Dialogue Regarding Freedom of the Will
with Godismyjudge
(Continued)
This post is a continuation of
this earlier post, which itself is an offshoot of
the Inventokos post.
Now, Godismyjudge (aka GIMJ or Dan) has written:
Dear Turretinfan,You asked for a reconciliation between LFW-P and my three points.
That is:
LFW-P “man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed”
And Man is:
1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause
3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.
#1 “Man is Able T=1, to choose or not choose A” is essentially LFW-P. I suspect that’s not where you have questions, but if you do please ask them.
#3 is essentially the excluded middle principle you used to drive a wedge between LFW and LFW-P. IE man can’t do the logically impossible.
#2 is the interesting one. I will try to make it boring by rephrasing.
2* man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.
Now it’s the same as 1 and LFW-P. The only difference is inception verses continuation of a choice. IE let’s say I choose to run a mile. At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice.
I worded #2 differently. I didn’t use alternates (ie stop or continue), but only one object: continuation. Hence I added the qualifier: “without an external sufficient cause”. For our present purposes, please think of a sufficient cause as that which necessitates in an LFW-N sense. So if there is a sufficient cause for A, A is LFW-N. So 2 and 2* have the same import.
That’s a high level matching of points 1-3 and LFW-P.
Thanks for your response to my question. I will get back to you on it.
God be with you,
Dan
I reply:
Dear Dan:
I respectfully disagree with at least some of your statements above.
Allow me to begin by pointing out again the definition of LFW-P:
LFW-P is defined as “man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed”
Your numbers 1-3 do not derive from LFW-P, but are rather new ideas.
In view of that position of mine, and for convenient reference, I will refer to them as LFW-3 (your number 1), LFW-4 (your number 2), LFW-5 (your number 3). At one point you provide yet another definition which at first appears to be neither derived from LFW-P, nor from your points as written, but which you refer to as 2*. Nevertheless, because it may be derivable from LFW-P, I will refer to this definition as LFW-P2.
LFW-3
LFW-3 defines freedom as: “Man is Able [at] T=1, to choose or not choose A”
This is not the same as LFW-P.
The first difference is minor, in that the genus "deed" has been replaced by the species "choice," which is one type of deed. This is a minor difference, as I would view LFW-3 as derived from LFW-P if it were a species of LFW-P.
The notable difference, however, is "is able ... prior to the deed ... to do," vs. "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose."
Surely you see the difference.
"Prior" means before the event, whereas "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose" means at the event. At and before are distinct concepts.
You wrote: "I suspect that’s not where you have questions, but if you do please ask them."
I respond: It's not so much that I have questions, as that it is important for us to be clear. To be clear, as shown above, LFW-3 is not the same as LFW-P, nor is it derived from LFW-P.
LFW-4
LFW-4 defines free will as: "Man is Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause."
This definition has the same "at"/"prior" difference from LFW-P as does LFW-3. LFW-4 introduces a further difference, the qualification "without an external cause."
This qualification did not derive from the definition of LFW-P. Instead, the qualificaiton LFW-4 appears to be simply your insertion, Godismyjudge. That's one reason it really ought to have its own label, as opposed to be a species of LFW-P or even LFW-3.
Another difference is "stop willing" as compared to "do" (LFW-P) or "choose" (LFW-3). Since to forebear is a deed, albeit a negative deed, this simply provides a species or example, and if it were only for this difference, we could accept LFW-4 as a species of LFW-3.
LFW-5
LFW-5 defines (apparently necessity) as: "Man is Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A."
LFW-5 is simply a species of Logical Necessity. I think we are in agreement (for once) on this, inasmuch as you comment: "#3 is essentially the excluded middle principle you used to drive a wedge between LFW and LFW-P. IE man can’t do the logically impossible."
One follow-up needs to be provided, though. I am not here to force any position on non-Calvinists. You can pick your definitions, and I wll analyze them. My analysis will be as pointed and thorough as I can provide, but we're keeping busy enough with actual definitions.
LFW-P2
LFW-P2 is defined as "man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3."
LFW-P2 can be viewed as a species of LFW-P.
Reasons why LFW-P2 can be viewed as a species of LFW-P:
- The specific designations T=2 and T=3 (understood as T = 3 is later than T = 2) are examples of the general principle of "prior."
