Steve Ray - Double Minded? You decide

Example (1)
Steve Ray wrote this blog post:

Someone informed me that James White the Baptist was continuing his rant concerning my blog on the Assumption of Mary. The guy continues to take me far more seriously than I have ever taken him. He's really just a little man full of himself — an angry know-it-all who's really just a tempest in a teapot. The only reason I have ever responded to him in the past is for the sake of others reading the material. If I had nine lives I might waste some time refuting his latest rantings, but this time his preaching is not worth responding to. Let him prattle on. I have better things to do that to respond to every pontificating anti-Catholic that sets up a blog.

Example (2)
Then, in the combox, Steve Ray wrote:

Steve Ray here: I agree with you completely, but there are some innocent folks who might be influenced by such nonsense and it is good for them to see that guys like White and his kind are very easy to refute. If someone does not refute them, like saints have refuted heretics in the past, then others might think they cannot be refuted. Such petty, self-important know-it-alls need to be refuted so others don't fall prey to them.
Actually James White does more for good for the Catholic Church right where he is! I know many people that have become more convinced of the Catholic Church by listening to arrogant folks like him.

Notice that Steve Ray has taken the "label 'anti-Catholic' rather than debate sensibly" page from Dave Armstrong's book.

But look at the lack of positional stability:
In (1), James White is not to be taken seriously.
In (2), James White should be taken seriously or "others might think [he] cannot be refuted."

In (1), "If I had nine lives I might waste some time refuting his latest rantings, but this time his preaching is not worth responding to. Let him prattle on."
In (2), "there are some innocent folks who might be influenced by such nonsense," and consequently James White should not be ignored.

In (1), James White is a nobody: "I have better things to do that to respond to every pontificating anti-Catholic that sets up a blog."
In (2), James White is a significant Roman Catholic apologetic tool: "I know many people that have become more convinced of the Catholic Church by listening to arrogant folks like him," and "James White does more for good for the Catholic Church right where he is!"

In (1), it would take a lot of time to refute James White, "If I had nine lives I might waste some time refuting his latest rantings."
In (2), it would be easy to refute James White, "guys like White and his kind are very easy to refute."

About the only commonality between the two is the vitriol exuded against Dr. White:
(1) "He's really just a little man full of himself — an angry know-it-all who's really just a tempest in a teapot."
(2) "Such petty, self-important know-it-alls need to be refuted" and "arrogant folks like him"

Yes, Steve Ray hates James White - that's easy enough to see. It's also easy to see why Steve Ray hates James White, and that is because Dr. White preaches the Truth and exposes the errors and delusions of Rome.

May we all be labelled and despised by those who hate the truth, but
May God be praised whose servants we are, for whose sake we endure these things,
To God be the Glory!

-Turretinfan

Miscellaneous Web Site

In an attempt to find some texts on the Internet, I stumbled across a web site that is rich in Reformation writings, as well as writings of church fathers, and oddly a few of the Arminian notables (such as Arminius and Wesley).

I was about to recommend the web site as a resource for downloads, when I came across two things that gave me pause:

1) The first was a very mild eye-brow arching over a critique of Codex Vaticanus - and particular the marginal notes therein. The critique made the claim that the marginal notes show the ancient character of the Textus Receptus, because the marginal notes (at least sometimes, and/or in important places) follow the TR. As a TR-preferred writer, I found these comments disturbing, because I have also read the work of palaeographers, who provide some instruction on how to date such marginal notes, and who would not necessarily reach the same conclusion as the web site owner/editor did. The website cited "research beginning in 1995," which again reinforced a worry that this author has that the author/owner/editor of the web site may not be fully equipped in the arena of textual criticism. What was especially interesting were some claims that the TR (apparently Stephanus' 1550 edition) represents the pure original autograph text! If this were the only issue, I would just issue a mild caveat.

2) The more serious concern was raised (in my mind) over the disclaimer provided one of the web pages:

Inclusion of a work on this Archives page does not imply any endorsement of particular views and doctrines contained in that work, except in the case of the inspired teaching of Brother William M. Branham, which is endorsed by the Lord Jesus Himself, and recommended to every soul who hungers and thirsts after righteousness.

Wow! I had no idea that there were still followers of that alleged prophet. At least for now, I don't plan to directly link to the site. Perhaps some other time, or for some of the specific books (including Calvin's Institutes and the Works of Arminius) that can be found there.

-Turretinfan

Thought-Provoking Questions for "Orthodox" Readers

Query:

Surely you are aware that the Orthodox church has a "one bishop, one city" rule that has been in place for centuries.

Do you think that this rule:

a) is only to prevent peer competition between bishops in a single city;

b) suggests that the flock in a single city has only a single (earthly) shepherd;

c) is irrelevant today; or

d) something else (please explain).

(You can pick more than one, if you like.)

If you agree with (b), doesn't that suggest that - for example - the Patriarch of Moscow does not have spiritual authority (or spiritual responsibility) for any Orthodox person outside the city of Moscow, although he may have some administrative authority. I've heard Orthodox folks who would say so.

If that is so, then is that also true of the "Ecumenical Patriarch" (namely that he has no spiritual authority outside of Constantinople) and the "pope" (namely that he has no spiritual authority outside of Rome).

Finally, given that other cities than Constinople and Rome have become dominant in the new order of things, shouldn't those other city's metropolitans/patriarchs be accorded greater administrative authority.

-Turretinfan

No, He Did Not

According to this article (link), a man followed every rule in the Bible for a year.

No. He did not.

Only Christ ever followed every rule in the Bible for a year. What the man in the article did is mock every rule in the Bible for a year.

While a few men have been scrupulous in their observence of the ceremonial law of the Old Testament (Saul of Tarsus being the prime example), ALL have sinned (including Christ's mother) and come short of the glory of God. Christ alone is sinlessly perfect.

-Turretinfan

Robot Theology / Puppet Theology

When one engages in Reformed Apologetics in the blogosphere (or in the Internet in general) one is bound to encounter the objection: Reformed Theology/Calvinism/Predestination/etc. "makes men into robots/puppets/etc."

These unoriginal (by now) objections have been rebutted many times. Nevertheless, this post will present a very brief rebuttal.

1) Rebuttal 1 - When the objection is just a saying: Where's the problem? (not a rhetorical question)

Suppose the claim is true. Why is that a bad thing? Most people who make the objection have no idea. They just heard someone else claim that about Calvinism, and it sounded catchy. If someone cannot explain why that's a bad thing, then they haven't stated an objection, they've used a catch-phrase or chanted a mantra.

If, perchance, some objector is able to explain why that is bad thing, at least the discussion has employed some reasoned, articulated explanation, as opposed to name-calling. Then, you can decide whether the "bad thing" really is a bad thing, whether "bad thing" really inheres to Calvinism/Reformed Theology/etc., or whether you need to rethink your theology.

Otherwise, it is the same as an objection that "Calvinism treats people as though they were pottery," to which the response is "because the Apostle Paul - speaking by inspiration - does."

2) Rebuttal 2 - When the explanation is that Calvinism denies free will/human responsibility/something similar: Perhaps the objector is simply unaware of Reformed doctrine.

Calvinism asserts that man has a (compatible - not libertarian) free will and that men are responsible for their deeds. Thus, either the objector is unfamiliar with Calvinism, is insisting on a particular kind of definition of free will, or is attempting to make an implicit objection to somethinig deeper.

3) Rebuttal 3 - When the explanation is that if God is in control, then implicitly man is lacking in any real free will, repsonsibility, etc.

This objection is more nuanced. If the objector has gotten to this point, he's presented a more detailed objection than 90% of what one finds on the web. That said, the objection is still not correct.

The rebuttal can proceed several ways:

Scripturally, one can point out that:
- God says all things work together for good to them that are the called. In order for everything to work together God has to be behind the scenes, and we see that He is in - for example - the Book of Esther. So, God really must be in control. Furthermore, Scripture clearly teaches that we make choices and that we are responsible for the things we do, including the choices we make. The Bible does not contradict itself, therefore God's totality of control must not be in contradiction to man's having a real will, and man's having moral responsibility.

Philosophical, one can point out that:
There is no logical contradiction between God being in control, and man having a will, more responsibility, and the like. Thus, there is no reason from philosophy to make the objection.

4) Rebuttal 4A - When the explanation is that in order for a will to be real, it must be "libertarian" or "autonomous" - Says who?

Ultimately the objections above - if they move from surface treatments to core objections, typically lead to claims as to what the will must be in order to be a will. At this point, one could simply hand the objector a copy of Jonathan Edwards' Freedom of the Will; but perhaps there is a simpler solution. Simply ask them to justify their claim.

Who says that is the only kind of will that there can be? Scripture certainly does not state or imply any such thing. Where did they get that idea from? This author has yet to see a significant, meaningful answer to that question.

5) Rebuttal 4B - Same explanation as above - On the contrary, a real will must NOT be libertarian, and no created will can be autonomous.

