Those following the Reformed blogosphere have no doubt witnessed occasional fireworks over the issue of paradox between my brethren who prefer the philosophy of Gordon Clark (whose most prominent disciple was John Robbins) and those who prefer the philosophy of Cornelius Van Til (whose most prominent disciple was Greg Bahnsen). As one might expect from fireworks, a great deal both of heat and light have been generated, and the occasional spectator has been injured or at least annoyed by some of the falling ash.
What is the primary issue? The primary issues seems to be over the issue of "paradox." There are places in Van Til's writings where it seems he simply loves paradoxes, whereas Clark is firmly opposed to paradoxes.
How can the two sides disagree? One area where the two sides disagree is over the semantic range of "paradox." If one reads Clark, one may get the distinct impression that Clark views "paradox" as only referring to real logical contradictions, whereas those who follow Van Til seem to think that Van Til is using "paradox" to refer only to apparent contradictions.
But is that all? No. Of course, that is not all. Clark more or less explicitly eschews the idea of paradox, where as Van Til (and/or his followers) seem to embrace it. Clark's followers view the followers of Van Til as irrational, and the view from the opposite direction is of Clark as excessively dependent on human reason.
What are the impacts? Clark and Van Til appear to differ in their understanding of the knowability of God. Van Til, for example, appears to permit there to be "paradoxes" that cannot be resolved with the human mind, but which can be resolved with the divine mind, because men and God think in qualitatively different ways. Clark would reject this, suggesting that any apparent paradoxes are more likely due to error, a lack of human effort, or a lack of revelation to provide the resolution.
To me the approach of Van Til sounds as though it magnifies God (by describing his knowledge as qualitatively different from ours) but it seems to contradict the Scriptural testimony that suggests that God wishes to communicate clearly truth to human beings. If what we know is not qualitatively the same as what God knows, how can anything we know truly be said to be "truth"?
I realize that perhaps this is only an apparent contradiction. However, for us to function, I think Clark's model is more reasonable: do not posit that there are irresolvable "paradoxes" because this may amount simply to throwing up one's hands when faced with a challenging problem. We should not welcome "paradox" but rather be concerned by apparent contradictions, because apparent contradictions may be actual contradictions, in which case at least one thing we previously held was false.
For Christians in particular, the lesson is that we should search the Scriptures diligently to confirm doctrines. If the Scriptures contradict the doctrines we hold, we must be careful not to simply wave our hands and call this a "paradox." Rather we need to carefully investigate whether or not the Scripture really contradicts our doctrine (in which case, our doctrine must change) or whether the initially perceived contradiction was simply apparent.
I have tried to be fair both to Clark and Van Til in the preceding paragraphs. Nevertheless, I welcome those of their contemporary disciples who would wish to disabuse me of my perceptions, should I be in error. I suppose I would consider myself a student of Clark's to a greater extent than Van Til (having read more books by the former than the latter), and I do not mean to write off everything good that Van Til may have had to say about other subjects by this criticism on the issue of paradox and the difference (alleged to exist) between the quality of man's knowledge and of God's.
-TurretinFan
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
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28 comments:
I have in mind both contradictions and paradoxes.
I am intrigued with this paragraph:
"...I realize that perhaps this is only an apparent contradiction. However, for us to function, I think Clark's model is more reasonable: do not posit that there are irresolvable "paradoxes" because this may amount simply to throwing up one's hands when faced with a challenging problem. We should not welcome "paradox" but rather be concerned by apparent contradictions, because apparent contradictions may be actual contradictions, in which case at least one thing we previously held was false..."
Can you cite a Scripture where we see a "contradiction may be actually a contradiction"?
For example, recall that the Pharisees made void Scripture through their traditions. Those were real contradictions, not just apparent contradictions of the Scriptures.
Had the Pharisees been followers of Van Til, perhaps they would have sought refuge in a paradox ... but (of course) that would have been wrong.
When our views contradict Scripture, we must revise them, because there are no real contradictions in Scripture.
-TurretinFan
yes,
I thought so, thanks and yes, there are no contradictions in Scripture!
This one is a very good article and mind bending! Oh I love difficulties!!!
:)
Beyond the debate over God's incomprehensibility is the additional debate over the epistemology of Scripturalism.
