that polygamy was generally not punishable under Hebrew law.
Now, perhaps TFan would say that although the word has multiple meanings, the context of Matthew narrows the semantic scope.
In fact, yes, that's what I would say. But see my clarification immediately above.
Or he might say that although incest, bestiality, and homosexuality aren’t inherently adulterous, inasmuch as single men and women can commit these sins, yet they are adulterous if a married man or woman commits them.
I wasn't really going there, no. On the other hand, just because adultery is also incest doesn't make it cease to be adultery, for example.
But as it stands, his usage lacks due qualifications.
Clarification has been provided.
v) I’m also unclear on why he thinks fornication is grounds for divorce. In standard usage, fornication denotes premarital sex, in contrast to extramarital sex. Is he claiming that unless a man or woman is a virgin on their wedding night, that that’s grounds for divorce?
Yes, of course I am.
a) That's the primary case in mind the Deuteronomy 22 passage.
b) That's the reason Joseph was minded to quietly divorce Mary.
What about someone who was sexually active before he (or she) became a Christian? Is he debarred from marriage? Considering the fact that many 1C converts to Christianity were former pagans, it’s unrealistic to think most of them were celibate prior to marriage. For instance, Greek males typically deferred marriage until the age of 30. In the interim, they had recourse to prostitutes.
a) Steve is still assuming that women had the option of divorcing their husbands.
b) But, even assuming we were to grant that they did, it would be undisclosed lack of premarital sexual purity that is in mind.  The man thinks that the girl is a virgin, but discovers on their wedding night that she is not.
c) Further to (b), premarital sexual activity between the now-spouses would not be a legitimate ground of divorce.  In fact, it might be the reason for the marriage.
d) Likewise, divorced women, former prostitutes, and widows were generally permitted to marry/remarry.  These would all have been sexually active women, and the prostitutes impurely so.
e) The laws about divorce in the Torah that we are discussing were not unique to Hebrews as distinct from aliens.  (Contrast to the prostitution law we discussed early in this dialog, which only forbade Hebrews from being prostitutes.)
f) Even if we were to say that known premarital sexual activity was a potential ground of divorce, that does not "debar" or even "bar" anyone from marriage. Just because a ground exists doesn't mean that the party who has the ground must exercise it. A man can forgive his adulterous wife rather than divorcing her.  A man can forgive his non-virgin bride.
vi) For some strange reason, TFan seems to think Jesus is correcting the rabbinic interpretation of Deut 24:1-4. I don’t see where he finds that in the text. Rather, I see Jesus doing something more radical. Rather than correcting their misinterpretation of Deut 24:1-4, he corrects their misvaluation of Deut 24:1-4. He denies the normativity of Deut 24:1-4.
I find it in the text in "it hath been said ...but I say unto you ...."  That formula or one like it is something Jesus repeatedly uses in correcting rabbinic interpretations.  The broad rabbinic interpretation of "found some uncleanness in her" as meaning "for any reason" is corrected by Jesus.

Incidentally, this is why in Mark and Luke the exception is not discussed.  In those passages, Jesus is just stating the general rule, not discussing the one exception.  Moreover, in the Matthew 19 passage, Jesus treats the passage as normative, at least in the sense that it was a permission under civil law.
Jesus bypasses the appeal to Deut 24:1-4 by going back to Gen 1-2. He treats Gen 1-2 as the primary, normative passage, while he demotes Deut 24:1-4 to a pragmatic, ad hoc concession to the reality of sin.
It is true that Jesus goes back to Genesis to define marriage.  And it is true that Jesus treats Deuteronomy 24 as a concession to the reality of sinful humans.  Those are Jesus' statements in Matthew 19.  But Jesus is also addressing the issue of whether the law's concession is "for every cause" or not.  In some ways that is more clear from the Matthew 5 passage, which doesn't include the appeal to Genesis.
Put another way, he abrogates Deut 24:1-4 by sidestepping and sidelining Deut 24:1-4. Jessu opposes Gen 1-2 to Deut 24:1-4.
a) I'm not sure what Steve means by abrogation here.  But there is nothing in the text indicating abrogation, except for the rabbinic "heard it said" view of the passage.
b) Indeed, Jesus explicitly states that he did not come to set aside the law of Moses.
c) I don't know whether Steve agrees, but we Presbyterians hold that ceremonial law (as distinct from the civil law and the moral law) was abrogated.  We don't hold that the moral law or the civil law was abrogated.  If Steve disagrees with the tripartite division of the and/or the unique abrogation of the ceremonial law and/or the treatment of marriage and divorce as civil law, we can explore this in greater depth.
vii) It doesn’t make sense to think Deut 24:1-4 alludes to adultery as the ground for divorce. The Mosaic punishment for adultery isn’t divorce, but execution. There’s a different statute that deals with adultery (22:22).
a) Divorce wasn't a communal punishment of the wife.
b) Not every case of adultery was able to be successfully prosecuted under the laws of the Hebrews:
Deuteronomy 17:6-7
At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death. The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterward the hands of all the people. So thou shalt put the evil away from among you.
Deuteronomy 19:15One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be established.
Since in divorce the man writes a bill of divorcement and sends the woman out, neither the death penalty or any other criminal provision is triggered. Thus, legally unprovable cases of adultery could still be covered (like when a husband walks in on his cheating wife, but only he sees the two in the act).