There is no need to burden the objector with the rebuttal in 4A. Taking a page or two from Edwards, we can simply point out that a will that acts contingently (a "libertarian" will) cannot be a will that is determined. Yet, wills in Scripture are determined, as are choices. A will whose acts are not determined by the person whose will it is, is a monstrosity that would destroy our intuition of what is required for moral responsibility. Finally, we can see evidence in Sociology, Psychology, and the like that people's wills are determined. The advertising industry is built on the fact that people are largely predictable in their behavior. Scripture confirms that man's acts are determined - comparing man's acts to the fruit of a tree.

Furthermore, Scripture is clear that creation is dependent for everything - even its very existence - on the Creator. Accordingly, to assert that something could come to be without its ultimate source being God is contrary to Scripture. In Him we live and move and have our being, as even the pagans recognized.

So far, this author has not seen any further responses that address the combined rebuttals 4A and 4B - if some come up, this author will either provide further rebuttals, admit his mistake, or adopt some third position as-yet-unimagined.

To our Sovereign Lord be the glory,

-Turretinfan

Word Use / Selective Quotation / Other Fun

In this recent post (link), lay Roman Catholic apologist Dave Armtrong spends a significant amount of time and space defending his action in labeling someone using a term that once meant "donkey" but has become mild vulgarity.

Rather than just say that "I meant "donkey," not the other thing," Dave devotes a post to providing literary examples of a non-vulgar use of the term as an insult.

1) Dave quoting Luther and Calvin when he thinks it is useful for him is exactly like Dave quoting Scripture when he thinks it is useful for him. This author respectfully submits that this particular posts illustrates how Dave quotes each of those sources: selectively.

2) Luther and Calvin obviously did not write in English. Thus, the corresponding vulgarity should not be read into their works.

3) Dickens wrote long before the term in question become a popular vulgarity.

4) Shakespeare's use of double entendre (including quite vulgar double-entendre) is well known to those who have actually studied the writings of Shakespeare. Thus, the selection by Dave of Shakespeare is deeply ironic: especially when one considers that comparing oneself to a literary great like Shakespeare is exactly what a pompous fellow would do (although, obviously, it is also what another person might do, if the shoe fit).

5) Bottom line (ha!) - enough time has been wasted pointing out that Dave insults people.

-Turretinfan

Why I am not an Evidentialist/Romanist

Here's a great example of why I am not an Evidentialist, Quasi-Evidentialist, or - for that matter - Romanist:

(link).

The portion of the post of interest is the account of the people who were tricked into thinking that they had been legally married when, in fact, they had not.

Our senses are generally reliable, but they do not always provide true information.

-Turretinfan

Post Script - A special note to Roman Catholic readers:

While this "priest" apparently "eventually" told the people that they were not married, it is certainly at least conceivable that there is at least one psychopathic person out there impersonating a Roman Catholic priest or even bishop on a daily basis, with no plan to reveal the truth. That priest may even be the one who married (maybe I should put "married") you and your spouse, who hears your confessions, and who will perform last rites for you.

If it turns out that the priest is a fraud, then none of the bread you ate was the body of Christ (nor was the wine his body), you have lived in unconfessed and unrepetant adultery (in fact all of your sins are unconfessed), and you will have died (without intending to do so) in a state of final impenitance. There is, one supposes, even a real question about whether you were ever baptized, since baptism by a non-believer has not traditionally been considered a valid baptism. [One dear reader has noted some ambiguity here: to be clear, Rome has not traditionally considered baptisms by non-Christians to be valid baptisms. Most protestants do not concen themselves with the question of baptismal validity.]

The point is this, if you think that participation in the sacraments is a necessary part of salvation, and if you agree that sacraments performed by a faux priest are not valid, you can have only a tenuous assurance of salvation.

And that is not Christianity. Salvation does not depend on human merit, human activity, or the faithfulness of the men who administer sacraments. Salvation depends on the action of God alone.

Think about it. If you trust in Christ alone for salvation, you have only the risk that Christ is a fraud, and God has revealed to us that Christ is the Way, the Life, and most importantly (in this context) the Truth. Confess your sins to God, not to someone who claims to be his vicar, whose claim you can never be sure about. Of course, we still confess our faults to one another, but do not place your reliance for salvation on the faithfulness of any man except Christ the one who is both God and Man in two distinct natures and one person. Only He can save you from your sins, and confidence in Him alone is sure.

-Turretinfan

UPDATE: Chinese Catholics can breathe a sigh of relief that this bishop bears the Vatican seal of approval (link). Some folks, however, will focus on the fact that the mitre that the bishop is wearing has six boxes, six vertical line segments, and six horizontal line segments (depending on how you count them). Even if that were intended to mean what it most likely is not intended to mean, that would be a very minor point contrasted with trust folks have in the man that wears the mitre.

Martyrdom Follow-Up

Avid readers of the news may recall the kidnap of many, and martyrdom of a few, South Korean professing Christians. This news report (link) suggests that the primary criminal responsible must now come before the Father to answer for the deaths of his children. I would not want to be in his place, and I thank God that he has mercifully restrained me from committing such sin (for which restraint I can take no credit), and mercifully provided an Advocate against that day of judgment.

Yet there are many others who have killed Christians, and yet have been so-far spared by God who permits them still to live. If anyone reading falls in that category, you should be in fear of God's judgment in the life to come, for God's longsuffering in permitting you to live only adds to the seriousness of your rebellion if you do not humbly turn to Him.

Repent, and beg God for mercy while there is time, for He has promised that all kinds of sin will be forgiven, and the most famous Christian apostle, Paul, was himself the most notorious persecuter of Christians before God turned His heart. If God has made you recognize His sovereignty, turn from your persecution of His bride, His children, His church, and cast yourself on His bounteous mercy.

Worship Him with me in Fear and Trembling, for He is an Holy God,

-Turretinfan

William Lane Craig's Middle Knowledge

William Lane Craig's

"Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection'"

A Reformed Critique

The present author is in the process of responding to William Lane Craig's (WLC's) book, "The Only Wise God." In the process, however, it seems as though it would be useful to focus on the topic of the final chapter of that book, Middle Knowledge, and particularly on another of WLC's writings on the subject, specifically his article, "Middle knowledge, Truth Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection.'" This topic is doubly timely due to the present author's on-going discussion in the comments section of a treatment of another of WLC's related articles, on Newcomb's Paradox, in which the topic of truth-makers came up.

Presently, a copy of WLC's article is available here (link).

WLC's article purports to address a critical problem for any theory of Middle Knowledge, which he phrases as there being no true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, because there is nothing to make them true, but which might more aptly be described as there being no way for God to have "free" knowledge (including knowledge based on the (actual or hypothetical) exercise of creaturely freedom) prior to the divine decree.

As WLC admits, the objection is not an undercutting, but a rebutting rejection of Molinism, because if God does not have "middle knowledge," there can be no Molinism, and one must accept either Thomism/Calvinism (which states that God has "free knowledge" posterior to the divine decree) or Open Theism (which denies that God has "free knowledge" at least with respect to creatures).

It is worthwhile to point out, before we begin a detailed analysis of WLC's article, what middle knowledge is alleged to be. It is alleged to be God's knowledge of what "would" happen if a free creature were in a particular circumstance. Thus, it is God's knowledge of what state of affairs "would" result from the exercise of man's (or other free creature's) "free will" in a particular circumstance. Accordingly, this knowledge is a special kind of "free" knowledge, namely knowledge that depends on the creature's exercise of "free will," as constrasted with what Molinists (and most philosophers) refer to as God's "free knowledge," namely the knowledge that God has as a result of the exercise of his own free will.

WLC begins by setting forth the alleged warrant for the Molinist assumption (WLC himself calls it an "assumption").

The first alleged warrant is that "we ourselves often appear to know such counterfactuals." This warrant, however, can be readily dismissed. Our knowledge of "counterfactuals" generally falls into one of two categories, neither of which is consistent with the Molinistic assumption. The first category are counterfactuals that are true by virtue of the law of the excluded middle (i.e. we know that it is true that if President Fox were held by terrorists, the US government either would or would not intervene. The second category are counterfactuals for which our ground is causal inference, which negates freedom. An example in this category would include your knowledge that if you showed up late for work for a week and then insulted your boss to his face, your boss would react by firing you. There is not some third category of counterfactuals that we know to be true by some other mechansim. Thus, this alleged warrant falls flat on its face.

The second alleged warrant is that "it is plausable that the Law of the Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a certain special form." As noted above, however, this is simply an example of the first category of counterfactuals that are true because they are just restatements of the law of the excluded middle. They do not assist Molinism in any way, because they do not depend at all on the exercise of a free will, and do not correspond to anything more than the application of a logical rule to a hypothetical scenario. Thus, this alleged warrant is also insufficient.

The third alleged warrant is that Scriptures are "replete with counterfactual statements." Scriptures, however, do not identify any creaturely acts as "free" in the Molinist (Libertarian) sense, and Scriptures also include counterfactual statements describing God's own actions. Finally, all such Scriptural statements are made posterior to the divine decree. Thus, such statements cannot possibly be a warrant for the Molinist assumption.