Great Post Turretin Fan. I tend to agree with your sentiments on this issue.
Doug
At the risk of shameless self-promotion, I'll just mention that my book on paradox addresses most of the concerns you raise about tolerating paradoxes (construed as apparent contradictions) in our theology. Paul Manata also wrote a nice summary review if you're short of time and money! :)
Some other comments:
1. Van Til understood a paradox to be a merely apparent contradiction. See here for more on this.
2. The vocabulary of "qualitative difference" was used at the time of the Clark-Van Til controversy. John Frame rightly points out that it was far from clear what exactly was meant by the phrase; consequently it shed little light on how to understand the opposing positions and how the issue ought to be resolved. It's questionable whether it functioned as much more than a shibboleth.
I have to say, I don't see that the meaning of the phrase is any clearer here. What exactly does a "qualitative difference" between God's knowledge and man's knowledge amount to? Are we talking about the objects of knowledge? Or the methods of knowledge? Or the phenomenology of knowledge? Or the conceptual precision of knowledge? Or something else altogether? Until we get clearer on that point, it's going to be pretty hard to see what implications we're supposed to draw about our knowledge of God.
As it stands, the phrase doesn't really illuminate the grounds for the disagreement between Clark and Van Til.
3. I suggest that the question of whether we should tolerate paradoxes in our theology cannot be conducted without considering specific doctrines that are thought to be problematic in this regard. Take the doctrine of the Trinity, for example. Is it possible to explicate it in a biblically orthodox yet non-paradoxical fashion? If so, then the question of paradox doesn't arise in the first place; it's not a live issue. But if it isn't possible, or it proves extremely difficult in practice, then arguably that fact is an important datum to be taken into account when considering the tolerability of paradox.
4. Van Til's position doesn't entail that we can simply "throw up our hands" when faced with a logically challenging problem. The rational acceptance of paradox as a "last resort" or "fallback position" needn't remove the motivation for sustained efforts either to develop logically consistent formulations of biblical doctrines or to re-evaluate our readings of Scripture. (I address this point at more length in my book.)
At any rate, I think more argument is needed to show that Van Til's position does commit one to that sort of "white flag" mentality.
5. If Clark's position allows that paradoxes can be due to "a lack of revelation to provide the resolution", and Clark is committed (presumably) to the closure of the canon, it follows that he must also allow in principle for irresolvable biblical paradoxes (at least in this life). But if that doesn't "contradict the Scriptural testimony that suggests that God wishes to communicate clearly truth to human beings", why think that Van Til's position does?
6. Both Van Til and Clark were firmly committed to the Protestant doctrine of the clarity of Scripture. But this doctrine doesn't entail that everything in Scripture is clear or that every aspect of God's self-revelation will be logically perspicuous. The same goes for doctrines derived from Scripture. The doctrine of the clarity of Scripture doesn't guarantee, for example, that our grasp of God's trinitarian nature must be free from all logical perplexities.
So I'm curious to know exactly which "Scriptural testimony" rules out the possibility of theological paradoxes. What passages are in view here? What is the nature and scope of the clarity promised by these passages? How does this clarity preclude the specific paradoxes to which Van Til drew attention?
Well, these are just a few thoughts to further the discussion!
I will admit up front I’m naïve on this issue, but when it comes to knowledge, I thought that the bible is the Christian’s source?
Wouldn’t most Christians believe that if we cannot square it with the bible then we need to drop it? So if our belief is out of line with what the bible says then we should align our belief with the bible. If we view the bible as truth, then that is the source we have to use to judge all other truth claims. Now I suppose the idea is that there are many things not in the bible so how do we deal with that? Now I’ve not read much of Clark, but it seems that most non-Clarkians would hold to at least a two-source theory of knowledge, the bible and something else and that Clark would hold only to the bible.
It seems strange though to have another source of knowledge and truth, if most of the time Christians point to the bible alone
TurretinFan,
I have not read much of either man, but Van Til has always struck me as having had the better position. It does seem to me that God's knowledge is qualitatively different from ours, insofar as God's knowledge is not learned.
This means, I suppose, that it is possible we may encounter paradoxes that are not resolvable by us. I am having trouble of thinking of an example, although I think Van Til regarded the Trinity as a paradoxical doctrine.