c) I suppose we should add also that just because one's wife commits adultery does not necessarily mean that he wants to see her dead.  I initially considered not including this item, because Jesus' explanation relates to the hardness of heart of the men - whereas this seems merciful (Joseph is praised for his initial response to his discovery of Mary's pregnancy).
Based on linguistic and contextual evidence, Bock and Walton think Deut 24:1 has in view a chronic menstrual irregularity which renders the wife ritually impure, thereby precluding conjugal relations (cf. Lev 12:2-8; 15:14).
a) I'll happily place Jesus' interpretation over against Bock and Watson. He has the edge when it comes to authority.
b) While I agree that uncleanness in a woman can refer to her reproductive function (even her healthy function left her periodically unclean), a woman who was never pure enough to have relations would hardly qualify as the sort of woman being discussed in Deuteronomy 24, who goes and marries another man and then gets divorced from him and the original man wants to have her back.
c) And while "after that she is defiled" again could in the abstract refer to her menstrual bleeding, in context it more naturally refers to her having conjugal relations with a man other than her first husband.
d) Furthermore, the bill of divorcement is only of use to a marriageable woman, and a woman who cannot have conjugal relations is not (at least by OT Hebrew standards) marriageable. Such a woman would not benefit from a bill of divorcement. Therefore, it makes no cultural sense to treat the passage as referring to such a woman.
However, it’s unnecessary for us to identify the underlying condition. It’s sufficient to point out that adultery is contextually excluded.
As noted above, it isn't contextually excluded.
For a post entitled “Understanding Divorce from a Biblical Perspective,” I’m afraid don’t see the evidence that TFan has actually done his exegetical spadework. It seems to be more a matter of rote prooftexting to retroactively validate a foregone conclusion.
At last he's come to the title of the post, but only just in time to terminate his comments that we'll be addressing in this post. And I don't mind his judgment, since whether or not I've done the necessary spadework is neither here nor there. What matters is whether the points I've expressed are true and come from the text. If they do, I'll gladly be thought insufficiently trowelicious for Steve's taste. If they aren't true and don't come from the text, spending Bock-and-Watson-like amounts of time simply would make my hole deeper. The key is the truth of the matter, not the degree of effort spent.  It's not about me, it's about the truth.

- TurretinFan

Part One of Thousands in Response to Steve's Rebuttal Post

Ok, I don't really intend to address all of the myriad points in my friend Steve's latest divorce-related post (link to his post).  Nor do I intend to address only one here.  I'll start at the beginning and get as far as I can in a reasonable amount of time.  Steve is a resourceful and astute thinker, so it's worth considering his points, even when my opinion is that they are in error.

Steve states: "TFan has posted a 2-part response to my discussion of divorce vis-à-vis domestic violence. In this post I’ll reply to part 1"  But actually the post to which Steve is responding is my own positive case.  It doesn't aim or claim to interact with anything Steve wrote.  Steve's wrongly framing my post.

Steve states: "Divorce is not the only thing the Lord hates. Given what God says about marriage in Eph 5 (to take one example), I’m sure that God also hates domestic violence."
a) Steve uses the term "domestic violence" without defining it.  Clearly God does not hate the corporal punishment of children, which falls within the scope of contemporary definitions of "domestic violence."  On the other hand, clearly God hates all sin, including spousal abuse (whether violent or non-violent).
b) In the context of this discussion, though, raising the fact that God hates sin that occurs within the marriage is red herring.  All parties agree to that.

Steve states: "TFan doesn’t seem to grasp the nature of case law, even though I already went over that ground."
a) Steve has leaped to a conclusion that isn't warranted.  While Steve does word it tentatively, this is supposedly the leading example of "several serious problems" in my post.
b) Steve is continuing to treat my positive post as though it were a response to him.
c) Steve's own understanding of the case law needs refinement, as we've seen in the last post and as we may see below also.
d) Whether or not I grasp the nature of the Torah is actually not the issue.  It's not about me (or Steve), it's about the truth.

Steve states: "OT case law is illustrative rather than exhaustive. It doesn’t cover every conceivable situation. Rather, when an issue arose which wasn’t specifically addressed in the Mosaic law, Jewish judges had to extrapolate from the nearest applicable law."

a) My comments don't deny that.  You don't have to think that the Torah was exhaustive in order to identify the absence of a particular concept in Hebrew law.
b) Moreover, amongst the provisions of the Torah is a provision that limited judicial legislation:
Deuteronomy 4:2
Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish ought from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the LORD your God which I command you.
Deuteronomy 12:32
What thing soever I command you, observe to do it: thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it.
Steve continues: "So TFan’s argument from silence is fallacious."
a) Steve's wrong about claiming that this in argument from silence.  My statement was: "There was no category of women divorcing their husbands."  Steve can try to claim that this is a fillable gap in the Torah that judges could extrapolate into, but he can't reasonably deny the fact that the category wasn't there. My comment is a factual observation, not an argument from silence.
b) And, of course, see Deuteronomy 4:2 and 12:32.  There were restraints on judicial legislation.  That's a positive argument from a written rule.

Steve continues: "Notice that TFan doesn’t even attempt to show that my explanation of case law is false. He simply ignores it."
a) Again, Steve is acting like my post was a responsive post, rather than the positive presentation that it was.
b) And, of course, not all of Steve's observations about the Torah were false.  Some of them are just irrelevant (like the fact that judges had to extrapolate in certain cases).

Steve continues: "I find it disappointing that he refuses to argue in good faith. When he raises an objection, and I present a counterargument, it’s incumbent on him to acknowledge and interact with the counterargument. For him to simply repeat the same objection, as if no response was offered, is intellectually frivolous."
a) I wasn't offering an objection in the post in question, as noted several times above.  I was making a positive case.
b) Given that Steve is clearly aware of my second post (the one that addressed his arguments), it's strange for him to act as though I didn't offer responses to his arguments.
c) I hope that Steve doesn't think that interacting with some of his arguments somehow intellectually commits me to responding to all of his arguments.  If so, he may be in for further disappointment.

Steve continues:
ii) In addition, I presented another counterargument. To quote myself:

To begin with, the complementarian position is that masculine nouns and pronouns can include women. That follows both from the conventions grammatical gender and generic masculine usage as well as the theological fact that men can function in a representative capacity for women.

For instance, the soteriological and eschatological promises (or threats) of Scripture are often addressed to male referents, yet they implicitly include women. Women as well as men can be saved or damned.

Of course, masculine language is sometimes used to single out males. But there’s no presumption to that effect. Rather, that’s context-dependent.
a) That's not a counter-argument.  It's an observation about a rule of grammar/syntax without an application of the rule to the particular case.  The fact that sometimes (or even often) a male is used as an example for both male and female is quite true.
b) A counter-argument would have a next step of showing why in a particular verse a masculine noun or pronoun must be understood generically.
c) Steve seems to be setting up a polemical idea that there is only one complementarian position.  But, of course, there are a range of complementarian positions, ranging from a highly patriarchical to highly feminist.