WLC implicitly notes at least some of these objections and suggests that "anti-Molinists" retreat to asserting that counterfactuals have no ground prior to the divine decree. WLC's only two responses are that "there seems to be no more ground now for many counterfactuals about creaturely free acts than there is logically prior to God's decree," and if "it is God who decrees which counterfactuals about creaturely free acts are true" then this seems to "make God the author of sin and obliterate human freedom."

The former of these objections ignores the obvious: posterior to the divine decree we have reality - the world that exists and operates according to the laws of Ordinary Providence. Thus, counterfactuals become grounded in reality.

The latter of these objections is wrong for enough reasons to occupy a major treatise (and Jonathan Edwards has written one that fully rebuts it). To briefly summarize, God is not the "author" of sin because he does not do sin: he is not a voluntary agent that performs a sinful act. Furthermore, God is not the "author" of sin because no one who sins is coerced into sin contrary to their will by God. If WLC means something else by "author of sin" we can respond with Vincent Cheung that we will simply grant the objection, and ask why that should be a problem. Used outside the first two items listed above, it is simply pejorative rhetoric, not a meaningful objection. Additionally, it is "libertarian" (not compatible) freedom that obliterates human responsibility, because it necessarily denies that man determines what man does. Or, to take a hint from WLC, we could simply deny the charge of obliteration of human responsibility and ask WLC to provide evidence. Nevertheless, as noted above Jonathan Edwards' "Freedom of the Will," has already thoroughly disabused any serious reader of the truth of either of the charges above, though (of course) WLC neither recognizes nor responds to Edwards' detailed and famous rebuttals.

Although we have seen that the Molinist assumption is philosophically warrantless, let us proceed to see what kind of response WLC is able to provide to the grounding objection.

WLC begins by explaining an alleged relationship between the grounding objection and a theory of "truth-makers." Theory, in essence, states that in addition to truth bearers (sentences, thoughts, or propositions) there are entities by virtue of which the truth bearers are true. Someimtes these truth-makers are labelled as "facts" or "states of affairs."

WLC recognizes what is intuitively obvious that the term "truth maker" suggests a causal relationship between the truth-maker and the truth of the truth bearer. (This same problem for the Molinist position had been observed by Dan in the comments section of the post linked-to above.) WLC's response is bafflingly off-base:

First, WLC responds that the truth-maker is usually conceived to be "such abstract entities as facts or states of affairs" and asserts that consequently a causal relation is not at issue here. This objection is bizarre, to say the least. While the terms "facts" and "states of affairs" are abstract, "facts" and "states of affairs" are categories of things that (mostly) have (or had or will have) tangible existence. Individual facts are not "abstract."

Second, WLC attempts to show that "negative existential statements" do not have truth-makers. If this were not presented as an attempted rebuttal, we would assume it were a poor play on words, for "do not have" with respect to statements of "negative existence" is fully consistent with a theory of truth-makers. The fact is that negative existential statements can be rephrased quasi-positively. Thus, "Baal does not exist" can be rephrased as "Everything that exists is a non-Baal," or more simply "All gods are non-Baals," since it is alleged that Baal is a god. Negative existential statements, therefore, can be converted to quasi-positive statements, for which there is an obvious truth-maker.

WLC then asserts that the various phrasing of the grounding objection are "crude construal[s]" of the problem. We have demonstrated, however, that WLC does not have an answer to the question variously phrased, but which amounts to:
Counterfactuals are supposedly true but not caused to be true by God, who then causes them to be true?
(A similar general question remains unanswered in the discussion thread identified above.)
The result of WLC's failure to answer this question is that WLC cannot provide an explanation for the truth of counterfactuals, and consequently can provide only an incomplete epistonomy.

Instead of identifying a cause, WLC simply calls the call for a cause (the request for grounding) "inept" and states that the objector must set forth some kind of "very special causal theory of truth-makers" in order to counter the "customary truth-maker theories." As we noted above, however, WLC has failed properly to analyze the customary truth-maker theories. Furthermore, no special theory of causality is required: everything external to God cannot be self-existent, and therefore requires a cause. The truth of counterfactuals is alleged to be external to God. Therefore, the Molinist should identify the cause, or acknowledge that the truth of counterfactuals is simply special pleading for Molinists.

WLC then identifies seven proposition that allegedly do not have "truth-makers." These include:

1) No physical objects exist.
(Which is not true, but if it were true the truth maker would be readily seen from the fact that "all things that exist are non-phsical things" has the truth-maker "all things that exist."
2) Dinosaurs are exitinct today.
(Which may be true, and if it is true today then the truth maker is a combination of the dinosaurs that once were (as to the implication of previous non-extinct status for the class of dinosaurs) and the status of all things as being members of the class "not-dinosaurs."
3) All ravens are black.
(If this were true, the truth-maker would be the color of all ravens.)
4) Torturing a child is wrong.
(If this is true, then the truth-maker is the standard of wrong, the moral law.)
5) Napolean lost the battle of Waterloo.
(The truth maker here could variously be ascribed to historians, Napolean's blunder, British genius, or God's providence.)
6) The president of the U.S. in 2070 will be a woman.
(If this is true, the truth-maker is inter alia God's decree.)
7) If a rigid rod were placed in uniform motion through the aether, it would suffer a FitzGerald-Lorentz contraction.
(Which has as its truth-maker the definitions of certain theories of 19th century mechanics and/or causal inference therefrom.)

In short, WLC presents seven propositions that he believes there is no truth-maker to be found for, and implicitly asserts that consequently there is no problem if no truth-maker can be found for counterfactual statements. But WLC, fortunately, does not rest on that idea (which has been demonstrated wrong above by provision of relevant truthmakers).

Instead, WLC continues with a section entitled "Do Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom Need Truth-Makers?" Of course, if WLC can answer this question negatively, then the problem would appear to be solved - regardless of the merit of any of the seven examples identified above.

WLC's contention appears to revolve around first, asserting that truth-maker theory is a minority philosophical position; second, some truth-maker philosophers permit some true statements to lack a truth-maker; and third, WLC has not found an explanation as to why counterfactuals should not be permitted to be without a truth-maker. None of these, of course, provide an excuse for counterfactuals to avoid the need for a truth-maker.

WLC's next question is whether such counterfactuals have truth-makers. WLC notes that Fredodoso has attempted to provide a truth-maker, namely the state of affairs that the propisition will have a truth-maker or that the proposition would have a truth-maker under the relevant condition. WLC recognizes that this alleged truth-maker creates the obvious, immediate, and insoluable problem of infinite regress, but seems to think that it is not so. WLC asserts that facts do not have to have truth-makers. That assertion may be true generally, to wit that ordinarily facts do not require truth-makers. This particular alleged fact, however, makes reference to another truth-maker, and thus creates the self-referential problem.

The problem is that WLC is taking shelter in the use of a similar technique to that used by philosphers who deny present grounding of future tense statements. Thus, WLC takes comfort in the fact that some explanatiosn of the grounding of future tense statements also suffer from infinite regress. WLC, however, seems to have overlooked the fact that many future tense statements can have other forms of grounding.

For example, the statement "tomorrow will be another day" is grounded in causal inference from the succession of time (and/or the definition of the word "tomorrow"), and "tomorrow will be rainy or not" is grounded in the law of the excluded middle. Finally, with respect to human perspective future tense statements that are not based on laws of logic or causal inference, such statements very rarely have grounding, and consequently are not "true" if, for a statement to be true, it must have grounds of truth. Note that what is being implied (but not stated) is that the statement must have grounds of truth for the speaker. In other words, the speaker must have a basis for the statement. The statement "a woman will be president of the U.S. in 2070" may turn out to be a correct statement of the state of affairs that transpires in 2070, but an ordinary human cannot have grounds for that statement - and, thus, while we might label the statement "true" after the fact, at the time the statement was made it was simply a guess.

This is not so with respect to divine omniprescience. God knows the future with the positive grounding of the divine decree. Thus, God's beliefs about the future are not guesses, but instead have the ground of the divine decree. Furthermore, God's beliefs about the hypothetical future are most readily grounded in causal inference, just as are ours - but God knows all the factors and thus has perfect knowledge of all hypotheticals posterior to the divine decree.

In contrast, for the Molinist, there is nothing that could ground God's knowledge of "counterfactuals" prior to the divine decree. Thus, God could not "know" such counterfactuals, and if God could not know such counterfactuals, then Molinism is dead.

WLC suggests that the ground of truth for a conditional "if A were in C, A would do S" is the hypothetical state of affairs described in the statement. This is somewhat similar to the non-predestinarian alleged grounding of future tense statements. The problem with that assertion, however, is that the hypothetical state of affairs does not exist, and (if it is really a counterfactual) will never exist. In other words, unlike future tense statements, there will never have been a corresponding state of affairs in which A is in C and does S, and the fact there will never have been a corresponding state of affairs in which A is in C and does S would "falsify" the future tense statement. Thus, WLC is relying for truth grounding on the very thing that would falsify a future tense statement, and a conditional statement does not purport to convey negative, but positive, information. Accordingly, even under a non-predestinarian analysis, WLC's basis for grounding is all wet.