TF,
I would read Anderson's book on the matter if you'd like to interact with the most sophisticated defense of the rationality in believing in paradox. I reviewed it here:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/paradox-in-christian-theology.html
1. Both God and man can know the same truth, however, and this is but one example, the qualitative difference comes in at, say, the level of the subject of knowledge. So, there's a qualitative difference here. The problem here arises, in part, because there are different ways to cash out the verb 'to know.' When considering the object of knowledge, the knowledge is "the same." That is why Van Til could claim that "out knowledge and God's coinside at every point," while also claiming that "our knowledge and God's coincide at know point." He qualified both of these by claiming "in the sense that." Thus, Van Til's point is more sophisticated than how some Clarkians want to paint it.
2. Parodox is not posited lightly, and, I would argue, is not a throwing up of the hands but, rather, the other side has thrown up its hands. It's always easier to say, "There, it's been resolved, we have cognitive rest, let's move on now." At any rate, I know that Anderson as well as myself would gladly welcome resolutions that are not only rational, but also orthodox. On this view, we actually believe that the alleged resolutions offered do not maintain orthodoxy. If you felt a view was unorthodox would you gladly affirm it? Even if it were rational?
"Had the Pharisees been followers of Van Til, perhaps they would have sought refuge in a paradox ... but (of course) that would have been wrong".
Hi TF,
They couldn't have given the necessary and sufficient conditions Anderson lays out for something being able to be a candidate for paradox.
Kyle:
You wrote: "It does seem to me that God's knowledge is qualitatively different from ours, insofar as God's knowledge is not learned."
That doesn't really seem to have to do with the quality of the knowledge. It's actually unclear how much of our own knowledge (particularly of God) is learned, and how much is simply made more apparent.
Paul: I had enjoyed your review of Anderson's book. I don't, however, see any particular reason to suggest that God's knowledge is qualitatively different from ours. If that permise of Van Til's argument is wrong, then the rest of the issue seems to go away.
To answer your question: "If you felt a view was unorthodox would you gladly affirm it? Even if it were rational?" If a doctrine is Scriptural, I will accept it, even if it gives me goosebumps. I'm not too worried about the label "orthodox" except to the extent that it is synonymous with "Scriptural."
-TurretinFan
I posted a lengthy comment here earlier today. Has it been lost in the ether?
Mitch:
I can only speak for Reformed Christians (not every sect out there that calls itself "Christian") but we hold to the view that knowledge can be acquired from the Bible and from the world around us.
Clark had an epistemology in which he essentially (and I am simplifying a bit here) referred to "Knowledge" (notice my capital letter) as being things that we can know with absolute certainty. Such Knowledge is only attainable through revelation. However, fallible and uncertain knowledge (notice the lowercase) can be obtained other ways.
I'd rather not debate Clark's view of knowledge in this particular forum, but I just want to clarify what his position was.
-TurretinFan
Mr. Anderson,
Two main issues (with respect to your first comment above)
1) The idea that something is irreconciliably contradictory but not truly contradictory is an odd concept. It is so odd that it leads one to believe that, vis-a-vis the human mind, these are real contradictions that Van Til is talking about (although for God they are not contradictions). That's a bit troubling, since it seems to open the door to a denial of the law of non-contradiction at least as far as the human mind is concerned.
2) I'm not sure why anyone would think that someone would have the onus of showing that there cannot be paradoxes. Instead, the onus would seem to be on the proponent.
Mr. Anderson,
As to your second comment, no - not lost in the ether (as you probably already see). On the other hand, since it was one of the first comments today, it got handled last when I was reviewing the posts for moderation.
I have occassionally seen folks lose their comments in the ether here, though, so I always suggest that if one has a long comment, one should probably save it on one's computer for later use.
And a few further notes in regard to your first comment:
As to your point (2), I don't think Van Til's distinction (summarized well, if with some minor typos, by Paul M. above) is either Scriptural or helpful. It does seem to clarify what he means by qualitative difference, but it doesn't help us understand God better.
As to your point (3), I'm not sure that the issue should be phrased in terms of "paradox" at all. If Scripture teaches (a) and (b), then both are true. If reconciling them is difficult, that's a challenge for theologians, but there doesn't seem to be any reason to think that they cannot be reconciled.