- The two qualifers of the act of "willing," namely "stop or continue" are mutually exclusive qualifiers, such that they form examples of the general principle "do A or not-A."
The criticism provided in the Inventokos post applies with equal force to LFW-P2, and LFW-P2 does not provide freedom at the example T=3, but only at the example, T=2. Thus, man's acts under LFW-P2 are not free any more than man acts are free under LFW-P, which (we have shown) is zero freedom.
You remark: "Now it’s the same as 1 and LFW-P."
I reply: It is a species of LFW-P, but it is not the same as LFW-3 (your "1"). The same "prior" difference noted above applies to LFW-P2 as it did to LFW-P.
You continue: "The only difference is inception verses continuation of a choice."
I reply: You have verbally conflated the act of choosing with the object of the choice. The inception versus continuation are not differences in the choice, but in the object. Allow me to demonstrate.
Using your example: "IE let’s say I choose to run a mile. At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice."
I reply: Notice that the object of the choice is "run a mile." At the ½ mile point (and arguably at every conscious moment along the way), you have a choice about whether to complete the running of the mile or quit. Nevertheless, those choices are different choices - not the same choice, strictly speaking.
The language in your example provides an interesting hook for our discussion. You wrote: "At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice."
Now, we both know you meant that "have to continue" as assuming the unstated "if I am to go on to complete the mile." In other words, neither of us would say that you are under an absolute necessity to complete the mile, in ordinary speech.
Nevertheless, if we adopted LFW-P or LFW-P2, we might imagine such a scenario, where you were free to choose to continue only at the starting line, not at the ½ mile point. That, of course, is an absurd world, which is why we should recognize the absurdity of LFW-P and LFW-P2 and return to the simple, Calvinistic sense of freedom of will, as de jure and de facto freedom, as described in the Inventokos post.
You stated: "I worded #2 differently. I didn’t use alternates (ie stop or continue), but only one object: continuation."
I reply: I don't have a problem with your implying one of the two alternatives. I know what you mean when you say a choice to continue: you mean a choice between continuing and not continuing (and likewise you convey the same thing negatively when you say "stop").
You wrote: "Hence I added the qualifier: “without an external sufficient cause”."
I reply: Non Sequitur. No qualifer is necessary if your goal is simply to convey the same information, since - as noted above - we can deduce the other alternative from the stated alternative.
You continued: "For our present purposes, please think of a sufficient cause as that which necessitates in an LFW-N sense."
I reply: I point you back to my earlier comments about the confusion that the use of the verb "necessitate" creates.
Nevertheless, as I understand you, you are saying that sufficient cause (SC) is anything that produces LFW-N in an act. Recall, however, that we already established that LFW-N is just logical necessity. Furthermore, recall that we established that the basis for logical necessity is the nature of God. This would seem to render "external" superfluous for everyone except God. As a corollary, however, it also produces the result that "without [the nature of God]" is a null set, because the nature of God applies everywhere and over all of time.
Nevertheless, there's no reason to start addressing the sufficiency of causes, so let's not force that particular definition on SC just yet.
You continued: "So if there is a sufficient cause for A, A is LFW-N."
I reply: Possibly you meant to insert "external" again? Or perhaps you recognized its superfluity and omitted it? In any event, everything that happens is LFW-N, because LFW-N just logical necessity, and everything is subject to logical necessity.
You wrote: "So 2 and 2* have the same import."
I respond: NS, QED.
-Turretinfan
4 comments:
Dear Turretinfan,
You claim that there is a notable difference between LFW-3 and LFW-P. Namely,
The notable difference, however, is "is able ... prior to the deed ... to do," vs. "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose."
Surely you see the difference.
"Prior" means before the event, whereas "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose" means at the event. At and before are distinct concepts.
This is incorrect. LFW-3 is successive, ie the ability first, then the choice.
This can be seen three different ways.
First, by explicit statement. I had said:
Let’s assume man is deliberating at T=1 and chooses at T=2. Man is:
1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
Second, via context. I had equated LFW-3 to LFW-P and LFW-4, which are successive, and contrasted LFW-5 which is simultaneous.
Third, because in relation to action, the ability to act, precedes the act.