Elsewhere, such as in "The Only Wise God," WLC has proposed an alternative basis for grounding. That basis is the fact that God knows all true counterfactuals. The problem with this attempted grounding should be immediately obvious. First, there is no reason to suppose that God knows all true counterfactuals prior to the divine decree, and perhaps even more plainly, it itself cannot have adequate grounding, unless we are to suggest that it is in God's nature to know all true counterfactuals. But if so, then true counterfactuals are part of God's natural knowledge, which both creates a paradox with respect to God himself, imposes necessity on counterfactuals, and takes out the "middle" from "middle knowledge." In short, an assertion that God's natural knowledge encompasses counterfactuals as much destroys Molinism as an assertion that God's free knowledge encompasses counterfactuals. Both scenarios destroy Molinism utterly.

WLC recognizes that the way that we treat normal hypotheticals (if I fire a shotgun at a pane of ordinary glass from a distance of 5 feet, the glass will break) is by identifying the causal inference. WLC, however, does not want to apply this to creaturely free acts, because he recognizes that doing so would destroy their libertarian freedom.

WLC even goes so far as to state that asking the question, "Why is F a fact?" or "What makes F a fact?" is to deny libertarian freedom, if F is a libertarian free act. The result is that WLC is unable to provide an account for the existence of F, and WLC is unable to handle Scriptural assertions that there are reasons why F is a fact (for example, there is a reason why Thomas believed). In short, WLC's philosophy falls prey to all the objections raised at great length and depth by Jonathan Edwards centuries ago.

Thus, when we arrive at WLC's conclusion that "anti-Molinists have not even begun to do the necessary homework," we are left with precisely the opposite impression. Specifically, we left with the impression that there is no warrant for accepting the Molinist assumptions, we are left with the impression that Molinism's assumption ends up contradicting Molinism, and we are left with the impression that Molinism fails to provide a complete epistemology: Molinism asserts that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and that they were known by God prior to the divine decree, but cannot give any account of them.

Finally, we may simply point out that the primary criticism raised against the Reformed view is essentially transitive to the Molinist viewpoint (in debate terms it is a "non-unique" criticism). That is to say, that while Molinists may deny that God makes the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true, nevertheless, God's selection of a particular world from all possible worlds (in Molinism) makes God in essence as much the cause of the evil that will be, as does God's selection of a particular world from all possible worlds in Calvinism or Thomism, because God recognizes that the consequence "If A is in C, A will do S," attaches just as certainly to C whether the link between C and S is causal (Calvinism/Thomism) or mysterious/unexplainable/impenetrable (Molinism/Arminianism). Thus, either way, C => S, and God's selection of C implies God's selection of S. In short, it is only the obviously mistaken position of Open Theism that an escape the charge that WLC attempts to level.

Thus, we may safely conclude that WLC has been unable to withstand the grounding objection proposed against Molinism, and the reader has no reason to believe in such a philosophical position. Instead, the reader should believe in the God who knows all hypotheticals on the basis of His infinite wisdom in combination with the Divine decree.

-Turretinfan

Blasphemy Note

Here is what the Roman Catholic Church says in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

1864 "Therefore I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven." There are no limits to the mercy of God, but anyone who deliberately refuses to accept his mercy by repenting, rejects the forgiveness of his sins and the salvation offered by the Holy Spirit. Such hardness of heart can lead to final impenitence and eternal loss.

In contrast, here is what Scripture says:

Matthew 12:22-32
22Then was brought unto him one possessed with a devil, blind, and dumb: and he healed him, insomuch that the blind and dumb both spake and saw. 23And all the people were amazed, and said, Is not this the son of David? 24But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, This fellow doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub the prince of the devils. 25And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand: 26And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself; how shall then his kingdom stand? 27And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out? therefore they shall be your judges. 28But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you. 29Or else how can one enter into a strong man's house, and spoil his goods, except he first bind the strong man? and then he will spoil his house. 30He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad. 31Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. 32And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.

And again:

Mark 3:14-30
14And he ordained twelve, that they should be with him, and that he might send them forth to preach, 15And to have power to heal sicknesses, and to cast out devils: 16And Simon he surnamed Peter; 17And James the son of Zebedee, and John the brother of James; and he surnamed them Boanerges, which is, The sons of thunder: 18And Andrew, and Philip, and Bartholomew, and Matthew, and Thomas, and James the son of Alphaeus, and Thaddaeus, and Simon the Canaanite, 19And Judas Iscariot, which also betrayed him: and they went into an house. 20And the multitude cometh together again, so that they could not so much as eat bread. 21And when his friends heard of it, they went out to lay hold on him: for they said, He is beside himself. 22And the scribes which came down from Jerusalem said, He hath Beelzebub, and by the prince of the devils casteth he out devils. 23And he called them unto him, and said unto them in parables, How can Satan cast out Satan? 24And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. 25And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand. 26And if Satan rise up against himself, and be divided, he cannot stand, but hath an end. 27No man can enter into a strong man's house, and spoil his goods, except he will first bind the strong man; and then he will spoil his house. 28Verily I say unto you, All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme: 29But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation: 30Because they said, He hath an unclean spirit.

Luke 12:8-10
8Also I say unto you, Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God: 9But he that denieth me before men shall be denied before the angels of God. 10And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven.

I ask the reader, is the CCC's interpretation even remotely plausible in the context of Jesus' discussion in Matthew and Mark, and especially in view of the explanation provided in Mark 3:30. In other words, perhaps the CCC's interpretation would not contradict Scripture if only Luke's testimony were given, but against the three-fold testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, can it hold its ground?

Surely not.

-Turretinfan

TurretinFan Recommends - Sovereign Salvation

If you have been following along with the Monergism Debate (link) and would a like a pamphlet that provides a monergistic and Biblical perspective on salvation, please peruse this excellent work (link). In fact, the present author recommends the pamphlet regardless of whether one has been following that debate. It's a well-written, logical, Scriptural exposition.

-Turretinfan

Response to Doug Wilson

In a recent blog post (responding to Frank Turk), Doug Wilson wrote:

Scott Clark is in the URC. In that tradition, when do children who were baptized in infancy generally come to the Table? They generally come when they have been catechized, which is when they are done or mostly done with high school. Then, when they are on the threshold of going away from home, they are fully brought into their home church. But this means that if we understand covenant community as being a full participation in koinonia, this is a tradition that does not really have any experience with covenant children. They are technically on the roster (having been baptized), but they have no experience of body life while they are children at all.

This comment highlights several defects in Wilson's thinking:

1) In the Reformed Churches, participation at the table is for those who can "discern the Lord's body." This was taught both by those who drafted the London Baptist Confession of Faith of 1689:

8. All ignorant and ungodly persons, as they are unfit to enjoy communion (m) with Christ; so are they unworthy of the Lords Table; and cannot without great sin against him, while they remain such, partake of these holy mysteries, (n) or be admitted thereunto: yea whosoever shall receive unworthily are guilty of the Body and Blood of the Lord, eating and drinking judgement to themselves.

m 2 Cor: 6,14,15.

n 1 Cor. 11.29. Mat. 7.6.

And also by those who drafted the Westminster Confession of Faith:

VIII. Although ignorant and wicked men receive the outward elements in this sacrament, yet they receive not the thing signified thereby; but by their unworthy coming thereunto are guilty of the body and blood of the Lord, to their own damnation. Wherefore all ignorant and ungodly persons, as they are unfit to enjoy communion with him, so are they unworthy of the Lord's table, and can not, without great sin against Christ, while they remain such, partake of these holy mysteries, or be admitted thereunto.

Thus, it can be seen that (on the topic of the sacraments) Doug Wilson does not have an historical connection to the Reformed churches, and to the extent that his comments reflect the general sentiments of the Federal Vision / Auburn Avenue Theology community, neither do they.

Now, of course, there are some who permit uncatechized (or only partially catechized) children to partake in the Lord's Supper. This would not automatically place a person outside of confessional subscription. Nevertheless, to have a policy of permitting all baptized members of the church to commune would be outside the bounds of Scripture and the historic Reformed doctrine.

Any pastor who does not fence the table to exclude ignorant adults and children is a bad shepherd, and his presbytery (or consistory) should consider whether such a man is fit to be a minister of the gospel. This is a matter sufficiently clear from Scripture that it has been adopted by both the Reformed Baptists and the Reformed Presbyterians.

To the extent that DW is advocating the idea that all baptized children and adults should participate in the Lord's Supper, his position is both clearly contrary to Scripture and (much less importantly) outside the Reformed community.

In other words, just so Frank Turk knows, (and, as best understood) DW does not represent us (Presbyterians, Reformed, and/or paedobaptists) - at least on the issue of the sacraments, and if DW has been understood correctly his fellow elders should take appropriate action to correct his doctrine.