As to your (4), I don't see how calling the acceptance of paradox "rational" is validated. It may be rational in the same way in which a woman stops asking her husband to put his clothes in the hamper, but it doesn't seem rational in the sense of being required by logic.
Your point at (5) seems to gloss over the fact that Van Til seems to suggest that these are not simply areas where information is deficient but where no amount of information would help.
Obviously, I agree (as all Reformed believers ought) that only those things necessary for salvation are guaranteed to be perspicuous.
Finally, I hope you will recognize that I approach this less from a desire to reanimate the Clark/Van Til controversy, and more from a desire to sift the valuable contributions that were generated in that time from the heat that was contemporaneously generated.
-TurretinFan
TF,
Thanks for the reply. (And please call me James!)
1) The idea that something is irreconciliably contradictory but not truly contradictory is an odd concept.It may seem odd to you, but as far as I can tell there's nothing incoherent about the idea itself. In fact, it needs to be disambiguated somewhat. An apparent contradiction could be said to be irreconcilable for any of the following reasons:
(A) We currently lack the information to resolve it, because although we have the cognitive capacity to grasp that information, the information has not yet been revealed.
(B) We currently lack the information to resolve it, because we currently lack the cognitive capacity to grasp that information, even if it were revealed.
(C) We will always lack the information to resolve it, because although we have the cognitive capacity to grasp that information, the information will never be revealed.
(D) We will always lack the information to resolve it, because we will always lack the cognitive capacity to grasp that information, even if it were revealed.
(E) We will always lack the information to resolve it, because there is no such information: the apparent contradiction is a real contradiction after all.
Van Til's position could be interpreted as any of A-D. You seem to suggest that he's ultimately committed to E. But it's far from clear why that would be so.
The model of theological paradox I develop in my book is specifically designed to avoid any denial of the law of non-contradiction. So it's not fair to say that it "opens the door" to such a denial. At the very least, you'll need to develop more argument on that point!
As for the onus, surely the burden of proof lies (as usual) with the one who asserts. If Clark asserts that there can be no paradoxes, then the onus is on him to argue that point. If Van Til asserts that there can be paradoxes, and furthermore that there are some paradoxes, then the onus is on him to argue those points. At any rate, I think my book states its thesis carefully and provides extended arguments in its support.
James:
Perhaps I have a mistaken understanding of Van Til's teachings (based on reading more Clark than Van Til), but I would typically view Van Til's argument as arising from the shared facet of (B) and (D), namely that we (every human being in this life) currently lack the cognitive ability to grasp whatever further information would reconcile the apparently irreconciliable.
Assuming arguendo that there is any such situation, there does not appear to be any good reason for thinking that there might also not be any such situations. There is, however, a good reason to think that there are no such situations, at least because we have a very strong shared intuition that the law of non-contradiction is universal and applicable to the human mind.
As for onus, it is on the proponent. The proponent of paradox is Van Til. Now, once a reasonable case has been set forth (and perhaps your book is such), there can be a shift in the burden.
-TurretinFan
Hi TF,
I didn't know we were getting called out on typos here, I'll try to make this comment fit for your meta (however, I noted that you misspelled ‘premise’ below)! :-)
You said in response to my post:
"Paul: I had enjoyed your review of Anderson's book. I don't, however, see any particular reason to suggest that God's knowledge is qualitatively different from ours. If that permise of Van Til's argument is wrong, then the rest of the issue seems to go away".Given the distinctions I made, it is fairly obvious to me that there are qualitative differences. Without objecting to my specific points, then you'd be claiming to be divine. Another qualitative difference is originality. Our thoughts are never original, God's always are.
I'm unsure why you don't think this is helpful. Van Til was entering into the theolgia archtypa and theologia ectypa discussion. it also has roots in Calvin's claim that God speaks balbutire, baby talk.
Also, I'm unsure how the issue would go away if that premise were wrong. Recall the spacelander/flatlander point Anderson makes (as you'll remember from my review), that's a paradoxical situation and there may not be any qualitative distinction between the 2-D and 3-D beings at all.