 Steve continues:
i) In his latest response to me, TFan blows right past that. Once again, it’s disappointing when he refuses to argue in good faith.

ii) In addition, he’s arguing like a feminist or egalitarian. “Evangelical feminists” deny generic masculine usage. They assume that all grammatically masculine usage is gender-specific and gender-exclusive. TFan seems to share the same understanding. I find it odd that he’s siding with feministic hermeneutics.

iii) Regarding Deut 24:1-4: if you read it carefully, this statute didn’t authorize men to divorce their wives.

This statute doesn’t institute, command, or condone divorce. It’s really about remarriage after divorce rather than divorce proper. It takes a certain custom for granted, then protects the divorcée against certain consequences of the customary divorce.
a) It's a little dull for Steve to continue to harp on not getting enough responsive attention from me in my positive presentation of my position.  It's worse than dull for Steve to suggest that it is somehow "bad faith" for me to offer a positive presentation, rather than a rebuttal of his views.  But, at least I'm offering one now, so hopefully he can feel less disappointed (though see above, I'm not committing to answering every comment he may ever make).
b) Whether I'm arguing "like a feminist or egalitarian" only matters if they argue wrongly.  Instead of trying to tar me with association to them, perhaps Steve can focus on the actual arguments.
c) Instead of actually engaging the argument I wrote, Steve sticks a position in my mouth that I didn't take.  I didn't assert that "all grammatically masculine usage is gender-specific and gender-exclusive."  Steve's arguing against a straw man.
d) Whether or not Deuteronomy 24:1-4 authorizes men to divorce their wives, or merely regulates that divorce is mostly immaterial.  I didn't argue that it authorizes men to divorce their wives.  I will point out that the KJV and the ESV have different interpretations of the underlying Hebrew text (they also differ on the Malachi passage I quoted in my positive presentation).
e) It's worth noting, though, that Steve's interpretation of Deuteronomy 24 differs not only from the rabbinical views but also from Jesus' view.  Jesus stated:
Matthew 19:8
He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so.
Steve continued:
iv) To take a comparison, the Mosaic law doesn’t ban prostitution across the board. Although prostitution is a sin, not all sins are crimes.

Rather, the Mosaic law takes the status quo (i.e. social reality of prostitution) for granted, then restricts it. Jews are forbidden from being prostitutes.

Likewise, Deut 24:1-4 doesn’t legitimate the right of a husband to divorce his wife under those circumstances. Rather, it takes the status quo (i.e. customary divorce) for granted, then limits remarriage under those circumstances–apparently to limit the harm done to the divorcée, who was divorced against her will.

v) Likewise, it doesn’t address divorce in general, but a very special case.
a) Steve's comparison is largely irrelevant to the discussion.  Yes, the law only outlawed the act of serving as a prostitute (by an Israelite) and not the act of hiring a prostitute.  And yes, that does not imply that it is ok to go in unto a prostitute, or even that it is morally upright to do so.
b) Perhaps the one relevant part is that Steve is setting up one of my rebuttal points.  Specifically, just because something is a sin does not mean that the law addresses it or provides sanctions for it.  To wit, spousal abuse is a very heinous sin, but that does not mean or imply that the OT law provides a sanction for it.
c) Moreover, Steve seems to recognize that there was not to be gap-filling to address the cases of the alien prostitutes or the men who hired prostitutes.  This reinforces the need for Steve to show why gap-filling or extrapolation is justified in the particular case he has in mind.
d) Whether Deuteronomy 24:1-4 addresses divorce in general may be a disputed point, but it seems like a totally irrelevant point.

I had written:

This is important to remember when dealing with the text of Scripture. It is easy to anachronistically apply contemporary cultural norms to the text. In an age when people are redefining marriage to include reference to same sex couples, one might think that Christians would be on their guard to remember that this is not the first redefinition of marriage.
Steve responds:

That’s a nice exercise in well-poisoning. Remember, though, that the question at issue is whether wife-battery is grounds for divorce. Is that “redefining” marriage? Does TFan think wife-battery figures in the original definition of marriage, which contemporary cultural norms are trying to redefine out of marriage?
a) As noted numerous times above, my post was a positive presentation, not a rebuttal.
b) Well-poisoning is probably a better description of Steve's repeated assertions early on that he's dealing with a disputant who is not arguing in good faith or suggesting that I'm using a feminist hermeneutic.
c) And, of course, the "question at issue" for Steve is not the question at issue in the post he's responding to. He's not dealing with the positive presentation, he's treating the post as though it is responding to his position (while simultaneously complaining that it is not responding to his position).
d) Steve's question is tendentious at best.  More to the point, he's again suggesting arguments/positions as mine that I haven't made.  And he's choosing inflammatory arguments without good contextual basis.
e) To wit, in context "This is important to remember" relates to what I wrote immediately above that line, which had nothing to do with "wife-battery," as Steve ought to have picked up on.
f) And, of course, the original (Garden of Eden) definition of marriage is not obviously at issue.  At issue is the definition of marriage at the writing of the Torah.  The question is how to interpret the Torah, not what the pre-Fall ideal of marriage was.
g) Was wife-beating a cultural norm at that time?  I wonder what Steve's response on that point is.  In contemporary times it has a massive negative social stigma that it did not have in America 400 years ago.  Clearly it did not have that stigma in 7th century Arabia.  Now, I'm certainly not suggesting that 1600's colonial America or 7th century Arabia is the cultural context of the Torah.  Since Steve has raised that question, what does he think the cultural norm was, and what's his basis for thinking that?
h) But, of course, my comment (in context) was a reflection on the fact that the family was a patriarchy.  Husband and wife did not have equal rights in general - the husband was the ruler.  Today, the cultural milieu is on the feministic side of egalitarian.  In that time, the only category of divorce was of a husband putting away his wife.