-Turretinfan

Prayers to Saints a Pot-Kettle Scenario

Recently (by the time this has been posted, "recently" will be about three months) Dave Armstrong wrote: "And (very unlike [Dr. White]) I will actually reply to and refute his objections whenever they are offered."

I respond: Actually, Dave, no you don't. To take one recent example, you failed to reply to or refute Dr. White's argument that the keys were given to all the apostles in Matthew 18:18. You did block quote Dr. White's argument, but you never addressed the substance of it. (anyone can see for themselves here)

On top of that, Dr. White could easily point out that unlike you, he has actually refuted the strongest objections presented by the other side.

Furthermore, aside from snide remarks like "fallacy-land" and "like a spouse snoring or a child who lisps or whines," you don't address the argument presented.

You don't establish what you know you need to establish, namely that "asking a dead saint to pray is just as reasonable and biblical as asking a friend on this earth to pray."

Communication with the dead is contrary to common sense (the dead have lost the use of their physical senses, because they have been disembodied) and is a species of necromancy, specifically prohibited in the Old Testament.

The excuse that those in Christ who are dead are alive spiritually is a red herring. Those who are alive but in rebellion against God are dead spiritually - yet there is nothing wrong with communicating with them. The prohibition on consulting with dead is the prohibition on consulting with the spirits of the deceased. The witch of Endor was a bad person, and what she did was wrong. She knew it was wrong, and Saul knew it was wrong. She was afraid to do what Saul asked, because Saul himself had carried out God's just judgment on witches throughout the land.

Dave presents a 7 part argument, of which 7 is the conclusion, 1-2 and 6 are generally acceptable.

The question then revolves around 3, 4, and 5.

Number 3 is based on faulty logic. Just because the prayer of a righteous man avails much, does not mean that prayers are more powerful the more righteous the person praying is. But this is not central to the argument. We can set it aside, even accept that it is true, and it doesn't matter, because ...

Number 4 "Dead saints are 'more alive' than we are," is not only false, but obviously false. They are not "more alive," they are only alive spiritually, whereas we who have received the gift of regeneration are alive both spiritually and physically. No, Dave, we are "more alive" than those who are dead. The problem is this argument is a throw-away. Dave can admit that number 4 is wrong, and still maintain the argument, because the saints are spiritually alive.

Turning to number 5, Number 5 is independently wrong as well. Armstrong wrote: "Dead saints are aware of what happens on the earth (Heb 12:1 etc.), and indeed, are portrayed as praying for us in heaven (Rev 6:9-10)."

The problem, of course, is that Hebrews 12:1 does not say or suggest that dead saints are aware of what happens on earth. On the contrary, Hebrews 12:1 says that we are aware of the lives of dead saints - of their faith while they were here on earth, as set forth in the previous chapter. The "great cloud of witnesses" testify to us, not about us, and Dave's failure to recognize this simply truth is reflection of the detail of his exegesis (none).

Revelation 6:9-10 likewise fails to say what Dave claims, rather it states:

9And when he had opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held: 10And they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?

These dead saints are neither praying for us, nor even about us, but are rather shouting for justice upon the wicked, i.e. for judgment day!

Thus, we can see that Armstrong's claims that Dr. White does not interact with him sufficiently are the pot calling the kettle black: Mr. Armstrong himself not only fails meaningfully to interact with Dr. White's response, Mr. Armstrong misrepresents Scripture and demonstrates the positional weakness of the Roman Catholic position on prayers to the departed.

-Turretinfan

Further Roundup of Kurschner Responses

The present author recently responded to Alan Kurschner's "8 Reasons." (link to the present author's rebuttal and the original article) Assuming, however, that there might be other responses, the present author went looking and found:

One other commenter suggests that Kurschner is unfairly lumping majority text advocates in with KJVO "kooks" (the commenter's word, not mine), and provides detailed responses to each of Kurschner's arguments in a thread format with other commentators interspersed. (link) It's really worth clicking through and reading the detailed response, even if one does not end up agreeing with the author.

I think that Kurschner is actually attempting to respond to KJVO-ism, and is less interested in the remainder of the majority text advocates. Perhaps, in the process, Kurschner fails to recognize the difference between the two, as well as the weakness of the arguments as applied to anything beyond KJV-only-ism.

Other than that, this author hasn't seen too much of a further response to Kurschner's article, though perhaps something is being overlooked. If any reader has links to other treatments of the article, those links would be most welcome.

First Rebuttal in Monergism Debate

The soteriology (monergism vs. synergism) debate (link) is progressing. Matt has now provided his introduction (link), and I am providing a rebuttal to it.

The reader may recall that the present author had previously summarized Monergism as:

"God's grace ensures the salvation of those upon whom God chooses to bestow grace."

Matt has countered by defining Monergism as:

"God has made salvation guaranteed for those he has chosen, having already determined who will perish."

Matt's modification contains a subtle shift that was perhaps not intended, and so the present author would like to address a potential misconception. Monergism teaches that salvation is all the work of God. Monergism does not teach the reverse, that perdition is also all the work of God. Instead, Monergism asserts that perdition is the work of man. Monergism denies "works salvation" but teaches "works perdition." Those who perish do so by their own "merit." (Adam earned death for himself and his children, but Christ earned life for his brethren.)

Specifically, mankind earns perdition by sinning, for as Scripture teaches:

Romans 6:23 For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Monergism adopts the asymmetry of Romans 6:23, teaching that perdition is merited, and eternal life is given gratuitously to those upon whom God chooses to bestow favor.

The effect, of course, is that those whom God passes over for eternal life receive what they deserve. Consequently, the point that God's decree determines (albeit negatively) who will perish is not entirely wrong - we certainly would not say that the destiny of the reprobate is uncertain. Nevertheless, the way of expressing that fact as "having already determined who will perish," would seem to be slightly off the mark. Furthermore, some monergists (sublapsarians) would explicitly hold that God first decreed to permit all men to fall, and then decreed to save some. Perhaps, however, that level of detail may be rendered superfluous by consideration of the three questions asked.

To set the stage for the three questions, Matt posed the following hypothetical scenario:

Two boys each have an inflatable raft and a group of kittens which they place into their respective rafts, which are in turn placed into a river. The first boy ties a string to some of the kittens. The second boy uses a plank to create a bridge between the raft and the shore. Both sets of kittens poke holes in their rafts, causing them to begin sinking.

The first question follows.

1.) Assuming there is a very good reason for kittens to be in a raft, is either boy justified in putting more kittens on his sinking raft?

This question is a bit puzzling, because it is unclear whether the "very good reason" extends to rafts in general or to a sinking raft in particular. If the latter, then it seems that the question answers itself: if there is a very good reason, that very good reason would seem to be the justification. If the former, then the answer would seem to be: "it depends." Specifically, it depends on whether this "very good reason" is negated in any way by the fact that these particular rafts are sinking.

For example, if the kittens are being placed into the raft because they love floating about the pond, then the fact that the rafts are sinking would negate that reason. If, on the other hand, the kittens are being placed into the raft because there is a fox on shore that will eat them immediately otherwise, well then perhaps there is still justification - as they will live a little longer in a sinking raft than on the land.

Perhaps this question could be clarified.

The present author supposes that the question may be aimed at the general idea of putting someone into harm's way. Normally (in the absence of justification) we are not permitted to do that to other people. Hopefully this answers the question, but Matt should feel free to clarify in his first rebuttal.

The second question was:

2.) The first boy rescues kittens by pulling on their string and dragging them to shore. The second boy rescues kittens by laying treats along the plank, by coaxing them, and by throwing down additional planks for any kittens who are seeking to escape the raft. Both boys save some kittens and not others. Which boy behaved more appropriately? Why?

Again, the question might seem to require a bit of clarification as to the foregoing issue of the very good reason for putting the kittens in the raft in the first place.

The determination of the correct answer to (2) will depend on whether the boys (either or both of them) had a duty to rescue the kittens. If the boys have a duty to rescue the kittens (either because they unjustifiably put the kittens in harm's way, or because they have some kind of general duty to rescue others), then it would seem that the more active attempt at rescuing the kittens would be more appropriate.

There is a bit of twist, though, because there is an open question about whether the string-pulling boy could have pulled all the strings. If he could have, and didn't, and if he had a duty to save as many as he could, then his passing over some of the kittens would seem to be unjust.

Likewise the plank-laying boy would have to be judged according to whether such an approach is a reasonable approach for getting kittens off a sinking raft. In other words, while simply passing over some kittens that the first boy had a duty to save would be bad, it would be worse for the other boy to leave it up to the kittens, if he had a good reason to expect that such an approach would not be successful.

Before a counter-examples are provided, let's address the third question:

3.) You're a kitten. Which raft would you rather be on?

If I were aware of the danger, I'd prefer the raft where I could exert my own effort rather than leaving my salvation from the raft up to the string-pulling boy. If I were unaware of the danger but hungry - probably still the plank raft. If I were neither aware of the danger nor hungry, in hindsight I'd prefer to be on the string-pulling raft.