Next:
To answer your question: "If you felt a view was unorthodox would you gladly affirm it? Even if it were rational?" If a doctrine is Scriptural, I will accept it, even if it gives me goosebumps. I'm not too worried about the label "orthodox" except to the extent that it is synonymous with "Scriptural".
Okay, and I think this is the view taken by defenders of paradox. It's not out of laziness but out of study of the formulations of the Trinity, codified in the orthodox creeds, which are believed to represent the data in Scripture, that one would hold that the formulation is paradoxical. However, each individual proposition is revealed in Scripture and warranted, thus the whole thing is warranted. It doesn't help us when Clark offers a kind of social Trinitarianism. That may not have the rationality problem, but it has a problem on the orthodoxy side of things. So, we cannot affirm ST or the other models on offer. We then affirm the paradoxical formulation, which best represents the biblical data. But the problem with this has been that such an affirmation is irrational. That's been the driving force behind finding another way out. However, Anderson has shown how one can be rational in affirming paradoxical doctrines.
TF,
As to your point (2), I don't think Van Til's distinction (summarized well, if with some minor typos, by Paul M. above) is either Scriptural or helpful. It does seem to clarify what he means by qualitative difference, but it doesn't help us understand God better.I tend to agree that the way Van Til expressed himself on this issue wasn't nearly as clear as it could have been. (I hope I've done a better job in my book!) Nevertheless, it's reasonably clear that Van Til wasn't making some of the absurd claims that have often been imputed to him.
If I get the time, I'll post something on my own blog about how we can better understand Van Til's position on the differences between divine knowledge and human knowledge.
As to your point (3), I'm not sure that the issue should be phrased in terms of "paradox" at all. If Scripture teaches (a) and (b), then both are true. If reconciling them is difficult, that's a challenge for theologians, but there doesn't seem to be any reason to think that they cannot be reconciled.A paradox is, by definition, an apparent contradiction. If you grant that (a) and (b) appear to involve an implicit logical contradiction, then you're not so far from my position after all. As to whether a resolution can be found, I leave that question relatively open in the cases of the Trinity and the Incarnation. But we still need to say something about how it can be rational for us to continue to hold (a) and (b) in the meantime.
As to your (4), I don't see how calling the acceptance of paradox "rational" is validated. It may be rational in the same way in which a woman stops asking her husband to put his clothes in the hamper, but it doesn't seem rational in the sense of being required by logic.My point is it can be rational (in the sense of 'reasonable') for Christians to affirm a (presently) paradoxical doctrine in the absence of a satisfactory resolution. At any rate, that's what I argue in the book. Once we have a satisfactory resolution, of course, the doctrine is no longer paradoxical (at least for those who can grasp the resolution).
TF,
Finally, I hope you will recognize that I approach this less from a desire to reanimate the Clark/Van Til controversy, and more from a desire to sift the valuable contributions that were generated in that time from the heat that was contemporaneously generated.Sure. I hope I didn't give the impression I thought otherwise.
Good point about the "premise" typo ... my glass house and all. I'm not free from them myself.
You wrote: "Given the distinctions I made, it is fairly obvious to me that there are qualitative differences."
Right, but I'm not willing to simply "give" you those distinctions.
I certainly grant that God is the source of all knowledge and we are only recipients (and not in any way sources) of knowledge vis-a-vis God. Nevertheless, I don't see why transmission of the knowledge would force it to undergo any qualitative change.
Perhaps I've forgotten how the argument would proceed absent the qualitative difference premise and its relation to Flatland. I'll check it (at least your review) out later, to see if I can track down what you are referencing.
As for the other part, I feel no need to drive a wedge between those who like the word "paradox" and those who don't. I'm glad to hear where there are areas of overlap.
Likewise, I don't want to get sidetracked by criticisms of Clark on his view of the Trinity.
-TurretinFan
"Nevertheless, it's reasonably clear that Van Til wasn't making some of the absurd claims that have often been imputed to him."
Sadly, I agree. That is to say, sadly I would not be surprised to find out that some of the absurd claims attributed to Van Til are not his own. I have found (in my more extensive reading on that side) that Clark's views are frequently subject to rather significant distortion among his critics: I would be surprised to find out that this was one-sided.
-TurretinFan
Hi TF,
Last reply 'cause it looks like we're winding down. I'll let you have the final word as it's your blog.