Unfortunately, Steve post goes on and on (or perhaps fortunately, Steve is an excellent thinker and it's always enjoyable to read his posts, even when they are critical of what I write).  I lack the time at the present to deal with every error that he makes or to highlight the many points of agreement between us.

-TurretinFan

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Responding to Steve Hays' Argument for Divorce Grounded in "Domestic Violence"

Steve Hays recently published a post (link to post) in which he argued in favor of the notion that domestic violence is a legitimate ground of divorce.  I provided some comments in the comment box of that post, which led to Steve posting two new posts addressing some of my comments (link to Steve's second post)(link to Steve's third post).

Steve's posts raise a lot of issues, no doubt.  But it seems that Steve's major argument for his position is this one:
c) There is also an argument from analogy. A battered slave could be manumitted (Exod 21:26-27). A fortiori, a battered wife can divorce her husband. What’s true in the lesser case of a slave is true in the greater case of a wife, for a wife has greater rights than a slave.
This argument is invalid.  Just because something leads to the release of slavery does not imply that it leads to the release of a marriage.  A Hebrew slave was released from bondage upon reaching a seventh year of service.  But no serious person would suggest that a Hebrew spouse was released from marriage upon reaching a seventh year.  Thus, the fact that something led to the release of a slave does not imply that the something should lead to the release of a spouse.

Likewise, it's worth noting that the provisions that warrant a divorce (adultery/fornication and actual desertion by an unbelieving spouse) are not things that warrant the release of a slave.  Indeed, it is absurd to suppose that if a slave's master commits adultery, the slave is free to leave.  Likewise, in the law Hebrews were not commanded to let unbelieving slaves go free if they wished to go free.  Furthermore, while death of a spouse liberate the other from the marriage, the death of a master does not liberate a slave.

Thus, there is no good reason to suppose that this argument from analogy is valid.  The two things are non-analogous precisely on the point that the analogy aims to press.

There are also further problems with this argument.  First, the use of the "rights" framework is anachronistic.  The Scriptures don't speak of "rights" and specifically in this instance the release of the slave was retributive justice against the master, not a "right" of the slave.

Second, it is not clear that a wife had "greater rights" than every slave in Hebrew law.  In this case, for example, if we call what the slave has a "right," the law does not provide for similar or greater rights for wives.

Steve tried to argue that wives did have greater rights because they had higher social status.  But actually, social status is something of a fluid concept.  For example, in second temple Judaism, the temple apparently included a "court of the women," between the court of the Gentiles and the court of the men.  Thus, at least in the temple, a male Hebrew slave would have higher social status - he could get closer to the symbol of the presence of God than she could.  Of course, I recognize that in other aspects the social status of a wife was higher - in the home, the slaves would be expected to generally obey the wife.

Moreover, higher social status is not convertible into greater "rights."  Whether one characterizes the mechanisms of Hebrew law in terms of "rights," "legal protections," "privileges," or "prerogatives," there was not some kind of general pattern of providing those with higher social status greater rights, protections, privileges, etc.  Indeed, the law called for a general principle of equality despite social status differences:
Leviticus 19:15
Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.
Deuteronomy 1:17
Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment is God's: and the cause that is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it.
There's another problem with Steve's analogy, which we could call the "two dimensional" problem.  Let's suppose that married women were of higher social rank than male slaves.  That's one dimension.  At the same time, though, marriage is a more binding bond than slavery.  "They twain shall be one flesh" is a bond that is greater than the highest degree of binding in slavery, the ear bored slave who wishes to serve his master perpetually (Exodus 21:6). Husbands have a duty to sacrifice themselves for their wives in a way that no master is called upon to act toward a slave.  That's another dimension.

So, even if wives have greater rights than male slaves, the bonds of marriage are stronger.  So, Steve's argument doesn't establish what he wants it to, for at least that further reason.  It's not really a proper a fortiori argument.

And the problems don't stop there.  It is not mere battery of a slave that gives the slave freedom.  The slave gets freedom in the case of significant permanent physical injury.  Specifically, the slave gets his freedom for the loss of an eye or a tooth.
Exodus 21:26-27
And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, that it perish; he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. And if he smite out his manservant's tooth, or his maidservant's tooth; he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake.
But Steve's move in his argument is from permanent physical injury to mere battery.  That's a move from greater injury to lesser injury.  Even if permanent physical injury could justify breaking the marriage bond, Steve would still need to find some justification for something less than permanent physical injury breaking the marriage bond.

There's an even more fundamental framing problem with Steve's argument.  Why focus on a wife?  If a wife has high social status, surely in Hebrew law a husband has even higher social status.  And surely a free husband would have higher social status than a female slave.

But, of course, a "battered husband" isn't nearly sympathetic enough for Steve's argument.  Moreover, if "social status" were a determiner of degree of divorce rights, Steve's argument would imply that men in general should have more divorce rights than women, and that rich men should have more divorce rights than poor men.  But one cannot imagine Steve seriously advocating such an absurd position.  Therefore, Steve's argument should be rejected, to avoid the reduction to absurdity.

Although there are these plethora of problems with Steve's argument, Steve may point out that I've addressed his third argument, argument c, but not his first two arguments, arguments a and b.  So, let's briefly address them.

Steve argues:
a) Domestic violence is a travesty of what marriage represents, in terms of companionship as well as the emblematic significance of marriage (i.e. to illustrate God’s devotion to the redeemed). It’s the antithesis of how marriage is supposed to function (e.g. Eph 5:22-33).

b) Breach of covenant can nullify a covenant if one party fails to honor the terms of the covenant. And this isn’t the case of a spouse who makes a good faith effort, but falls short due to sin. Rather, this is acting in bad faith.
Let's take for granted that "domestic violence is a travesty of what marriage represents," as to the two aspects identified.  Let's even assume that it is the "antithesis of how marriage is supposed to function."  However, even if those statements are true, they fall short of justifying "domestic violence" as a ground of divorce.  These would just be legitimate complaints about sin, or arguments that this sin is severe ("travesty" has that connotation).  So, this is the weakest of Steve's three arguments.  He doesn't even include a step in the argument that leads to a conclusion in the form of "and thus divorce is justified based on domestic violence."