Counter-examples:

1) The Rich Man

A certain rich man has a large family and a beautiful house. One day, when the man is away taking care of some business, five thieves break into the house, plunder its goods, torture and kill the man's family, and finally burn down his house. Their crime spree, however, is cut short when the men are caught by the authorities.

Suppose that despite all that the five thieves did wrong, the rich man decides to help two of the five thieves in their criminal defense. He hires them the best lawyer, and pleads for mercy to the judge on their behalf, even offering to serve their prison time or receive capital punishment in their place.

Has the man acted unjustly because he has only assisted two of the five, while permitting the others to receive what they richly deserve? Is such an act "cruel" of the rich man? Surely not.

2) The Potter

A certain potter goes out and finds a large clump of clay. He brings it back to his shop and makes from it four pieces. One piece is a beautiful vase, which the potter then paints in gold leaf and enamel and places in his front hall to be shown off for its beauty.

A second part of the lump is used to make a frame for one of the potter's favorite photos. This frame is given little ornamentation, and no gold leaf.

With a third part of the lump, the potter makes a chamber-pot. This too he paints, but mostly to keep its surface smooth so that it can serve its purpose by his bed at night.

Finally, the potter makes from the fourth part of the lump a small disk to be used as a clay pigeon. He does not paint this piece, but leaves it unornamented.

Has the potter been unjust or cruel toward any of the parts of the lump? Does any of the parts of the lump have the right to complain that they were not treated fairly? Is the potter "cruel" towards the clay? Surely not!

3) Two Kittens

Suppose that there are two kittens in a sinking raft. One kitten is given the choice about whether to stay in the raft or go, and the other kitten is pulled out of the sinking raft by the scruff of the neck. Which kitten would you rather be? Surely the latter.

Suppose again that there are two kittens in a raft but that, rather than gradually sinking, the raft is about to be hit be a torpedo. Suppose also that the kittens cannot appreciate the danger the torpedo poses. Would you, as a kitten, prefer a boy who simply tells you about the torpedo and tries to persuade you of the danger, or a boy who grabs you by the scruff of the neck and pulls you to safety? Surely the latter.

4) Two Lifeguards

Suppose you develop a cramp while swimming. Would would you prefer a lifeguard who merely makes your rescue possible, or a lifeguard that grabs out of the water and administers CPR? Surely the latter.

The point of these four counter examples is this:

1) We all richly deserve to perish. We are not fuzzy innocent kittens that someone else has placed in harm's way. We have harmed the rich man, he has not harmed us.

2) God could have made us all for the purpose of having lives of suffering and destruction, without being unjust or cruel. The potter could have operated a clay pigeon factory, or a chamber pot assembly line. It was his clay to do with as he pleased.

3) It is better to be saved without dignity than to perish with dignity. Better a living dog than a dead lion.

4) A savior that saves is better than a savior that merely makes salvation possible. A lifeguard who wants to save tries hard.

Thus, contrary to Matt's assertions, the present author suggests that monergism presents God as powerful and man as weak, but not God as cruel or unjust. Monergism also does not teach that men are bound for eternal damnation "regardless of their choices," but as a punishment for their sin. Monergism teaches works-perdition. Monergism also teaches that men freely choose to rebel against God. The destruction of mankind is caused by the choice of mankind. Salvation of the elect, however, is caused by a choice of God.

Contrary to apparent implicit assertions of Matt (perhaps unintended and colored by the present author's previous interactions with other synergists), God does not have the same relationship to us as we do to our fellow men, or even as we do to little kittens. Instead, God's relationship to mankind is more like the relationship between a Potter and Clay.

God did not have a duty to prevent man from sinning in the first place, and God does not have a duty to rescue mankind from the effects of sin. Consequently, there is nothing unjust or cruel about God choosing to turn some from destruction and leave others on that path.

Matt makes one claim in particular that seems to this author to betray a mistaken assumption about God's duty to man. Matt writes: "Since God is the sole determiner of whether or not a person is created, if God is also the sole determiner of that [person's] eternal state, then justice demands that God saves all those he creates." Justice demands only that people receive what they deserve. No sinner deserves salvation, and all men freely sin. Instead, sinners deserve eternal condemnation. Thus, what justice requires is that all men be eternally condemned.

The gospel is about another way for justice to be satisfied, namely by the substitutionary death of Christ. Christ died to satisfy God's justice and reconcile God to those who Christ represented as federal head. Christ standing in someone's place is gratuitous, and based on love by Christ for that person, not based on that person deserving or meriting escape from judgment in any way.

Even if the synergists were correct about how salvation is administered, God could have permitted all mankind to perish, without making a way of escape possible. It seems hard to believe that Matt would deny such a fact. If he does not deny that, however, it seems as though the remainder of his argument for eliminating monergism unravels. If God does not have to save anyone, then how God chooses to save people is completely up to Him: he could do so out of pre-love (monergism's explanation), arbitrarily (the usual misrepresentation of monergism), or any other way. No matter which way he picks, he is neither cruel nor unjust. In fact, no matter which way he picks he is kind and merciful.

Now, Matt has not presented a positive case for synergism, but let's flip the tables a bit, and take a shot across synergism's bow.

P1) Let us suppose that God wants to save at least some people, and that this was God's purpose in sending Jesus Christ into the world.

P2) Let us further suppose that God wants to save this group of at least some people on the basis of his love for them.

Scripture seems to teach both of those propositions quite clearly. In fact, many (probably most) synergists take the position that God wants to save not only some, but all people. Furthermore, most synergists will attribute this desire to God's love, not - in any way - to God's justice.

If, however, those to propositions are true, something has to give. Because from those two premises, we can conclude:

C1) God will exercise His power to save those whom he loves and wants to save. (By coupling those premises with the idea that God's intent is sincere.)
C2) God's exercise of His power will succeed in its intended purpose. (By coupling those premises and C1 with the idea that God is omnipotent.)
C3) All whom God wants to save, will be saved. (By coupling C2 and P1, with the result of universal salvation of those whom God intends to save.)

Although it is not required as essential to synergism, synergism usually arises from an attempt to explain verses that appear (to some) to suggest that God wants to save each and every person. In essence, synergism denies C2 above. It states that God exercises His power by sending Christ to die and giving prevenient grace, but denies that God's exercise of power will fully succeed. Alternatively, sometimes synergism argues that God has other competing intents besides saving everyone, and that these other intents prevent God from fully exercising His power.

Neither of the two options provided in order to bolster synergism are supported by Scripture. Instead, the former is positively at odds with the doctrine of divine omnipotence, and the latter is special pleading and also tends to undermine the alleged love of God toward those whom He wants to save.

To illustrate: consider a sinking raft full of kittens. Suppose that a boy claims to love the kittens very much and to desire their salvation from drowning. Nevertheless, suppose that the boy (a) does not exercise all his power to save them or (b) exercises all his power, and nevertheless some kittens drown. In situation (a), we would question the strength and sincerity of the boy's love or desire to save the kittens. In situation (b), we would chalk up the boy's failure to save all the kittens to a lack of ability: i.e. to the boy's impotence.

In essence, in the absence of universal salvation, those are the choices provided to a synergist who (like the typical synergist) asserts that God loves and desires to save each and every person. So, that should be the counter-question:

Matt, in your view of synergism, is God unable or merely unwilling to save everyone?

Let me be clear about something, monergism asserts that God is not willing (unconditionally) to save each and every person, but that God instead has mercy on whom He will have mercy. The point is not that monergism provides a way to reconcile God's universal desire to save with a limited number of people actually being saved, but that synergism's primary raison d'etre is false: the only escape from an assertion that God is unwilling to save each and every person, is that God is unable to save each and every person, and that assertion denies God's omnipotence.

-Turretinfan

Lunacy - of a different sort

Godith asks:

Totally unrelated to anything:
Ps. 121:6 Why would God assure His people that the moon would not strike them by night? Were they irrationally afraid of the sky falling (Chicken Little Syndrome) or meteors or lunar eclipses? Just a nagging question.

It could also be that they were afraid of becoming lunatics (recall that Latin: luna = moon), werewolves, or the like.

None of those explanations, however, seem to be the most obvious explanation. The most obvious explanation is that in the ancient world, both the sun and the moon were thought to be the most powerful things in the created order. Consider, for example, their prominent roles in most pagan religions. This role is reflected in the English days of the week: "Sunday" took first place, followed by "Monday."

The fact that God is more powerful than the sun and the moon should be a comfort to any Christian, as God is able to protect us not only from wild animals and dangerous men, but even from "the stars" - the influence of the zodiak.

It is - in some sense - lunacy for Christians to be afraid of anything created, for God is the creator.

-Turretinfan

GNRHead Follow-up

A while back, GNRHead (William) had provided some comments to a rebuttal the present author had provided. GNRHead disputed the idea that Tertullian was the first early church father of record to identify Peter as "the rock" in Matthew 16. At that time he referred us to his videos. The present author can report that he has now watched every YouTube video that GNRHead has produced. GNRHead lists six church fathers that alleged identify Peter with Matthew 16's rock.