That LFW-3 and LFW-P are the same is an important point and I don’t think we are on the same page yet.
On another note, upon reflecting on your response to my question regarding necessity, and your comments regarding sufficient causation, it seems to me that we may be substituting LFW-N and LFW-P-N.
I am perhaps to blame for this, since I maintain that the difference is semantic and not real. You on the other hand seem equate LFW-P-N with logical necessity, but you have only demonstrated that LFW-N (understood in an LFW-5 sense (which is not the sense that I think the Arminian intends)) equals logical necessity. But the problem is neither of us has defined LFW-P-N.
Let me talk a shot.
Given LFW-P is: man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed
I would “loosely” say LFW-P-N is: Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise
Tightening this up will probably involve defining a sufficient cause, and will probably distinguish LFW-P-N from logical necessity. But I think not defining LFW-P-N is part of the problem here.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
TF, previously: "Prior" means before the event, whereas "[at] T=1 ... is able to choose" means at the event. At and before are distinct concepts.
GIMJ: "This is incorrect."
I respond: Let's see how you back that up.
GIMJ: "LFW-3 is successive, ie the ability first, then the choice."
I reply: That's not how LFW-3 is written, as has been shown. The "to choose" is not time differentiated from the ability, within the definition itself.
I also reply: I understand, however, that you are attempting (and presumably intended) to say that man has the freedom at T = 1, and acts at T = 2. If that is the case, then the criticism that the acts are not free under the definition also attach to this definition, and whether it is different or the same as LFW-P is moot.
GIMJ: "This can be seen three different ways. First, by explicit statement. I had said:"
GIMJ, previously: "Let’s assume man is deliberating at T=1 and chooses at T=2. Man is: 1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A."
I reply: Notice that you are using an equivocal time frame in your assumption. Which is the present T=1 or T=2? If 1 is the present, then "chooses" at T=2 does not fit, and if 2 is the present then "is deliberating" does not fit.
I also reply: If you are trying to phrase LFW-3 as "Man is able, at T = 1, to choose A at T = 2," then the statement is obviously absurd, since man cannot NOW do things in the FUTURE. It's logically necessary that man, being a temporal creature, act in the present.
GIMJ: "Second, via context. I had equated LFW-3 to LFW-P and LFW-4, which are successive, and contrasted LFW-5 which is simultaneous."
I reply: As noted above, while I may disagree that you said what you meant to say, it is clear from your comments here that you mean to convey succession, but - as explained above - succession implies no freedom in the act itself, only prior to the act.
GIMJ: "Third, because in relation to action, the ability to act, precedes the act."
I reply: No. As normally understood, the relevant ability need not precede the act, but MUST exist at the time of the act. Thus, any ability that last exists prior to the act is not relevant to the normal sense of ability as it relates to action.
GIMJ wrote: "That LFW-3 and LFW-P are the same is an important point and I don’t think we are on the same page yet."
I respond: Perhaps we are not on the same page. Let's see how you clarify below.
GIMJ wrote: "On another note, upon reflecting on your response to my question regarding necessity, and your comments regarding sufficient causation, it seems to me that we may be substituting LFW-N and LFW-P-N."
I reply: hmmm
GIMJ wrote: "I am perhaps to blame for this, since I maintain that the difference is semantic and not real. You on the other hand seem equate LFW-P-N with logical necessity, but you have only demonstrated that LFW-N (understood in an LFW-5 sense (which is not the sense that I think the Arminian intends)) equals logical necessity. But the problem is neither of us has defined LFW-P-N."
I reply: To be clear, I have shown the LFW-N is a species of Logical Necessity, and that, accordingly, LFW is absurd. For LFW-P, I defined freedom, but did not explicitly define necessity. Nevertheless, we can deduce LFW-P-N from LFW-P, if you will grant that necessity is the absence of freedom.
GIMJ: "Let me talk a shot. Given LFW-P is: man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed"
I interrupt: In view of the understanding that necessity is the absence of freedom, what would seem to follow is that LFW-P-N is "man is NOT able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed."
Instead, GIMJ wrote: "I would “loosely” say LFW-P-N is: Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise."