Steve's second argument also has problems.  One problem is the idea that marriage is a covenant.  While it is popular these days to speak of marriage covenants or "covenantal marriage," these are not Biblical descriptions of the marriage between a man and a woman.   Nevertheless, Malachi and Jeremiah both intermix covenantal language with the description of marriage:
Jeremiah 31:32Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake, although I was an husband unto them, saith the LORD:
Malachi 2:10-16Have we not all one father? hath not one God created us? why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother, by profaning the covenant of our fathers? Judah hath dealt treacherously, and an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem; for Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god. The Lord will cut off the man that doeth this, the master and the scholar, out of the tabernacles of Jacob, and him that offereth an offering unto the Lord of hosts.
And this have ye done again, covering the altar of the Lord with tears, with weeping, and with crying out, insomuch that he regardeth not the offering any more, or receiveth it with good will at your hand.
Yet ye say, Wherefore?
Because the Lord hath been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously: yet is she thy companion, and the wife of thy covenant.
And did not he make one? Yet had he the residue of the spirit.
And wherefore one? That he might seek a godly seed.
Therefore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth. For the Lord, the God of Israel, saith that he hateth putting away: for one covereth violence with his garment, saith the Lord of hosts: therefore take heed to your spirit, that ye deal not treacherously.
My own view is that this is a blending of various aspects of God's relationship with Israel - they were in a covenant with him, and their relationship to him was also illustrated as a marriage (usually with God as the husband, although note that he's the bride in one part of Malachi's argument).  Nevertheless, to avoid being contentious, let us assume that on some level or other a marriage is a covenant.

Steve's argument refers to the "terms of the covenant."  That would be fine if Steve could point us to terms of the covenant that support his position.  The problem is that there aren't any such terms of the covenant for Steve to point to.  Rather, if any, the terms of the covenant are those specified in my previous post, namely that the parties must not engage in adultery/fornication.

Furthermore, a spouse who makes a "good faith effort" but falls into the sin of adultery doesn't get a pass. So, "good faith effort" isn't really the Biblical standard.  Granted that it is more heinous when a person does not make a good faith effort at their marriage than when they do make such an effort, but that effort is not the measure of the marriage bond.

Likewise, there can be all kinds of bad faith.  A husband can, in bad faith, wear his shoes in bed, knowing that his wife hates the fact that it muddies the sheets.  He might even do this because he's a mean person, and not for any even remotely legitimate reason.  But one would be hard pressed to argue that if he does that once, she's free to divorce and remarry - or even that she would be free to divorce and remarry if he often did it.

Of course, one difference between making the house a pig sty and physical abuse is the severity of the absence of love of neighbor that the man is exhibiting.  Indeed, there can be many violations of a husband's duties to his wife or a wife's duties to her husband.  In a sense any violation of any of the duties is "breaking the covenant."

Presumably, though, Steve would argue that divorce is justified only when those violations are sufficiently severe.  The muddy sheets is not severe enough but "domestic violence" is severe enough.  But why does Steve get to decide what is severe enough?  After all, the Bible identifies adultery/fornication as the only example of what's ordinarily severe enough (with desertion by an unbelieving spouse being an exclusion).

Indeed, Jesus' way of describing the grounds of divorce is exclusive, not illustrative.  Jesus doesn't say "unless it be for something like adultery" but rather limits it to sexual sin ("except it be for adultery"). So, while a heinous sin like spousal abuse may in a sense "break covenant" does not mean that it rises to the level where Biblical divorce is the solution.

-TurretinFan

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Understanding Divorce from a Biblical Perspective

The Lord hates divorce. That was one of the messages of the prophet of Malachi.
Malachi 2:16
For the LORD, the God of Israel, saith that he hateth putting away: for one covereth violence with his garment, saith the LORD of hosts: therefore take heed to your spirit, that ye deal not treacherously.
So, naturally, I also hate divorce - and you should too. Before we get further, though, it is perhaps important to provide a little background into what divorce is, in Biblical terms.

From a Biblical standpoint, a divorce is the husband putting away the wife. The classical passage is this:
Deuteronomy 24:1-4
When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife. And if the latter husband hate her, and write her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house; or if the latter husband die, which took her to be his wife; her former husband, which sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled; for that is abomination before the Lord: and thou shalt not cause the land to sin, which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance.
There is no similar provision for wives in the Old Testament law. A wife could not decide that her husband was unclean and write him a bill of divorcement and put it in his hand and send him out of her house. There was no category of women divorcing their husbands.

This is important to remember when dealing with the text of Scripture. It is easy to anachronistically apply contemporary cultural norms to the text. In an age when people are redefining marriage to include reference to same sex couples, one might think that Christians would be on their guard to remember that this is not the first redefinition of marriage.

There is some question about whether women ever divorced their husbands even in the NT era. There is no discussion about wives writing writs of divorcement for their husbands, and yet the discussion of marriage relationships is sometimes balanced (see Mark 10:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 7).