Without getting into whether these fathers were misquoted, we can dismiss GNRHead's claim on the following basis:

1) Ephraim of Syria lived ca. 306-373;
2) Hillary of Poitier lived ca. 315-367;
3) Cyril of Jerusalem lived ca. 315-387;
4) Gregory of Nazianzus lived ca. 330-390;
5) Jerome lived ca. 347-420; and
6) Augustine of Hippo lived ca. 354-430.

In contrast, Tertullian lived ca. 155-230.

So, no, the alleged testimony of those six men in no way substantiates the claim that "all the church fathers believed Peter was the Rock." The claim remains unproven, as GNRHead remains unable to demonstrate even a single (much less "all") church father who lived before the middle of the third century who believed that Peter was Matt. 16's "Rock" upon which the church was built.

-Turretinfan

On Responding to Critiques

Although it is not perfect, and although I in no way endorse either the author's opinion (on this issue or in general) or any of the substance of his comments, the form of this response (link) was a model that could be adopted by others whom James White has validly criticized (such as D.A., J.P., J.A., or A.S.). It attempts to clarify what was originally intended, while humbly acknowledging error and keeping both the number of "my critic is an idiot" comments and the number of "I've been misrepresented" comments to a minimum.

So Benedict XVI said that, so what?

A couple months ago, the pope made a statement allegedly clarifying what Vatican II meant about the relationship between salvation and the Roman Catholic Church.

Meanwhile, the CCC (Catechism of the Catholic Church) still states:
"841 The Church's relationship with the Muslims. "The plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator, in the first place amongst whom are the Muslims; these profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one, merciful God, mankind's judge on the last day.""

So, the question is, does the CCC say that Muslims are saved or not?
After all, there are two ways to read the statement, either that the plan of salvation includes them as part of the mission field or (more naturally) that the plan of salvation includes people being saved by being devoted Muslims.

This further comment does not particularly help:
"848 "Although in ways known to himself God can lead those who, through no fault of their own, are ignorant of the Gospel, to that faith without which it is impossible to please him, the Church still has the obligation and also the sacred right to evangelize all men.""

I'm inclined to believe that the Official Catholic View (OCV) is that Muslims are saved but stupid (i.e. not Catholics through no fault of their own).

Consider this comment from Cardinal Shen:

As Christians we should not be paralyzed by fear, but should find new ways and means to keep open the doors of dialogue and mutual understanding with different religions. This is especially important with the Muslims who are unjustly perceived as evil by a large majority of people.

Unjustly perceived as evil? Unjustly? Really?

In contrast, Cardinal Sanchez seems to take the extreme opposite view:

Pastoral charity for brother priests and for the faithful should not make the priest forget the missionary requirements of dialogue with and evangelization of the "de-christianized," non-Catholics and non-Christians present in the area where he lives (ecumenical dialogue, dialogue with the Muslims and believers of the traditional religions).

Really? Non-Catholic Christians are "de-christianized"??? They need to be subject to evangelization? Interesting!

Likewise, JP2 canonized Ignatius Maloyan, a Roman Catholic bishop who was allegedly martyred by Turkish Muslims in 1915 for refusing to convert to Islam. Ignatius Maloyan allegedly answered that he would never betray Christ and His Church. His words, according to JP2, were: "It does not please God that I should deny Jesus my Saviour. To shed my blood for my faith is the strongest desire of my heart," to which JP2 added: "May his example enlighten all those who today wish to be witnesses of the Gospel for the glory of God and for the salvation of their neighbour."

So, are the Muslims saved or not? Must they become Christians to be saved or not? And are non-Catholic Christians saved? What truly is the OCV, and isn't this just a little bit important?

-Turretinfan

Catholic Alleged Impenetrability

Impenetrability (lack of understandability to outsiders) can be a real problem in many situations. It is a real problem, for example, to the doctrine of "Total Depravity," which is mistaken by many (such as, apparently, Art Sippo) to mean that everyone is as depraved as they possibly can be.

Nevertheless, in Roman Catholic Apolegetical circles a standard part of the fare has been to assert that virtually all critics have not been able to comprehend Catholicism. That standard response is typified by this quotation that I gleaned from the signature block of an internet poster:

"There are not over a hundred people in the United States who hate the Catholic Church. There are millions, however, who hate what they wrongly believe to be the Catholic Church...."

-ARCHBISHOP FULTON J. SHEEN

I do not know whether the quotation is genuine or the context of the quotation. I also do not know whether Archbishop Sheen is a Roman Catholic archbishop. The point is that the comment illustrates a typical line of argument by RC apologists today: nobody knows what we believe.

You'd think that the most popular denomination would be able to have at least a couple of hundred critics who really don't like the doctrines of the veneration of Mary and the "Saints," who really don't like the doctrine of papal infallibility, and who really don't like the doctrine of indulgences and the treasury of merit.

There are many misinformed critics, but there are also many sound critics. RC responses that group both camps into one risk exposure, even if they persuade many to come "home to Rome" in the short term, once the converts start to recognize that - in fact - many notable critics are actually more familiar with Catholicism than is their parish priest.

Oh, and there are far more than 100 people in the U.S. (or even in a smaller country like Wales) who hate God and who hate what Christianity universally is, whether or not they hate Roman Catholicism.

-Turretinfan

Human Rights?

The true head of the Roman Catholic Church (unless you ask a sedavacantist RC) recently stated (source):

"It was in Europe that the notion of human rights was first formulated. The fundamental human right, the presupposition of every other right, is the right to life itself."

This is interesting on several levels.

1) It is interesting because it affirms the RCC's continued opposition to intentional abortions.

2) It is even more interesting because it implicitly acknowledges that human rights are not a Biblical or Christian concept. After all, the Middle East where the Old Testament and much of the New Testament were written, where the apostles were trained, and where Jesus taught, is not in Europe.

3) The Bible emphasizes human responsibilities, not human rights. Murder is wrong, because man is responsible to preserve life, and is forbidden from taking human life - not because men have a "right" to live. Abortion is wrong because it is the intentional taking of a human life: abortions shed human blood.

4) It is yet more interesting when we reflect on the number of people who were deprived of life by virtue of the edicts, decrees, agents, and associates of previous popes.

5) Finally, it is interesting to see that it is this admittedly innovative concept of "human rights" that places the modern RCC in conflict with the government's use of capital punishment to execute judgment on deserving wrong-doers.

None of the above should be taken to suggest that the concept of "human rights" is not a useful concept, or that it was not used to good effect to limit the power of governments in the past.

God gives and God takes away, blessed be the name of God!

-Turretinfan

Evangelism - Islam Style

Osama bin Ladin has released a new video. The present author has no plans to link to it, nor to any transcript of it.


The summary is:


America is bad,
Bush is bad,
Christians are bad,
Capitalism is bad,
Corporations are bad,
Democracy is bad,
Globalisation is bad,
Islam is good,
Terrorism is justified,
Muslims don't incinerate Jews and Christians,
The Qaran and the Gospel are from the same source, and
The Qaran has been preserved from the alterations of men.


And, of course, key quote:


"[T]he greatest mistake one can make in this world and one which is uncorrectable is to die while not surrendering to Allah, the Most High, in all aspects of one's life - ie., [sic] to die outside Islam."


May God have mercy on Bin Ladin, and convert him from the error of his way, before it is too late.


As for his specific claims:


- As a matter of historical fact, the Qaran was subject to alteration and standardization by various people. Furthermore, early Muslims famously acknowledged that much of the Koran was permanently lost: " 'Uthman, A'isha, and Ibn Ka'b (among others) all insisted that much of the Koran had been lost." (source)


- As a matter of theology, the path of salvation in Christianity is different from that of Islam, and the doctrines of the Evangelists are not the doctrines of Islam. Christ is the I AM, and the Muslim denial of that truth is blasphemy.


- Not all Muslim incinerate every Christian or Jew that they meet. Nevertheless, Muslim terrorists routinely incinerate both themselves and the Christians, Jews, and other Muslims they attack. Those young men who foolish follow Bin Ladin and the false prophet of Islam demonstrate that incineration is a weapon that Muslims use. Furthermore, whether or not they use incineration, Muslims are notorious for the use of the sword (whether literally or with reference to modern hand weapons like the gun). Only in the last week it has been reported that Christian missionaries in Pakistan were martyred by Muslims who used a gun.


- Bin Ladin claims that there are no taxes in Islam, but instead "a limited Zakaat totaling only 2.5%." Of course, Muslims famously eradicated Christianity in North Africa not only by the sword but also by confiscatory taxation.


- Terrorism is justified how exactly? Bin Ladin hints that the Christian west, especially America, Britain and France, deserves to be attacked. Why? Apparently because of our continued warfare against Iraq. Huh? It should be fairly obvious to those who read the news that the population of Iraq has accepted the regime change and is fighting a war against radical Muslim extremists who, like Bin Ladin, seek to spread Islam by the sword. We're there to help Iraq - we're not waging war against Iraq. Oh yes, one other thing. Were we at war with Iraq or any other Muslim nation when Bin Ladin attacked on September 11? (He notes that he cannot reasoanbly claim to be innocent of the September 11 attacks.)


