Steve Hays (Calvinist) wrote: God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.
GodIsMyJudge (Molinist) wrote: Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?
God's Will not Like Man's Will:
GodIsMyJudge's question misses part of the reason for Steve's comment. God's will is not like man's will. There is an analogy, but it is not a correspondence. God's will (his secret will - his decree of Providence) is not something time-bound. It is not something that begins from existing circumstances and produces a choice that is responsive to the circumstances in which it finds itself. It itself determines all circumstances. The decrees of God are his eternal purposes according to the counsel of his will, whereby - for his own glory - he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
The will's decision itself (that is to say, the decree of God) is not something that comes to pass. It is an eternal purpose of God. There was never a time when it was not.
Sometimes, for analytical purposes, we treat it as though we viewed it as active, but it is not. There is no time before God's will chooses what it chose - it is an eternal decree.
Relation to Knowledge of God:
This issue has a bearing on the discussion of the knowledge of God. What GodIsMyJudge seems to have overlooked is that in both the Molinist and Calvinist understanding, God's decrees are eternal - they do not come to be. The order that we discuss is simply a logical order - not a temporal order.
Thus, the Calvinist logical order is as follows:
1) Natural Knowledge
3) Free Knowledge
Whereas the Molinist logical order is as follows:
1) Natural Knowledge
2) Partial Decree
3) Middle Knowledge
4) Rest of Decree
5) Free Knowledge
Comparison to Human Will:
But both Molinists and Calvinists agree that this is simply a logical not a temporal order.
In contrast, human wills (in both systems) operate with temporal order:
That is an order that is both logical and temporal. First, there is our nature. This is something that is a given. Next, we and our nature encounter a specific circumstance. Sometimes that circumstance is largely of our making, other times we had nothing to do with the circumstance. Finally, in the circumstance, we make a choice.
Observation about Molinism:
Oddly enough, although Molinism advocates "Libertarian" free will (as opposed to simple, Calvinistic free will), Molinism essentially makes man's decree a product of his nature and his circumstance, such that if the same nature is placed in the same circumstance man's decree will be the same.
Functionally, that sounds quite deterministic. The Molinist insists that the choices are free in a "libertarian" and "indeterminate" sense, but it really isn't apparent how that is possible or even credible. In the Molinist regime, it really looks like man's choices are essentially the product of his circumstances.
I don't want to get too sidetracked by pointing out the apparent inconsistency of Molinism. I understand (I think) the rationale behind GodIsMyJudge's question: he'd like to have Steve say that God has libertarian free will, to open the door to the idea that man could also have libertarian free will. The problem, however, is that while God and man both have wills - they operate in very different ways. In fact, even saying "operate" is a word that is only analogous when speaking of God's will.
No, God is the only uncaused cause. He is the only self-existent being, and his choices are eternal - they did not come into being indeterminately or determinately - they simply did not come into being, but always were. Therein lies the fallacy in, under, or behind the question posed by GodIsMyJudge.