Regardless of what the practice may or may not have been, the "bill of divorcement" passage was inauthentically interpreted by the Jewish leaders, and this wrong interpretation was corrected by Jesus:
Matthew 5:31-32It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.
Matthew 19:3-10The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?"
And he answered and said unto them, "Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."
They say unto him, "Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?"
He saith unto them, "Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery."
His disciples say unto him, If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.
Mark 10:2-12And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" tempting him.
And he answered and said unto them, "What did Moses command you?"
And they said, "Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away."
And Jesus answered and said unto them, "For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."
And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter. And he saith unto them, "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery."
Luke 16:18 Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.
Jesus' argument relies on the authority of the institution of marriage:
Genesis 2:22-24And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man." Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.
The apparent rabbinical view was that the "uncleanness" mentioned was anything that the husband found undesirable. Jesus, however, tightly confined the exception to adultery/fornication. Recall that the law had taught:
Deuteronomy 22:13-21If any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her, and give occasions of speech against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say, I took this woman, and when I came to her, I found her not a maid: then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate: and the damsel's father shall say unto the elders, I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her; and, lo, he hath given occasions of speech against her, saying, I found not thy daughter a maid; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity. And they shall spread the cloth before the elders of the city.
And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him; and they shall amerce him in an hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the father of the damsel, because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel: and she shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days.
But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for the damsel: then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die: because she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's house: so shalt thou put evil away from among you.
Likewise the law had taught:
Numbers 5:11-31
And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, If any man's wife go aside, and commit a trespass against him, and a man lie with her carnally, and it be hid from the eyes of her husband, and be kept close, and she be defiled, and there be no witness against her, neither she be taken with the manner; and the spirit of jealousy come upon him, and he be jealous of his wife, and she be defiled: or if the spirit of jealousy come upon him, and he be jealous of his wife, and she be not defiled: then shall the man bring his wife unto the priest, and he shall bring her offering for her, the tenth part of an ephah of barley meal; he shall pour no oil upon it, nor put frankincense thereon; for it is an offering of jealousy, an offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance.
And the priest shall bring her near, and set her before the Lord: and the priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel; and of the dust that is in the floor of the tabernacle the priest shall take, and put it into the water: and the priest shall set the woman before the Lord, and uncover the woman's head, and put the offering of memorial in her hands, which is the jealousy offering: and the priest shall have in his hand the bitter water that causeth the curse: and the priest shall charge her by an oath, and say unto the woman, If no man have lain with thee, and if thou hast not gone aside to uncleanness with another instead of thy husband, be thou free from this bitter water that causeth the curse: but if thou hast gone aside to another instead of thy husband, and if thou be defiled, and some man have lain with thee beside thine husband: then the priest shall charge the woman with an oath of cursing, and the priest shall say unto the woman, The Lord make thee a curse and an oath among thy people, when the Lord doth make thy thigh to rot, and thy belly to swell; and this water that causeth the curse shall go into thy bowels, to make thy belly to swell, and thy thigh to rot: And the woman shall say, Amen, amen.
And the priest shall write these curses in a book, and he shall blot them out with the bitter water: and he shall cause the woman to drink the bitter water that causeth the curse: and the water that causeth the curse shall enter into her, and become bitter.
Then the priest shall take the jealousy offering out of the woman's hand, and shall wave the offering before the Lord, and offer it upon the altar: and the priest shall take an handful of the offering, even the memorial thereof, and burn it upon the altar, and afterward shall cause the woman to drink the water.
And when he hath made her to drink the water, then it shall come to pass, that, if she be defiled, and have done trespass against her husband, that the water that causeth the curse shall enter into her, and become bitter, and her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall rot: and the woman shall be a curse among her people.
And if the woman be not defiled, but be clean; then she shall be free, and shall conceive seed.
This is the law of jealousies, when a wife goeth aside to another instead of her husband, and is defiled; or when the spirit of jealousy cometh upon him, and he be jealous over his wife, and shall set the woman before the Lord, and the priest shall execute upon her all this law.
Then shall the man be guiltless from iniquity, and this woman shall bear her iniquity.
So, what the law says is that there is one legitimate ground of divorce, and that is fornication/adultery (see Jesus' own interpretation of Deuteronomy above).  Moreover, it was not supposed to be the mere suspicion of that fornication/adultery (for mere suspicion there was a remedy in Numbers 5).

In 1 Corinthians 7, Paul describes marriage and provides for the case of a believing spouse married to an unbelieving spouse.  Jesus and Paul command:
1 Corinthians 7:10-16And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, "Let not the wife depart from her husband: but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband: and let not the husband put away his wife."
But to the rest speak I, not the Lord: "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy. But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases: but God hath called us to peace. For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?
So, Paul announces the general rule that husbands and wives should stay together and if, despite this command, they separate they should only remain unmarried or be reconciled to their spouse.

Paul then turns to the specific case of unbelief.  Husbands are not to divorce their wives and women are not to leave their husbands over disbelief.  However, if an unbelieving spouse desires to break the marriage, the believing spouse is allowed to permit this.

This provides a second exception to the general rule.  The general rule is "no divorce," and the two exceptions are a breaking off of the marriage by an unbeliever and adultery/fornication.  For those of us who are Presbyterian, our confession of faith also affirms this (Westminster Confession of Faith 24:5&6).

There are no other grounds for divorce authorized in Scripture.  So, it gives me great sorrow to read Christian brethren promoting the idea of divorce in other cases.

For example, I recently read a Christian brother's blog, in which he tried to argue that "domestic violence" is a legitimate ground of divorce.  The Scriptures don't teach this, and our confession doesn't recognize this ground.

In anticipation of the inevitable, let me affirm that husbands ought to love their wives as Christ loved the church.  That's a husband's moral obligation.  On the other hand, two wrongs don't make a right.  Just because a husband sins against his wife doesn't justify her in having put asunder what God joined together.  There might be a reason for her to leave her husband for the preservation of life or for a husband to leave for the preservation of his life.  But even in those cases, the Scriptures do not authorize a divorce - the parties in such a situation are not free to remarry.

Your reaction may be that of the disciples, namely that if marriage is that permanent, it is good not to marry.  And if so, at least it is good that you see how serious marriage is. God hates divorce, and we ought to as well.

-TurretinFan

P.S. It might be interesting to get into the question of whether women should be permitted to divorce their husbands at all (given that the law does not provide for it), but that question goes beyond the scope of this post.

Monday, October 22, 2012

William Lane Craig - If God's Just a Player, Who is the House?

William Lane Craig wrote:
God doesn’t create such a choice for Himself. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt.
(source)

One of the objections to Molinism is precisely that it reduces God to playing the cards he has been dealt, rather than being the dealer. But then who is the dealer? The creature? And we're back to the grounding objection (link to discussion of grounding objection).