- Ironically, Bin Ladin asserts that "our [Muslim] rulers in general abandoned Islam many decades ago." That should make it clear that Bin Ladin is advocating a particular - rather strict - variety of Islam.


- Bin Ladin claims to be "winning ... the war against you despite the fewness of our numbers and materiel." In contrast, however, about 75% of Al Quaeda has been destroyed, and the 25% that remains is mostly either hiding or incarcerated.


- Bin Ladin may be right that democracy is a bad idea (and this blog is not taking a position on that issue), but if it were not for democracy, he would have been long ago destroyed by the Russians. In any event, Bin Ladin is probably confusing democracy with pluralism.


- Bin Ladin uses the communist propaganda against capitalism, asserting that it makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. History has shown that capitalism made the Christian world rich when the Muslim world suffered in gross poverty, so that obesity (not starvation) has become the afflication of the poor in Christian nations throughout the world.


- Bin Ladin lumps in globalization with capitalism and democracy - an odd combination, but apparently an appeal to the anti-globalization radicals in America. Interestingly, the forces of globalization have been the major visible cause of improvement in the health and welfare of developing countries.


- Bin Ladin notes "abject poverty and tragic hunger" in Africa, but this occurs mostly in Muslim, former Communist, and pagan societies.


- Bin Ladin asserts that the war has aided "major corporations." What Bin Ladin does not seem to recognize is that "major corporations" are virtually all publicly owned. If Lockheed Martin benefitted, all its stockholders benefitted, and anyone who has money can buy stock in that corporation. Have "major corporations" benefited from the eradication of Al Quaeda? Probably yes. And that benefit has been transferred on to the stockholders, the American and global public.


- Bin Ladin blames Rumsfield for the Vietnam war, yet Rumsfield was a "dove" in the Nixon administration. (source)


- Bin Ladin blames Christianity for the Spanish Inquisition and the "holocaust of the Jews," when he should be blaming athiesm and Catholicism. On top of that, has Bin Ladin forgotten why the Spanish Inquisition was formed? One of the reasons was the invasion by militant Islam in Southern Europe.


- Bin Ladin claims that Bush is try to win the war by turning sect against sect in Iraq. In fact, Bush has already succeeded in uniting multiple sects against Al Quaeda in Iraq.

Finally, a summary of Bin Ladin's soteriology.

Bin Ladin writes (well, the transcript of his speech reads): "And all praise is due to Allah, who awakened His slaves' desire for the Garden, and all of them will enter it except those who refuse. And whoever obeys Him alone in all his affairs will enter the Garden, and whoever disobeys Him will have refused."

This is not so different from an Arminian or Pelagian soteriology.

But compare it to a Reformed soteriology:

All praise be to The One Triune God! He has redeemed His children from out of every land, nation, tribe, and tongue. He will open their eyes to the glory of His name, and they will follow Him. He will riase them to spiritual life from spiritual death, and they will dwell with Him in Heaven forever!

-Turretinfan

Pope Repents of Nazi Genocide

See this article (link), key words: "Pope Benedict XVI paid solemn tribute to Holocaust victims Friday, extending his “sadness, repentance and friendship” to the Jewish people as he began a three-day pilgrimage to Austria." (emphasis added)

One wonders whether the Albigensians, Hussites, Lollards, Covenanters, etc. can expect a similar and more well-deserved apology.

-Turretinfan

A Second Debate - Monergism vs. Synergism

In the background, one Orthodox Christian is preparing to respond to the Exegesis Challenge I previously presented (link). Meanwhile, an Internet poster (Matt) from BeyondFundamentalism.com has accepted a challenge to debate Monergism vs. Synergism. Here's a link to the debate page (link), as well as the present author's introduction, below:

The present debate is one that is of great importance and interest in the church today, as it has been for many years. The issue is the administration of salvation: is it monergistic or synergistic? The present author will advocate for monergism and respond to Matt's advocacy of synergism.

There are, in essence, three views of salvation with respect to the role of God and man in its administration. The first view (which neither the present author nor Matt will advocate) is a view that man saves himself - help from God is not needed. This view is usually classified under the heading of Pelagianism, whether or not the historical figure Pelagius actually held such a view. For the sake of completeness, we could label such a view anergism, though such a term has not been academically accepted. This view suggests that grace is not necessary: man has the ability unassisted to avail himself of salvation, and any grace from God is superfluous. In other words, anergism argues that the grace of God has no essential role in salvation. Conversely, anergism either denies that God can positively influence man's saved/unsaved status, or that God chooses not to. Anergism can handily be identified as the view that "Salvation is possible for the unassisted, and God has left the decision up to man as to whether he will perish."

A second view is a view that man cooperates with God in order to be saved. This view is held by - among others - Arminians, Semi-Pelagians, and modern-day Roman Catholics. It is also held by others that are usually grouped outside of Christianity, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons. This is the view that the present author identifies as synergism. This view acknowledges that grace is necessary, but asserts that grace is not sufficient. Conversely, synergism denies that God can entirely determine man's saved/unsaved status, or that God chooses not to. Synergism can handily be identified as the view that "God has made salvation possible, has provided assistance to man, but has left the final decision up to man as to whether he will perish."

The third view is monergism, the view that God by grace alone saves man. This view is held by those within the "Reformed" and "Calvinist" communities as well as by many pre-Reformation Christians, most notably Augustine. This view is also the view of the present author and his namesake Francis Turretin. Monergism holds that grace is both necessary and sufficient for salvation. Consequently, Monergism affirms that God ultimately determines who will be saved and who will perish, and denies that God either cannot save some or that God restrains Himself from saving those whom He wants to save. Monergism can handily be identified as the view that "God's grace ensures the salvation of those upon whom God chooses to bestow grace."

Anergism and synergism, to the extent that they attempt Scriptural justification, both rely on the Scriptures that focus on man's need to do various things such as confess, repent, believe, and persevere. Synergism goes further and recognizes the Scripture that teaches that grace is necessary - that man cannot be saved apart from grace.

Monergism completes the Scriptural testimony by recognizing that even man's good actions: confession, repentance, faith, and perserverence are gifts of God and the fruit of the Spirit's work in a person. Monergism concludes from these Scriptures that man is unable to do good of himself (sometimes referred to as "total depravity"), that man is changed from unable and unwilling to able and willing by an act of God's regeneration (sometimes referred to as "irresistable grace"), that God exercises His grace to preserve the sonship of His children (sometimes referred to as "perseverance of the saints"), that God chooses His children without regard to their merit (sometimes referred to as "unconditional election"), and that Christ's sacrificial work was offered for all and only the chosen children, whom God alone knows (sometimes referred to as "limited atonement").

The philosophical considerations noted above are typically with respect to the issue of "free will," with anergists and synergists viewing man's will as essentially autonomous from God's will, and monergists viewing man's will as subordinate to God's will. Scripture, of course, is typically brought to bear on the issue, with the anergists and synergists emphasizing the requirements made of man and certain general statements of God's interest in salvation, and monergists emphasizing the omniscience, wisdom, and omnipotence. Synergists and monergists also typically appeal to God's love, though in different respects: synergists claiming that they understand God's love to be broader, and monergists that they undestand God's love to be deeper.

The present author believes that monergism is the purest expression of Scriptural truth as to the administration of salvation: it is all of God. We do act, but we are not the cause of our salvation: we run as though we have not seized the object, and yet we have already been seized by Christ. We trust in Him to save us, and we trust in Him because He has converted us.

Scripture says:

Psalm 3:8 Salvation belongeth unto the LORD: thy blessing is upon thy people. Selah.

Psalm 68:20 He that is our God is the God of salvation; and unto GOD the Lord belong the issues from death.

Therefore, the present author affirms monergism as the truth of Scripture.

As agreed, the following three questions are presented to challenge Matt to consider the issues. In order to set the stage for the questions, I present the following account:

In 1950 a man named Osama and his twin sister Theresa are born. He lives and dies in 2010 without ever having had faith in Christ. He does not inherit eternal life. She comes to faith in Christ in 2009 and dies in faith in 2010 with her twin brother. She does inherit eternal life.

1) In what way and at what time did God desire to save each of these twins?
2) Did God love these twins differently (from each other) at any time?
3) Did God get what He wanted with respect to each of these twins?

I hope that this provides a good platform for this informal debate, and I welcome any comments, clarification, and so forth. [Incidentally, I welcome comments by any readers of this blog on the questions presented, particular readers who are synergist or anergist in their soteriology.]

May God use this debate to the edification of all those who pass by,

-Turretinfan

A Modern Abomination

Human/animal hybrids (link). It's not a new idea, but it raises some interesting issues in terms of the protection of human life, and the definition of "human." Does the substitution/insertion of a short "alien" genetic sequence render a human embryo non-human? Does the substitution/insertion of a short human genetic sequence render a non-human embryo human?

Obviously, the scientists are not going to treat the hybrids as though they are people, and yet are interested in them precisely because of their genetic derivation from people.

-Turretinfan