I reply: That definition is not deduced from LFW-P, it's something entirely new. It is, perhaps, the "loosely" that is making the leap possible, but "loosely" is not the way to reason deductively. We can certainly discuss this definition of necessity, and - for convenience - we can call it LFW-6-N.
GIMJ: "Tightening this up will probably involve defining a sufficient cause, and will probably distinguish LFW-P-N from logical necessity. But I think not defining LFW-P-N is part of the problem here."
I reply: As noted above, we can obtain a tight definition of LFW-P-N from LFW-P, without adding any new ideas regarding cause.
I also reply: Furthermore, the "loose" definition above says only "cause" not "sufficient cause."
I further reply: As your definitions get more complicated to (depending on your perspective) overcome my objections or clarify my misunderstandings, it is important that you define terms when they are being used in a special technical sense. Thus, for LFW-6-N, above, a first step would likely be to technically define "cause," since I'm confident that you mean that word in a specialized sense.
I finally reply: Incidentally, given
LFW-6-N = Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise
(i) I should point out that this definition is probably more expansive than human necessity, in that no human enters the definition.
(ii) The proposition "A cannot be otherwise" is true of logical necessity because of the law of identity, and does not depend on causation.
(iii) We can deduce LFW-6-F as being "Given preceding causes, A CAN be otherwise," from the idea that freedom is the absence of necessity and the definition of LFW-6-N. Note that this is not precisely the same as LFW-P, although - presumably - it conveys a similar sense of succession that you were trying to convey in LFW-3 and 4, and which you asserted applies to LFW-P.
(iv) I'll try to post a new post that identifies each of LFW through LFW-6, in order to keep the flow of ideas as clear as possible.
-Turretinfan
Dear Turretinfan,
Your general strategy seems to be to push me into saying freedom is LFW-5 and that LFW-5 is illogical. But I have denied LFW-5, so this argument is not against my position.
Your fall back strategy is to claim that my denial of LFW-5 leaves man without freedom at the time of action. In the LFW-5 sense, of course, I agree. But again, this does not damage my position. In the LFW-P sense, freedom is in respect to upcoming acts. So man is still free and his actions are not necessary in the relevant sense.
Me: LFW-P-N is: “Given preceding causes, A cannot be otherwise.”
Thee: LFW-P-N is: "man is NOT able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed
For reference: LFW-P is: man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed
I am open to a redefinition of LFW-P-N. Perhaps necessity with respect to causality deserves it’s own category. But your definition does not define what man has to do. It could be read as:
Man can’t do both A & nonA
Man can’t do one of A or nonA (but which is unspecified)
It also could be read as leaving open the possibility that at the time of the deed, man is able to do either A or NonA.
Me: in relation to action, the ability to act, precedes the act.
Thee: No.
This may be where the semantic difference between LFW & LFW-P comes into play.
Thee: As normally understood, the relevant ability need not precede the act, but MUST exist at the time of the act. Thus, any ability that last exists prior to the act is not relevant to the normal sense of ability as it relates to action.
These are not mutually exclusive. Ability may both precede and exist at the time of action. So even though what you say is true it does not support your negation of my claim. If the Arminian makes a similar claim to mine, the difference between LFW & LFW-P collapses. But this point is non-essential to our discussion…
God bless,
Dan
Dear Dan,
This thread sprouts from a failure in your original article to clearly define the terms that you are seeking to establish as your position.
I'm interested in pushing you into accepting the ordinary, Scriptural sense of freedom and necessity, and to abandon these philosophical definitions, as either absurd, nonsensical or irrelevant.
I'm not interested into pushing you into any form of LFW at all, because the Bible does not teach such a thing.
Nevertheless, a first step is for you to identify what it is you believe. I'm going to post a summary shortly (perhaps today), in which I address each of LFW through LFW-6.
Of your comments, one deserves immediate response.
GIMJ: "These are not mutually exclusive. Ability may both precede and exist at the time of action. So even though what you say is true it does not support your negation of my claim."
I reply: The lack of mutual exclusivity is part of the point. Whether or not man is free (in whatever sense) five days before the deed, is not the question. Thus, LFW-P and the other types of "successive" (your term, not explicitly defined) free will are not freedom of activity (including choice as one species of the activity) and thus are not germane to the discussion.
-Turretinfan
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