-TurretinFan

The Memorization of the Koran Argument

One of the more interesting arguments I've heard recently in favor of the idea that the Qur'an has been perfectly preserved is the argument that people have memorized the whole Qur'an, and that this has been done for many generations. Thus, even if all the physical Qur'ans were destroyed, the Qur'an would still be perfectly preserved.

This argument apparently has some intuitive appeal. There is something of a problem with this argument. Consider the counter-example of the memorization of the canon of Scripture.

It's quite common in Christian schools (I have not done any formal study of this, but I believe it is quite common) for children to memorize the canon list of all the books of the Bible. Thus, numerous children can recite the books of the Bible, beginning from Genesis and ending at Revelation, sixty-six books in all.

This fact, however, does not mean that there have never been any canon questions or canon disputes. The practice of having children memorize the canon list is not something that started with the apostles. Thus, we cannot argue that it would have been impossible for anyone to add or subtract a book, because "every child knows that there are sixty-six books, and that they are called Genesis ... Revelation."

The same problem exists for Qur'an memorization. In order for this argument to have weight, someone needs to show that there was an early, widespread practice of memorizing the entire Qur'an.

On the contrary, the records we have suggest that the early memorizers of the Qur'an did not memorize it in its entirety, but rather in parts. For example:
'Casualties were heavy among the Qurra' of the Qur'an (i.e. those who knew the Quran by heart) on the day of the Battle of Yalmama, and I am afraid that more heavy casualties may take place among the Qurra' on other battlefields, whereby a large part of the Qur'an may be lost.
(context and citation can be found here).

If there were many people who had the Qur'an entirely memorized in that time, it would seem impossible that "a large part of the Qur'an may be lost." Therefore, assuming the testimony we quoted above is accurate, there were not many (if any) people who had the Qur'an entirely memorized in that time. Thus, the argument from Koranic memorization fails.

-TurretinFan

Friday, October 19, 2012

If you are looking for a speaker at a reasonable cost ...

I think it is safe to say that Carl Trueman charges significantly less than $10,000 per speaking engagement (see his discussion here). Incidentally, it is sad to see the scandal surrounding Dinesh D'Souza. I have no idea what the whole story is, but it is sad to hear about his family situation.

For Those in the Roman Communion Who Want to Own Ryan but not Biden...

Consider that the corpulent Cardinal Dolan is willing to publicly call both Paul Ryan and Joe Biden "Catholics" in his speech (about one minute, twenty seconds into his remarks) at the Al Smith dinner. The easily offended might want to stop just after that bit, though, and before his joke involving Benedict XVI.

It was nice to see him identify Mormons separately from "Protestants." However, Cardinal Dolan then shortly afterward suggested that both Obama and Romney have a "love of God and country." Which god exactly do either of those men love?

Dolan went on to identify something he called the "five finger gospel." It's a handy mneumonic for "You (1) do (2) it (3) to (4) me (5)." On the other hand (UPDATE: no pun intended), that's not the gospel - that's the law.

Here Cardinal Dolan's remarks:


You can also find Romney's remarks here (link) and Obama's remarks here (link). Personally, I thought Romney's jokes were more funny, though for some reason he felt it necessary to make about three references to the fact that he totally abstains from alcohol.

- TurretinFan

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

Why Don't These Arguments Persuade All the Atheists?

William Lane Craig gave an amusing but persuasive lecture in which he "Eastwooded" Richard Dawkins (embedded below). The argument rehashed arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument and the ontological argument.

Some of these, like the cosmological argument, are so airtight that one really wonders how some atheists continue to reject them. One possibility is that the arguments are too strong. Atheists think it can't be that easy, and that they must be being tricked. There must, they think, be some flaw in the argument that just has not yet been appreciated.

I would add that those arguments are valuable, but they are not enough. Acknowledging that God exists and created the world is not enough to escape God's wrath. One must repent of one's sins and trust in the Son of God for salvation from sin.

Craig's good, but incomplete, presentation is embedded below:
-TurretinFan

For those in the Roman Communion Who Think There is Only One Church ...

Consider Bendict XVI's remarks as reported today by the Vatican Information Service (emphasis mine):
The problem Europe has in finding its own identity consists, I believe, in the fact that in Europe today we see two souls: one is abstract anti-historical reason, which seeks to dominate all else because it considers itself above all cultures; it is like a reason which has finally discovered itself and intends to liberate itself from all traditions and cultural values in favour of an abstract rationality. Strasburg’s first verdict on the crucifix was an example of such abstract reason which seeks emancipation from all traditions, even from history itself. Yet we cannot live like that and, moreover, even "pure reason" is conditioned by a certain historical context, and only in that context can it exist. We could call Europe's other soul the Christian one. It is a soul open to all that is reasonable, a soul which itself created the audaciousness of reason and the freedom of critical reasoning, but which remains anchored to the roots from which this Europe was born, the roots which created the continent's fundamental values and great institutions, in the vision of the Christian faith. As you said, this soul has to find a shared expression in ecumenical dialogue between the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant Churches.
I have noticed that some folks in the Roman communion have seemingly scrupled over calling the Reformed churches "Churches," opting instead for weird-sounding alternatives like "faith communities."

While I wouldn't hope that Benedict XVI's statement signals a reversal of his view that Rome is the one true church, perhaps his broader use of the term to encompass Orthodox and "Protestant" churches is something that his servants can bring themselves to adopt.

-TurretinFan

Monday, October 15, 2012

Reepicheep - Clark and Van Til

Over at Reepicheep, it was nice to see images of the cover pages of a couple of Van Til's books demonstrating that Van Til viewed Clark as a brother in Christ, notwithstanding their significant theological differences (link to post). That does not, of course, make right the mistreatment Clark received previously, but it was encouraging nonetheless.

-TurretinFan

Thursday, October 11, 2012

"The Real Catholics" - R. Scott Clark and Perkins

R. Scott Clark has posted a series (so far two, I'm not sure if more are in the works) drawn from the works of William Perkins (1558–1602) discussing what constitutes true Catholicity. (part 1)(part 2)

In general, both Clark's and Perkins' comments are excellent. Clark notes, "Vatican II changed none of the doctrines against which the Reformation reacted." I would caveat that with "almost none" or "none of the major." Of course, on these points, a "conservative" Roman Catholic might argue that the points of change were never doctrinal issues, despite the fact that things like the use of Latin to the exclusion of the common tongue, forced celibacy of deacons, and rigid rules for orders were defended by Rome's advocates on doctrinal grounds.