You said:
"Right, but I'm not willing to simply "give" you those distinctions".
The distinction I drew was regarding the subject of knowledge. Surely you don't think there is only a quantitative difference between you and God.
So, though we may have problems with the way VT put things---and we should cut some slack considering he was writing more in the continental and idealist tradition---the point he was trying to get at seems fairly uncontroversial to me.
The point was---and ironically this was very analytic---there are distinctions to be drawn when speaking of "man's knowledge" and "God's knowledge." It's not just as simply as talking about what is known (there is no qualitative change here), but questions as to standards, subjects, origins, etc., of that knowledge should be asked as well (and there can be qualitative changes, at least in some of these, here).
TF,
Perhaps I have a mistaken understanding of Van Til's teachings (based on reading more Clark than Van Til), but I would typically view Van Til's argument as arising from the shared facet of (B) and (D), namely that we (every human being in this life) currently lack the cognitive ability to grasp whatever further information would reconcile the apparently irreconciliable.Yes, I think it's most likely that Van Til wanted to affirm either B or D. But my point is that neither B nor D come close to a denial of the law of non-contradiction.
The LNC states that no proposition can be both true and false. Van Til doesn't suggest that any propositions can be both true and false. Rather, his suggestion seems to be that our grasp of certain propositions about God exhibits a degree of conceptual imprecision, because of our creaturely finitude, and furthermore that in some areas this imprecision gives rise to the appearance of inconsistency. So the paradoxes are due not to actually contradictory propositions, but to our limited grasp of certain propositions. There is no violation of the LNC here. Our "very strong shared intuition" on that front is honored.
In my book, I give some non-theological examples of apparent contradiction arising from conceptual imprecision to illustrate that this isn't a case of special pleading.
As for onus, it is on the proponent. The proponent of paradox is Van Til. Now, once a reasonable case has been set forth (and perhaps your book is such), there can be a shift in the burden.Let's not lose sight of the dialectical context here. In your original post, you were the proponent of the view that Clark's position is more biblical and rationally satisfying than Van Til's. And to your credit, you gave several reasons in support. I've argued in response that these reasons don't hold water. At the least, I think I've shown that you need to clarify and further support your arguments. So I believe the ball is back in your court, brother. :)
I'll also add that the case for the existence of theological paradoxes isn't based on a deduction from general claims about divine knowledge and human knowledge. Rather, it arises from critical reflection on specific doctrines, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation.
Anyway, I'm done for now. Thanks for the stimulating interaction!
PM: "The distinction I drew was regarding the subject of knowledge. Surely you don't think there is only a quantitative difference between you and God."
God and I are different subjects, to be sure. I'm not seeing how that would affect the knowledge much as how I don't see how the origin would affect the knowledge.
-TurretinFan
Sorry about the formatting in some of my comments. Blogger doesn't seem to be behaving as expected! Anyway, I hope it's clear enough that I've used italics to mark off quotations from TF's comments.
"Anyway, I'm done for now. Thanks for the stimulating interaction!"
Thanks for stopping by!
"In your original post, you were the proponent of the view that Clark's position is more biblical and rationally satisfying than Van Til's." I certainly did advocate that, although I hope I couched my claims in sufficiently soft terms to address the fact that I would like to read more of Van Til before rigidly concluding that there is more than a semantic disagreement between Clark and Van Til (although it really seems there must be).
-TurretinFan
Clark would reject this, suggesting that any apparent paradoxes are more likely due to error, a lack of human effort, or a lack of revelation to provide the resolution.
I realize this thread is somewhat old, but to add one minor caveat, I have never come across anything in Clark's work that would even suggest that any biblical paradox would be due to a lack of revelation. FWIW this is the tactic used by some Vantilians (Anderson would be one of them)to justify the idea of the so-called "apparent contradictions" inherent in Scripture.
BTW I very much recommend Anderson's book in defense of the Vantilian idea of paradox since it is arguably the best defense of the Vantilian view of Scriptural logical incoherence I've yet read, even if seriously and dangerously flawed. I cannot commend Anderson's conclusion or his method, but I certainly commend his effort. Of course, I would commend him more if he would just give up the futility and bankruptcy of Van Til's epistemology. But, he's made his bed I suppose....
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