And Rome has worsened her doctrines in several ways, in addition to what Clark mentions, Rome has subsequently made the Bodily Assumption and Papal infallibility dogma. Moreover, the exclusivity of Rome has certainly be downplayed to the point where inclusivism is rampant throughout the Roman hierarchy.

Clark states: "Perkins was concerned about a false ecumenism then and we have just as much right to be concerned about it now." Just as much, and perhaps even more. Rome is approaching ecumenism more winsomely today than she did back when she was having the Reformers imprisoned and burnt at the stake.

-TurretinFan

UPDATE: Part 3 is up (link).

Dr. Adam Francisco - Understanding Islam

Modern Reformation has posted a couple of videos from Dr. Adam Francisco on "Understanding Islam." (Part 1)(Part 2). It is fairly rudimentary material, but it may be a useful introduction for folks who think they probably have a good sense of what Islam is, from watching the news.

-TurretinFan

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Does the Bible Have a Rule about That?

Mob rule brings out the worst in Americans every four years.  Sadly, that's also true of Christians.  At this time of year, especially every four years, we get all sorts of appeals from our friends and brethren who are eager to have us join and/or financially support their mob, which will hopefully outnumber, outspend or otherwise defeat some one or more of the other mobs.

Some of these Christian friends and brethren will attempt to bolster their persuasive argument with appeals to Scripture.  And, of course, it is true that the Scriptures are our rule not only of faith, but also of life.  The Bible is not just a book that describes "religious things."  The Scriptures do speak to issues of how countries are to be governed, and they do address many issues that are  highly politicized.  It's good and proper for Christians to appeal to Scripture to decide legislative and political questions.  Those who suggest that the Bible is silent about such issues are wrong (and they are outside the boundaries of the Reformed confessions as well).

That said, just because the Bible has many things to say about legislation, politics, and so on, does not mean that the Bible speaks to every issue with the same level of clarity and does not mean that the Bible answers every question we may have.  As others have pointed out, while the Bible speaks to all of life, the Bible does not provide the order of steps needed to rebuild a motorcycle engine.

So, when we are confronted with appeals to Scripture on these questions or any question where people are telling us that there is a divine rule, one question we should ask ourselves is "Does the Bible have a rule about that?"  If the Bible does not have a rule, then we have Christian liberty to act within the broader and more general rules that the Scriptures provide.

So, for example, if someone claims that we must not vote for a Mormon or must not vote for someone who holds to black liberation theology, we may reply that the Bible has no such rule.  I would probably disagree with aspects of what John MacArthur says (see what he says here), but he's right in saying that to an extent the question of selecting an elected official is a question of selecting an employee to perform a job.

Everything being equal, we would prefer to select a pair of employees that includes at least one Christian over pairs that respectively include a former Muslim and a liberal Roman Catholic or a Mormon and a conservative Roman Catholic.  But not everything is equal.

The point of this post is not actually to persuade you, the reader, to join the mob I would like you to join.  My goal is to encourage you to think clearly about the question of elections, to set aside scruples that lack actual Biblical basis, but to do so without forgetting that our acts as citizens must be in accordance with the rule of faith and  life, the Holy Scriptures.

May the best mob win, but God's purposes will be accomplished regardless of men's machinations - political or otherwise.

-TurretinFan

Friday, October 05, 2012

Response to "The Quick and Easy Guide to God"

The "quick and easy guide to God," is an image that has been circulating on the Internet in the form of a flow-chart.  The flow chart begins with the premise "evil exists."

I suppose that one easy way to address this chart is to point out that "evil" doesn't exist.  "Evil" is an abstract idea.  Moreover, "evil" is defined negatively by reference to "good."  Asking if concrete examples of "evil" exist is like asking if shadows exist.  Well, there are shadows, and we can talk about them, but they are really an absence of light.  In much the same way, physical evils are really absences of physical perfections and moral evils are any absence of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God.

But let's say that for the sake of argument, we grant that there is some sense in which "evil exists."

The next step of the chart asks, "Can God prevent Evil?"  The answer to that question, of course, is only "yes."  As the chart indicates, if you can  God cannot prevent evil, then you have denied that God is omnipotent (all-powerful).

The next step of the chart asks, "Does God know about all the Evil?"  The answer to that question, as well, as a firm "yes," because (as the chart indicates) if the answer were "no," it would imply that God is not omniscient (all-knowing).

The next step of the chart asks, "Does God want to prevent Evil?" The answer that question is, "no."  If the answer were "yes," the options one would be left with would be that either God is internally conflicted (he wants to prevent it, but he also doesn't want to prevent it), which would be denial of God's simplicity.

The chart objects to the answer, "no," alleging that "Then God is not good/ God is not loving."  But this does not follow.  It is not necessary that a good or loving God would want to prevent every Evil.

A good and loving God can have a good and loving reason for allowing evil.  Allowing evil to exist for a greater purpose is a rather obvious and example of how this may be the case.

We can stop the analysis right there, as we have found an important flaw in the flowchart.

-TurretinFan

What Else Has Been Destroyed?

According to the linked news report, the papers that the pope's butler leaked were papers that the pope had personally indicated as being papers to be destroyed.    This reminds us of the similar case of Archbishop Dziwsz refusing to follow John Paul II's request that his personal papers be destroyed after his death.

Given that we see evidence of at least the two most recent popes attempting to have documentation of their papacy destroyed, one really has to wonder, what else has been destroyed by popes over the years?

Zealous "conservative" RCs have a very rose-colored picture of the papacy.  But the reality is that it is institutionalized corruption.  We have the butler and the archbishop to thank for two peeks into the machinations that go on behind the curtain, but does anyone doubt that this is but the tip of the iceberg?

-TurretinFan